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The idea for this book has emerged out of the unease with developments in 
a field that since the 1990s we have become known to summarize under the 
neologism ‘transitional justice’. Within a relatively short time, transitional 
justice became the standard formula for a broad range of concepts, instru-
ments, and measures dealing with atrocities such as genocide, torture, civil 
conflict, disappearances, and other human rights violations.1 Originally a 
label for legal instruments and mechanisms applied in transitions from au-
thoritarian rule to democracy, the term by now is applied to fields beyond 
law, and therefore it covers a much broader terrain of attempts to deal with 
past violence. While transitional justice initially covered mechanisms such 
as trials, commissions of inquiry, vetting, restitution or reparation, the field 
                                                 
1  A burgeoning scholarly literature has emerged on the subject of transitional jus-
tice. For a sampling, see Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitutions and 
Negotiating Historical Injustices (New York: Norton, 2000); Priscilla B. Hay-
ner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Com-
missions, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2011); Martha Minow, Between Ven-
geance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1998); Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democra-
cies Reckon with Former Regimes, 3 vols., ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).  
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now also includes non-judicial instruments such as apologies, healing cir-
cles, or forms of collective remembrance and commemoration. What is par-
ticularly striking about this development is the speed with which this de-
velopment took place. As Christine Bell notes, the term ‘transitional jus-
tice’ “only came to be used in the mid-1990s” but already sometime after 
2000 it was consolidated as a field of study and a set of practices.2 One rea-
son for what Elazar Barkan has called the “tidal wave of apologies, truth 
commissions, reparations, and investigations of historical crimes”,3 can be 
found in the establishment of a network of experts, international founda-
tions, and non-governmental organizations, including the International Cen-
ter for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), the Institute for Justice and Reconcilia-
tion (IJR), and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral As-
sistance (IDEA). These experts and institutional bodies became quite pow-
erful actors in the transitional justice process. As James Campbell notes, al-
ready their sheer number suggests “a fundamental shift in international po-
litical culture [and] an emerging consensus on the importance of confront-
ing atrocious pasts”.4 An example here is the emergence of truth commis-
sions. In her contribution to this volume, Anne Krüger convincingly argues 
that an “epistemic community” has developed that consists of practitioners 
in the field as well as academics, politicians, and policy consultants. Some 
of the members of this network are active in truth commissions, thereby 
contributing to the institutionalization of transitional justice as “a widely 
shared expectation in the context of regime transitions”. With the adoption 
of the United Nations’ “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
                                                 
2  Christine Bell, Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the 
‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’, The International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 
(2009), 5-27, here: 7.  
3  Elazar Barkan, Introduction: Historians and Historical Reconciliation. AHR Fo-
rum Truth and Reconciliation in History, American Historical Review 114 
(2009), 899-913, here: 901. 
4  James T. Campbell, Settling Accounts? An Americanist Perspective on Histori-
cal Reconciliation, American Historical Review 114 (2009), 963-977, here: 965. 
INTRODUCTION | 9 

Law”,5 the codification affirming the importance of confronting past atroci-
ties and recalling the resolutions of the International Humanitarian Law by 
the Commission on Human Rights in 2005, indicates that a global regime 
of transitional justice has been successfully established setting an interna-
tional norm for dealing with past atrocities all around the globe. Or, as Su-
san Dwyer points out, “there appears to be a global frenzy to balance moral 
ledgers. Talk of apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation is everywhere”.6  
To be sure, the unease about this development that inspired this book 
does not root in a fundamental scepticism when it comes to prosecute and 
punish perpetrators, restore the dignity of the victims of atrocities or ‘re-
pair’ the injuries suffered by them. It is not arguing in favor of a politics of 
forgetting, of amnesties and silence. Although it cannot be denied that there 
are possible dangers when past injustices are excavated, sometimes leading 
to even more conflict and violence, confronting past atrocities does lead to 
more balanced justice. It is a not only a politically, but even more so an eth-
ically defensible position that the notion of transitional justice and the 
recognition of past suffering are given more serious consideration today. 
Fact is that perpetrators nowadays run a much greater risk of becoming sub-
ject to legal prosecution, and victims often are given a greater chance of ha-
ving their suffering acknowledged and of being compensated for their loss-
es. Moreover, it is more likely that their testimonies are being heard and 
recorded.  
The unease about the developments briefly described above has other 
reasons. It is based on the impression that the current developments in tran-
sitional justice, both as a field of practice and research, tend to narrow the 
horizon and restrict the view of what coping with past atrocities means and 
contains. There is for instance a certain tendency to conflate democratiza-
tion and transitional justice. Relevant research contends that coping with 
the legacies of repression of the old regime is a precondition of democrati-
zation. Leaving aside the fact that this fundamental assumption is fraught 
with multiple problems, for example the problem that we know cases of 
successful democratic consolidation based on silencing the past such as in 
                                                 
5  http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/147, accessed 21 
June 2012. 
6  Susan Dwyer, Reconciliation for Realists, Ethics and International Affairs 13 
(1999), 81-98, here: 81. 
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Spain, this assumption seems to somehow constrict our focus on societies 
in transition. However, coping with past legacies is not always limited to 
transitional periods; rather it is sometimes linked to older historical issues 
that inform contemporary crisis and political tensions. Take the example of 
historical injustices towards indigenous people who suffered from colonial-
ism and who have been living in long lasting democracies such as Australia 
or the United States of America. It took several generations before attempts 
of dealing with these injustices emerged. Or, take the individual humanitar-
ian payments to people who had to perform slave and forced labor in Ger-
many during the period of National Socialism. The disbursement of these 
payments only commenced in 2001, no less than 55 years after the collapse 
of the National Socialist Regime. These are only two of many examples out 
of a great variety of cases that can be brought forward to show that coping 
with past atrocities is not always linked to processes of democratization. 
This book therefore decouples questions related to transitional justice from 
processes of democratization by arguing that transitional justice is not only 
about the sometimes rather short period of transition, but also about longue 
durée. Within this context, it was important to also integrate cases of transi-
tional societies such as Ulrike Schröber’s case study on Franco-German 
rapprochement and reconciliation in the ecclesial domain in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. But, at the same time, we have broadened the spectrum of 
cases to be considered by including studies in which past atrocities became 
the focus of attention either long after transitions or even completely de-
coupled from such transitions.  
Furthermore, this book takes issue with the practices that are considered 
as relevant in transitional justice discourse. With the establishment of net-
works of transitional justice experts, the tendency to formulate “best prac-
tices” of how to cope with past atrocities has emerged. An example is the 
International Center for Transitional Justice (IJTC) that provides “policy 
briefs and reports on best practice cover measures” such as reparations or 
vetting.7 Experts not only formulate these standards of transitional justice 
but also are often involved themselves in these processes as third parties 
and some kind of mediators. This not only points to a certain tendency to-
wards standardizing measures and instruments for coping with past atroci-
ties but it moreover points to a concentration on processes in which experts 
                                                 
7  http://ictj.org/our-work/policy-relations, accessed 21 June 2012. 
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are involved. Against this backdrop, the articles in this book argue in favor 
of a differentiation of the field. This volume presents studies that examine 
cases beyond the support of experts and outside the sphere of standardized 
best practices of coping with past crimes. We are especially interested in 
cases were actors from within civil societies – dedicated personalities or en-
gaged initiatives – developed often idiosyncratic means of dealing with the 
past. A case in point is the Aktion Sühnezeichen (literally: Action Sign of 
Atonement) analyzed by Christiane Wienand in her article for this volume. 
Founded in 1958, this organization developed a specific approach of hands-
on reconciliation that was meant to atone for the atrocities committed under 
the National Socialist regime – a goal that is still being pursued today. Ac-
tivities consist of practical reconciliation work performed by German vol-
unteers in those countries that suffered the most from German crimes and 
include work assignments in various Kibbutzim in Israel or care for elderly 
Holocaust survivors in various countries. Within the scope of practical rec-
onciliation work, it seems that approaches such as the one developed by the 
Protestant church functionary Lothar Kreyssig in the 1950s do not fit neatly 
into the rationale of best practices designed by transitional justice experts 
because they are to a great extent connected to particular local realities and 
specific cultural contexts. This book therefore argues in favor of studying 
cases of dealing with past atrocities that were established long before tran-
sitional justice developed as a paradigm. Moreover, it argues in favor of 
looking into initiatives that adopted approaches beyond the best practices 
designed by experts in the field of transitional justice, often idiosyncratic 
and born out of specific cultural prerequisites.  
It can be stated that the broadening of the field beyond law has paradox-
ically caused a narrowing down of our perspective on actors, instruments, 
and measures involved in processes of coping with past atrocities. While, 
on the one hand, the initial focus on legal mechanisms has been broadened 
by including factors beyond law, the basic assumptions of transitional jus-
tice have, on the other hand, not been adjusted or codified accordingly. This 
observation serves as the point of departure for the contributions to this 
book. It is a plea for opening up opportunities for inquiry in the field of 
transitional justice by looking into relevant cases that do not fit neatly into 
the paradigm and that, to a large extent, have so far been overlooked. 
Because this is a considerable challenge, we made some initial deci-
sions concerning the case studies to be included and the research questions 
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to be concentrated on. Firstly, we decided to integrate cases from the be-
ginning of the 20th century up to the current day. The decision to cover this 
rather long period stems from the observation that transitional justice re-
search seems to reflect a certain bias towards recent developments and cas-
es to an extent that the invention of the term ‘transitional justice’ is some-
how conflated with the beginnings of an increased sensibility for human 
rights violations and for questions of how to deal with them appropriately. 
An example is Joanna Quinn’s textbook entry on transitional justice: “It 
was only in the 1990s that scholars and practitioners began to sort out how 
to deal with violent histories.”8 Contrary to such assertions, this book at-
tempts to show that concerns about human rights violations and attempts at 
dealing with past atrocities can already be found at the beginning of the 
20th century. We included case studies starting around 1919 with Armin T. 
Wegner’s efforts of convincing his German and international audiences to 
look at images and listen to stories of the forced deportation of the Armeni-
ans from the Ottoman Empire.9 We consider cases of early concerns with 
human rights, more precisely René Cassin’s impressive engagement in fa-
vor of soldier’s rights in the interwar period,10 and the European Unity 
Movement’s visions on human rights and reconciliation in the aftermath of 
the Second World War.11 We proceed with three transnational initiatives 
developed by civil society actors since the 1950s that cover a broad range 
of ideas, instruments, and attempts of dealing with the atrocities committed 
under the National Socialist Regime. More precisely, these are attempts at 
Franco-German rapprochement and reconciliation in the ecclesial domain 
in the 1950s,12 attempts at reconciliation between Germans and the French 
town Oradour-sur-Glane from around 1950 up to today,13 and the already 
mentioned study on Aktion Sühnezeichen, founded in the late 1950s in the 
Federal Republic of Germany.14 We furthermore included more recent ex-
                                                 
8  Joanna R. Quinn, Transitional Justice, in: Human Rights. Politics and Practice, 
ed. Michael Goodhart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 354-369.  
9  See the contribution by Charlton Payne to this volume.  
10  See the contribution by Jay Winter to this volume. 
11  See the contribution by Marco Duranti to this volume. 
12  See the contribution by Ulrike Schröber to this volume. 
13  See the contribution by Andrea Erkenbrecher to this volume. 
14  See the contribution by Christiane Wienand to this volume. 
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amples on civil society’s engagement. With Ayda Erbal’s chapter on the 
apology campaign initiated by Turkish intellectuals in 2008, we revisit the 
question of how to come to terms with the Armenian genocide around 90 
years after Armin T. Wegner started his campaign in interwar Germany. 
Moreover, our recent examples include two case studies on the problem of 
dealing with colonial violence in postcolonial settings, both between Na-
mibia and Germany15 and Portugal and Mozambique.16 Finally, we includ-
ed two case studies on commissions in their function as rather new instru-
ments of reconciliation and by now, the most commonly used restorative 
mechanism in processes of transitional justice.17 With this long-term per-
spective on processes and dynamics of coping with past atrocities and hu-
man rights violations, we intend to present a more comprehensive and sim-
ultaneously more refined understanding of what transitional justice can 
mean in different socio-political contexts and time spans. At the same time, 
this approach allows us to gain comparative insights on similarities and dif-
ferences emerging over a longer period. 
Secondly, we decided to concentrate on civil society’s involvement in 
processes of dealing with past atrocities. We are particularly interested in 
transnational engagement of civil society actors, ranging from dedicated 
personalities over institutionalized forms of engagement to societal elites. 
The decision to address the legacy of past wrongs from the perspective of 
transnational civil society’s interventions is based on the observation that 
relevant research has mostly concentrated on major initiatives, either by na-
tional governments or by the international community. Except for non-
governmental organizations involved in these initiatives, the role of civil 
society has not attracted careful attention. Given the fact that actors from 
within civil society are active in processes of coping with past atrocities al-
ready since the beginning of the 20th century, the chapters collected in this 
book intend to contribute to this so far neglected aspect of transitional jus-
tice. That civil society became an active protagonist in the processes and 
dynamics of dealing with past atrocities is due to more general develop-
ments such as the increasing significance of society’s involvement in public 
                                                 
15  See the contribution by Reinhart Kössler to this volume. 
16  See the contribution by Robert Stock to this volume. 
17  See the contributions by Anne K. Krüger on truth commissions and by Melinda 
Sutton on the Bloody Sunday Inquiry.  
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affairs. But it is also related to changing practices of warfare and state-
sanctioned violence in 20th-century Europe and elsewhere. Just as total 
wars affected and mobilized whole societies, post-war processes also in-
volved an unprecedented range of actors beyond the state. This involve-
ment of large strands of the population into wars and atrocities as victims, 
perpetrators or bystanders led to a shift in the understanding of how power 
works. As Jeremy Sarkin and Erin Daly note, “until recently, political acts 
were likely to be seen as acts of single individuals or small cabals”.18 If jus-
tice after transitions was done, it was by trying and punishing the top lead-
ers only. This slowly changed with “the recognition that political events are 
not the exclusive province of leaders, but implicate, and are implicated by, 
the population as a whole”.19 This fact carries implications “both for the 
new government’s treatment of the past and for laying the foundations for 
the future”.20 Transitional justice is also an attempt at dealing with the in-
volvement of society into the atrocities of past regimes, and building up a 
civil society after transitions is one of the main tasks in democratization 
processes. In addition, the question of contributions to these processes by 
actors from within civil society is here of fundamental importance. By fo-
cusing on civil society’s involvement in processes of dealing with past 
atrocities, the chapters of this book refer to these developments. 
Thirdly, we decided upon paying particular attention to reconciliation, 
both as a concept and a practice. On the one hand, “reconciliation has be-
come a buzzword in the literature on […] transitional justice”21 and “the 
darling of the transitional justice movement”.22 It is, as Jeremy Sarkin and 
Erin Daly note, “so easily evoked, so commonly promoted, and so immedi-
ately appealing”.23 Yet, at the same time, reconciliation remains a black box 
insofar as our knowledge is very limited with regards to the specifics of 
                                                 
18  Jeremy Sarkin and Erin Daly, Too Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Recon-
ciliation in Transitional Societies, Columbia Human Rights Law Review 35 
(2004), 661-728, here: 683. 
19  Ibid., 684. 
20  Ibid., 685.  
21  Jens Meierhenrich, Varieties of Reconciliation, Law and Social Inquiry 33, 1 
(2008), 195-231, here: 224. 
22  Sarkin and Daly, Too Many Questions, 665.  
23  Ibid., 664. 
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achieving and promoting reconciliation. We are not fully aware of the his-
torical factors that contribute to the spread of reconciliation initiatives 
around the globe, the question of whether reconciliation can achieve the 
goals imputed to it, or what reconciliation actually means in different cul-
tural contexts. In other words, there are still “too many questions, too few 
answers”.24 The chapters of this book intend to contribute to a better under-
standing of what reconciliation actually means when imbedded in processes 
of coping with past atrocities. The multitude of meanings generally associ-
ated with the term becomes more so obvious when looking at the actors in 
our case studies who refer within the context of their actions in various 
ways to ‘reconciliation’. Yet, not only do they attach different meanings, 
goals, instruments, and strategies to the term, ranging from the Christian 
notion of reconciliation to versions that are more secular, but they them-
selves are at times uncertain about what this term might mean or what im-
plications it might carry. In other words, continuing debates about the 
meaning of the term are not merely academic, but are already present with-
in the initiatives under study here. We therefore do not start from a com-
mon definition of the term but rather ask what understandings of reconcilia-
tion are brought forward by the actors under consideration, what measures 
and instruments are used when ‘reconciliation’ shall be achieved, and what 
actually happens when actors become involved in processes they label as 
reconciliatory.  
Taken together, the in-depth studies contained in this book analyze pro-
cesses of coping with atrocities and human rights violations that were com-
mitted since the beginning of the 20th Century. The studies focus on the 
role civil society plays in processes in which reconciliation, both as an idea 
and a practice, plays a significant role. Special attention is given to situa-
tions where the actors and processes transcend national borders. The con-
tributions describe actors and actor constellations involved in transitional 
justice, both as initiators and addressees. They ask for meanings attached to 
the concept of reconciliation and for the implementation of these ideas in 
practice. The contributions analyze strategies adopted and instruments uti-
lized in attempts to repair historical injustices and to make whole what has 
                                                 
24  Ibid., 661. 
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been smashed.25 In addition, they investigate expected and/or received out-
comes of processes of reconciliation, hence ask both for successes and fail-
ures, potentialities and limits of intentional strategies and unintentional dy-
namics related to these processes.  
What conclusions with regard to these research questions can be drawn 
from the detailed case studies contained in this volume? Firstly, the find-
ings show that reconciliation by and large seems to be a utopian project. In 
all our cases, it is an unfinished, sometimes even a highly fragile endeavor 
in which a single ill-chosen phrasing, an inappropriate timing or the focus-
ing on one group of victims or one atrocity instead of another can lead to 
even more dispute or hardening of positions. For example, take Wegner’s 
attempts at reconciliation in interwar Germany, analyzed by Charlton 
Payne. Wegner’s lecture in Berlin in 1919 and the accompanying presenta-
tion of pictures showing stages of the deportation and massacre of the Ar-
menians in 1915 in graphic, sometimes brutal detail “was interrupted by the 
violent uproar among Turks and Armenians in the audience”. As Payne 
shows, with the presentation of these pictures that was meant to create em-
pathy for the fate of the Armenians, Wegner achieved just the opposite, 
namely the mobilization of feelings of partisanship instead of empathy. Or 
take the reactions to Tony Blair’s setting-up of a judicial inquiry into the 
killings of thirteen unarmed civil rights demonstrators in Derry in 1972 that 
became known as Bloody Sunday. As Melinda Sutton shows, many Union-
ists interpreted the establishment of this inquiry “as indifference to the suf-
fering sustained by the families of other victims of the Troubles”. The ex-
ample shows that acknowledgement of the pain and suffering of some vic-
tims can lead to bitter feelings on the side of other victims who interpret 
this recognition as a denial of their own trauma, suffering, and loss. It there-
fore points to the creation of some sort of competitive victimhood through 
measures aimed at reconciliation. In sum, these examples demonstrate how 
difficult and ‘preconditionally dependent’ these attempts at reconciliation 
are, e.g., how much they depend on an abundance of premises. They also 
raise the question of who is included in such endeavors, whose pain and 
suffering is left without public consideration, and who is entitled to make 
                                                 
25  I borrow this phrase from John Torpey, Making Whole what has been Smashed: 
On Reparation Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).  
INTRODUCTION | 17 

decisions within these processes. In other words, within the politics of rec-
onciliation power may at times also play a significant role. 
To state that reconciliation is a utopian project indicates an understand-
ing of reconciliation as some kind of end state. In the case studies presented 
in this volume, this end state is hardly ever achieved. Against the back-
ground of a maximalist concept of reconciliation that calls for nothing less 
than an “ethics of caring for the enemy”,26 this seems not only plausible but 
in most cases probably an unrealistic expectation. As is convincingly ar-
gued in the contributions to this volume, reconciliation is not only an end 
state, but also constitutes a process. There is a road to reconciliation. It is 
made up of a great variety of gestures, symbols, instruments, and measures. 
Often it is taken in small steps, but it is those small steps that can make a 
difference. The case studies presented here may also be read as a plea to 
concentrate on those small steps and to adopt rather minimalist conceptions 
of reconciliation. Of course, sometimes already neutralizing issues of past 
conflicts in post conflict societies and initiating processes to move away 
from war requires a huge effort, as Jay Winter shows. At times, as Ayda 
Erbal in her contribution on the apology campaign by Turkish intellectuals 
in 2008 argues, even a rather unsuccessful attempt at apologizing can at 
least be “a step in the right direction for changing the lens of society by in-
forming the public sphere of the necessity for recognizing that there is 
something grave to apologize for”. Against this background, it seems plau-
sible to not only shift the focus from an understanding of reconciliation as 
an end state to one as a process, but moreover to pay closer attention to re-
lated and probably less morally charged terms such as atonement, under-
standing, rapprochement, or redress. As Christiane Wienand points out in 
her contribution, the founder of Aktion Sühnezeichen, Lothar Kreyssig, had 
initially intended to call the organization Aktion Versöhnungszeichen (sign 
of reconciliation), “yet became convinced that Sühnezeichen (act of atone-
ment) would be a more fitting term: atonement is offered by or on behalf of 
the one who has become guilty, whereas reconciliation already describes 
the next step of a mutual agreement between the two sides”. To adapt less 
ambitious and morally charged concepts such as atonement, also seems to 
comply with the feelings of the victims. Asher Ben Nathan, the first Israeli 
ambassador in the Federal Republic of Germany, and one of the supporters 
                                                 
26  Meierhenrich, Varieties of Reconciliation, 211. 
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of German-Israeli youth exchange programs, nevertheless stated “instead of 
reconciliation I was talking about understanding”. This and other examples 
in our volume show that the quest for reconciliation can be an unreasonable 
demand for the victims. Andrea Erkenbrecher draws our attention to the 
psychological barriers of some of the surviving victims of the massacre 
conducted on June 10, 1944 by a unit of the Waffen-SS in the French village 
of Oradour-sur-Glane. She argues that “reconciliation is not something that 
can rationally be decided upon”, and that some victims just “cannot recon-
cile even if they would like to”. Within the context of these findings, Er-
kenbrecher also states that the demand for reconciliation can be an all-to 
ambitious objective. The conclusion she draws is “a plea for a right to ir-
reconcilability” on the part of the victims. This is only one of many exam-
ples that point not only to a certain scepticism when it comes to reconcilia-
tion but to its very limits. 
The chapters of this volume convincingly show that there is no way 
around recognizing the power of experiences and memories related to con-
flict and war and that therefore one has to be very modest in expectations 
when it comes to reconciliation. In fact, in most of the cases described and 
analyzed here, only future generations might be able to reestablish “trust-
worthy and cooperative relationships”27 and master the task of returning to 
some normalcy. This also leads to a conclusion of great significance: recon-
ciliation is not just about a situation or moment, but rather, as stated previ-
ously, it involves rather long-term processes. Aside from this aspect of 
longue durée, the findings in our chapters point to another dimension of 
time being of importance, especially when asking at what time actors take 
initiative for reconciliation and within what time span these initial attempts 
take place. There are cases of rather immediate attempts at reconciliation 
such as Armin T. Wegner’s activities described by Charlton Payne or the 
meetings of French and German church affiliates taking place as early as 
1949 and 1950 analyzed by Ulrike Schröber. René Cassin’s dedicated en-
gagement for the war disabled presented by Jay Winter is another example 
                                                 
27  Veit Straßner, Versöhnung und Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung – Ein Vorschlag zur 
Begriffsbestimmung und Konzeptualisierung, in: Amnesie, Amnestie oder Auf-
arbeitung? Zum Umgang mit autoritären Vergangenheiten und Menschen-
rechtsverletzungen, ed. Siegmar Schmidt et al. (Wiesbaden: VS, 2009), 23-36, 
here: 29. 
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for initiatives being launched in temporal nearness to the experiences of 
war and violence they refer to. Nevertheless, other initiatives only start with 
a rather huge temporal distance to the events. The apology campaign by 
Turkish intellectuals analyzed by Ayda Erbal was set in motion nearly one 
hundred years after the genocide of the Armenians in the late Ottoman Em-
pire. The cases of attempts at reconciliation connected to crimes committed 
under colonial rule analyzed by Reinhart Kössler and Robert Stock, also 
point to context variables that are of some importance here. Both in the case 
of Turkey’s reluctance of dealing with the Armenian genocide in an open 
manner and in the cases of dealing with colonial atrocities, we are faced 
with the problem of silence and taboo that only lately began to slowly break 
down. In other cases such as in Franco-German relations, the environment 
was more supportive of these attempts at reconciliation, not least because of 
the political necessities imposed by the Cold War. 
Furthermore, the findings of the investigations underline the importance 
of keeping alternatives in mind, both with regard to civil society’s engage-
ment and in terms of instruments utilized in processes of reconciliation. As 
Charlton Payne shows, Armin T. Wegner’s attempt at reconciliation failed 
– at least as far as we can tell. What had a more positive effect was the trial 
against the Armenian student Salomon Teilirian who assassinated Talaat 
Pascha, one of the principle instigators of the Armenian genocide. After he 
had fled from Istanbul in 1919, Talaat Pascha had been living incognito in 
Berlin, where he was detected and assassinated by Teilirian in 1921. Teilir-
ian’s entire family had been massacred during the deportation in June 1915. 
A district court in Berlin had to decide whether this was a case of premedi-
tated murder. Surprisingly, Salomon Teilirian was acquitted of the charge. 
As Payne argues, “this trial marks an instance of reconciliation between 
Germans and Armenians, and can be interpreted as contributing to the for-
mation of an official cultural memory of the Armenian genocide. In this 
case, an authority sanctioned by the state […] became a conduit for the dis-
semination of witness testimonies as well as for a gesture of reconciliation, 
by issuing a verdict of not-guilty in favor of a victim of a massacre and 
thereby distancing itself from the previous foreign policy of supporting 
Germany’s war-time ally responsibility for the forced deportations and 
massacres.” This incident reminds us of alternatives to civil society’s en-
gagement. Here, the juridical system did find a more adequate response 
than was found by the civil society – not only from the perspective of Ar-
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menian victims living in Berlin but also in the view of some Germans. It is 
therefore of utmost importance to keep the interplay of different levels and 
actors – state, juridical system, civil society, dedicated personalities – in 
mind. Furthermore, this incident points to the distinction between restora-
tive and retributive justice. While the latter includes forms of actively en-
forced measures such as trials und tribunals, the former describes ultimately 
voluntary instruments such as commissions, healing circles, or apologies. 
While the goals of measures of retributive justice are prosecution and pun-
ishment, restorative justice is commonly associated with reconciliation. The 
case presented by Charlton Payne complicates the picture of this often too 
clear distinction by showing that under certain circumstances, retributive 
rather than restorative justice can contribute to the dynamics of reconcilia-
tion.  
Finally, the contributions to this volume point to the crucial and at the 
same time changing role played by mediators in processes of reconciliation. 
These mediators can be dedicated personalities as described in the chapters 
by Charlton Payne and Andrea Erkenbrecher, non-governmental organiza-
tions such as Aktion Sühnezeichen or various kinds of commissions as ana-
lyzed by Anne Krüger and Melinda Sutton. Even published texts, technical 
objects, or documentary films may be viewed as having mediating capaci-
ties as demonstrated by Robert Stock and Charlton Payne. Although not 
always with positive outcomes, these mediators fulfilled different functions. 
At times, they made people look at the pain of the victims and they created 
space for dialogue. They made efforts toward multiplying the number of 
circulating narratives and at complicating the language of all parties in-
volved. The contributions also point to the changing role of mediators in 
the course of the 20th century. Methods and instruments utilized in the first 
half of the century have been rather idiosyncratic and mediators were some-
times in some – often unclear – way themselves involved in the events they 
had to cope with. In contrast, today we face the growing importance of 
standardized instruments of a culture of experts who advise countries all 
over the world in how to deal with past atrocities. It almost seems that by 
now a global regime of transitional justice has developed that might be a 
successor of the international humanitarian organizations having emerged 
in the first half of the 20th century. To look more closely into the question 
of whether these new global cultures of transitional justice are or will in-
deed be the successors to the international regimes of humanity described 
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by Marco Duranti, Jay Winter and Charlton Payne in their chapters, will 
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Reconciliation after the Armenian 
Genocide

“A Question of Humanity in its Entirety” 
Armin T. Wegner as Intermediary of Reconciliation 
between Germans and Armenians in Interwar German 





Armin T. Wegner was a humanitarian writer and activist who witnessed the 
massacres and forced relocation of Armenian deportees while he was sta-
tioned in Ottoman Turkey during the First World War. This essay analyzes 
his efforts as an intermediary of reconciliation between Armenians and 
Germans within emerging conduits of civil society in Germany between 
1919 and 1921. A look at the degree of apparent success, proximity to ex-
plicit political agendas, articulation and mobilization of narratives of suffer-
ing, and institutional sanction of his work is instructive for more general 
considerations about the role of intermediaries in acts of reconciliation in 
civil society.1 The essay thus traces some of Wegner’s activities within civil 
                                                 
1  I prefer the term ‘intermediary’ to that of ‘mediator’, and venture to follow here 
Michel Callon’s definition of an intermediary as “anything passing between ac-
tors which defines the relationship between them”; hence, “actors define one 
another in interaction – in the intermediaries that they put into circulation”. 
Whereas the term ‘mediator’ conforms to Wegner’s self-presentation, the term 
‘intermediary’ describes more aptly how his activities emerge out of processes 
of interaction between multiple agents and institutions, and with often unexpec-
ted results. Intermediaries include not only human agents but also published 
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society as well as the narrative and rhetorical contours of the interpretive 
framework within which these activities are set, and which they set-up, in 
the brief period of 1919-1921. Presenting himself as a mediator of reconcil-
iation, Wegner explored ways of convincing his German and international 
audiences to look at images and listen to stories of the forced deportation of 
the Armenians. His work faced the difficult task, however, of how to navi-
gate the heterogeneous terrain of personal witness testimony, contentious 
assertions of geopolitical identity by Germans and Armenians, and the nor-
mative claims of international humanitarian activism with which Wegner 
seems most strongly to identify. Despite Wegner’s commitment to interna-
tional humanitarianism and experiments with forms of narrative empathy, 
his attempts to mediate reconciliation were impeded by political circum-
stances and his own rhetorical associations of Armenian suffering with the 
legitimation for an independent Armenian nation-state. 
 
 
EYEWITNESS OF THE DEPORTATION 
 
Armin T. Wegner (1886-1978) was born in Wuppertal, Germany in 1886 to 
a socially well-connected family. He studied in Breslau, Zürich, and Berlin, 
before completing a doctoral degree in law. Yet he was more interested in 
the theatrical and literary arts, trying to make his way in the circles around 
Max Reinhardt’s theater and as a writer of Expressionist poetry.2 At the 
                                                                                                  
texts and technical objects, such as Wegner’s writings and photographs. Michel 
Callon, Techno-economic Networks and Irreversibility, in: Sociology of Mons-
ters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination, ed. John Law (London: 
Routledge, 1991), 132-164, here: 134-135. 
2  For more details about Wegner’s wider activities as a writer and not just as an 
activist for Armenian independence, I recommend Andreas Meier’s informative 
podcast: http://podcast.uni-wuppertal.de/2008/09/04/politisch-literarische-aben-
teuer-armin-t-wegner/. See also: Martin Rooney, Leben und Werk Armin T. 
Wegners (1886-1978) im Kontext der sozio-politischen und kulturellen Entwick-
lungen in Deutschland (Frankfurt a.M.: Haag + Herchen, 1984). For a recent 
study on Wegner’s wider literary writings on the Ottoman Empire, see Behrang 
Samsami, “Die Entzauberung des Ostens”: Der Orient bei Hesse, Wegner und 
Schwarzenbach (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2011), 149-216.  
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outbreak of the First World War, he was initially stationed as a doctor’s as-
sistant on the Russian front. Thanks to his family’s influence, he was then 
transferred in 1915 to the regiment of Field Marshall Colmar von der Goltz, 
where he served as the assistant to von der Goltz’s personal doctor sta-
tioned in the region of the Ottoman Empire that is now Iraq. While sta-
tioned with von der Goltz, who was in charge of a Turkish regiment trying 
to fend off attacks by British soldiers, Wegner travelled from east to west 
within the Ottoman Empire. It was during this trip in the fall of 1915 and 
returning in 1916 that he crossed paths with the trekking Armenian refu-
gees from the north heading southward into the Syrian Desert. In 1916, he 
spent time in the last refugee camp along the trek, where he talked to nu-
merous refugees and documented in photographs and writing the suffering 
caused by the state-sponsored mass deportations and other brutal expatria-
tion measures. After returning to Germany, he became a vocal activist on 
behalf of Armenian refugees. Due to censorship during the war, little in-
formation was disseminated within Germany about the Armenian geno-
cide,3 but following the November Revolution, Wegner was able to publish 
writings depicting the atrocities, overtly blaming them on the Young Turk-







                                                 
3  For a detailed and well-documented discussion about what was known within 
the German administration and what was silenced by the wartime censor, see 
Margaret Lavinia Anderson, Who Still Talked about the Extermination of the 
Armenians? German Talk and German Silences, in: A Question of Genocide: 
Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Ronald Grigor 
Suny et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 199-220; Dominik Schal-
ler, Die Rezeption des Völkermordes an den Armeniern in Deutschland, 1915-
1945, in: Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah, ed. Hans Lukas 
Kieser and Dominik Schaller (Zürich: Chronos, 2001), 517-556, here: 522-531. 
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THE OPEN LETTER TO WILSON AND THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM 
 
With the publication of his “Open Letter to the President of the United 
States of America, Woodrow Wilson, On the Expulsion of the Armenian 
People into the Desert” in the Berliner Tageblatt on 23 February 1919, 
Wegner achieved fame and notoriety both at home and abroad as an activist 
for Armenian relief and national independence.4 His appeal to Wilson 
makes clear that his ambition is “to right a wrong that no other people suf-
fered like the Armenians [ein Unrecht wieder gutzumachen, wie es keines 
dieser Völker erlitt]” (5). Wilson had already announced his plan for the na-
tional independence of ethnic minorities within the crumbling Ottoman 
Empire. Hoping to garner support for the Armenians at the peace negotia-
tions in Paris, Wegner announces in the letter his intention to speak on be-
half of an Armenian nation – as “the mouth of a thousand dead ones” – jus-
tifying this speaker position on the basis of his eyewitness experience of the 
deportation, “as one of the few Europeans to have witnessed this nation’s 
horrible demise” (2). He describes the letter as a “testament”, at once an 
address “in accordance with the law of human community” and “a sacred 
promise” (5). Declaring that “no group of people has ever suffered an injus-
tice to the extent the Armenians have”, he casts responsibility and atone-
ment simultaneously as “a question of Christianity” and a “question of hu-
manity in its entirety” (2).  
Wegner’s appeal to Christian values here avers a common cause with 
the international evangelical lobby backing Wilson’s foreign policy regard-
ing Armenian independence. Evangelical missionary groups were some of 
the most vocal supporters of Armenian relief in the United States, for in-
                                                 
4  I cite from the text published separately in book form, Offener Brief an den Prä-
sidenten der Vereinigten Staaten von Nord-Amerika, Herrn Woodrow Wilson, 
über die Austreibung des armenischen Volkes in die Wüste (Berlin-Schöneberg: 
Buchdruckerei Alb. Sayffaerth [Otto Fleck], 1919). All translations from Weg-
ner’s texts in the following essay are my own. For more on Wegner’s popularity 
among evangelical supporters of Armenians, as well as his troubles with the Fo-
reign Ministry, following the publication of the letter to Wilson, see Martin 
Tamcke, Armin T. Wegner und die Armenier. Anspruch und Wirklichkeit eines 
Augenzeugen (Hamburg: LIT, 1996), 185-186. 
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stance. At the forefront of these activities was the Near East Relief organi-
zation, which had a long history of Protestant missionary activity dating 
back to evangelizing missions in the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East 
in the nineteenth century.5 These U.S. missionaries were already present in 
the years before, during, and after the war, with some members supplying 
on-site relief work while others were concerned with bearing witness to the 
persecutions and launching a media campaign on behalf of the Armenians 
back in the United States – all in the name of a common Christian destiny. 
Granted a charter from Congress in 1919 and with James Barton appointed 
as its head, who would later participate in the treaty negotiations at the Lau-
sanne Conference in 1922-23, Near East Relief became an important hu-
manitarian relief organization and a vociferous lobby for Armenian inde-
pendence.6 The fact that Near East Relief could so successfully combine 
evangelism, philanthropy, and international politics was due in no small 
part to the close personal ties of some of its members to Woodrow Wilson.7 
Wilson’s connection to the Protestant activists would not have been lost on 
Wegner, nor was Wegner unfamiliar with sibling networks of Protestant ac-
tivism within Germany. 
Yet Wegner’s humanitarian agenda for reconciliation between Germans 
and Armenians is also staged here as a matter of concern for a presumed in-
ternational community (hence the address to Wilson and the appeal to “hu-
manity in its entirety”), and it consists of at least two parts. One concerns 
the commemoration of the dead: the creation of a cultural memory of the 
atrocities as a way to confer public recognition upon the dead as belonging 
to an imagined human community, in order to re-incorporate them into the 
world of the living.8 This act of incorporating dead bodies into the memory 
of the living community involves the creation of empathy with the absent 
                                                 
5  Flora A. Keshgegian, “Starving Armenians”: The Politics and Ideology of Hu-
manitarian Aid in the First Decades of the Twentieth Century, in: Humanitaria-
nism and Suffering: The Mobilization of Empathy, ed. Richard Ashby Wilson 
and Richard D. Brown (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 140-
155, here: 141. 
6  Ibid., 143. 
7  Ibid., 144-145. 
8  Thomas W. Laquer, Mourning, Pity, and the Work of Narrative in the Making 
of “Humanity”, in: Humanitarianism and Suffering, 31-57, here: 38. 
30 | CHARLTON PAYNE 
 
dead. Furthermore, this story of mourning overlaps with the second project 
to ameliorate the suffering of the living in the present. And Wegner has 
concrete demands for how this should happen: through the founding of an 
independent Armenian nation-state, compensation for lost property, and the 
mandatory care of Armenian orphans. These measures, Wegner argues in a 
move which expands the issue of reconciliation beyond the confines of a 
matter solely concerning Germans and Armenians, would represent the in-
ternational community’s “recognition of our common guilt for the atroci-
ties” (7-8). Armenian relief is thus no longer articulated solely as the objec-
tive of Christian missionary work, nor are distinctions between perpetrators 
and victims to be understood strictly in terms of national interest. Wegner 
presents the matter as entailing shared histories9 by virtue of all participants 
being part of the common humanity underlying the international regime of 
nation-states.  
Wegner’s open letter to Wilson signals not only a shift in German hu-
manitarian activism on behalf of Armenians, but also a recalibration of nar-
ratives about Armenia within discussions in German politics and civil soci-
ety. Wegner’s particular intervention in German debates about Armenians 
must be considered in light of changing attitudes in Germany toward Turks 
and Armenians since at least the time of the earlier massacres of 1894-96 
during the rule of Abdul Hamid II in the Ottoman Empire. Whereas these 
deadly pogroms generated widespread international humanitarian outcry in 
Switzerland, France, Great Britain, and the U.S., a counter-discourse 
formed in Germany, which, as Margaret Lavinia Anderson has shown, 
“succeeded in diluting sympathy for the victims and shifting it to the perpe-
trators” of the massacres.10 A conglomeration of arguments from diverse 
political directions were thus woven into effective geopolitical narratives 
aligning support for Armenians with support of either an expansionist Eng-
land or tsarist Russia. These political arguments against Armenia and for 
                                                 
9  Elazar Barkan contrasts the notion of “shared narratives” to “national myths” in 
the efforts of civil society to achieve historical reconciliation. Elazar Barkan, 
Introduction: Historians and Historical Reconciliation. AHR Forum Truth and 
Reconciliation in History, American Historical Review 114 (2009), 899-913. 
10  Margaret Lavinia Anderson, “Down in Turkey, far away”: Human Rights, the 
Armenian Massacres, and Orientalism in Wilhelmine Germany, The Journal of 
Modern History, 79, 1 (2007), 80-111, here: 83. 
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Turkey were buttressed by “Orientalist” narratives that cast Turkey as an 
agent of secular progress and tolerance, in contrast to “backwards” Arme-
nians abroad and Christian zealots at home, and were circulated even by the 
liberal German press.11 
Wegner can thus be regarded as one of those alternative “spokesmen 
who could fit Armenians and Turks into a narrative in which listeners could 
imagine themselves”.12 He did so by appealing to a broad sense of suffering 
and re-inscribing notions of victims and perpetrators within a framework 
that cast matters in terms of international regimes of humanity and inhu-
manity. These rhetorical and narrative strategies are the main features of his 
work as an intermediary of reconciliation between Germans and Armenians 
from the time of his letter to Wilson and subsequent public lectures until 
the trial of Talaat Pascha in 1921. 
The publication of the letter to Wilson in 1919, as well as of a pro-
grammatic statement the previous year demanding official acknowledgment 
of the Armenian massacre and support for the founding of an Armenian na-
tion-state in German foreign policy,13 cost Wegner his position as editor of 
Der neue Orient. Monatsschrift für das politische, wirtschaftliche und geis-
tige Leben im gesamten Orient, a monthly publication of the Berlin Orient 
Institute supported by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His public 
advocacy for the Armenians even cost him his contract with the Fleischel 
Verlag, his publishing company at the time.14 Between 1919 and 1921, 
Wegner continued his public advocacy by aligning his activities with those 
of the international Bund der Kriegsdienstgegner in 1919, as well as by 
teaming up with organizations within Germany, such as the evangelical so-
                                                 
11  Ibid., 93-102. 
12  Ibid., 84. 
13  Die Neugestaltung unserer Orientpolitik, Der neue Orient N.F. 4, Berlin 1918, 
101-104. For a discussion and lengthy excerpts from this text, see Rooney, Le-
ben und Werk Armin T. Wegners, 253-256, as well as Martin Tamcke, Armin T. 
Wegner’s “Die Austreibung des armenischen Volkes in die Wüste”. Einführung 
zum unveröffentlichten Vortragstyposkript vom 19. März 1919 in der Urania zu 
Berlin, in: Orientalische Christen zwischen Repression und Migration. Beiträge 
zur jüngeren Geschichte und Gegenwartslage, ed. Martin Tamcke (Hamburg: 
LIT, 2001), 65-71, here: 66-67. 
14  Rooney, Leben und Werk Armin T. Wegners, 288. 
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cieties and the Deutsch-Armenische Gesellschaft.15  Wegner’s struggles for 
reconciliation between Germans and Armenians must be considered in the 
context of a pacifist proclamation of “a new law for the human” that entails 
the rejection of the centuries-old “law of violence” upheld by European po-
litical leaders, and the “complete and unconditional abolition of violence” 
as outlined in the manifesto of the Bund der Kriegsdienstgegner.16 Weg-
ner’s language of rights and crimes in this context mirrors the terms de-
ployed in his advocacy of Armenian aid and right to self-determination; in 
both contexts, normative prescriptions are elicited by Wegner’s phrase of 
“righting a past wrong” (ein Unrecht gutmachen).17 Wegner’s interventions 
in civil society with the aim of reconciliation between Germans and Arme-
nians are conducted under the banner of “righting a wrong”. 
 
 
“THE EXPULSION OF THE ARMENIANS”: NARRATING 
SUFFERING, STAGING EMPATHY  
 
One of his most impressive endeavors as an intermediary of reconciliation 
between Germans and Armenians was the presentation of his personal col-
lection of pictures and reports, which he delivered between 1919 and 1921 
as a public lecture accompanied by a slide presentation. The Institute for 
Popular Natural History at the Urania in Berlin had been founded in 1888 
as an institution dedicated to the presentation of scientific knowledge to a 
                                                 
15  At the end of June 1919, Wegner founded the Bund der Kriegsdienstgegner with 
Robert Pohl, G.W. Meyer and Magnus Schwantje.  
16  Armin T. Wegner, Die Verbrechen der Stunde – Die Verbrechen der Ewigkeit. 
Aufruf zur Gründung eines Bundes der Kriegsdienstgegner, in: Das Ziel. Viertes 
der Jahrbücher für geistige Politik, ed. Kurt Hiller (München: Kurt Wolff, 
1920), 142-165, here: 143 and 152.  
17  Wegner evokes this phrase in his discussion of the aims of the Bund der Kriegs-
dienstgegner, which he regards as a veritable alternative to the League of Na-
tions, “a league of nations, whose provisions only entail a displacement, in the 
best case a reduction, of the instruments of power”. He suggests that Germany 
could right one of the “the most disgraceful crimes of all time” by abolishing not 
only the institution of universal conscription but of military service in general. 
Ibid., 160.  
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popular audience. Its building contained an observatory, an exhibition 
space, and a theater – and, according to an expanded definition of interme-
diaries, which would include non-human actors, should as well be consid-
ered a potential intermediary of reconciliation within civil society, for it 
provides the physical site where participants might assemble to look at 
Wegner’s images of suffering. The directors of the Urania Society agreed to 
schedule one or two personal lectures by Wegner on the topic of the Arme-
nian massacres. Because, “the events that you depict have for some time 
now receded into the background”, the directors write to Wegner in a letter 
from 1918, they questioned whether his presentation would have a strong 
“attraction” (Zugkraft) for the public.18 Moreover, they expressed their dis-
appointment at the poor quality of many of the diapositives for his slide 
show that he had sent along with his query letters, pointing out that many of 
them appear to be photographs of paper images and that their technological 
quality is substandard. Not until almost a year later, on March 19, 1919, did 
the plans for a public lecture at the Urania come to fruition.19 
That the event was sponsored by the Deutsch-Armenische Gesellschaft 
reveals just how closely aligned Wegner had become to the efforts of the 
Protestant activists in Germany. The Deutsch-Armenische Gesellschaft had 
been founded in 1914 in Berlin by Pastor Johannes Lepsius (1858-1926), 
one of the most prominent German supporters of the Armenian cause, along 
with the journalist Paul Rohrbach and the Armenian writer Avetik Issaha-
kyan. Lepsius’ organization was an outgrowth of a conglomeration of most-
ly confessional non-governmental organizations such as the Evangelische 
Hilfswerke, Der Hilfsbund für christliches Liebeswerk im Orient, Das Not-
wendige Liebeswerk, and Lepsius’ own Deutsche Orientmission. Lepsius’ 
Deutsche Orientmission was founded in 1895 in response to widespread vi-
olence in cities and throughout the countryside targeting Armenians in the 
Ottoman Empire. A reaction to increasing resistance and unrest by Armeni-
an populations due to decades of expropriation and mistreatment at the 
hands of paramilitary groups in regions along the Russian border, as well as 
to mounting perceptions of an international threat to Ottoman sovereignty, 
                                                 
18  Direktion of the Urania to Wegner, 20 February 1918, Deutsches Literaturarchiv 
Marbach (hereafter: DLA), Nachlass Wegner, A: Wegner. 
19  Wegner delivered the lecture several times afterwards in Breslau and Vienna un-
til 1924. 
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this wave of massacres between 1894 and 1896 claimed the lives of more 
than 100,000 Armenians. While the massacres were primarily conducted by 
Kurdish paramilitary groups, state authorities did little to protect the Arme-
nian population.20 News about the massacres reached audiences in Europe, 
resulting however in little more than notes of protest from the major state 
powers, yet sparking support for the Armenians within private relief organ-
izations, such as Near East Relief in the U.S., or Pro Arménia in France. 
We thus find in conjunction with the early massacres against the Armenians 
an international history of humanitarian organization and assistance formed 
in explicitly non-state sectors. In the case of pre-war Germany, the channels 
of activity are primarily forged or pursued by confessional leaders such as 
Pastor Lepsius and the Frankfurt Pastor Ernst Lohmann.21 
Strategy played a role in Lepsius’ support for Wegner’s lecture, for the 
event was scheduled to take place shortly before the issue of Armenian in-
dependence was to be raised at the peace negotiations in Paris, and tickets 
were reserved for representatives from the Foreign Ministry. It was hoped 
that Wegner’s lecture would bolster support for Armenian claims for inde-
pendence.22 Not only did Wegner provide flesh and blood evidence as an 
eyewitness to the genocide, he also deployed his rhetorical prowess as a 
writer to help articulate the claims of Lepsius’ humanitarian organization 
within a wider semantic framework than that of Christian charity. Around 
this time, Lepsius was also active as a compiler of documentary informa-
tion concerning the state-sponsored Armenian massacres. Lepsius pub-
                                                 
20  Annette Schaefgen, Schwieriges Erinnern: Der Völkermord an den Armeniern 
(Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2006), 18-19. 
21  Uwe Feigel, Das evangelische Deutschland und Armenien. Die Armenierhilfe 
deutscher evangelischer Christen seit dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts im Kon-
text der deutsch-türkischen Beziehungen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1989). A work that critically situates Wegner’s interventions within the wider 
context of the evangelical societies is Tamcke, Armin T. Wegner. For a discussi-
on of efforts by the Deutsch-Armenische Gesellschaft to prevent the genocide 
during the war, see Anderson, Who Still Talked. 
22  Martin Tamcke, Die Kamera als Zeuge. Armin T. Wegners Fotografien vom 
Völkermord 1915/16 in Armenien, in: Das Jahrhundert der Bilder. Band I: 
1900-1949, ed. Gerhard Paul (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 172-
179, here: 178-79. 
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lished a revised version of his Report on the Situation of the Armenians in 
Turkey, originally published in 1916 but banned during the war, with the 
new title The Passage to Death of the Armenians in 1919.23 He also edited a 
volume of diplomatic records commissioned by the German Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, who hoped to thereby dispel notions of a German complic-
ity and even removed passages that might have implicated German offi-
cials.24 Although they are replete with numerous statistics, documentary 
sources, and factual reports, Lepsius’ publications lack the narrative – 
sometimes lyrical25 – eloquence of Wegner’s writing.  
Wegner’s narrative eloquence faces the challenge, however, of how to 
move from the form of an open letter staging testimony in the first-person 
(i.e. the letter to Wilson) to the form of a public lecture in which those ad-
dressed view the images and hear the story of massacre as a communal 
event. The corollary question, moreover, is what type of communal event 
gets enacted in the process. Is it an act of looking at pictures or listening to 
stories together, in the hope of reconciliation between Germans and Arme-
nians, or is it rather an act of myth-making and community-formation that 
solidifies geo-political identities and interests through a partisan founda-
tional narrative? In the open letter to Wilson, Wegner still operates on the 
level of first-person address in the hybrid form of an open letter and an 
epistle.26 He pens a self-aggrandizing eyewitness, who both “dares to grant 
                                                 
23  Johannes Lepsius, Der Todesgang des Armenischen Volkes. Bericht über das 
Schicksal des Armenischen Volkes in der Türkei während des Weltkrieges, zwei-
te, vermehrte Auflage (Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1919). 
24  Johannes Lepsius, Deutschland und Armenien 1914-1918. Sammlung diplomati-
scher Aktenstücke (Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1919); Schaefgen, Schwieriges Er-
innern, 38-39. See also the reproduction of these and other documents by Wolf-
gang and Sigrid Gust at www.armenocide.de. 
25  Upon witnessing the deportation during his trip through the desert, Wegner 
composed a poem in 1916 about the horror of what he saw, with the title, The 
Expulsion, which he tellingly also titled, The Expulsion of Humanity. DLA, 
Nachlass Wegner, A: Wegner. 
26  Because the address to Wilson as a prominent representative of the U.S.A. is al-
so published in the Berliner Tageblatt, it simultaneously seeks to inform a wider 
public; furthermore, the personal tone of the address “amplifies the credibility 
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myself the right to conjure before you these images of misery and horror”27 
and authorizes himself to serve as “the mouth of a thousand dead that speak 
through me”.28 This is no less than an inflated epistolary subject who as-
signs himself the moral authority to speak on behalf of Armenian victims in 
a German-language or international public sphere. A passage from the end 
of the slide presentation, on the other hand, describes the personal reaction 
of Wegner the public speaker to the images being presented, in a gesture 
that simultaneously affirms the amplified speaking self and hints at the di-
lemma of such a stance. 
 
“Every time when I talk about the horrible pictures of misfortune of this group of 
people, from which your eyes have perhaps in horror often turned away from the 
screen, I imagine myself again among the starving and dying in the refugee camp, 
feel their supplicating hands in mine, summoning me to plead for them again once I 
return to Europe. And the bones of these abject ones, whose silent lament still cries 
over to us from these pictures, should become once again flesh in all of our hearts, in 
order to remind us of the hour of our deepest plunge. Yes, with the fervor of one 
who experienced the unthinkable ignominy of their suffering in his own tortured 
soul, I raise my voice for the surviving remnants of those abject ones for whom the 
benefit of life is no less precious than ours.”29 
 
While the passage affirms the aggrandized epistolary self by justifying his 
“fervent” speaker position with a description of his own reaction to the mo-
ving vividness of the images, the similarly presumptuous suggestion of an 
appropriate audience reception also raises the oratorical problem of how to 
create a shared reception of these images. The odd figure of the silent la-
                                                                                                  
and effect on the reader”. Johanna Wernicke-Rothmayer, Armin T. Wegner. Ge-
sellschaftserfahrung und literarisches Werk (Frankfurt a.M.: Lang, 1982), 188. 
27  Wegner, Offener Brief, 2. 
28  Ibid., 5. 
29  DLA, Nachlass Wegner, A: Wegner. A comparison of the manuscript in Mar-
bach with Tamcke’s reconstruction of the manuscript indicates that Wegner ap-
parently altered the passage after the presentation in the Urania. The figure of 
bones becoming flesh again in Wegner’s heart and motivating him to testify on 
behalf of the dead is nonetheless already present in the older text. Orientalische 
Christen, 133-134. 
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ment of pictures of bones crying out at and becoming flesh in the hearts of 
the recipient is a riff on the rhetorical figure of evidentia, which denotes 
here the passage of images into voices that produce audience empathy for 
the victims.30 While the text describes how the horrible images speak to 
Wegner, the question is what kind of images will be produced for the audi-
ence by Wegner’s words as they present these images. Will the audience 
turn away in disgust, or hear the silent lament, and to what end? 
Wegner opens by saying that the lecture tells “a story of death” of un-
precedented scale either in the history of the Great War, or perhaps even in 
the history of humanity.31 Wegner evokes the hearing of stories as a com-
munal and even international phenomenon in the figure of the reverberating 
                                                 
30  Classified as an ornamental figure of thought ascribed to the domain of elocutio 
in, for instance, the rhetorical systems of Quintilian and Cicero, evidentia de-
notes the orator’s ability to represent a case (narratio) in vivid, convincing im-
ages for the audience, as if all were eyewitnesses to the events. Such a compel-
ling representation of the events should immediately convince the recipient of 
the veracity of the reconstruction. The clarity or liveliness (enargeia) of the il-
lustration (evidentia) depends on the recipient’s being emotionally affected, i.e. 
moved, by the mental images produced before his or her eyes in the reconstruc-
tion (representatio). For the discussion of the section in Quintilian, Inst. Oratio, 
VIII 3, 61, see Heinrich Lausberg, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik. Eine 
Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1990), 400. 
Further research on the figure of evidentia has of course been conducted in re-
cent years. I follow a similar approach to the one elaborated, for example, by Pe-
ter Schneck, The Laws of Fiction: Legal Rhetoric and Literary Evidence, Euro-
pean Journal of English Studies 11, 1 (2007), 47-63. 
31  I cite an unpublished manuscript of Wegner’s lecture from his papers at the 
DLA, Nachlass Wegner, A: Wegner. This manuscript resembles a palimpsest, 
for it is a later version that has been written over several times and that does not 
have identifiable consecutive page numbers. For a published version of the lec-
ture see: Die Austreibung des armenischen Volkes in die Wüste: Ein Lichtbild-
vortrag, ed. Andreas Meier (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2011). Tamcke has published 
an attempt to reconstruct the lecture from the Urania in Orientalische Christen, 
72-135 (hereafter: Wegner, Die Austreibung). Whenever possible, I will provide 
citations for the quotations which correspond to the page numbers in Tamcke’s 
reconstruction. Here: 72. 
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echo, saying that this particular story of death’s “echo reverberated across 
the borders of all countries even during the war, failing only to penetrate in-
to the heart of Germany”. The goal of the lecture, then, is to educate the au-
dience about the devastating nature of what Wegner refers to as a “crime” 
by presenting “an unadorned [schlichte] representation of the events as 
such, because they alone speak such a strong language that they cannot be 
trumped [überboten] by any political explication”.32 Wegner’s intended 
function is here neither that of plaintiff nor propagandist against Turkish 
people or culture, but instead that of a mediator of a moral admonition 
against the “terrible and disastrous demon” of violence. He strives to avoid 
a portrayal of the matter in terms of friend and foe distinctions between 
Armenians and Turks, or Christians and Muslims. In compliance with Weg-
ner’s desire to avoid partisanship, the narrative itself must not be adorned 
with either ornament or political explanation. An “unadorned” representa-
tion of the events, according to Wegner, will thus reveal the “truth” about 
the violence committed by a state against its own citizens in the interest of 
war. An underlying premise of his lecture is thus that “[t]he truth obligates 
him who knows it to speak”.33 Yet this is a form of speech that Wegner – 
and one could argue humanitarian narrative in general – has a difficult time 
negotiating. For the credibility of victimhood requires that narratives of suf-
fering attest to the genuine innocence of a victim without too much inter-
ference by mediating instances. Wegner thus has to determine how to nar-
rate this story of death in a way that enables the images to speak for them-
selves. 
Wegner crafts a narrative out of his collected photographic materials 
and own eyewitness account from his tenure as personal assistant to Field 
                                                 
32  If Tamcke’s reconstruction of the lecture at the Urania is accurate, then Wegner 
must have added this opening remark to a later version of the presentation. In 
any case, Wegner seems committed to the notion that truth can somehow speak 
for itself and that a politics of truth does not require further “political” explana-
tion, as is apparent in his rather optimistic hope that “the politics of truth and 
humanity [die Politik der Wahrheit und Menschlichkeit]” could serve as a guide 
in these introductory remarks as well as in his denunciation of the propagation 
of lies and misinformation during the war. Wegner, Die Austreibung, 73.  
33  “Die Wahrheit verpflichtet den, der sie kennt, zu reden”. Wegner, Die Austrei-
bung, 74. 
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Marshall von der Goltz in the region of the former Ottoman Empire that is 
now Iraq. Although Wegner photographed and talked to numerous refugees 
at that time, he does not elect to report his own experience in the form of an 
autobiographical narrative of his experience, but instead chooses first to in-
troduce some historical background and then to reconstruct the expulsion 
of the Armenians with the aid of around 100 diapositives structuring the ac-
count. Because Wegner continued to collect materials from all sorts of 
sources, only around 24-26 of the pictures have been verified as actually ta-
ken by him.34 The first thirteen slides show pictures of local color – geogra-
phy, ruins, churches, Armenian women, etc. – while the following three 
show leaders of the Young Turkish revolution to supply political back-
ground to the account.  
The account of the expulsions begins after such background infor-
mation with a slide titled “Departure of the Refugees”. The next slides and 
their accompanying text present stages of the deportation and massacres in 
graphic, sometimes brutal detail. Wegner’s text surrounds the images with 
stories, including images and descriptions of groups of refugees, beaten in-
dividuals, corpses, and many Armenian women and children. Subsequent 
slides show packed wagons, families in tents, camps, and scenes from the 
Syrian Desert, including Kurdish horsemen, and the arrival of a transport in 
the desert. The remaining slides depict conditions in the desert camps, and, 
though interspersed with pictures of Armenian priests, they are overwhelm-
ingly filled with additional images of women, children, and corpses.  
The effectiveness of Wegner’s narrative of the deportation is indicated 
by the response of his audience at the Urania in Berlin on March 19, 1919, 
although it was not the response he had sought. The presentation was inter-
rupted by the violent uproar among Turks and Armenians in the audience.35 
Wegner was nonetheless able to conclude his lecture following an intermis-
                                                 
34  Andreas Meier: http://podcast.uni-wuppertal.de/2008/09/04/politisch-literarische 
-abenteuer-armin-t-wegner/. 
35  According to a newspaper report, “voices of protest were repeatedly raised by 
Turks present in the audience, which were then whittled down by the Armenians 
who were present”. Berliner Abendzeitung, 20 March 1919, cited in Tamcke, 
Die Kamera als Zeuge, 178. 
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sion and the director’s removal of the most disturbing slides.36 The slides 
themselves thus played no small part as an intermediary of an unsuccessful 
attempt to bring people together to look at images of suffering. Despite his 
desire to articulate a narrative of human suffering at the hands of a particu-
lar logic of the nation-state at war – Wegner refers to a “megalomania of 
the concept of the nation-state and the bloodlust of armed force” – the vio-
lent response of the audience at the Urania suggests that his presentation of 
the events, through its focus on the production of a credible narrative of 
victimhood, mobilized feelings of partisanship rather than of empathy. This 
was the case for both Armenian and Turkish partisans in the audience, as 
well as for those eager to discuss the question of Germany’s complicity 
with the persecution in the German press. The press reports focused predo-
minantly on the conflict generated by the presentation and less on the actual 
topic of the lecture. Nationalist newspapers denounced Wegner as a charla-
tan, who either sought to discredit pre-republican Germany by suggesting 
its culpability or hoped to interfere in an internal affair that, as an article in 
Die Verteidigung from 22 March 1919 asserted, “could be settled between 
Armenians and Turks themselves”.37 Defending its ambitions to be an insti-
tution of civil society with a neutral stance toward partisan politics, the 
Urania consequently distanced itself from Wegner’s lecture. The directors 
complain to him in a letter five days later that, “The Urania cannot permit 
itself to become a stomping ground for political oppositions and opinions. 
                                                 
36  “After the customary intermission the second part of the lecture was listened to 
in greater quiet; however, the director of the ‘Urania’ had run by meanwhile and 
removed the worst pictures of horror from the sequence of slides accompanying 
the lecture.” Berliner Abendzeitung, 20 March 1919, ibid.  
37  For an overview of press reports by both liberal and nationalist newspapers, see 
Tamcke, Armin T. Wegner, 196-197. Tamcke holds the “expressionist overload, 
the excess of affect”, of the language of Wegner’s lecture responsible for pre-
venting “a more objective reception of what the audience heard”. See Tamcke, 
Armin T. Wegner’s “Die Austreibung”, 69. Tamcke seems to believe that emo-
tions are the source of conflict here and that there exists an appropriate form of 
representation that could bracket emotional factors in the pursuit of what he 
calls “political enlightenment” about the massacres. 
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Your lecture was a lesson for us that we have to steer more carefully 
here”.38  
One explanation for the failure of Wegner’s lecture at the Urania, 
which had sought to provide an immediate forum for a shared experience of 
looking at the images and hearing this particular story of death, could pos-
sibly have been that the contested political situation at the time generated a 
pervasive environment of self-vindication and mutual recrimination. Weg-
ner tries to carefully navigate the question of guilt. On the one hand, he 
avoids simple attributions of guilt by naming several international sites of 
war crimes,39 and to no small extent, of German suffering. “Germany in 
Belgium, Russia in East Prussia, Rumania and France in the camps of Ger-
man prisoners of war”: these nations too are all guilty of committing hei-
nous crimes against enemy combatants or local populations during the war. 
Yet he even goes a step further and distinguishes between the benevolent 
intentions of a majority of Turks or the Muslim religion and the nationalist 
ambitions of brutal Turkish political leaders. He makes a similar distinction 
when it comes to Germans. He asserts that while “Germany bears no small 
amount of complicity, due to its close alliance with Turkey during the war”, 
the “mass of the German people that was shamelessly deceived knew noth-
ing of this crime in which it was unwittingly implicated, because, as with 
everywhere else during the war, the public sphere, the voice of humanity, 
was suppressed”. A key demarcation between innocent populace and cul-
pable leaders underlies his efforts at reconciliation between Germans and 
Armenians. The implication is that if the Armenians are depicted here as 
                                                 
38  Direktion of the Urania to Wegner, 24 March 1919, DLA, Nachlass Wegner, A: 
Wegner. 
39  His discussion of war crimes intersects with the discourse of international law 
around the time. At the Paris Peace Conference, this language of war crimes was 
used by the victors against Germany. For a discussion of this context with 
respect to international relations toward the Ottoman Empire, see Daniel Marc 
Segesser, Dissolve or punish? The international debate among jurists and publi-
cists on the consequences of the Armenian genocide for the Ottoman Empire, 
1915-23, in: Late Ottoman Genocides. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire 
and Young Turkish population and extermination policies, ed. Dominik J. Schal-
ler and Jürgen Zimmerer (London and NY: Routledge, 2009), 86-101, here: 96. 
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innocent victims, so too have the populations of warring European nations 
suffered at the hands of bellicose political leaders.  
Yet a closer analysis of the rhetoric of Wegner’s presentation reveals 
that the text also fails to escape a certain political logic of national myth. 
The final slide of Wegner’s lecture contains a picture of a sunrise over Lake 
Van. Signifying life in contrast to death and darkness, optimism, awaken-
ings, and new beginnings, the rising sun is a metaphor of the birth of an 
Armenian nation with Europe’s help. It thus also figures the promise of rec-
onciliation between Armenians and Germans as part of the international 
community of European nations. Europe, Wegner insists, has a duty to par-
ticipate in the relief work, which according to him should include no less 
than the allocation of land, the supply of resources, and the founding of an 
internationally recognized independent Armenian nation-state.  
 
“When, we finally ask, will the conscience of humanity rise up with such power that 
a crime will ultimately disappear from the earth, a crime, which for the last twenty-
five years has tarnished the earth for the eyes of Europe. It is Europe’s duty to assist 
earnestly and lovingly in this relief work so that the fate of Armenia does not take 
second place to the self-centered goals of large states. All of Europe, and not in the 
least Germany, adopted in the Berlin Agreement of July 1878 the most sacred guar-
antee to protect the peace and security of Armenia. Seduced by self-centered poli-
tics, it has to this day not honored this vow.”40  
 
Wegner’s story thus does not end in the Syrian Desert, does not merely 
commemorate the deaths of many innocent Armenians, but signals the pro-
mise of a new beginning among the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Humani-
tarian relief work is here coupled with the founding of an Armenian nation-
state, which is no small demand and a very explicit political agenda that 
leads the search for a “transitional formula between suffering and relief”41 
back into the political logic of nation-states. 
                                                 
40  DLA, Nachlass Wegner, A: Wegner. The first sentence of the passage is not in-
cluded in Tamcke’s reconstruction of the manuscript. Orientalische Christen, 
132. 
41  The phrase is borrowed from Slaughter’s analysis of grammars of humanitarian 
narrative in Joseph R. Slaughter, Humanitarian Reading, in: Humanitarianism 
and Suffering, 88-107, here: 99. 
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A second metaphor for the politics of the nation-state overlaps with that 
of the sunrise: the transmission of knowledge and the moral repercussions 
of the atrocity figured as the crime’s echo across national borders. In the in-
troduction of his lecture, Wegner refers to the reverberation of the crime’s 
echo across national borders and its halting at the sound barrier in the heart 
of Germany. The moral imperative animating Wegner’s project of reconcil-
iation between Germans and Armenians is inseparable from recognition of 
the political responsibility of both Talaat Pascha and his accomplices and of 
the world powers that failed to intervene or are in a position now to redress 
this injustice. The previous distinction between the moral authority of inno-
cent populations and the violent abuse of political authority by their leaders 
transforms into a newly claimed political authority for the victims pit 
against the immorality of political leaders. Wegner makes such a connec-
tion in the text accompanying a slide showing Talaat and Enver in their sa-
lons. The text briefly summarizes their plans for a pan-Turkism, which 
Wegner claims they strove to accomplish through the “regretless eradica-
tion of all that is not Turkish [rücksichtslose Ausrottungn (sic.) alles des-
sen, was nicht türkisch ist]”.42 Two slides later, the lecture presents a relief 
map of Turkey. In the corresponding text, Wegner explains that the consol-
idation of a Turkish nation-state went hand in hand with the transformation 
of entire regions, including not only the Russian front but also the territo-
ries historically populated by Armenians, as well as the coastal areas along 
the Mediterranean, into the “concept of the border [der Begriff der Gren-
ze]”. This “concept of the border” territorializes the notion of an ethnic na-
tion-state by demarcating those areas, which might be susceptible to foreign 
invasion and providing a rationale for measures enacted to defend these 
borders in a time of war.43 Wegner’s sunrise metaphor reiterates, however, 
the logic of the border – though it temporalizes it by locating it on the hori-
zon – and thereby legitimates semantics of the nation-state based on a story 
of common identity and geographical space ascribed to Armenia. What is 
more, his is a foundational myth tied to a vision of international reconcilia-
                                                 
42  Wegner, Die Austreibung, 82. 
43  Ibid., 87. A process analyzed by Jay Winter, Under Cover of War: The Armeni-
an Genocide in the Context of Total War, in: The Spector of Genocide? Mass 
Murder in Historical Perspective, ed. Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernen (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 189-214.  
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tion and cooperation that is legitimated by an appeal to a normative sense 
of “humanity”. 
Wegner’s audience would thus have cause to be wary of the reconcilia-
tion staged by his slide presentation. Even if his narrative was able to es-
cape the solipsistic mobilization of the figure of evidentia that is character-
istic of the Letter to Wilson, in order to encourage a situation of reception 
in which the vividness of his narrative slide show motivated his audience to 
look together at the images of mass brutality, such an act of communal 
hearing and viewing remained nevertheless subordinate to those very stub-
born investments in the integrity of the nation-state that so often hinder the 
successful construction of shared histories. Although Wegner’s slide show 
stages a scene of looking and hearing in the name of “humanity”, the legit-
imation of an independent nation-state put forth in the narrative was too 
contentious for audience members caught up in the environment of political 
groups seeking to advance their interests at home and abroad during the ne-
gotiation of peace treaties and the consolidation of new political regimes in 
Turkey and Germany. 
 
 
THE TRIAL OF TALAAT PASCHA: A UNILATERAL 
GESTURE OF RECONCILIATION 
 
Two years later, on June 2 and 3, 1921, a trial was conducted before a 
sworn jury of the Third District Court of Berlin to decide the question of 
Salomon Teilirian’s guilt for murdering Talaat Pascha, the former Minister 
of the Interior in Turkey between 1909 and 1917 and one of the principle 
instigators of the Armenian genocide. Talaat Pascha had been living incog-
nito in Berlin since November 1918, after having fled there from Istanbul, 
along with other Young Turkish leaders, onboard a German torpedo boat 
with the help of the German General Hans von Seeckt.44 Under pressure 
from the victorious allied powers, and in particular from Great Britain, the 
Ottoman regime conducted trials between 1919 and 1921 against politicians 
and officials responsible for the deportations of Armenians into the Syrian 
Desert. Talaat was sentenced in absentia to death on 5 July 1919.45 He was 
                                                 
44  Schaefgen, Schwieriges Erinnern, 42. 
45  Ibid., 31; Segesser, Dissolve or punish, 97. 
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thus either living secretly in Berlin as a refugee, or, depending upon one’s 
perspective, as a fugitive. On March 15, 1921, the Armenian student and 
member of the Nemesis Group, whose avowed goal it was to assassinate 
such fugitive officials responsible for the Armenian genocide, shot Talaat 
Pascha in Berlin-Charlottenburg.46 It was up to the jury to decide whether 
this was a case of premeditated murder.47 After an hour of deliberation, the 
jury surprisingly acquitted Salomon Teilirian of the charge. 
Remarkable for the topic of reconciliation and civil society is how this 
trial marks an instance of reconciliation between Germans and Armenians, 
and can be interpreted as contributing to the formation of an official cultur-
al memory of the Armenian genocide. In this case, an authority sanctioned 
by the state, such as the district court of Berlin, became a conduit for the 
dissemination of witness testimonies, as well as for a gesture of reconcilia-
tion, by issuing a verdict of not guilty in favor of a victim of state-spon-
sored massacre and thereby distancing itself from the previous foreign poli-
cy of supporting Germany’s war-time ally responsible for the forced depor-
tations and massacres.  
While the verdict was in strict legal terms to be decided by a twelve-
member jury of laymen on the basis of expert testimony about the mental 
state of the defendant, whose entire family had been massacred during the 
deportation in June 1915, the shocking testimonies by eyewitnesses and 
German officials stationed in Ottoman Turkey during the war transformed 
the trial into a forum for the denunciation of the inhuman practices of a po-
litical regime toward the Armenians, in which victim transformed into per-
petrator and vice versa. Armin T. Wegner had been commissioned as an 
expert witness for the trial by Counselor Johannes Werthauer due to his in-
timate knowledge of the massacres.48 Though he never testified in court, he 
was involved in the proceedings and drafted an assessment of the trial, enti-
tled “A Just Verdict” (Ein gerechtes Urteil), which was printed later in 
                                                 
46  Schaefgen, Schwieriges Erinnern, 42. 
47  According to the Eröffnungsbeschluß. Der Prozeß Talaat Pascha. Stenographi-
scher Prozeßbericht mit einem Vorwort von Armin T. Wegner und einem An-
hang (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1921), 
13. The publication of the court transcript was financed by the Deutsch-Armeni-
sche Gesellschaft. Tamcke, Armin T. Wegner, 214-215.  
48  Werthauer to Wegner, 30 March 1921, DLA, Nachlass Wegner, A: Wegner. 
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1921 as the Foreword to the publication of the stenographic report of the 
trial. Wegner declares that the trial reveals “once again to the eyes of the 
world, and for the first time also to those of the German public [...] the sys-
tematic massacre of an entire people by the Young Turkish regime”.49 
Wegner’s synechdoche of the “eyes of the world” suggests that the path 
towards reconciliation was made possible by the trial’s setting, which ena-
bled both involved parties and an imagined international community to look 
together at the vivid and compelling images of the atrocity. This time the 
act of seeing together occurred within at least two frameworks that differ 
significantly from the previous ones in which Wegner was active.  
The first setting was delineated by the institutional parameters of a local 
court of law. The district court in Berlin became, importantly and in con-
trast to Wegner’s public lecture at the Urania, an opportunity for Armenian 
victims living in Berlin to bear witness to their own experiences of suffer-
ing. The testimony of witness for the defense Christine Tersibaschian, in 
particular, delivered a first-hand account of the horrors of the deportation 
from her hometown of Erzerum in July 1915. With the assistance of a trans-
lator, Tersibaschian recalled in explicit detail the deportation of the town’s 
population in groups of four over the course of eight days.50 Her twenty-one 
member family was part of the second group of five-hundred families to be 
deported; her testimony was especially moving for those present in the 
courtroom, because she testifies, “I have seen with my own eyes the loss of 
all but three of my family members”, as well as the brutal deaths of many 
others who were drowned in a river or beaten to death at the hands of Turk-
ish police and soldiers.51 According to the court transcript, two statements 
from her testimony in particular caused “commotion” in the courtroom: The 
first was when she “swore” to have seen how the police and soldiers cut 
open the rib cages of pregnant women and threw away the fetuses. The se-
cond was when she explicitly attributed responsibility for the massacres to 
the Turkish leader Enver Pascha and described how Turkish soldiers forced 
the Armenian refugees to call out “Long live the Pascha!” for having spared 
their lives.52  
                                                 
49  Prozeß Talaat Pascha, vii. 
50  Ibid., 53-55. 
51  Ibid., 54.  
52  Ibid., 55. 
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Additional eyewitness testimony combined with the accounts of expert 
witnesses, including extensive testimony by Lepsius, to make a damning 
case against Talaat Pascha and generate empathy for the defendant.53 At the 
same time, the district court offered the German foreign ministry the oppor-
tunity to exonerate itself. For another expert witness called to testify at the 
trial was Limon von Sanders, the commander of the German military mis-
sion in the Ottoman Empire during the war, who explained for the record 
that neither the German government nor military officials had either partic-
ipated in the deportations or been aware of the extent of the massacres.54 
Moreover, his account shifts the blame away from Talaat by emphasizing 
rather the role of unruly functionaries. For although he concedes that the 
Turkish regime ordered the mass deportations, he imputes the extent of 
their brutality to the undisciplined “bad elements” of the makeshift police 
placed in charge of conducting the deportations.55 The presence of Limon 
von Sanders at the trial insured that reconciliation between Germans and 
Armenians was thus achieved at the expense of both vilified Turkish re-
gime and functionaries. The trial thus conveniently allowed the German 
foreign ministry to participate in a gesture of reconciliation toward Armeni-
an survivors while denying any responsibility as a former military ally of 
the Turkish regime and creating a measured degree of distance from those 
immediately responsible.56 This in turn meant that the German public was 
also provided with an experience of hearing about the atrocities without be-
ing overly burdened by questions of complicity. 
In addition to creating a setting invested with legal authority for the dis-
semination of survivor, eyewitness, and expert testimony about the massa-
cre, the trial resulted predominantly in the scripting of an official public 
                                                 
53  Schaefgen, Schwieriges Erinnern, 42-49. 
54  Sanders claims under oath: “everything was kept secret from us, so that we 
could not gain insight into the internal political affairs.” Prozeß Talaat Pascha, 
63.  
55  Ibid., 61-62. 
56  Nevertheless, the trial and question of German complicity or guilt for war  
crimes persisted as highly contentious issues within Germany, as the widely va-
rying responses in the press show. Schaller, Die Rezeption des Völkermordes an 
den Armeniern, 531-538. Further remarks on the trial’s reception are provided 
by Tamcke, Armin T. Wegner, 216-218. 
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record of the massacres within Germany, with no direct impact on Armeni-
an political affairs. To be sure, Armenian survivors expressed their enthusi-
asm for the official recognition of the atrocities signified by the verdict, and 
their appreciation to Lepsius in particular for his efforts.57 Yet the modest 
success of the trial as a unilateral gesture of reconciliation by Germans to-
wards Armenians can be attributed to a large extent to its setting aside the 
question of material or political retribution through support of Armenian 
national independence. The Treaty of Sèvres from 10 August 1920 had rec-
ognized an Armenian Republic – the so-called “Wilsonian Armenia” – 
whose existence was under constant threat until finally being annexed by 
the Soviet Union in 1922, yet this political context was never thematized in 
deliberations at the trial. The trial might have served as a more congenial 
site for a gesture of reconciliation because its institutional conventions de-
tached testimony from the explicit goal of Armenian independence that had 
been so important and contentious for Wegner’s project of reconciliation.  
Wegner’s commentary to the trial attempts to re-frame the verdict with-
in the international story of humanity that he had been advocating and nar-
rating during the previous years. He insists on the political nature of the tri-
al, asserting that it became a “tribunal of humanity” and that the verdict 
contains “world-historical significance”.58 Moreover, while he still advo-
cates “empathy [...] on the side of the Armenian nation”,59 he casts the trial 
as a decision over “two other powers”, those of “violence and law, crime 
and humanity”. In other words, he casts the verdict as a “rejection of that 
politics which claims the right to treat entire peoples like animals for 
slaughter, or even worse, like unfeeling stones”.60 Wegner’s text concedes 
here many of the concrete political goals that he had considered necessary 
                                                 
57  Schaefgen refers to a large file in the Johannes-Lepsius-Archiv in Halle contain-
ing positive responses to the verdict by prominent members of the Armenian 
diaspora community, 48, and to the study: Hermann Goltz, Dr. Johannes Lepsi-
us (1858-1926). Zu Leben und Werk des Potsdamer Anwalts der Armenier. This 
essay is available alongside others on Lepsius, the genocide, Wegner, and Ger-
man-Armenian relations at the website of the Lepsiushaus Potsdam: http://lepsiu 
shaus.wordpress.com/aktivitaeten/publikationen/  
58  Wegner, Vorwort, in: Prozess Talaat Pascha, vii.  
59  Ibid., xi. 
60  Ibid., x. 
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for the process of reconciliation between Germans and Armenians. His role 
has changed along with the different context of reconciliation from that of 
the humanitarian activist trying to inform the German public about the 
atrocity, and thereby garner political and material support for the Armenian 
survivors, to that of the passionate interpreter of a moment of symbolic rec-
onciliation offered by a German court of law toward Armenian survivors.61  
Nevertheless, Wegner continued his activism, trying in vain, for in-
stance, to found a humanitarian relief operation in Armenia in cooperation 
with Fritjof Nansen, who was in charge of refugee aid under the auspices of 
the League of Nations.62 In a gesture of appreciation for his work as an in-
termediary of reconciliation, an Armenian congregation granted him a gen-
erous stipend of 10,000 Reichsmark in 1922 to finance his attempt to write 
a great historical novel about the deportations called The Expulsion.63 
                                                 
61  Robert M.W. Kempner, the assistant U.S. Chief Counsel during the Nürnberg 
trials, interprets the trial as “recognition for the first time in legal history of the 
tenet” that foreign states can try to combat genocide without being regarded as 
interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, and Wegner’s role as con-
sisting in “hammering the truth about this holocaust into the conscience of hu-
manity”. Robert M.W. Kempner, Vor sechzig Jahren vor einem deutschen 
Schwurgericht. Der Völkermord an den Armeniern, Recht und Politik 3 (1980), 
167-69, here: 167. 
62  Nansen to Wegner, 23 February 1923, DLA, Nachlass Wegner, A: Wegner. 
Continued attacks on the Armenians by nationalist Turks led Wegner to write 
another epistle, this time to the “regimes of the victorious nations”, condemning 
the international failure to protect the newly-formed Armenian republic and the 
many displaced Armenians. Armin T. Wegner, Die Schrei vom Ararat. An die 
Regierung der sieghaften Völker. Aufruf zum Schutze Armeniens, Die neue Ge-
neration 18 (1922), 348-355, and again as: Die Schrei vom Ararat, Die Welt-
bühne 19 (1923), 122-126.  
63  Meier, podcast. Despite fifty years of work, the novel was never completed. See 
also: Rooney, Leben und Werk Armin T. Wegners, 349. Exiled Armenians living 
in Germany expressed their appreciation for Wegner’s work around 1920 and 
especially after the trial, as evidenced by publication of his writings in Armenian 
newspapers, the fact that many exiled Armenians bought his books, and letters 
of thanks in his archived papers, such as the one from the Verein der Armeni-
schen Kolonie in Berlin from 2 July 1921. Tamcke, Armin T. Wegner, 205. 
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Moreover, in 1968, he was invited to Armenia by the Catholics of All Ar-
menians and awarded the Order of Saint Gregory the Illuminator in recog-
nition of his work on behalf of Armenians. Wegner’s efforts as an interme-
diary of reconciliation between Germans and Armenians, which he always 
regarded as a project to be undertaken not only as a German but also as an 
international matter, explored with varying degrees of success strategies for 
getting people to look together at or listen to the pain of others. His activi-
ties remind us that while such acts of looking and listening are embedded 
within contentious frames of reference by a host of intermediaries within 
civil society, these mediating instances of acts of reconciliation are them-
selves defined by those very political circumstances and dynamics that they 
set out to discern, contain, and change. 
Mea Culpas, Negotiations, Apologias  
Revisiting the “Apology” of Turkish Intellectuals1  
AYDA ERBAL 
 
“History is a nightmare from which I am 
trying to awake.” Stephen Dedalus  




The long nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire’s dismantling that star-
ted with the Serbian revolt of 1804 culminated in a series of events leading 
to the years 1915-1918 during which the Christian populations of the Em-
pire, among them Armenians, Assyrians and Pontic Greeks, were annihilat-
ed in their homelands. Justified by the official narrative both as a response 
to the deportation and ethnic cleansing of Muslims from the Balkans and 
Russia and as a structural necessity to save the remains of the Empire, the 
last thirty years of Ottoman policies in the imperial territories that will be-
come contemporary Turkey still remain a taboo.  
Even though since the 1990s there has been considerable change in the 
Turkish state discourse and policy,2 the Armenian Genocide and its institu-
                                                 
1  I thank Marc Mamigonian and Axel Bertamini Çorluyan for their valuable cri-
tiques and comments for several versions of this paper. I cannot thank Birgit 
Schwelling enough for her comments and patience during the editorial process. 
Lastly I would like to thank the participants of the Political Reconciliation and 
Civil Society in 20th Century Europe Workshop for their inputs.  
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tional and political/economic repercussions occupy the center-piece of this 
taboo. Among other things, contemporary street names and boulevards, 
schools and memorials honoring key figures in the planning and perpetra-
tion of the Armenian Genocide3 offer testimony to the lack of the Turkish 
state’s institutional commitments regarding gross human rights violations.  
However, the Turkish state has not been the only enforcer of the taboo 
surrounding the issue of the Armenian Genocide. Turkish civil society and 
the academic and intellectual establishment within that civil society have 
also been either actively in denial or in some cases in service of a denialist 
state agenda or standing passively silent – another form of denial – for over 
90 years. As a result, all late Ottoman historiography and the social scien-
ces and related high school curriculum in Turkey4 have been highly proble-
matic in their evident obscurantism in both historical and economic data 
concerning the late Ottoman and early Republican periods. Historical soci-
ologist Taner Akçam’s pioneering work on the Armenian Genocide5 has 
been the first crack in the long history of silence in Turkey, yet its trickling 
down to the popular journalistic discourse in Turkey is still very limited.  
                                                                                                  
2  For an elaborate take on the history of the change of the Turkish state discourse 
since the 1970s see Seyhan Bayraktar, Politik und Erinnerung: Der Diskurs 
über den Armeniermord in der Türkei zwischen Nationalismus und Europäisier-
ung (Bielefeld: transcript, 2010). 
3  Ahmet nsel, Katilden Milli Kahraman Olur Mu?, Radikal, 26 April 2004, 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1047 
371&Yazar=AHMET%20%DDNSEL&Date=26.04.2011&CategoryID=99. Un-
less otherwise mentioned, all internet sources are accessed on 12 April 2012. All 
translations from Turkish by the author. 
4  For an extensive debate on Armenian Genocide and Turkish high school cur-
riculum see Jennifer M. Dixon, Education and National Narratives: Changing 
Representations of the Armenian Genocide in History Textbooks in Turkey, The 
International Journal for Education Law and Policy, Special Issue: Legitima-
tion and Stability of Political Systems: The Contribution of National Narratives 
(2010), 103-126. 
5  Taner Akçam wrote a series of books from Turkish National Identity and the 
Armenian Question (stanbul: letiim, 1992) to The Young Turks Crime Against 
Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Em-
pire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
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The apology campaign initiated by four Turkish scholars in December 
2008 and endorsed by over thirty thousand Turkish citizens, the subject 
matter of this chapter, might be considered as another “crack” in the long 
history of silence. I argue that despite the apology initiators’ presentation of 
the apology as a purely “personal” gesture, framing it as a matter of “con-
science”, the campaign nonetheless cannot be viewed as falling outside the 
domain of political apologies. But their potentially important place in seem-
ingly solving contemporary political crises aside, what are political apolo-
gies? Are they empty rhetorical tools with which states or citizens try to 
score public relations points in situations where there is neither the possibil-
ity of a direct remedy because of passage of time, nor the willingness to fol-
low a transitional democratization process with direct economic and/or po-
litical consequences including retribution and reparation? Do contemporary 
apologies rather “signify the death twitches of expiring moral systems”, and 
do those who complain about “disingenuous,” “inauthentic” or “commodi-
fied” apologies suffer from nostalgia for a more principled age that proba-
bly never have existed”?6 Are apologies new ways of “imagining”, hence 
transforming the “nation”? What kind of institutional or civil societal nor-
mative commitments does the language of the state-to-state, state-to-many, 
or many-to-many apologies communicate, if any? What differentiates a 
successful apology from a pseudo or non-apology? What is the difference 
between apologia and apology? 
In order to analyze the apology campaign with regard to these ques-
tions, I will first clarify the term apology by touching upon its evolution 
from the Greek word apologia (speech in defense) to the current word 
apology (a speech act of contrition), then very briefly go over the literature 
itself and possible political pitfalls both in the literature and actual acts of 
state-to-many and many-to-many apologies, the latter being a rarity itself. 
Secondly, I will also revisit the context and text of the Turkish intellectuals’ 
I Apologize campaign to position and analyze it within the parameters of 
the present literature on apologies. I argue that although the I Apologize 
                                                 
6  Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 2.  
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campaign is a move in the right direction for changing the lens7 of society 
by informing the public sphere of the necessity for recognizing that there is 
something grave to apologize for8, it falls short in too many aspects to be 
considered a successful apology that would lead to conciliation9. I also 
claim that the passive, unclear and negotiationist language of the text makes 
it more of an apologia in the old sense of word rather than an apology. 
While doing so I problematize the one-sided, top-down elitist/Jacobinist 
and preemptive/vertical politics of the preparation process of the “apology” 
text in which horizontal, large-scale deliberation clearly was lacking in at 
least two separate contexts: neither the necessity for nor the meaning of a 
personal apology, nor the wording of the text was widely discussed in the 
Turkish public sphere, nor were any Armenian representative organizations 
consulted about many issues ranging from whether they expected a person-
al apology to whether they approved the text of the “apology”. I also posit 
that this preemptive public negotiation, lacking deliberative input from the 
offended party, is offensive itself in its re-creation of historical vertical 
power politics once again to the detriment of the offended party.10 The non-
                                                 
7  I thank Hella Dietz for the “changing the lens” metaphor she came up with dur-
ing the discussions at the Political Reconciliation Workshop at the University of 
Konstanz. 
8  This may not be a problem if one perceives apologies as repetitive performative 
actions to be bettered over time. In a parallel way Elazar Barkan argues in his 
The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (New 
York: Norton, 2000), xxix: “An apology doesn’t mean the dispute is resolved, 
but it is in most cases a first step, part of the process of negotiation but not the 
satisfactory end result. Often, lack of apologies, demands for apologies, and the 
refusal of them all are pre-steps in negotiations, a diplomatic dance that may last 
for a while, a testimony to the wish and the need of both sides to reach the nego-
tiations stage.” 
9  I use the term conciliation instead of reconciliation in this context. Turks and 
Armenians never dealt with equal terms neither during Ottoman nor Republican 
times. The period leading to genocide recognition and post recognition will be 
the first where they will overcome animosity, hence conciliate.  
10  Aaron Lazare dedicated Chapter 10 of On Apology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 205-227, to the complex negotiation process between the offended 
and the offender before the actual apology gets publicized.  
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deliberated public nature of the apology is offensive in the present because 
if the offended party does not accept the apology, it will look non-coope-
rative and hostile. I finally argue that Armenians as a party not only disap-
peared from the historiography and the land itself but also from what 
should have been a non-preemptive, dialogical process of apology. 
 
 
APOLOGIES IN PROCESSES OF (RE-)CONCILIATION 
 
Apologia or Apology? 
 
Most of the introductory courses in Western philosophy start with Plato’s 
Apology – a philosophical work in which Socrates could not be farther 
from being apologetic, as the term has come to be understood later. Instead 
he provides an apologia as was customary in the classical Greek system in 
rebuttal to the prosecution’s accusations. Its Greek root apologos means a 
story, from which apologia, an oral or written defense, will emerge and lat-
er be transformed into what we know as apology today. The Oxford English 
Dictionary11 omits any reference to apologos as a story and begins from the 
Greek apoloyia (apo, away, off; loyia, speaking), which is defined as a de-
fense or speech in defense. As we understand the term now, an apology is 
an encounter between two parties, the offender and the offended, where the 
offender acknowledges responsibility for an offense or grievance and ex-
presses regret or remorse to the aggrieved party. There is an overall tenden-
cy, well studied by the literature, to confuse an apology with a perfunctory 
“sorry about that”, which is merely a compassionate or empathetic expres-
sion where there is no offender or offended in the classical sense and, 
hence, no necessity for the acknowledgment of grievances.  
The present literature dealing with political, philosophical, linguistic, as 
well as psychological issues related to apologies, mostly refers to the two 
works of Tavuchis and Lazare, and takes the following criteria as the basis 
of a successful apology: 12 
                                                 
11  Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., 20 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989). 
12  Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); Smith, I Was Wrong; Lazare, On 
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• Explanation of the offense 
• Expression of shame/guilt/humility/sincerity 
• Intention not to commit the offense again 
• Reparations to the offended party  
 
The first three are the standard criteria for a successful apology and the last 
criterion becomes all the more significant in proportion to the extent of the 
crime/offense. Nick Smith took the existing literature a step further and 
came up with several other criteria for a categorical apology in order to dis-
tinguish it from non-categorical apologies. For Smith, a categorical apology 
consists of the following: 
 
• Corroboration of Factual Record 
• Acceptance of Blame  
• Possession of Appropriate Standing 
• Identification of Each Harm 
• Identification of the Moral Principles Underlying Each Harm 
• Shared Commitment to Moral Principles Underlying Each Harm 
• Recognition of Victim as Moral Interlocutor 
• Categorical Regret 
• Performance of Apology 
• Reform and Redress 
• Intentions for Apologizing 
• Emotions13 
                                                                                                  
Apology; Barkan, The Guilt of Nations; Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn, Tak-
ing Wrongs Seriously: Apologies and Reconciliation (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2006); The Age of Apology: Facing Up to Past, ed. Marc Gibney 
et al. (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Danielle Celer-
majer, The Sins of Nations and the Rituals of Apology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009); Roy Brooks, When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The Controver-
sy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice (New York: New York 
University Press, 1999). 
13  Smith, I Was Wrong, 28-108. Smith’s work is not just limited to identifying cat-
egorical apologies and differentiating them from the non-categorical kind, he is 
also interested in the varieties of meanings that even non-categorical apologies 
transmit. 
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Hence, issues of linguistic and intentional clarity are paramount for a suc-
cessful apology. A sentence such as “I apologize for whatever I may have 
done” is not an apology since it fails to acknowledge the offense; indeed, 
the offender may not even believe that an offense was committed. Similar-
ly, what is called a conditional apology, i.e., “if you were hurt, I am sorry”, 
is not an apology at all, because the implication is that perhaps it’s the ag-
grieved party’s sensitivity that is the problem. Another often cited example 
to illustrate the problems of an unclear language is President Nixon’s resig-
nation speech (1974) where he deeply regretted any injuries that may have 
been caused, or Senator Robert Packwood’s “apology” for “alleged” offen-
ses of sexually abusing female pages (1992). According to Aaron Lazare, 
“both failed to acknowledge definitively what the public believed to be 
true, thus insulting the intelligence of their respective audiences”.14 Al-
though measuring sincerity is difficult in any given situation, with apolo-
gies the issue is not only vagueness but also sincerity. One also has to un-
derstand that it is possible to deliver a sincere but unsuccessful apology; 
hence, despite the fact that sincerity has been cited as one of the emotional 
components of a successful apology it is not indicative of success on its 
own.  
 
Politics of Apologies 
 
State, as well as non-state apologies from many-to-many, have proliferated 
especially since 199515 to the point where the Catholic Church had issued 
ninety-four apologies by 1998.16 As Elazar Barkan pointed out, in the same 
period “questions of morality and justice” started to receive “growing atten-
tion as political questions. As such, the need for restitution to past victims 
has become a major part of national politics and international diplomacy”.17 
The literature dealing with institutional or state apologies for gross vio-
lations of human rights has grown tremendously within the last forty years, 
                                                 
14  Lazare, On Apology, 8-9. 
15  Gibney et al., The Age of Apology, 2. 
16  Ibid., 3. Not all of these apologies were directed towards the immediate victims 
themselves but “were apologies to God for the way the Church, or members of 
the Church, had behaved”. 
17  Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, xvi. 
58 | AYDA ERBAL 

but more so since the Canadian government’s official apology to their na-
tive citizens in 2008. It can be said that civil rights politics in the United 
States and Europe along with the continental institutional commitments of 
the post-Holocaust world gave way to a new wave of movements, both do-
mestic and international, which tried to limit the way the powerful operated 
vis-à-vis the powerless.18 Perhaps the apology of Queen Elizabeth II (1995) 
and of Jenny Shipley, the Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Maori 
people (1998) or Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s recent apology 
“for the past wrongs caused by successive governments on the indigenous 
Aboriginal population”19 (2008) have been informed by a world order more 
concerned about institutional impunity. It seems that “the problem of impu-
nity became more and more of an issue, not only to new states but also to 
those still burdened by their colonial and world war pasts”.20 Or perhaps, 
scholars in memory studies as well as some victims of injustice are right in 
their suspicions of the usefulness of apologies themselves or the sincerity of 
several of these reconciliation policies in the 1990s. McLaughlin for exam-
ple calls official apologies “symbolic and meaningless gestures made by 
leaders who have no intention of avoiding similar acts in the future”. 21 Jan-
na Thompson also refers to Aboriginal leader Patrick Dodson who thinks 
that “the only meaningful act an Australian government could perform is to 
guarantee the rights of indigenous Australians in the Australian Constitu-
tion”. Thompson also reports that other Aboriginal leaders are highly criti-
cal of apologies they believe to be only a feel-good process for the apolo-
gizers that does nothing concrete to solve the issues of their communities. 
                                                 
18  Jean-Marc Coicaud and Jibecke Jönsson, Elements of a Road Map for a Politics 
of Apology, in: The Age of Apology, 77-93. Coicaud and Jönsson also mention 
the Latin American shift from dictatorships to democracies and several other re-
gions, post-Soviet republics and African countries in transition that underwent 
significant institutional transformation in the years following the end of the Cold 
War. 
19  Australia apology to Aborigines, 13 February 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
7241965.stm. 
20  Coicaud and Jönsson, Elements, 82.  
21  Martin McLaughlin, Blair and the Potato Famine, Socialist Equality, 14 June 
1997, quoted in: Janna Thompson, Apology, Justice, and Respect: A Critical 
Defense of Political Apology, in: The Age of Apology, 31-44, here: 32. 
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This is in line with Gibney and Roxstrom who criticize the West’s highly 
selective and very ambiguous apologies mostly devised with an eye on pre-
serving the international status quo.22 De Laforcade also “notes that slavery 
memorial day, ironically, became an occasion for self-praise rather than for 
self-criticism since the commemorations focus on ‘enlightened values, gen-
erosity of French liberals in 1830’ rather than anti-colonial revolts and re-
sistance movements in the Antilles”,23 and he suggests that by “declaring 
slavery ‘a crime against humanity’, legislators intended to divert migrant 
public opinion from measures against contemporary issues of discrimina-
tion”.24 Karen E. Till similarly argues that the commemoration of the aboli-
tion of slavery “positions France as a moral leader in a global order with 
‘good’ nations acknowledging past actions. As tied to a neo-liberal agenda, 
acknowledging past crimes against humanity locates that legacy in the past, 
not the present, even in the face of stark anti-immigration laws and militant 
government responses to student and minority social unrest.”25 In a similar 
critical vein, after revisiting several selective political apologies Jenna 
Thompson argues that “political leaders are willing to apologize only when 
they think that there will be no serious political or legal repercussions”.26 
Political scientists have generally been less interested in apologies than 
philosophers, sociologists, linguists and anthropologists, perhaps because 
what state-to-state or state-to-many apologies achieve institutionally is not 
very clear. But although one can be conflicted about the meaning or func-
tion of collective apologies and acknowledge the validity of critiques of po-
litical apologies as diversions or fig leaves for regime crimes, especially if 
not accompanied with retributive and/or restorative justice measures, at the 
                                                 
22  Mark Gibney and Erik Roxstrom, The Status of State Apologies, Human Rights 
Quarterly 23, 4 (2001), 911-939. Accordingly, the West “wants credit for rec-
ognizing and acknowledging a wrong against others, but it also wants the world 
to remain exactly as it had been before the apology was issued”. 
23  Geoffrey De Laforcade, ‘Foreigners’, Nationalism and the ‘Colonial Fracture’: 
Stigmatized Subjects of Historical Memory in France, International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology 47, 3-4 (2006), 217-233, here: 229. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Karen E. Till, Memory Studies, History Workshop Journal 62, 1 (2006), 325-
341, here: 339.  
26  Thompson, Apology, 31. 
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same time one can see the existence (or in some cases the non-existence) of 
formal and informal political apologies as indicative of the direction of the 
normative commitments of the society in question. 
As Nicholas Tavuchis argues in his path-breaking work Mea Culpa, 
“apologies […] are potentially sensitive indicators of members’ (and non-
members’) actual, if unspoken, moral orientations”. Secondly, “as symbolic 
barometers, apologies register tensions and displacements in personal and 
public belief systems, that is, the contraction and expansion of interdictory 
motifs – what calls for an apology and what does not – that either precede 
or follow changes in social behavior and cultural expectations”.27 “We not 
only apologize to someone but also for something. The analytical focus of 
the former is on actors, agents, and social relationships; the latter, by con-
trast, directs attention to rules and meta-rules, that is, rules about the 
rules.”28 
In a parallel vein, the domestic and international demands of recogni-
tion have changed the way liberal theory classically thought about the so-
cial goods that the individual needed. Social recognition of present subal-
tern identities and the recognition of past sufferings were added to the tradi-
tional list until then headed by equality and liberty.29 This also generated a 
critical discussion that exposed the Christian core of the politics of apology 
and made the parties more sensitive to local concepts, such as ubuntu, 
“which emphasizes restorative justice, including restored relations between 
perpetrators and victims, over retributive justice”.30 This was a novelty in 
the way the West positioned itself and its previously unchallenged and Eu-
rocentric claims for truth.  
Overall, it is not clear exactly what apologies accomplish in interna-
tional or domestic politics or what other considerations within the domain 
of realpolitik make apologies necessary, not for their intrinsic value as sin-
cere acts of contrition, but more for their value as one in a stash of self-
                                                 
27  Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 13. 
28  Ibid. 
29  For the new politics of recognition of “others” and minorities, see Michael 
Freeman, Historical Injustice and Liberal Political Theory, in: The Age of Apol-
ogy, 45-60.  
30  Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann and Mark Gibney, Introduction: Apologies and the 
West, in: The Age of Apology, 2-6, here: 5. 
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serving diplomatic moves. Leonard Jamfa brings to our attention such a 
possible calculus behind the German statement of apology for the 1905-
1908 genocide of the Herero people of Namibia, for example, and corre-
lates the apology to the German fear of possible land invasions of white 
farms in Namibia akin to those in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe.31 This rather vigi-
lant way of reading the process and the context of apology, without reduc-
ing it to the text, is one of the reasons why apology cases need to be ap-
proached not only from within a linguistic or philosophical framework but 
also from a political and economic perspective and calculus of realpolitik.  
Notwithstanding an apology’s timing and considerations of the political 
context in which the statement is written, apologies also are relevant to po-
litical theory since they lead to questions of membership in a community 
and responsibility stemming from such membership, i.e., citizenship. Be-
sides, present apologies for injustices that happened in the recent or distant 
past are relevant for the domestic and international debates on institutional 
continuity and path dependency, and normative commitments and respon-
sibilities of polities living in the present. What makes present political com-
munities, whose members also may or may not include formally disenfran-
chised or discriminated-against citizens, responsible for past acts of trans-
gression, for example? These discussions are not merely futile attempts at 
restoring what is perhaps impossible to restore. They also hint at possible 
ways of re-imagining domestic as well as international politics. For exam-
ple, the debate within the Netherlands or Belgium regarding apologies to 
the peoples of their former colonies informs us about what is legitimate for 
future international endeavors of both countries since the political spectrum 
is divided between those who think that colonialism was beneficial – hence 
there is nothing to apologize for – and those who think that colonialism’s 
detrimental effects far exceeded its benefits. In that sense, the politics of 
apology is another political issue mirroring the divide between the liberals 
and conservatives of almost any given country. Bearing these considera-
tions in mind, I will proceed to examine both the official and non-official 
responses to the Turkish I Apologize campaign in an effort to contextualize 
and position it within the larger domain of Turkish politics and its actors.  
 
                                                 
31  Leonard Jamfa, Germany Faces Colonial History in Namibia: A Very Ambigu-
ous “I am Sorry”, in: The Age of Apology, 202-215, here: 206. 
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THE I APOLOGIZE CAMPAIGN OF TURKISH 
INTELLECTUALS 
 
There has been an increase in the frequency of the usage of the term Geno-
cide in the Turkish media and in the general coverage of the events of 
191532 especially since the assassination of Agos newspaper’s editor-in-
chief Hrant Dink in January 2007. Yet the Armenian Genocide is still large-
ly seen as a security issue and foreign policy obstacle to be brushed aside. 
As a result, a genuine intellectual quest to understand what genocide means 
for the Turkish state’s institutional framework and the grammar of ethnic 
relations in Turkey is lacking. Thus, it is not surprising that current or for-
mer ambassadors are viewed as legitimate parties to the discussion; such 
was also in the discussions leading to the I apologize campaign. In an inter-
view given to Taraf’s Nee Düzel approximately three months before the 
Turkish intellectuals’ “apology” campaign took off, and shortly after Turk-
ish President Abdullah Gül’s visit to Yerevan in the course of a series of 
events initiated by Armenian President Serge Sarkisian commonly referred 
to as ‘soccer diplomacy’,33 Turkish former ambassador Volkan Vural clear-
ly expressed the need for the state to apologize to Armenians. 34  
Thus, it is against this background of increased debate that the “apolo-
gy” campaign launched by four scholars, Ali Bayramolu, Cengiz Aktar, 
Ahmet nsel, and Baskın Oran, in December 2008 should be understood. 
The text of the campaign was translated as follows:  
 
“My conscience does not accept the insensitivity showed to and the denial of the 
Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject 
                                                 
32  For a non-exhaustive coverage of the subject from year 2000 to 2011, see 
http://hyetert.blogspot.com/. 
33  For an extensive coverage of this particular process see Khatchig Mouradian, 
Soccer Diplomacy and the Road not Taken: An Alternative Perspective for 
building piece between Turkey and Armenians, ZNET, 13 April 2009, http:// 
www.zcommunications.org/soccer-diplomacy-and-the-road-not-taken-by-khatc 
hig-mouradian. 
34  Nee Düzel, Volkan Vural: ‘Ermeni ve Rumlar tekrar vatanda olsun’, Taraf, 9 
August 2008, http://www.taraf.com.tr/nese-duzel/makale-volkan-vural-ermeni-v 
e-rumlar-tekrar-vatandas.htm#. 
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this injustice and for my share, I empathize with the feelings and pain of my Arme-
nian brothers and sisters. I apologize to them.”35 
 
The first newspaper that broke the news of the campaign was the center-
right Vatan via an interview with Cengiz Aktar, on December 3, 2008.36 
Nergis TV station (NTV) followed with the actual text of the apology on 
December 5, 2008,37 and slowly all other major news outlets picked up the 
following week. The moderate Islamist Zaman, the highest circulating 
newspaper in Turkey did not cover the story until December 16, whereas its 
English edition Today’s Zaman started to cover ten days earlier.38  
The organizers first announced on NTV and other outlets their plan to 
launch the campaign via internet at the beginning of 2009 so that citizens 
could join them.39 However, the online campaign began three weeks earlier 
than had been originally announced. Coincidentally, intellectuals from Ar-
menia sent a letter to President Abdullah Gül on December 9, urging him to 
recognize the Armenian Genocide.40 This letter was lost in the shuffle and 
largely ignored by the international and Turkish press. Addressing the 
Turkish President, the Armenian intellectuals challenged Ankara’s vehe-
ment denial of any government policy to exterminate Ottoman Turkey’s 
Armenian population:  
 
“[…] here we deal with an appalling crime perpetrated against humanity which has 
no expiration date. This is not only a position held by all Armenians, but also an ex-
pectation shared by the World community. The Armenian Genocide is a crime 
                                                 
35  Özür diliyorum, http://www.ozurdiliyoruz.com/default.aspx. 
36  Tülay ubatlı, ‘Ermenilerden özür diliyorum’ Aydınlar, 1915’teki Ermeni teh-
ciriyle ilgili imza kampanyası balatıyor,” Vatan, 3 December 2008, http://hab 
er.gazetevatan.com/Haber/211898/1/Gundem. 
37  Apology campaign of intellectuals for the Armenian deportation, http://arsiv.n 
tvmsnbc.com/news/468300.asp. 
38  Aye Karabat, Turkish intellectuals give personal apology for 1915 events, To-
day’s Zaman, 5 December 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-160701-tu 
rkish-intellectuals-give-personal-apology-for-1915-events.html. 
39  Apology campaign of intellectuals for the Armenian deportation. 
40  For the full text of the Armenian intellectuals see: Open Letter to Abdullah Gül, 
http://asbarez.com/59724/open-letter-to-abdullah-gul/. 
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against humanity and against the values of modern civilization, and no individual, 
organization or even government can put a question mark on these events.”  
 
The letter further claimed that “[…] today’s Turkish state has inherited this 
responsibility” and “[…] Your generation of Turkish leaders must accept 
the undeniable truth and recognize the fact of the Armenian Genocide […] 
Only then will both our nations be able to pursue a frank dialogue and 
achieve the true reconciliation so much desired.”41 This letter was particu-
larly significant since it originated from Armenia and was an indirect res-
ponse to the long-standing cliché that genocide recognition was important 
only for Diaspora Armenians, not for Armenians from Armenia. 
In effect, by enlarging the scope of the campaign earlier than had been 
announced, the organizers of the campaign successfully, if not necessarily 
intentionally, blocked the Armenian text and the demand of the offended 
party. The historically powerless side’s voice – the voice of those to whom 
the I apologize campaign was ostensibly directed – was thus muffled, and 
the historically asymmetrical character of the Turkish-Armenian relation-
ship, itself a result of the Genocide, reasserted itself.42 
The apology campaign led into a major backlash in Turkey – one that 
was hardly unexpected by those conversant with Turkish politics, but one 
that nonetheless went underreported in the international press or Turkish 
press in English: two major websites backed by several groups from the 
Turkish Republican left, center and the right appeared almost overnight, 
leaving the optimistic 13,000 number of the earlier days of the apology 
campaign pale in comparison.43 At the same time, although the campaign 
                                                 
41  Ibid. 
42  The letter was covered as short news by NTV website, Evrensel newspaper 
(Left), and Yeniça newspaper (Right), but completely ignored by mainstream 
news outlets, columnists and journalists alike, including the apology campaign 
organizers themselves.  
43  As of September 19, 2011 anti-apology websites özür bekliyorum (Iamexpecting 
anapology.com) has 201,142 (http://www.ozurbekliyorum.com), özür dilemi-
yoruz (Wedonotapologize.biz) that also carries the public endorsement of main 
opposition party deputies has 87344 signatures (http://www.ozurdilemiyoruz.biz 
/index2.php). The main site of the I Apologize campaign özür diliyorum (weapo 
logize.com) has 31003 signatures (http://www.ozurdiliyoruz.com/default.aspx).  
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organizers, among them Cengiz Aktar44 and Baskın Oran,45 and various 
other participants and journalists46 reiterated that the apology was not for 
the genocide itself nor, technically speaking, for genocide denial per se, 
news outlets in English and French reported it as Turkish intellectuals 
“apologizing for the Armenian Genocide”.47 Nonetheless, on no occasion 
did the initiators of the campaign48 offer a correction to this (mis)inter-
pretation of the apology in effect, allowing this misunderstanding to flour-
ish among audiences who would be receptive to such a (mis)reading. In this 
manner, the apology authors were frequently “credited” with apologizing 
                                                 
44  Tülay ubatlı, ‘Ermenilerden özür diliyorum’, Vatan, 3 December 2008. 
45  Baskın Oran, Verdiimiz huzursuzluk için özür dileriz, Radikal, 16 December 
2008, http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklerDetayV3&A 
rticleID=912867&Date=16.12.2008&CategoryID=42.  
46  See Hadi Uluengin who vehemently argued that Great Catastrophe does not and 
cannot mean genocide. Hadi Uluengin, Özür ve imza, Hürriyet, 24 December 
2008, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=10633079&p=2. 
47  Robert Tait, Writers risk backlash with apology for Armenian genocide, The 
Guardian, 7 December 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/08/ar 
menian-genocide-turkey-apology-petition. 
48  See for example Le Monde coverage and its language equating “Grand Catastro-
phe” to Genocide. Des intellectuels turcs demandent pardon à l'Arménie, Le 
Monde, 20 December 2008 (http://www.lemonde.fr/web/recherche_breve/1,13 
-0,37-1063162,0.html) and another longer Le Monde piece aggregated by the 
website CollectifVan. Réveil des consciences, Le Monde, 19 December 2008 
(http://www.collectifvan.org/article.php?r=4&id=24972). Guardian oscillated 
between alleged genocide and genocide, BBC Monitoring Europe did not use 
the term since it mostly translated and covered Turkish newspapers, which 
avoided the term. The New Zealand Herald was the only news outlet that got the 
avoidance of the term genocide correctly. See: Turkish Intellectuals Issue Apol-
ogy for Past Atrocities Against Armenians, http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/ 
showthread.php?154411-Turkish-Intellectuals-Issue-Apology-For-Past-Atrocitie 
s-Against-Arme#.TngVrnN3E5s. The Independent used genocide and ethnic 
cleansing interchangeably. Nicholas Birch, Turkish academics in apology to 
Armenians, The Independent, 15 December 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk 
/news/world/europe/turkish-academics-in-apology-to-armenians1067066.html. 
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for something which they explicitly stated elsewhere that they were not 
apologizing for. 
I Apologize also received both official and unofficial reactions from the 
Turkish political elite, journalists and larger public alike. While it is impos-
sible to give a full account of all unofficial reactions, an extensive coverage 
of several positions both for and against the apology among its endorsers 
and critics is paramount to understand the scope and variety of these argu-
ments. It is also necessary to be able to soundly contextualize the endeavor 
and elaborate on the politics of both the text and the process leading to and 




The official reaction to the campaign was initially mixed. Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoan categorically rejected the idea of contemporary citi-
zens apologizing for past deeds, whereas President Abdullah Gül did not 
condemn the campaign and framed it as an issue of citizens exercising their 
freedom of speech. 
Although President Gül’s reaction would change in the week following 
his press conference due to pressure and personal attacks from the main op-
position party and its deputies, his approach to the campaign was more ac-
commodating than the Prime Minister’s. Gül49 viewed the campaign as a 
sign of freedom of expression in Turkey along with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs that viewed both the apology and the counter apology campaigns 
launched by retired diplomats and others asking an apology from Armeni-
ans as part of the lawful exercise of freedom of speech.50 
The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) condemned the 
campaign claiming that it was the Armenian side that needed to apologize 
for siding with and supporting a foreign country against Ottoman Empire, 
                                                 
49  Aye Karabat, Apology campaign triggers fierce debate, Today’s Zaman, 18 
December 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-161594-apologycampaign-
triggers-fierce-debate.html.  
50  Turkish Foreign Affairs views apology campaign for “1915 incidents” as part of 
freedom of speech, Today’s Zaman, 17 December 2008, http://www.todayszama 
n.com/news-161530-turkish-foreign-affairs-views-apology-campaign-for-1915-i 
ncidents-as-part-of-freedom-of-speech.html. 
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for massacring thousands of Azeri citizens and “for not persecuting or pun-
ishing ASALA terrorists who assassinated Turkish diplomats”.51 In the 
same week, CHP deputy Canan Arıtman besides calling the organizers of 
the campaign as traitors and asking for an apology for their deeds, also 
claimed that President Gül had not reacted negatively to the campaign be-
cause of his Armenian ancestry,52 a claim President Gül would deny and 
later take to court. The leader of the second opposition party in the par-
liament, the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), Devlet 
Bahçeli, along with several other prominent figures from the party con-
demned the apology campaign along the same lines as CHP members.53 
Two weeks into the apology campaign, the Turkish military also ex-
pressed its opinion during a General Staff meeting. General Staff Director 
of Communications Brigadier General Metin Gürak said: “We absolutely 
do not find the campaign right. Not only is apologizing wrong, it could also 
lead to detrimental results.”54  
In the same week, the Pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party’s (DTP) 
objected to a joint condemnation statement by CHP and MHP, and as a re-
sult deputies decided to issue condemnation notes on an individual basis. 
DTP deputy Sırrı Sakık supported the apology campaign further and argued 
that “the state’s confrontation with its history would not be the end of the 
                                                 
51  Turkey’s Main Opposition Party Condemns Apology Campaign For “1915 Inci-
dents”, 17 December 2008, http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=255909. 
52  Aye Karabat, Critics of apology campaign turn to personal attacks, Today’s 
Zaman, 19 December 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-161691-critics-
of-apology-campaign-turn-to-personal-attacks.html. 
53  Bahçeli: Onlardan utanıyorum, 18 December 2008, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.t 
r/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=10594801; E.Bari Altınta and Ercan Yavuz, Na-
tionalists react to intellectuals’ courageous apology, Today’s Zaman, 6 Decem-
ber 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-160813-nationalists-react-to-intel 
lectuals-courageous-apology.html. 
54  TSK: Ermeniler'den özür dilemek doru deil, 19 December 2008, http://yenis 
afak.com.tr/Gundem/?t=19.12.2008&i=157194. For a critique of military’s in-
volvement in a civilian initiative see: Cengiz Çandar, Genelkurmay, sivil birey-
ler ve Ermeni tabusu..., Hürriyet, 20 December 2008, http://hurarsiv.hurriye 
t.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=10609505. 
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world”.55 Still, the main opposition MHP went ahead and issued a condem-
nation note later signed by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
and CHP representatives.56  
Canan Arıtman’s personal attack on President Gül led to a massive re-
action even from center rightist newspapers. Fatma Dili Zıbak of Today’s 
Zaman summarized the mainstream reactions both from center right and 
center left in her column under the title “Deputy’s ‘Fascist’ Remarks Met 
with Criticism”. Center-right journalist Ahmet Tagetiren of Bugün, despite 
his disapproval of the apology campaign, argued: “What she (Canan Arıt-
man) said about Gül is very ugly and disgraceful. Even if Gül has Armeni-
an origins, presenting this as a very negative feature could only be the re-
flection of a fascist mentality.”57 In spite of such support in the press, Presi-
dent Gül found it necessary to clarify that his family’s roots were Muslim 
and Turkish for centuries.58 Furthermore, the President took Arıtman to 
court where she was charged with “denigrating the reputation of a public 
persona”.59 A number of European deputies including Hannes Swoboda and 
Jan Marinus Wiersma, the two vice chairmen of the Socialist Group in the 
European Parliament, along with Joost Lagendijk, the Co-Chairman of EU-
Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee also harshly criticized both Arıtman 
and her party.60 
By December 20 the earlier milder position of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs changed with Foreign Minister Ali Babacan claiming in Brussels 
                                                 
55  Press Roundup, Today’s Zaman, 20 December 2008, http://www.todayszaman.c 
om/news-161741-press-roundup.html. 
56  MHP'den özür kampanyasına karı bildiri, 18 December 2008, http://hurarsiv 
.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=10597947. 
57  Fatma Dili Zıbak, Deputy’s ‘fascist’ remarks met with criticism, Today’s Za-
man, 20 December 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getN 
ewsById.action?newsId=161748. 
58  Gül Arıtman'a cevap verdi, 21 December 2008, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/g 
oster/ShowNew.aspx?id=10615884. 
59  Cumhurbakanı Gül’den Arıtman’a dava, 22 December 2008, http://arsiv.ntvm 
snbc.com/news/469808.asp. 
60  Selçuk Gültalı, Arıtman should apologize or resign, say European leaders, To-
day’s Zaman, 25 December 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-162236-
aritman-should-apologize-or-resign-say-european-leaders.html. 
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that the campaign may “negatively affect the Turkish-Armenian dia-
logue”.61 Indeed Gül’s position also changed over the course of the month 
of December. In an interview he gave to Aktüel TV station (ATV) and To-
day’s Zaman during the first week of January 2009, Gül said: “To be hon-
est, it will affect the process negatively. Looking at the consequences and 
the latest debates, I don’t think that it has made a positive contribution.” 
While Gül insisted on freedom of speech, he nonetheless warned that the 
polarization that the campaign had triggered had brought negative conse-
quences.62 President Gül himself was criticized by CHP Parliamentary 
leader Hakkı Süha Okay for filing a symbolic 1 New Turkish Lira (YTL) 
lawsuit against Arıtman. Okay said that “[f]iling this lawsuit is an injustice 
to our citizens of Armenian roots”, explaining that it implied that the presi-
dent regards “Armenian ethnicity” as an insult. Emphasizing that “every-
one’s roots deserve respect”, he added that Arıtman’s words lacked “class”, 
but that the president’s action was inappropriate.63 
 
Semi Official Reactions 
 
As previously stated, former Turkish ambassadors hold a special position 
on the discussions of the Armenian Genocide because of the linkage be-
tween state security and foreign policy. In fact, the first organized non-offi-
cial reaction came from retired ambassadors of Turkey, some of whom 
were actively on duty during the period of Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) activity. But there were differences of 
opinion among retired ambassadors: for example, retired ambassador Te-
mel skit supported the apology campaign whereas ambassadors ükrü  
Elekda and Korkmaz Haktanır were not only against the apology; they al-
                                                 
61  Aye Karabat, State says ‘no’ to apology campaign, Today’s Zaman, 20 Decem-
ber 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-161807-state-says-no-to-apology-
campaign.html. 
62  Yavuz Baydar and Fuat Uur, Gül says apology campaign hurts Armenia recon-
ciliation bid, Today’s Zaman, 2 January 2009, http://www.todayszaman.com/ne 
wsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=162971. 
63  CHP members react to racist remarks despite party inaction, 25 December 2008, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-162237-chp-members-react-to-racist-remar 
ks-despite-party-inaction.html. 
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so were among those who started a counter declaration.64 The group who 
came out against the campaign included former Foreign Ministry undersec-
retaries Korkmaz Haktanır, ükrü Elekda and Onur Öymen,65 who labeled 
the campaign “against Turkish national interests”. In a public letter, the 
ambassadors repeated the CHP and MHP line, further linked the issue to 
the Nagorno Karabagh conflict and stated that Armenians should apolo-
gize.66 
One-time Minister of Education, now columnist for Radikal newspaper, 
right-conservative Hasan Celal Güzel claimed that “this traitorous text, 
which includes the expression ‘great catastrophe’ in capital letters and has 
captured the signatures of some of our spineless intellectuals, hands every-
thing over to those who prepared the text. Even the title of this text is per-
ceived by both the diaspora and Armenia itself as a reference to ‘genocide’. 
In other words, those who signed this traitorous text, no matter what they 
may insist on, are in fact accepting the allegations of genocide.”67 
 
Non Official Reactions 
 
The non-official reactions can be categorized as protesters (left and right), 




The State-Employees Union (Memur-Sen) and Public Employees Union 
(Kamu-Sen) protested the campaign, asking for an apology from Armenians 
for ASALA and “the Azerbaijan territory that is still under occupation”. In 
                                                 
64  Abdülhamit Bilici, Let us set up our own historical committee independently of 
Armenians, Today’s Zaman, 20 December 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/ 
columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=161764. 
65  Aye Karabat, Apology campaign triggers fierce debate, Today’s Zaman, 18 
December 2008. 
66  Zeynep Gürcanlı, Büyükelçiler isyan etti, Hürriyet, 15 December 2008, http:/ 
/hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=10574633. 
67  Hasan Celal Güzel, If you’re all intellectuals, I guess I’m not!, Today’s Zaman, 
19 December 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-161627-if-youre-all-int 
ellectuals-i-guess-im-not.html. 
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a statement on behalf of a platform comprised of ninety-six labor and trade 
organizations, including Ankara Trade Chamber (ATO), Union of Agricul-
turalists and Turkey Workers Union (Türk-), Bircan Akyıldız, the leader 
of Kamu-Sen said: “Turkish Republic is always under attack openly or indi-
rectly by cooperatives who have been sold.” Atatürk University’s senate 
not only opposed the campaign but also the president of the university read 
a statement that condemned the campaign as a “disrespectful act against the 
Turkish nation” betraying “our martyrs who lost their lives in Armenian 
terror”.68 
Although the apology text was signed by almost thirty thousand citi-
zens, including two hundred academics and journalists in the first two 
months, there were prominent intellectuals on the left who refrained from 
signing the text. Some of these intellectuals withheld the reasons why they 
did not sign, but some spoke out early on and criticized either the endeavor, 
or the text, or both.69 There also were instances of intellectuals critiquing 
the endeavor after having heard some of the campaign organizers’ denialist 
public speeches.70 
The coordinator of the Association for Facing History Aytekin Yıldız, 
criticized the campaign on three grounds: that the campaign was redundant 
in the sense that Armenians were aware that there were people of con-
science in Turkey. Secondly, while admitting the campaign was a good 
start, Yıldız criticized usage of Medz Yeghern as “great disaster”: “What do 
                                                 
68  Aye Karabat, State says ‘no’ to apology campaign, Today’s Zaman, 20 Decem-
ber 2008.  
69  One of those intellectuals is Ismail Besikci, “Büyük Felaket” mi, Soykırım mı?, 
22 December 2008, http://www.gelawej.net/modules.php?name=Content&pa=s 
howpage&pid=2711. 
70  For Ragip Zarakolu’s critique of Baskin Oran’s populist denialist language see 
Özür o kadar kolay deil, Özgür Gündem, 12 February 2009, http://www.hyete 
rt.com/yazi3.asp?s=&Id=394&DilId=1#. 
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they mean by ‘great disaster’? Let’s name it, it is genocide.”71 Finally, 
Yıldız also emphasized the fact that the state had to apologize.72  
Historian Aye Hür, known for her work in popularizing the history of 
1915 in newspaper articles, refused to sign the apology, criticizing both the 
idea and the implementation as elitist.73 Hür also wrote a newspaper col-
umn, “I Apologize for not Apologizing”, where she further clarified her po-
sition towards the apology campaign, explaining why she refused to apolo-
gize for the faults of Turkish nationalism with which she does not identi-
fy.74 
Ismail Beikci,75 one of the most important figures in recent Turkish in-
tellectual history with his pioneering research and discourse on the Kurdish 
issue, and a group of Kurdish intellectuals explicitly criticized the vague 
choice of wording in the apology and the problematic usage of the term 
Great Catastrophe.76 These intellectuals signed a joint declaration explain-
ing the reasons why the apology campaign falls short trying to satisfy sev-
eral constituencies, including the state. Beikci, while criticizing the cam-
paign organizers’ utilitarian calculus, said: “You can collect more signa-
tures when you use a term such as ‘Great Catastrophe’ in order not to dis-
turb the state. However, correctly understanding the content of factual con-
nections is more precious than this. Quality (of the debate) must be more 
precious than the quantity (of the signers).”77 In the same piece Beikci also 
criticized the organizers for not referring to the “1915 Genocide against As-
                                                 
71  At the initial stages of the “apology” campaign there were different translations 
for the term Medz Yeghern, here Aytekin Yıldız, is referring to one of them. See 
page 83 et seq. of this chapter for further information on the reactions to the us-
age of Medz Yeghern. 
72  Aye Karabat, Turkish intellectuals give personal apology for 1915 events, To-
day’s Zaman, 5 December 2008. 
73  Ibid. 
74  Aye Hür, I Apologize for Not Apologizing, Armenian Weekly, 20 April 2009, 
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2009/04/20/i-apologize-for-not-apologizing. 
75  Ismail Besikci, “Büyük Felaket” mi, Soykırım mı? 
76  Ortak Açıklama; Felaket Deil Soykırım, 26 December 2008, http://www.nas 
name.com/tr/2464.html. 
77  Ismail Besikci, “Büyük Felaket” mi, Soykırım mı?  
MEA CULPAS, NEGOTIATIONS, APOLOGIAS | 73 

syrians, to the genocide against Kurds spread over time, and to the cultural 
and religious genocide against Alevis”.78  
In a lengthy article published in the popular news magazine Aksiyon, 
Taner Akçam, besides criticizing the close-ended character of the apology 
text and problematizing the issue of political responsibility like Hür and 
others, also criticized the avoidance of the term Genocide within the cam-
paign by saying he found the arguments against the use of the term to be at 
a very low intellectual standard. While Akçam elaborately criticized the en-
deavour, he still found it important in its potential to start a debate on the 
issue and even could be considered a watershed moment for this reason 
alone.79 This brings us back to the questions of what apologies are and 
whether this is really an apology or an apologia instrumentalizing the idea 
of apology for something else: A domestic “discussion starter” over the 
events of 1915 at the expense of Armenians? 
 
Supporters with reservations 
 
Emre Aköz of the center-right Sabah, Ahmet Hakan of center-right Hürri-
yet and Nuray Mert of center-left Radikal newspapers all agreed with the 
necessity communicating regret, but disagreed with the last sentence that 
included the actual “apology”. They all claimed they found personal apolo-
gy in the name of a nation politically problematic especially for something 
they did not take part.80 Hakan and Mert signed the petition conditionally – 
                                                 
78  Ibid.  
79  For a republished version of Akcam’s article see Taner Akçam, Tartıalım ama 
bilgiyle, 26 December 2008, http://hyetert.blogspot.com/2008/12/tartisalim-ama 
-bilgiyle-prof-dr-taner.html. 
80  Emre Aköz, “Özür” meselesi, Sabah, 11 December 2008, http://www.sabah.co 
m.tr/Yazarlar/akoz/2008/12/11/ozur_meselesi; Center Right Milliyet’s ex-editor 
in chief Mehmet Y. Yilmaz also argued along similar lines with a slightly dif-
ferent take asking why ordinary Turks will accept this, after all, he said, even the 
Holocaust is committed by Nazis and not Germans. Mehmet Y. Yılmaz, Bir 
rüvet hikayesi! Muhalefet partileri nerede?, Hürriyet, 17 December 2008, 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=10584497. 
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up until the last sentence.81 In an odd discriminatory tone Mert further reit-
erated a common stereotype in her column where she claimed she did not 
feel the necessity to apologize to well-to-do Armenians at all.82 
Similarly, Murat Belge, a professor of English literature and one of the 
most prominent figures of the left, and Yıldırım Türker, columnist at the 
Radikal newspaper, also criticized the apologetic part of the apology on 
similar grounds to Mert, Hakan and Aköz. Belge further argued for a politi-
cally discriminatory approach to the surviving Armenians: “[...] if I am 
‘apologizing’ or doing something else, it is neither possible nor meaningful 
to do this towards all Armenians. In the Armenian society, in the ‘home-
land’ or in the ‘Diaspora’ there may be such persons that I may not even 
want to meet or greet, let alone apologize. Why should I apologize to an 
Armenian fascist because some Turks have done this act against Armenians 
in 1915?”83 Türker, on the other hand, though he had initial reservations re-
garding the act of apologizing since this would mean his self-association 
with the denialists, ultimately decided to endorse it and condemned CHP 
parliamentarian Canan Arıtman in very strong language.  
 
“Arıtman was not satisfied with implying that President Abdullah Gül’s mother 
might be of Armenian descent, but she also declared Armenians are the element that 
should be sought after every catastrophe and be labeled our eternal enemy. Arıtman 
is proud. She is not only unapologetic but also brags about how many supporters she 
has. Is there anyone left who still doubts that this is exactly the right time for the 
campaign [of apology to Armenians by intellectuals] that we have been debating for 
a long time at a time when Arıtman and those who like her proudly commit this 
crime in Parliament and declare a segment of the country’s population the national 
                                                 
81  Ahmet Hakan, Aferin Cem Yılmaz, Hürriyet, 17 December 2008, http://www.h 
urriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/10584434.asp?yazarid=131. 
82   Nuray Mert, Özür Deil, Paylama, Radikal, 16 December 2008, http://www. 
radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=912950&Yazar=
NURAY%20MERT&Date=16.12.2008&CategoryID=98.  
83  Murat Belge, Ermeni Kıyımı üstüne metin, Taraf, 14 December 2008, http://ww 
w.taraf.com.tr/makale/3097.htm. 
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enemy, creating threats against their lives? Arıtman and those like her are the 
strongest reason we have to apologize to the Armenian community.” 84  
 
While Belge (along with Aköz, Hakan, Hür and Mert) expressed legitimate 
concerns about the uneasy relationship between individual responsibility 
regarding past crimes and apologies, a tension problematized within both 
communitarian and liberal theory,85 his political categorization of Armeni-
ans who deserve an apology as only non-fascists shows that he completely 
misses the point of apology and gross human rights violations which are 
quite different than discriminatory politicides. On the other hand, Türker’s 
lengthy take on why they should apologize only shows the kind of anti-
intellectual corner in which the Turkish liberal left is trapped: as can be 
clearly seen from the CHP-MHP-ex-ambassadors episode, the Turkish cen-
ter and right were able to hijack the discourse and reduce the entire dis-
cussion to being pro or anti apology, without an informed and substantial 
debate on the kind of issues that are paramount in a dialogical process in-
volving gross human rights violations and political responsibility. 
The majority of the non-official reactions in English were published by 
the moderate Islamist Today’s Zaman that has a number of non-Islamist 
liberal scholars and journalists as columnists. One such liberal scholar close 
to the ruling AKP is hsan Daı, an International Relations’ Professor at 
Middle East Technical University. Daı criticized the ultra-nationalist dis-
course used to justify the massacre of Armenians in the name of survival of 
the state then argued:  
 
“We do not have to, and should not, accept that the 1915 events constituted geno-
cide, but we must stop trying to find excuses for the massacres of Ottoman citizens 
of Armenian origin. Otherwise, we can find excuses for the suppression of the 
                                                 
84  Yıldırım Türker, What if we are all Armenian?, Today’s Zaman, 23 December 
2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=det 
ay&link=161978&bolum=130. 
85   Freeman, Historical Injustice and Liberal Political Theory.  
76 | AYDA ERBAL 

Kurds, of Islamic dervish orders, of the girls who wear the headscarf, etc. If we al-
low the raison d'état to reign, then everything will be explainable and justifiable.”86  
 
Daı’s position is indeed important in that it shows that even individuals 
close to government circles do not deny the massacres but refuse to ac-
knowledge that the massacres constitute genocide. 
Another columnist close to government circles, Hüseyin Gülerce, sup-
ported the endeavor as expressing the will of citizens, something that 
should not be condemned as traitorous. Yet he was critical of the timing of 
the campaign, claiming that because of the climate of animosity it generat-
ed among the citizenry, the campaign may disrupt an otherwise successful 
process of rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia.87 He also criti-
cized the text of the campaign, asking why it was silent on the issue of 
Turks massacred by Armenians or the Ottoman losses in Balkans. A posi-





It will be extremely difficult to cover the arguments of all initial two hun-
dred campaign supporters since a good number of them either in print or on 
                                                 
86  hsan Daı, From Apology to Reconciliation, Today’s Zaman, 22 December 
2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?new 
sId=161892. 
87  Hüseyin Gülerce, Apology is Valuable If It Works Out, Today’s Zaman, 19 De-
cember 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.acti 
on?newsId=161695. 
88  See the links below for a more extensive response from centre-right journalists 
Enis Berberolu, Söz kılıçtan keskin, Hürriyet, 20 December 2008, http://hura 
rsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=10609508, Tufan Türenç, Gen-
çler için bazı gerçekler, Hürriyet, 19 December 2008, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.c 
om.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=10600787, Rahmi Turan, Aacın kurdu içinde 
olur, Hürriyet, 18 December 2008, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/Show 
New.aspx?id=10592881, Bülent Kene, Yes, but who will apologize to my 
grandmother and grandfather?, Today’s Zaman, 17 December 2008, http://ww 
w.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=161457. 
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TV defended their position. However, the following support without a sig-
nature is meaningful since it exemplifies a very common misrepresentation 
of both the critiques and context of the campaign.  
Although he neither signed nor disclosed why he withheld his signature, 
Yavuz Baydar of the center-Islamist Today’s Zaman newspaper wrote fa-
vorably about the campaign while criticizing what he called the response 
from Armenia and Armenian diaspora – though without making it clear 
which Armenian authors or organizations he had in mind:  
 
“It is encouraging that the international press gives it broad coverage. Reactions 
from the West are mainly positive, though the ‘response’ from Armenia and the Ar-
menian diaspora was rather scarce, mainly because of the apparent discontent over 
the wording of the text, which, to them, falls short of calling it ‘genocide’. The shy-
ing away of Armenian support seems to have deviated from the focus that the indi-
vidual apology addresses the consciences and exclusively highlights the (in)human 
dimension of what happened in 1915, rather than ‘minimizing it to a legal term that 
functions as a stumbling block for reconciliation and dialogue’.”89 
 
Baydar’s portrayal of Armenians as a group hung up on a “minimizing” le-
gal term – i.e., genocide, which “functions as a stumbling block for recon-
ciliation and dialogue”, as opposed to the representation of Turkish indi-
viduals’ as attentive to “the ‘(in)human’ dimension of 1915”, is in line with 
the mainstream representations of diaspora Armenians in the Turkish press. 
In the same article Baydar quoted University of Michigan Professor Fatma 
Müge Göcek as one of the pioneers of Turkish-Armenian dialogue in aca-
demia. Göcek argued: 
 
“I think this is a very significant step forward that needs to be congratulated and fer-
vently supported for two reasons. First, it is an initiative occurring within the public 
sphere free of state intervention, unhindered by state interests and the denialist stand 
the state has promoted for so long. It actually openly counters it, trying to build a so-
cial movement against it. Second, it tries to do so with a very simple grass roots aim 
of acknowledgment, which comprises the first step in addressing a social problem. 
                                                 
89  Yavuz Baydar, Public Apology Stirs Controversy, Angers, Breaks New Ground, 
Today’s Zaman, 17 December 2008, http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDe 
tail_getNewsById.action?newsId=161419. 
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In a country where the state has for so long officially denied that there has been such 
a problem, its acknowledgment would indeed be the first step forward and it could 
only be done through the public sphere. One therefore has to first get society to 
acknowledge there is a problem in order to start working on it: Since one relates to a 
problem interpersonally as an individual, through one’s own interpretation, ideas, 
feelings, emotions, experiences or recollections, the best way to do this is to trans-
form all those who individually acknowledge into a social group.”90 
 
Baydar’s asymmetrical presentation of the “Turkish side” and “Armenian 
side” of the discussion and Göcek’s argument need to be problematized 
separately. Although Baydar chose to frame the Armenian response in very 
general terms and as devoid of agency while framing and (mis)representing 
their critique in his own terms, he chose to feature prominently, and hence 
legitimize, a Turkish scholar’s argument, all in service of praising an initia-
tive that he calls “yet another strong signal of Turkey’s undefeatable con-
science”. 
In actuality, Armenian or other protesting responses were neither uni-
fied nor did they focus solely on the omission of the word genocide; indeed, 
although some Armenian responses did offer such a criticism this was by 
no means unique to Armenians. Much of what was expressed by Armenian 
and other critical scholars in the Armworkshop discussion list, an outlet of 
which Yavuz Baydar was a longtime member, was also later expressed at 
length by Marc Mamigonian,91 Khatchig Mouradian,92 Bilgin Ayata,93 Sey-
han Bayraktar and myself94 on several occasions. These critiques were 
                                                 
90  Ibid. 
91  Marc Mamigonian, Commentary on the Turkish Apology Campaign, Armenian 
Weekly, 21 April 2009, http://www.armenianweekly.com/2009/04/21/commenta 
ry-on-the-turkish-apology-campaign/. 
92  Khatchig Mouradian, From Yeghern to Genocide: Armenian newspapers, Raph-
ael Lemkin, and the Road to the UN Genocide Convention, Haigazian Armeno-
logical Review 29 (2009), 127-137. 
93  Bilgin Ayata, Critical Interventions: Kurdish Intellectuals Confronting the Ar-
menian Genocide, Armenian Weekly, 29 April 2009, http://www.armenianweekl 
y.com/2009/04/29/kurdish-intellectuals-confronting-the-armenian-genocide/. 
94  For a review of a critical panel discussion on the I Apologize campaign, see 
Aye Günaysu, Silenced but Resilient: A Groundbreaking Panel Discussion in 
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similar to those expressed during the first days of the campaign and showed 
variety and depth, as opposed to being simply ‘hung up’ on a term. Thus, a 
historical discursive asymmetry was further exacerbated through Baydar’s 
editorial choice.  
Göcek, in her remarks, reframes the debate as if the usage (or lack 
thereof) of the term genocide is completely irrelevant to the discussion and/ 
or as if Great Catastrophe is equivalent to genocide – which it is not – ei-
ther in linguistic or in historico-legalistic terms (something that will be dis-
cussed in length later in this chapter). Göcek also reduces genocide recogni-
tion (a term she refuses to use) to an interpersonal affair where individuals 
will decide with their own “interpretation, ideas, feelings, emotions, experi-
ences or recollections”. For this reason, she sees the apology campaign as a 
“significant step” towards “acknowledgement”. Acknowledgement of 
what? Presumably of what Baydar terms Armenian “suffering” and what 
the apology statement calls “pain”. 
However, what has been denied by the Turkish state and the public in 
general has not been whether Armenians suffered in 1915. The proponents 
of the Turkish state discourse, such as former ambassador and Turkish Ar-
menian Reconciliation Committee member Gündüz Aktan, never denied 
that there was “suffering” or large numbers of Armenian deaths;95 rather, 
the discussion has revolved around whether this “suffering” and these 
deaths were the result of a deliberate policy or policies, and thus whether 
the term genocide can be applied. Finally, Göcek’s remarks remain silent to 
the following socio-political question: “if individuals should decide on their 
own, as individuals, how to confront ‘the events of 1915’, why did intel-
lectuals decide to mandate a text and a term from above without con-
sidering an open-ended, transparent and horizontal campaign along the 
lines of the Australian Sorry Books”.96 
                                                                                                  
Istanbul, Armenian Weekly, 3 August 2010, http://www.armenianweekly.com/2 
010/08/03/gunaysu-silenced-but-resilient-a-groundbreaking-panel-discussion-in-
istanbul/. 
95  For further discussion about Gündüz Aktan’s position see David Phillips, Unsi-
lencing the Past: Track two Diplomacy And Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2005). 
96  The Sorry Books project was an initiative of the group Australians for Native 
Title (ANT), which was formed in June 1997. They were seen as an opportunity 
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The Armenian Responses 
 
The several Armenian responses were marred by similar kinds of problems, 
ranging from vagueness to lack of wide-scale deliberation. The two largest 
representative American-Armenian organizations, the Armenian National 
Committee of America (ANCA) and the Armenian Assembly of America 
(AAA), both hailed the apology campaign by reframing it in their own way.  
Whereas the campaign organizers explicitly refrained from using the term 
genocide in the text of the apology and they also explicitly said they are 
neither claiming responsibility nor apologizing for the Armenian Genocide, 
the ANCA’s statement said:  
 
“The efforts of those courageous parliamentarians and historians in Turkey who 
have placed the Armenian Genocide center-stage must be commended. […] By the 
same token, the campaign by Prime Minister Erdoan and other Turkish leaders to 
quash honest discussion of the murder of 1,5 million Armenians from 1915-1923 
must not be rewarded. Silence by the international community will be misinterpreted 
by Turkey’s leadership as support for their genocide denial agenda.”97  
 
Even though the voices in Turkey themselves did not send a clear message 
of neither responsibility, nor showed any incentive for formal recognition 
of genocide, ANCA communications director Chouldjian said, “Only by 
formally recognizing the Armenian genocide can the United States and 
democratic countries around the world send a clear message that they stand 
with the voices of truth in Turkey”.98 The AAA’s Executive Director Bryan 
                                                                                                  
for ordinary Australians who wanted to do something in response to the Federal 
Government’s refusal to make a formal apology to the Stolen Generations. For 
more see The Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Stud-
ies’ website, http://www.aiatsis.gov.au/collections/exhibitions/sorrybooks/introd 
uction.html. 
97  Armenian National Committee of America, ANCA Statement on Recent Efforts 
in Turkey to Confront the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1923, press release, 22 
December 2008, http://www.anca.org/press_releases/press_releases.php?prid=1 
641. 
98  Ümit Enginsoy, US Armenian group hails ’apology’, Hürriyet Daily News, 26 
December 2008, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10644886.asp. 
MEA CULPAS, NEGOTIATIONS, APOLOGIAS | 81 

Ardouny’s words also clearly indicated a reframing of reality, despite the 
fact that AAA’s statement was more tuned to the difference between Great 
Catastrophe and genocide:  
 
“Over 12,000 people in Turkey want history to be recorded truthfully, having al-
ready signed the Internet-based petition apologizing for what they call the ‘Great 
Catastrophe’ that befell the Armenians of Ottoman Turkey in 1915. This public 
apology is a first step in that direction and will inevitably lead to Turkey coming to 
grips with its genocidal past.”99 
 
A letter of support initially signed by 21 Armenian individuals, mostly Ca-
nadian and French Armenians involved in arts, was circulated in Armenian 
newspapers in mid January 2009. These Armenians seem not to have been 
aware of the kind of political discourse that surrounded the apology cam-
paign other than its limited accounts in British and French newspapers, nor 
did they command the same kind of political clout that the apology cam-
paign organizers and initial signers did. Whereas the campaign organizers 
wrote and acted within a consistent national political sphere in which they 
have been prominent political actors at least for the last ten years, the Ar-
menian respondents lacked the same kind of national discursive space and 
have not been involved in active politics themselves.  
Indeed this power asymmetry led to a scandalous event at the beginning 
of February 2009 when Armen Gakavian, an Armenian academic in Aus-
tralia’s Macquarie University, gave an interview to the Turkish daily Radi-
kal which quoted him as saying, “Armenians should apologize to the Turk-
ish nation for killing several thousands of Turks in the early 20th century 
and for the actions of ASALA”.100 Later Gakavian would issue a correction 
letter where he claimed his words were distorted by Radikal and that he 
                                                 
99   Aye Karabat, Critics of apology campaign turn to personal attacks, Today’s 
Zaman, 19 December 2008. 
100  Erhan Üstünda, Armenian Diaspora Reactions to Apology Campaign, 4 Feb-
ruary 2009, http://bianet.org/english/english/112323-armenian-diaspora-reacti 
ons-to-apology-campaign; Adnan Gündoan and Erturul Maviolu, ki 
“özür” den sıkı bir kardelik doar mı?, Radikal, 2 February 2009, http://www. 
radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=919479&Da
te=01.02.2009&CategoryID=97. 
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never spoke for all Armenians nor did he state that Armenians should apol-
ogize.101 
Finally on February 2, 2009 the European Armenian Federation issued 
a statement that read:  
 
“We have noted the development of a new campaign in Turkey by which the Arme-
nian people would need appeasement provided by certain strata of Turkish society, 
thereby solving the Armenian question without causing too much damage to Turkey. 
While being fully receptive to genuine expressions of sympathy and outreach by 
Turkish individuals who choose to speak out against their own government’s policy 
of denial of the Armenian Genocide, we must also make clear that the cause of jus-
tice with regard to this mass crime cannot be ‘apologized’ away by populist initia-
tives, however well-intentioned such actions might seem to be. The recently publi-
cized ‘apology’ campaign in Turkey is, indeed, a populist initiative, which deliber-
ately avoids the term ‘genocide’ and which, by so doing, intends to de-criminalize 
the destruction by the Ottoman Turkish government of 1,5 million Armenians, as 
precisely claimed one of its initiators, Mr. Baskın Oran in a Turkish newspaper 
(Milliyet, December 19, 2008).”102 
 
All in all the Armenian side was underinformed regarding the intricacies of 
the Turkish politics. Both linguistic barrier and information asymmetry 
worked against the Armenians. Especially the initial statements from repre-
sentational organizations show that the Armenian side heard what they 




                                                 
101  Armenian Academic Reacts To Apology Speculations, 4 February 2009, 
http://bianet.org/english/world/112343-armenian-academic-reacts-to-apology-
speculations. The first distorted version of Gakavian’s initiative was not publi-
cized by anybody but one of the initiators of the campaign, Baskın Oran, on 
February 1, 2009. See Oran’s article on the incident: http://www.agos.com.tr/i 
ndex.php?module=corner&status=old&author_id=5&corner_id=1079&cat_id
=22. 
102  Armenians still demand recognition and reparation of their genocide by Tur-
key, 2 February 2009, http://eafjd.eu/spip.php?article521. 
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CONTEXTUAL CONSTRAINTS OR POLITICAL 
STRATEGIES? AN ANALYSIS OF THE “APOLOGY” TEXT  
 
2012 is the twentieth anniversary of the publication of Taner Akçam’s first 
book.103 Akçam, the first historian from Turkey to openly acknowledge the 
Armenian Genocide without resorting to euphemisms did not use the term 
genocide in this early work and later explained the kind of psychological 
barriers he overcame in the years to follow.104 Akçam and others published 
several books and dozens of newspaper and scholarly articles on the issue 
and appeared frequently on TV since then. Hence, although the debates sur-
rounding the Turkish apology campaign suggested or stated outright that as 
a result of the campaign Turkish society at large encountered the issue of 
Armenian Genocide the first time, this is not the case. 
It is true that the Turkish public has not had many opportunities to re-
ceive a good education on the subject of the Armenian Genocide, and the 
Turkish press, on this issue, is either willfully denialist, completely un-
aware or ill-informed or simply politically biased. Nonetheless, the Turkish 
public at large is familiar with the fact that Armenians and others105 are de-
manding the recognition of a particular kind of crime, that of genocide. 
Elsewhere in Turkey the term genocide has been non-problematically used 
for cases such as Bosnia, Algeria, and at times for Gaza or Palestine. More-
over a number of recent scholarly works have clearly established that the 
Turkish state never entirely denied the “tragic events” of 1915 as such. The 
core argument of the Turkish Republic has always been that the mass kill-
ings during and as a result of forced deportations were not a result of an in-
tentional policy by the Young Turk regime to eliminate the Armenians, thus 
these events cannot be defined as genocide according to the UN Conven-
tion of 1948.  
The apology text, the choice of the term Medz Yeghern and the cam-
paign itself did not appear out of nowhere but exist in a historical and polit-
                                                 
103  Akçam, Turkish National Identity and the Armenian Question. 
104  See the introduction of Taner Akçam, nsan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu: ttihat 
Terakki’den Kurtulu Savaı’na (Ankara: mge Kitabevi, 1999). 
105  See the letter of International Association of Genocide Scholars addressed to 
Prime Minister Erdoan, 6 April 2005, http://eo.tchobanian.org/en/communiqu 
e00010086.html. 
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ical context; thus they must be the subject of a political, philosophical and 
linguistic analysis taking into account this context. In order to do so, one 
needs not only take into consideration the limits of the public sphere in Tur-
key and the place the left and the liberals occupy in it, but also to challenge 
and expose the ways in which the progressive discourse fails to deliver 
what it promises to do, i.e., acknowledgement of a particular crime against 
humanity in the full extent of the international legal framework. Since the 
text is the work of four writers, Ahmet nsel, Ali Bayramolu, Baskın Oran, 
and Cengiz Aktar, all known as public intellectuals in Turkey, it is safe to 
assume that they are, as Marc Mamigonian says, “acutely aware of the ef-
fects of language, that they chose their words with great care, and thus that 
the apology text was not arrived at by accident or in haste”.106 For this pur-
pose we need to read the text of the apology campaign closely, in addition 
to revisiting the speeches and writings of the campaign organizers as well 
as the way the campaign was publicized and managed in the public sphere. 
As is established in the literature primarily by Nick Smith107 but also by 
others, non-categorical apologies or even non-apologies transmit meaning 
that may still inform us about intentions, offense, regret, shame, humility or 
the lack of any of these.  
The first sentence of the text: “My conscience does not accept the in-
sensitivity showed to and the denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Otto-
man Armenians were subjected to in 1915” acknowledges that there is an 
insensitivity towards the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians 
were subjected to in 1915, and that there is a denial of the same Great Ca-
tastrophe. Also the sentence posits that this is an issue of conscience. The 
second sentence: “I reject this injustice and for my share, I empathize with 
the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers”108 rejects this injustice and 
claims to personally empathize with the feelings and pain of Armenian 
brothers. The third sentence: “I apologize to them” claims to apologize to 
them. 
                                                 
106  Mamigonian, Commentary on the Turkish Apology Campaign. 
107  Smith, I Was Wrong, 17-27. 
108  Following various critiques, “Armenian sisters” was added to the text after its 
first publication in the newspapers and the website. 
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The full extent of the political, philosophical and linguistic issues at 
stake here are beyond the scope of this chapter. Yet they need to be ana-
lyzed, even if briefly.  
 
Linguistic Issues: Translatability, Clarity, Agency 
 
Aaron Lazare,109 among others, cautions us to the first issue, that of trans-
latability, which, in this case is not just a simple issue of translation be-
tween different languages and cultures. To begin with, the Armenian term 
Yeghern, the usual word for “pogrom”, cannot be translated to any other 
language as catastrophe for three reasons: As indicated by Marc Nichanian, 
“it seems that its root is the past form of the verb to be, as though Yeghern 
was the Event par excellence”.110 Yeghern embodies an element of agency, 
in the sense that there cannot be a yeghern, slaughter, without a yegherna-
gorts, slaughterer. In contrast, neither the word Catastrophe nor its Turkish 
“equivalent” Felaket includes the element of agency.111 However Boos 
Levon Zekiyan used the poetic license to translate Medz Yeghern as Great 
                                                 
109  Lazare, On Apology, 34.  
110  Marc Nichanian and David Kazanjian, Between Genocide and Catastrophe, in: 
Loss: The Politics of Mourning, ed. David Eng et al. (Berkeley and Los Ange-
les: University of California Press, 2003), 125-147, here: 127. 
111  Catastrophe is the translation of Aghed – one of the words used by Armenians 
to describe both 1915 and several pogroms and massacres before 1915, such as 
the Adana massacres of 1909 or 1895-96 massacres. Besides the issue of im-
possibility of translation for linguistic reasons, the term is also non-translatable 
from a cultural perspective, since it’s not a categorical proper name, but rather 
one that corresponds to a particular experience within Armenian history. Just 
as there is no Yeghern that means Catastrophe in the Armenian language, there 
also is no Medz Yeghern that means Great Catastrophe. So the Turkish intel-
lectuals came up with a brand new concept Great Catastrophe that would have 
been the translation of Medz Aghed, and not that of Medz Yeghern. For a much 
elaborate discussion on the issue of impossibility of translation and further 
philosophical considerations such as impossibility of categorizing that which 
is uncategorizable and unimaginable see Marc Nichanian, Catastrophic Mour-
ning, in: Loss, 99-124; Nichanian and Kazanjian, Between Genocide and Ca-
tastrophe. 
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Catastrophe in order to avoid the legal repercussions of Article 301 of the 
Turkish Penal Code112 and Turkish intellectuals referred to his translation. 
The second linguistic issue, that of clarity, is not exclusively linguistic 
and has both political and philosophical implications. This dimension is 
well problematized in the literature under the subtitle of pseudo or failed 
apologies. Lazare cites eight – some slightly overlapping – ways that the 
statements of offense can fail. The following are relevant for our purposes 
since the I Apologize text does all: “offering a vague and incomplete ac-
knowledgment; using the passive voice; […] minimizing the offense; using 
the empathic ‘I’m sorry’; […] apologizing for the wrong offense”.113 
It is necessary to revisit the terminology used in the Armenian language 
use to describe 1915, in order to clarify what we mean by vagueness in this 
particular context. Armenians use Medz Yeghern (Great Pogrom), Darak-
rootioon (Deportation), Ahksor (Exile), Chart (Chopping), Aghed (Catas-
trophe), Vojir (Crime), Medz Vodjir (Great Crime), and several other terms, 
and most commonly Tseghaspanootioon (Genocide). The Turkish terms 
Tehcir (Deportation), Sürgün (Exile), and Kıtal (Massacre) are even used 
within official Turkish discourse, though with some variety: For example, 
Turkish official sources and historians close to the Turkish official position 
prefer to use Mukatele (Mutual Massacre) instead of Kıtal. 
By adopting the more sanitized and literary term Great Catastrophe the 
authors of the apology, firstly, introduced, via this campaign a brand new 
term to the Turkish public sphere. Even if the term meant something for 
Armenians, it certainly did not mean anything for the larger public in Tur-
key who heard the term Buyuk Felaket/Great Catastrophe or its Armenian 
“equivalent” Medz Yeghern for the first time. One of the campaign organiz-
ers, Baskın Oran, explicitly claimed on more than one occasion that Medz 
Yeghern was the only term Armenians used until 1965 when they “discov-
                                                 
112  Boos Levon Zekiyan, Tehcir ve Soykırım: Badamaz Görünümden Tamam-
layıcı leve; Büyük Ermeni Felaketi ‘Medz Yeern’ üzerine Düünceler (Lec-
ture, New Approaches to Turkish-Armenian Relations, Türk Ermeni likiler-
ine Yeni Yaklaımlar Sempozyumu, stanbul Üniversitesi, 15-17 March 2006, 
9). 
113  Lazare, On Apology, 86. 
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ered” the political value of genocide.114 Not only is the normative implica-
tion of Oran’s words problematic for its chastising of Armenians for using 
the term genocide, but also his argument is historically baseless, as shown 
earlier: Armenians used over a dozen terms besides Yeghern and started us-
ing genocide almost immediately after its being coined by Raphael Lem-
kin.115 
Secondly, the authors of the apology text avoided the politico-legal as-
pect of genocide by divorcing the naming of the crime from its legal/poli-
tical repercussions and pushing it, on the one hand, into the sphere of the 
parochial,116 as opposed to the positive legal, and on the other hand, into the 
sphere of the past. By only partially acknowledging earlier generations, 
who expressed their experience via a dozen terms other than genocide and 
by choosing to obscure the ongoing political struggle of subsequent genera-
tions embodied in the term genocide, the “apology” authors managed to 
keep the past confined within a private sterilized linguistic terrain while at-
tempting to avoid any current political or institutional consequences. Indeed 
Ali Bayramolu explicitly argued for a divorcing of several aspects of 1915 
from each other and came up with the term “understanding by differenti-
ating”, claiming that “understanding by differentiating” is simultaneously 
the indicator of a democratic culture, democratic maturity, democratic eth-
ics and indeed of understanding itself. Bayramolu claimed the legal/poli-
                                                 
114  See Mamigonian, Commentary on the Turkish Apology Campaign, for Oran’s 
interview with Canadian Broadcasting Company and the text of his election 
campaign pamphlet where he publicly repeated his position on Armenians’ po-
liticizing their pain. 
115  Mouradian, From Yeghern to Genocide. 
116  Indeed one of the campaign organizers, Cengiz Aktar, argued for this kind of 
romanticized parochialism vying for an Anatolian exceptionalism in his post-
campaign Agos and Radikal piece. Soykırım ötesi Büyük Felaket, Radikal, 26 
April 2009, http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklerDeta 
yV3&ArticleID=933179&CategoryID=42. Aktar claimed that the narrow 
“cold” term genocide is not able to capture the full scope of “the Anatolian 
tragedy”, and that a more humane term is needed. The entitlement to speak for 
the Armenian experience on the one hand, the odd aestheticization of a crime 
against humanity by reducing it to a parochial exception on the other is ex-
tremely puzzling to say the least.  
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tical dimensions and human dimensions of the catastrophe can be divorced 
and this divorce can contribute to their understanding of Armenians’ pain.  
Thirdly, the authors politicized a formerly non-political term, by instru-
mentalizing the term Yeghern for their own multidimensional utilitarian 
calculus to be discussed below. The irony of this is that some of the organ-
izers have been extremely critical of the term genocide on the basis of its 
“politicized” nature. Seemingly unaware that any term used to refer to a 
historical crime of this nature is necessarily always already “politicized”, 
when used in this context, just as when President Obama used the same 
term as a means of avoiding the word genocide, Medz Yeghern ceases to be 
a private term of communal mourning for Armenians, it becomes some-
thing else: a political instrument in the hands of others.117 
Finally, the authors arbitrarily shifted the terrain of denial by redefining 
denial of “Great Catastrophe” as a general denial by the Turkish state and 
society of any Armenian suffering, which has not historically been the case. 
Using denial without a qualifier itself can easily become an instrument of 
denialist discourse, since even the most notorious denialists in parallel con-
texts, such as David Irving, for example, do not deny that something terri-
ble happened. They deny that it happened the way and to the extent estab-
lished historiography says it happened – that the resulting deaths were the 
product of intentional actions and policies. In this debate, denial means 
                                                 
117  Mamigonian, Commentary on the Turkish Apology Campaign, points to a 
similar issue: “On April 24, 2005, President George W. Bush issued a state-
ment reading, in part, ‘On Armenian Remembrance Day, we remember the 
forced exile and mass killings of as many as 1,5 million Armenians during the 
last days of the Ottoman Empire. This terrible event is what many Armenian 
people have come to call the ‘Great Calamity’.’ The official Armenian-
language version of the statement translated ‘Great Calamity’ as Mets Yeg-
hern. It is unreasonable to suppose that during the reportedly two years that the 
apology was being pondered, the authors did not notice that Medz Yeg-
hern/Great Catastrophe/Great Calamity was becoming the ‘not g-word’ of 
choice when a political agenda disallows the ineffable g-word. Unfortunately, 
rather than openly acknowledge this concession to political expediency, an im-
aginary history has been conjured in which this usage is the only one Armeni-
ans knew before they were tainted by political agendas and started insisting on 
‘genocide’.”  
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genocide denial alone and not the denial of anything and everything. To re-
iterate a point, even the state discourse itself and pro-state historians do not 
deny that Armenians were massacred. 
 
Lack of Offense, Lack of Agency  
 
The vagueness is not limited to the issue of denial alone. One of the central 
aspects of any successful apology, even for smaller offenses that concern 
the public, is the clear acknowledgement of responsibility for the offense or 
grievance and expression of regret or remorse to the aggrieved party. Here 
the first sentence acknowledges some offense but neither specifies any 
agency nor takes any responsibility for the said offense. The use of the pas-
sive voice is instrumental in hiding both the agency and responsibility. One 
could read the statement and have no idea who subjected the Ottoman Ar-
menians to the “Great Catastrophe.” 
 
Lack of Responsibility in the Past 
 
The organizers have chosen a language that neglects to specify agency for 
the historical crimes whose denial they are criticizing. Instead, a vague des-
cription of 1915 is used that neither addresses individual and collective re-
sponsibility nor steps in any significant way outside the politics of the state 
with regard to 1915.  
It is true that the Turkish state has never apologized for Armenian suf-
fering and in that sense the apology attempt is a novelty. Yet the new Turk-
ish foreign policy discourse under Ahmet Davutolu is willing to ac-
knowledge Armenian suffering within a certain safety zone.118 Similarly, 
we note the comparatively mild reaction to President Obama’s use of the 
term Medz Yeghern starting with his Presidential Statement on Armenian 
Remembrance Day of April 2009. There were no threats of cutting diplo-
matic ties, no burning of American flags in the streets of Turkey, nor were 
there threats of trade reduction as has been the case with the French Parlia-
                                                 
118  Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu acknowledges the Armenian pain – to a 
point in his Harvard speech of 28 September 2010, http://www.iop.harvard.edu 
/Multimedia-Center/All-Videos/A-public-address-by-Ahmet-Davutolu,-Minis 
ter-of-Foreign-Affairs,-Republic-of-Turkey.  
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ment’s acknowledgement of Armenian Genocide. Although the far right re-
acted strongly – as it reacts strongly to any mention of “the events of 1915” 
– the state appeared to regard Medz Yeghern as an acceptable and basically 
harmless variation on its own retooled, more humane policy of denial. 
 
Lack of Responsibility in the Present 
 
An additional dimension of vagueness is the reason why many journalists, 
both domestic and international, intellectuals, politicians and lay people 
were confused about what exactly people were apologizing for. As indicat-
ed by Marc Mamigonian the text is not an apology for the events of 1915, 
but a meta-apology for “insensitivity towards and denial of Medz Yeg-
hern”,119 which brings us to a different kind of lack of responsibility, the 
one situated in the present. 
In this sense the “apology” text not only does not identify agency for 
past crimes but also fails to identify agency in the present: Who is respon-
sible for the denial? The state? The intellectuals? Lay people? All? To the 
same extent? And denial of what exactly? Is an apology text what every-
body makes of it? Is it the place to start (and end) a negotiation over termi-
nology? If so, how are we sure that this negotiation over terminology is not 
a sophisticated form of validating denialist discourse frames and minimiz-
ing the legal political extent of the crime? 
Indeed one of the campaign organizers, Professor of International Rela-
tions Baskın Oran, said on December 19, 2008: “The Prime Minister should 
be praying for our campaign. Parliaments around the world were passing 
automatically resolutions. These are going to stop now. The diaspora has 
softened. The international media has started to no longer use the word 
genocide.”120 While Oran’s words should not cast doubt on the intentions of 
thirty thousand citizens, his take coupled with Cengiz Aktar’s take on the 
term genocide (see footnote 116) gives one ample reason to rethink about 
the intentions of the campaign organizers. This concern was emphasized by 
longtime human rights activist Aye Günaysu, who wrote:  
 
                                                 
119  Mamigonian, Commentary on the Turkish Apology Campaign. 
120  Quoted in Mamigonian, Commentary on the Turkish Apology Campaign. 
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“We now hear some of the initiators of the campaign trying to use the apology as a 
means to fight the use of the word genocide and hamper the work of those who seek 
the recognition of the Armenian Genocide. They portray those seeking recognition 
as the twin sisters and brothers of the Turkish fascists, and they present the ‘diaspo-
ra’ as the enemy of any reconciliation […]. [By] their discourse, they contribute to 
the demonization of those who do use the word genocide.”121 
 
Obviously, a comprehensive critique of Turkish intellectuals in the past and 
the present is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, one can speculate 
via the apology campaign’s text and the nature of the debate surrounding it, 
that either the intellectuals themselves did not give serious thought to the 
connection between the responsibility of intellectuals and genocide denial, 
or that they thought about it extensively but consciously wanted to avoid 
responsibility. Since the intellectuals’ responsibility must be greater than 
regular citizens’, their silence has been more deafening than if they were 
“the man in the street”. This brings us to the close-ended, non-deliberative 
nature of the apology text also briefly problematized by Taner Akçam as 
cited earlier.  
 
Jacobinism vs. Horizontal Deliberation 
 
Although the campaign looks like a participatory endeavor where citizens 
could individually decide on their own whether to sign or not, since the 
terms of the apology were defined by the intellectuals from above, it was 
rather mock-deliberative in character. The signers did not necessarily agree 
with the text, indeed a number of intellectuals, some referred to in this pa-
per, signed the text while either disagreeing with the content publicly or 
criticizing it privately. Some did not agree with the idea of apologizing for 
the crimes or the denial altogether; some said they can only be sorry and 
cannot apologize for something for which they are personally not responsi-
ble. We are not even sure whether the signers agreed with the idea of apol-
ogizing. In stark contrast, several counter-“apology” campaigns were more 
horizontally deliberative in their being open-ended. Citizens who expected 
a counter-apology from Armenians or expressed their anger at the “apolo-
gy” campaign signed their opinions individually with their own words. 
                                                 
121  Ibid. 
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The campaign is not only Jacobinist in its nature, since the preparation 
process was not transparent even to the majority of intellectuals, but also 
Jacobinist in its approach to both the offended and the offender party. In the 
case of Turkish citizens, both the idea of apologizing for denial and the text 
are dictated from above without any attempt to broaden the base of partici-
pants in drafting or pre-apology deliberation regarding the terms of the apo-
logy. The organizers did not strive for inclusiveness and the involvement of 
as many people as possible in the process itself – unlike the very horizontal 
experience of Sorry Books in Australia where many took part in an apology 
campaign personally by writing their own apologies (or refusals) in empty 
notebooks.  
Regarding Jacobinism towards Armenians, which is worse, compara-
tively speaking, the organizers made no effort to get in touch with repre-
sentative bodies of the Armenians to gain an insight into what they really 
want or need from an apology, or whether they need an apology from indi-
vidual Turkish citizens at all. Instead, by mandating the term, hence nor-
malizing the discourse at a lower equilibrium point than what genocide en-
tails, by pre-emptively authoring a public apology on whose terms the of-
fended and the “offender” did not agree, the campaign organizers created a 
de facto setting wherein if the offended party (Armenians) rejected the 
“apology”, they would be cast in a negative light and end up being por-
trayed as the hostile and aggressive party, despite the fact that preemption 
of this kind is a symbolically violent endeavor to begin with – this was the 
case in Yavuz Baydar piece cited earlier. Symbolic violence stems from the 
fact that the public negotiationist character of the text itself lacks the kind 
of humility that is expected from any apology, let alone an apology for 
gross human rights violations. In short, the campaign commands an enor-
mous amount of preemptive power over the offended party: this is its most 
politically, to say nothing of ethically, problematic aspect. The Armenians 
not only disappeared from the land but they also disappeared from a pro-
cess that is supposedly intended to bring them “healing” or “closure”; in-
stead, they were treated as bit-players in someone else’s drama instead of 
being a party whose century-old quest for political justice and equality be-
fore international law is treated with respect.  
The pre-apology process, then, was not transparent; and during the post-
apology process, the domestic backlash, hence politics, hijacked the discus-
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sion and an apology for Armenians became a public terrain of fighting 





The Turkish intellectuals’ “apology” initiative promised to start a debate on 
the Armenian Genocide and according to the campaign organizers strived 
to remain within the domain of individual citizens’ conscience. However, it 
is obvious from the kind of reaction it provoked among citizens that it 
could never stay outside of the domain of politics since the calamity itself is 
the immediate result of a political decision with constitutive political and 
economic results. As we have seen, the attempt to compartmentalize the is-
sue of genocide recognition into public and private spheres is an evasive 
tactic that is far from establishing the kind of trust that any conciliation 
process would require. So despite the fact that the campaign informed the 
general public that there is something to be apologized for, it failed to go 
beyond the discursive mechanisms that are remnants of denialist politics. 
Far from opening up the debate to substantial arguments regarding the legi-
timacy of genocide recognition, the apology campaign gave way to a rather 
odd discursive space in Turkish civil society in which citizens are encour-
aged to empathize with the “pain” of Armenians, sometimes called Anato-
lian pain. Accordingly, the events of 1915 should be understood through 
emotions without necessarily calling a spade a spade. Individual citizens 
are given decision-making agency over how to qualify the events of 1915 
while not being properly educated on the events or the legal framework that 
emerged out of the international debates following the events of 1915. A 
vague language of common pain is substituted instead of demanding com-
mon post-genocidal institutional norms on which both Turkish and Arme-
nian citizens and societies can base their future both as individuals and as 
neighbours.  
In this sense the campaign does not constitute any meaningful challenge 
to the official Turkish stance and is also far from a novel move away from 
the perspective of the societal discourse about 1915 in Turkey. To be clear 
on this: it is not the refusal or lack of courage to call the forced deportation 
and massacres a genocide that has been central to my take. Instead I mainly 
critiqued the balancing act of the organizers trying to appeal to a wide 
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range of internal and external audiences. It is this strategy that tries hard not 
to alienate any group involved in the Turkish-Armenian conflict over the 
history that makes the text and the endeavor a patchwork rather than a criti-
cal assessment of the discourse in Turkey on coming to terms with 1915. 
Last but not least, the total omission of much earlier attempts at apology by 
Kurdish politicians and citizens both in exile and in Turkey by the cam-
paign organizers is also indicative of the limits of the apology endeavor that 
claimed to remember the distant past while conveniently forgetting the re-
cent past itself.  
Armenians and Turkish citizens need a more substantial, horizontal and 
deliberative dialogical process where the historically disadvantaged party is 
not further forced into pre-emptive public negotiations on whose terms it 
has absolutely no power. 
Reconciliation and Human Rights

Soldiers’ Reconciliation  
René Cassin, the International Labour Office, and the 





Reconciliation is the search for an alternative way of configuring hostile 
parties, locked in the hatred and bitterness unleashed by war and violence. 
One set of identities – that of soldiers killing other soldiers on the other side 
of the line – is muted by the construction of another set of identities, com-
ing out of combatant status but moving away from war. Here the moral au-
thority of soldiers, as men who know what Walt Whitman termed the red 
business of war, is decoupled from the conflict which brought them into 
uniform in the first place. Thereafter the door is at least ajar, leading to oth-
er encounters with those whom they would have tried to kill on the battle-
field. Those post-combat meetings help engender solidarities, an unlikely 
alliance of former enemies determined after the end of hostilities to make 
another murderous war unthinkable. 
I want to tell the story of one such effort. To be sure, in the short term, 
it failed, but in the process of creating a new kind of veterans’ politics, a se-
ries of ideas emerged which had long-lasting consequences. These are the 
interests former soldiers had in constructing a norm of international affairs 
above that of the nation state. States, Raymond Aron tells us, are those in-
stitutions defined by their right to wage war. Veterans in the interwar years 
challenged the absolute sovereignty of states precisely because of the lethal 
consequences of decisions to go to war for everyone caught up in them. 
Veterans had rights that superceded the writ of the states, which had sent 
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them to war; those rights were human rights, shared by men without limbs 
or eyes or faces or minds, all over the world. They deserved pensions and 
prosthetic devices and a new start in life not because of their nationality but 
because of their individual and collective dignity. This turn from charity to 
entitlement is one of the key preliminary stages in the creation of a new 
kind of social movement, a human rights movement, which took shape in 
the Second World War, and which after 1970, has mushroomed into a sig-
nificant social, political, and moral force all over the world.1 Reconciliation 
after one war led to reconciliation after a second, and even more embitter-
ing and devastating calamity.  
In this chapter, I want to trace this crooked path of reconciliation, a 
twisted journey leading in directions no one in 1918 had ever imagined. To 
do so, I will tell the story of René Cassin, who would go on to frame the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and win the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1968. In 1914, he was almost killed in combat, and joined with other dis-
abled veterans to create the French veterans’ movement.2 In the interwar 
years, René Cassin became a soldier in another kind of war, one waged  
against war itself. His point of entry into international politics was the in-
ternational veterans’ movement, launched with the aid of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) in Geneva in the early 1920s. There too, be-
tween 1924 and 1938, he served as a member of the French delegation to 
the League of Nations (LON). His place at the table in Geneva was as the 
official representative of the French veterans’ movement. Year after year, 
the Union fédérale des anciens combattants et mutilés de guerre (UF) for-
mally nominated him for this post. Indeed, Cassin himself drafted the letter 
signed by the Federation’s president, making this request, and dispatched it 
to the Prime Minister’s office. And each year until 1938, Cassin travelled to 
Geneva and spent the month between about the 10th of September and the 
10th of October at work on League of Nations’ business. After the disas-
                                                 
1  Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2010). My interpretation differs from Moyn on the 
significance of pre-1970 developments, but on the later period, his book is now 
the standard work. 
2  Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, René Cassin et les droits de l’homme. Le projet 
d’une generation (Paris: Fayard, 2011).  
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trous Munich accords of 30 September 1938, he decided not to return to the 
LON, which to all intents and purposes, had collapsed.  
Over the years he spent in Geneva, he was joined by a remarkable as-
sembly of men, in the ILO, in its early days under Albert Thomas, and in 
the LON itself. In 1926, for instance, Aristide Briand, Louis Loucheur, and 
his old friend from student days in Paris, Marcel Plaisant, served on the 
League’s first commission, devoted to juridical questions. Léon Jouhaux, 
the designated representative of the French trade union movement, served 
on the second commission, devoted to economic questions. In the same 
year – 1926 – Cassin joined Paul-Boncour, Jouhaux and Henri de Jouvenal 
on the third commission, which focused on disarmament. In other years 
Cassin also served on the fifth commission, devoted to humanitarian mat-
ters, and on the sixth commission, responsible for what were termed politi-
cal questions. 
In Geneva, he also served alongside and formed friendships with distin-
guished jurists and politicians from many other countries. It was in Geneva 
that he met Eduard Beneš, foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, and Nikolas 
Politis, foreign minister of Greece. Both were pillars of the League, and do-
minant figures on the commissions on which Cassin served. Both made im-
portant contributions to the development of notions of human rights and 
state sovereignty at the very time Cassin began to write substantially about 
these matters. He presented his thinking to the Institute of International 
Law in Geneva and The Hague Academy of International Law. It is evident 
that his work in these years prepared the ground for the effort he made 
alongside many others during the Second World War and after to frame a 
new international rights regime.3 
In Geneva, Cassin saw why the theory of absolute state sovereignty was 
in need of fundamental revision. The League sought collective security, but 
rested on the premise that its members enjoyed absolute state sovereignty. 
This contradiction ultimately tore it apart. In the 1920s, in the glow of the 
Locarno agreements, there seemed to be a commonality of interest among 
sovereign states in finding alternatives to war as a means of settling con-
flicts between states. But after the economic crisis of 1929, that consensus – 
always precarious, though palpable enough in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
1926 – evaporated. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 opened a 
                                                 
3  Ibid., chapters 5-6, and 9. 
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decade of disasters for the League of Nations, a sorry spectacle Cassin saw 
at first hand. While he and his colleagues continued to work on disarma-
ment and other matters of common concern, the League crumbled, and then 
collapsed after the Munich accords of 1938. 
In this chapter, I tell the story of Cassin’s engagement in international 
affairs in the ILO and the LON in the hopeful years of the 1920s. His lead-
ership in a veterans’ effort of reconciliation rested on a second tier of the 
identities of millions of soldiers: that of mutilated men, men wounded or 
disabled who had a claim – moral, political, and financial – on the countries 
which had called on them to fight. The rights of disabled men to care, treat-
ment, prosthesis, and a living pension was not a national right; it was a hu-
man right, one that was independent of the nationality of the legless, arm-
less, eyeless, or brain-damaged men. By shifting veterans’ politics from the 
level of international reconstruction to the level of transnational rights, they 
formed one of the first effective bridges between the two sides in the Great 
War. 
That wounded men had the right to care was inscribed in the work of 
the Red Cross ever since the Battle of Solverino in 1859. But that associa-
tion was an effort of charity, conducted by those who had not fought. The 
veterans’ movement I discuss here was led by disabled men themselves, 
and their struggle for recognition provided a basis for what we now term 
rights talk. Twenty five years later, when the Second World War required a 
second effort of reconciliation, veterans were there too, making human 
rights the project of a generation, the war generation of 1914-18.  
 
 
THE THIRD WAY, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 
ORGANIZATION, AND VETERANS’ POLITICS 1919-25 
 
For veterans, there were three paths out of the Great War. The first was to-
wards communism. Henri Barbusse’s war novel Under fire (1917) had won 
the Prix Goncourt, international acclaim and a wide readership. Royalties 
helped launch Barbusse’s Association Républicaine des Anciens Combat-
tants (ARAC) which took heart from the hopes of social transformation 
kindled by the Bolshevik Revolution. The second path was that of battle-
hardened nationalism, of the kind the Union Nationale des Combattants 
(UNC) expressed, thereby keeping alive the spirit of camaraderie and bit-
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terness towards Germany. Cassin helped forge a third way, an international-
ist veterans’ movement aligned with the League of Nations and committed 
towards reconciliation between the two enemy camps after the war. 
From the start, Cassin was a League of Nations man. He helped the 
nascent organization create its working library of books and official statis-
tics and reports, and gathered support among those who saw in the League 
the only hope against communism on the left and strident nationalism on 
the right. It is this middle-of-the-road, progressive line that he forged in the 
UF. He did so with other men like Henri Pichot, who had suffered in com-
bat with German forces, but who came to be committed to transcending the 
iron bitterness of the war. 
Cassin was not at all averse to joining the inter-Allied veterans’ organi-
zation, La Fédération Interalliée des Anciens Combattants (FIDAC). But 
he was against a political and cultural quarantine of German and Austrian 
veterans. Why should justified contempt for the old guard of the Kaiser-
reich pollute the atmosphere long after those responsible for the war had 
been overthrown? This is a question Cassin and Pichot, through their ser-
vice and their suffering, had earned the right to ask. They were moral wit-
nesses to the war, men who had faced the enemy, and had bled for their 
country.4 What they said commanded respect. Pichot had spent eleven 
months in a German prisoner-of-war camp, and another six months at home 
recuperating from wounds received at the end of August 1914, wounds and 
the maltreatment of which, almost cost him his left leg.5 He was initially 
convinced that German culture and the German people were rotten through 
and through, but abandoned his initial amertume and used his fluent Ger-
man to argue in both Germany and France for reconciliation.6  
As we have noted, Cassin had been fortunate to survive his combat ex-
perience, and had cried Vive la France, when hit by enemy fire on 12 Octo-
ber 1914. The defeat of Germany was a moral victory to him, a victory for 
the right. But his unshakable view was that the only way to prevent the re-
turn of war was to forge an international order which would block the de-
                                                 
4  Avishai Margalit, The Ethics of Memory (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 
5  Fond Pichot, Archives Nationales, Paris (hereafter: AN), AS 43 1 and 2. 
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scent into armed conflict, when international tensions rose. His was the 
view of Lord Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, who said time and again 
that had in the summer of 1914, had there only been a League, a place for 
the Great Powers to bring their grievances, the war would never have oc-
curred.7 After 1918, that conviction made Cassin and many other veterans 
turn towards Geneva, the seat of the new League of Nations. 
By no means did all French veterans share Cassin’s and Pichot’s views. 
But what is remarkable is the degree to which their internationalist position 
became the middle way, the dominant position among French veterans in 
the inter-war years. From the spring of 1920 on, Cassin joined inter-allied 
meetings of veterans, where he and others put the case that the best defense 
of France was the strengthening of the democratic forces represented in the 
Weimar Republic.8 
The man who forged the links between the UF and the LON was Adrian 
Tixier. Tixier like Pichot was a teacher. Tixier had lost his left arm in the 
Battle of the Frontiers in 1914, and like Cassin, he had won the Médaille 
Militaire and the Croix de Guerre for bravery. Tixier returned to the class-
room in 1915, and served as president of one of the early veterans’ organi-
zations, the Fédération des mutilés du Tarn. He joined the UF, and then in 
1920, accepted the invitation offered by Albert Thomas, director-general of 
the ILO, to come to Geneva and take up the post of secretary responsible 
for disabled veterans in the new organization.  
From the outset, Tixier worked to make the ILO a meeting point for 
veterans from countries on both sides of the war. The advantage he had was 
that the ILO, an independent satellite of the LON, could offer a venue for 
the discussion of purely technical questions of interest to veterans: ques-
tions concerning different approaches to retraining and reeducating wound-
ed veterans, as well as different developments in prosthetic surgery and 
technology going on all over Europe and beyond. The political arena was 
elsewhere, a few streets away in the League of Nations. Thus from mid-
1920 on, Tixier did everything he could to point out to British, French or 
Belgian veterans the benefits arising from an exchange of information and 
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experience with disabled men and their representatives in Germany or Aus-
tria, whose wounds and whose difficulties in coping with disability and 
with finding and keeping a job were very similar to their own. 
There is no doubt that this was a sleight of hand. Tixier wanted the ILO 
to provide the venue for regular meetings of veterans from all combatant 
nations, both to forge an international organization with its own voice, and 
to imbed this large and influential population in the culture and overall 
work of the LON. The problem was, though, that there were many veter-
ans’ groups in Britain, France, and elsewhere unwilling to sit down together 
with their former enemies. The question was how to get around them.9 
Discussing technical matters was one way to do so. Already in 1920, an 
inter-allied veterans’ meeting was held in Brussels, during which a Centre 
de prothèse internationale was born. At the same meeting, the Allied veter-
ans decided to enter into discussions with the ILO “pour les questions in-
ternationales intéressant les mutilés”. This confirmed an earlier resolution 
at the 1920 UF Congress at Nancy to work towards an international meet-
ing of veterans at Geneva. 
In January 1921, Tixier wrote to the UF, asking if it would participate 
in such a meeting to discuss “législation internationale des victimes de la 
guerre”. Cassin as secretary-general of the UF, replied favorably, since this 
request was in line with the Conseil d’administration’s decision to discuss 
technical matters among other veterans’ organizations; such a meeting 
would in no way constitute the creation of “une Fédération internationale 
des victimes de la guerre”.10 So much for Allied veterans’ sensibilities. Cas-
sin insisted that the initiative had to come from the ILO, not from the UF. A 
majority of the Conseil d’administration supported Cassin’s position, gi-
ving him a  
 
“mandat de représenter éventuellement l’Union Fédérale à toutes conferences inter-
nationales qui pourraient être organisées pour le BIT de Genève, en vue de l’étude 
                                                 
9  See Tixier’s reports to Albert Thomas, Historical Archives of the International 
Labour Organization, Geneva (hereafter: ILO Archives), as well as articles in 
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d’une unification des mesures de protections édictées par les different pays en faveur 
des mutilés, réformés et veuves de guerre”.11 
 
The first such meeting was held on 12-14 September 1921, when delegates 
from the UF, the British Legion, and the Italian veterans’ movement sat 
down in Geneva with representatives of the German Reichsbund and the 
Austrian Zentralverbund. Pichot and Gaston Rogé were unable to attend; 
Cassin was the sole spokesman for the UF. He felt some apprehension, he 
wrote, in starting down this path, sensing  
 
“la conscience des grands devoirs à accompli envers tous les invalides, toutes les 
familles victimes de cette guerre, envers aussi notre France ravagée, dont les devas-
tations, dont l’effort de relèvement et l’esprit pacifique, si souvent ignorés ou mé-
connus, devaient être mis au première plan dans une conférence visant aux soulage-
ment des souffrances”.12 
 
Tixier and the head of the ILO Albert Thomas welcomed the delegates. 
Among them was General Sir Frederick Maurice, representing the British 
Legion. There were delegations from Italy and Poland in Geneva, alongside 
German and Austrian delegates. Both countries had participated in the work 
of the ILO since 1919. 
This very first encounter of veterans’ representatives from both sides 
was a delicate moment. And yet Cassin saw this meeting as the right time 
and the right place to begin to construct a different kind of veterans’ inter-
nationale. Surely, he said, disabled men should benefit from developments 
in care and treatment, whatever their origin. If they lived outside their coun-
try of origin, they had to have the right to receive pensions and to obtain 
medical assistance. Cassin knew that there were employers’ organizations 
alongside trade union groups attached to the ILO: here was the natural 
place to discuss retraining and job placement. From these points of mutual 
interest, he argued that veterans could construct a common front, based on 
the view that the Treaty of Versailles had opened the way towards a peace-
ful future. 
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Cassin himself witnessed the way the German delegate to the meeting, 
Schumann, representing the Reichsbund, took up the challenge, and 
 
“responded by making a declaration which everyone listened to with rapt attention, 
especially by the French delegation. He said he came not only to manifest a pacific 
spirit, in denouncing war and revenge, but in order to recognize the debt in repara-
tions that Germany owes to our country. They were committed to take all steps to 
ensure that the German government pays this debt, and also to struggle against all 
those efforts to overthrow the Weimar Republic and to resurrect the imperialist prin-
ciples of the pre-war period.”13 
 
Here was the opening Cassin had hoped for: a public commitment by Ger-
man and Austrian veterans to accept the terms of the peace treaty and to 
work together with their former enemies on matters of mutual interest. 
Deeds, to be sure, had to follow words, and Cassin expressed a certain re-
serve in reporting to French veterans what had happened in Geneva. His 
aim was clear: “To remember so that we do not fall into a trap; to act every-
where to lessen the suffering and to see justice done.”14 
Not all Allied veterans were persuaded that they could work with Ger-
man and Austrian veterans. Suspicions were still set in stone; it would take 
time, Cassin believed, to dissolve them. A second step towards building an 
international veterans’ movement took place in Geneva in March 1922, 
which was the convening of the first ILO-sponsored meeting of experts on 
problems of war disability. Tixier and Cassin worked hand-in-hand to pre-
pare this meeting. Cassin suggested names of possible delegates, and hoped 
that labour and employers’ leaders could be persuaded to come; perhaps, 
Cassin suggested, someone from the Comité des forges.15 That was not pos-
sible, but others accepted the invitation. One was Dr Ripert, an expert on 
prosthetic medicine who had worked at the Centre de prothèse de St Mau-
rice, and joined Cassin in the French delegation in Geneva.16 
Between 2 and 4 March 1922, Albert Thomas himself presided over the 
meeting of delegates from Austria, France, Britain, Germany, Poland, Italy 
                                                 
13  Ibid. 
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15  Cassin to Tixier, 26 November 1921, ILO Archives, MU/7/3/1. 
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and Germany. Their recommendations were uncontroversial: veterans 
should have the right to treatment and care wherever they resided; there 
should be a center of documentation on developments in prosthetic and or-
thopedic medicine – a point on which Cassin insisted – and a fully interna-
tional exposition on the care of disabled men; veterans’ organizations 
should work closely with other associations, including the Red Cross and 
the Comité d’hygiène of the LON. 
The only bone of contention concerned how this initiative cut across the 
work of the Centre de prothèse internationale. Here Tixier was clear. The 
Brussels meeting of 1920, including an exhibition of prosthetic appliances, 
was part of the work of the permanent Inter-Allied committee on medical 
care of the disabled; they rejected the idea of a fully international associa-
tion to deal with these questions. That is why they did not participate in the 
March 1922 meeting in Geneva; it was therefore necessary, Tixier felt, that 
the ILO move into the area they refused to inhabit. Cassin seconded Tixier: 
there were matters on which the Inter-Allied committee was the competent 
authority; and others, fully international matters, on which the ILO was the 
competent authority. They should work in parallel.17 
This was easier said than done. Six months later, Tixier took the next 
step, once again in tandem with Cassin. On 26 September 1922, he wrote 
on behalf of the ILO inviting the UF and other veterans’ groups to come to 
Geneva the following year for a second meeting of experts. On 3 October 
1922, Cassin, then President of the UF, stated that, after consultation with 
the Executive Committee, his organization was happy to accept the invita-
tion. Such a programme, he said, “fits perfectly the ideas of the Union Fé-
derale”. Cassin asked Tixier further to send him any information he had 
about “the legal and economic organization of the supply of prosthetics 
through cooperatives in Austria and Czechoslovakia”. Following his line of 
argument in March, Cassin added that the UF’s decision was without preju-
dice to the work of the Centre de prothèse internationale in Brussels. It was 
time, Cassin wrote, to seize the moment, one which was “exceptionnel-
lement favorable à tous points de vus”.18 
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Getting other associations to join the meeting was not so simple. On 10 
November 1922, Tixier wrote to Albert Thomas in no uncertain terms: “I 
will not deny that establishing cordial relations among veterans of the Great 
War on both sides is a delicate matter.” There were those who would not sit 
down with German veterans, but he believed that after “negotiations, per-
haps protracted, we will be able to establish a formal programme and fix a 
specific date acceptable to all the major associations of men wounded in the 
Great War”.19 The UNC refused to go, but other Allied groups, like the 
British Legion, accepted the invitation. 
The ILO did indeed convene a second meeting of experts on disabled 
veterans’ matters in Geneva in July 1923. This time the focus was on job 
placement, and on the conditions disabled men faced on the job in many 
different countries.20 Delegates attended from South Africa, Germany, Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Britain, Italy, New Zealand, Po-
land, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Red Cross. Cassin was joined by 
Pichot and Rogé from the UF, as well as Monsieur Gauthier, head of L’of-
fice regional de la main d’oeuvre de Paris. The deliberations, Cassin later 
noted, were helpful in negotiations on French legislation passed a few 
months later on the mandatory employment of disabled veterans.21 
These discussions, while intrinsically useful to veterans, were eclipsed 
by the increasingly tense reparations crisis. In January 1923, French and 
Belgian troops had occupied the Ruhr Valley. German inflation assumed 
astronomic proportions. In January 1922, the exchange rate was roughly 
200 Deutschmarks to the dollar; in July 1923, the rate was 350,000 to the 
dollar; month after month the spiral continued. In this atmosphere, little 
could be done to promote international understanding. Though Tixier kept 
trying to find common ground among veterans’ groups, he knew he had to 
await the end of the crisis.22 
The parallel efforts of the new German Chancellor Gustav Stresemann 
in Germany and the new French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand created 
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the conditions for rapprochement. Currency stabilization, through the Da-
wes Plan, and greater Franco-German understanding, leading to the Locar-
no Treaties of 1925 broke the log-jam in Geneva as elsewhere. Here was 
the moment Tixier had been waiting for. But once again, it took a parallel 
effort by Cassin and the UF to bring about the creation of CIAMAC, the 





In effect, improved relations between and among the Great Powers still left 
many ex-soldiers and other nationalists suspicious of the LON in general 
and the ILO in particular. For that reason, Tixier, identifed unalterably as a 
League of Nations man, could not himself convene a meeting of veterans’ 
groups without alienating many potential delegates; that job was done by 
Cassin and the UF. 
Here begins a story of eight years of work both in the field of interna-
tional veterans’ affairs and in the corridors of the League of Nations itself. 
From 1924 on, Cassin served as a French delegate to the League. At the 
same time, he launched, with the assistance of the Secretariat of the ILO, la 
Conférence internationale des associations des mutilés et d’anciens com-
battants, known by its acronym, CIAMAC. Since the two sides to Cassin’s 
Geneva years form one integral story, we first deal with his work with an-
ciens combattants in this organization in the years before 1933, before turn-
ing to his parallel activity within the League itself. Both show his broaden-
ing and deepening approach to the difficult task of healing the wounds of 
war, an approach, which prepared the ground for his work on human rights 
during and after the Second World War. 
Cassin was fully aware of the differences between the UF and other 
French veterans’ groups on questions of working with old enemies. He and 
Tixier reached the unavoidable conclusion that they simply had to go ahead 
on their own with the plan to create a body in which old soldiers from both 
the Allied and the Central powers could come together to discuss issues of 
mutual interest and to defend the peace.23 
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On 7 August 1925, Paul Brousmiche, then President of the UF, wrote to 
Albert Thomas, asking him to provide a venue for an international meeting 
of all veterans’ groups to be held later that year in Geneva. With Thomas’ 
support, Tixier wrote back to the UF saying that the good offices of the ILO 
were at the disposal of the organizing committee of CIAMAC. Tixier found 
two rooms in the University of Geneva, on the ground floor, to enable disa-
bled men to attend the meeting without difficulty. The ILO provided trans-
lators and secretarial staff, who gathered in the salle d’attente des pro-
fesseurs of the University, adjacent to the rooms set aside for the meeting, 
whose date was set as 18-19 September 1925. The ILO provided no finan-
cial support, save negotiating a fee of 2 francs for the rent of the meeting 
rooms. This was formally a UF affair.24 
On 18 September 1925, Brousmiche welcomed delegates from eleven 
countries to Geneva. He saw the meeting as a reflection of the growing 
power and confidence of veterans, who felt impelled to speak out on a 
broad range of domestic and international issues. Disabled men, in particu-
lar, had to voice their views on war and peace. After the formalities were 
over, the delegates got down to business. And business was not easy. Tixier 
explained to Thomas that it took five to six hours of negotiation before a 
text was agreed, committing all delegates, including the German delegation, 
to support unequivocally the Covenant of the League and the obligatory ar-
bitration of future international disputes. Tipping the balance towards 
agreement was the rapport developed between Rossmann, the German del-
egate and Socialist member of the Reichstag, and Pichot, whom Tixier 
termed “the most convincing speak and also the best journalist in the UF”.25 
The next day the delegates were greeted formally by Eric Drummond, 
the Secretary General of the LON, by the president of the League’s Assem-
bly, the Canadian Raoul Dandurand, and by Joseph Paul-Boncour, the 
French President of the Council, with whom Cassin worked in the French 
delegation.26 The publicity was good for CIAMAC, but some journalists 
tried to reduce this initiative simply to an LON public relations exercise. 
Tixier took care, with Thomas’ prodding, to distance himself from 
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CIAMAC, which thereby became one of the first of a breed of political 
groups we now term ‘non-governmental organizations’. 
The originality of CIAMAC was that it was a political group speaking 
up on behalf of ex-soldiers, people with rights. They had no intention of 
taking or giving charity, and hence were at one remove from the Red Cross 
and its allied organizations. They were also at one remove from the gov-
ernments of their members, and were emphatically not paid by nor respon-
sible to the states from which they had come. “The role of CIAMAC”, 
wrote Cassin in 1930, “is not to stand in the place of governments, but to 
make known to them popular sentiment” in more than one country.27 Their 
responsibility was to all the men who had fought in the war, and those 
whose courage and whose suffering gave them the moral authority to speak 
out on a whole range of issues. They were non-denominational, and hence 
had none of the advantages nor any of the disadvantages of the Vatican. 
They represented a generation of men in uniform, their families, their wid-
ows, their orphans, their dependents. They spoke for those millions of men 
and women for whom the war of 1914-18 was a catastrophe. And for whom 
was it not? For disabled men like Cassin, Pichot and Tixier, theirs was a 
moral crusade, a crusade against war. From the outset, their primary aim 
was to help build a durable peace, and to work to strengthen the League of 
Nations.28 
This pacifist voice is what Cassin and his colleagues in the UF trans-
ferred to CIAMAC. It was a forum for the discussion of matters of common 
interest, in the same way as the experts’ committees had been. But it was 
also a voice for understanding across the divide between former enemies, 
and throughout the later 1920s, before the onset of the world economic cri-
sis undermined the fragile democracies of Germany and the rest of Europe, 
CIAMAC pressed its campaign to ensure that no future generation of young 
people would know the ravages of war. Even before Germany was admitted 
to the League of Nations in 1926, German delegates came to Geneva, to 
CIAMAC, to prepare the way for their country’s re-entry into the commu-
nity of nations. 
CIAMAC met for a second time in Geneva on 30 September to 2 Octo-
ber 1926: 80 delegates from 10 nations and 20 organizations attended. The 
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hope was that Col. G.R. Crossfield, the British president of FIDAC, could 
attend and open the meeting, but he was barred from doing so by national-
ists within his own organization.29 As before, the UF, as an allied veterans’ 
group, participated in FIDAC; but FIDAC refused to have anything to do 
with CIAMAC, tainted by the presence of former enemy soldiers. These 
tensions erupted within the French delegation as well. Some who attented, 
Tixier learned, probably from Cassin, aimed to disrupt the meeting and de-
stroy the organization.30 They wanted to force the German delegates to state 
publicly their acceptance of the war guilt clause of the Treaty of Versailles, 
article 231; this would have compromised them at home. Pichot got around 
this, by asking for a majority vote, yes or no, on the matter within the 
French delegation. The no’s won the vote; the French delegation spoke with 
one voice. They did not raise the issue, and the storm faded away. For Cas-
sin, as much as for Tixier, five years of slow and steady work had paid off. 
How moving it was, Tixier told Albert Thomas, to stand together at this 
meeting, with all these old soldiers, and feel the emotion of the moment of 
silence they observed to pay their respects to the dead of the war.31 CIA-
MAC was launched. 
Cassin saw the association as reflecting the interests of a wide body of 
veterans. In terms of membership, the French, German, and Polish associa-
tions predominated. The first service they offered was to bring the experi-
ence of other veterans to the aid of individuals in different countries dealing 
with laws and regulations concerning disability payments, services, and 
pensions. In addition, its independence from all other bodies – including, 
Cassin insisted a bit disingenuously, from the LON – enabled it better to 
work “towards a rapprochement of the countries divided by the war”.32 
In 1927, CIAMAC’s annual congress was held in Vienna. Cassin was 
there together with Brousmiche, Viala, and a priest who was very active in 
the UF, Bernard Secret. He was a prominent member of the Catholic social 
movement, was apparently a particular favorite among Austrian Catholics. 
In Vienna there were 17 delegations in attendance, all, in Tixier’s opinion, 
“resolutely pacifist”. The absent organizations were the American Legion, 
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the British Legion, and the fascist association of Italian veterans. The pro-
file of CIAMAC was centre-left. Half were socialists, radical socialists, or 
social democrats. What mattered most, Tixier wrote, was their power to 
challenge ardent nationalists who claimed to speak for the war generation.33 
Here was the pacifist alternative.34 
In the following year, 1928, CIAMAC met in Berlin, from 9-11 August. 
Now there were 100 representatives in attendance, coming from 25 delega-
tions. Secret introduced a motion, passed by acclamation, affirming that all 
disabled men had a right to reparation for the wounds they had incurred in 
the service of their country. Once more, their position was to demand jus-
tice, not charity. The one ticklish moment in the meeting was a complaint 
by a Polish delegate about certain “incessant aggressive tendencies among 
German nationalists”. This potential embarrassment was defused by Ross-
mann who said that “the commitment to the principles of the renunciation 
of war and obligatory arbitration of international conflicts applies to all 
countries including Poland, and the German people will never permit the 
use of force to modifier the status quo in Europe”.35 If only that had been 
true. Unbeknownst to the delegates, the years of hope were coming to an 
end. The economic crisis of 1929 put paid to the vision that CIAMAC 
could help forge from soldiers’ solidarity a weapon to defend the peace. 
Meetings in Warsaw in 1929 and in Paris in 1930 showed how braided to-
gether in substance were the efforts of CIAMAC and the work of the LON. 
Its International Commission, established in 1929, was in constant contact 
with Geneva, as well as with national commissions in each member state of 
CIAMAC. In the annual meetings in Paris in 1930 as well as in Prague in 
1931, Cassin and Rossmann were joint rapporteurs on progress and imped-
iments in the path towards a system of arbitration, collective security, and 
disarmament. But despite all their efforts, the tide had turned. Just after the 
Prague meeting, in September 1931, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria 
became the first of the major shocks that were to destroy the foundations of 
the LON, and of CIAMAC as well. 
Throughout its early years, CIAMAC’s leaders had hoped to preserve a 
kind of peace in its dealings with FIDAC, the old Allied veterans’ organiza-
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tion. In 1932, the gap between them became unbridgeable. CIAMAC met in 
Vienna on 1-3 September 1932; FIDAC chose precisely the same day to 
hold its annual convention in Lisbon. The British veterans chose FIDAC; 
then in 1933, the Nazis came to power, and promptly arrested a number of 
men who had attended CIAMAC meetings. With the major Italian veterans’ 
organizations refusing to come, the entire raison d’être of CIAMAC van-
ished rapidly. The vision Cassin and Tixier had had of a powerful pacifist 
veterans’ association, bringing former enemies together, had been a chime-
ra. The group soldiered on until 1939, but it was – like the peace itself – 





Cassin knew what had been lost, but he also enumerated what had been 
gained, in particular in defence of the rights of disabled men and their fami-
lies to decent treatment and adequate pensions. In Danzig, the work of 
CIAMAC had helped bring sightless veterans under the aegis of the LON, 
with a subsequent increase in their pensions. The same had been true in 
Bulgaria. The centre for documentation on the treatment of disabled men 
was a source of reference for those working on behalf of disabled men eve-
rywhere. These were small gains, but real ones. They established in micro-
cosm what CIAMAC stood for in general: the notion that veterans every-
where had rights, defined not only by their nationality but by their humani-
ty. They were not supplicants, but citizens, men who had fought and bled 
for their countries, and whose well-being was a matter not of charity but of 
natural justice.37 What they demanded went beyond citizenship, and by mo-
ving in that direction, they presented an option of solidarity, which offered 
an alternative to the sterile nationalism of the interwar years. Their failure 
was palpable, but out of it came a precedent central to a later reconciliation 
with which we are still living today. 
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“A Blessed Act of Oblivion” 






In a now celebrated address delivered at Zurich in September 1946, the 
British Conservative politician and former prime minister Winston Church-
ill launched an ambitious transnational campaign to “re-create the European 
family in a regional structure called, it may be, the United States of Eu-
rope”. He urged his audience to lift the opprobrium cast upon those com-
plicit in the crimes committed by the Axis powers during the war. “The 
guilty must be punished. Germany must be deprived of the power to rearm 
and make another aggressive war”, Churchill conceded. The Nuremberg 
trials were coming to a conclusion and few believed that the top Nazi lea-
ders deserved to be spared. “But”, he continued, 
 
“when all this has been done, as it will be done, as it is being done, there must be an 
end to retribution. There must be what Mr. Gladstone many years ago called ‘a 
blessed act of oblivion’. We must all turn our backs upon the horrors of the past. We 
must look to the future. We cannot afford to drag forward across the years that are to 
come the hatreds and revenges which have sprung from the injuries of the past. If 
Europe is to be saved from infinite misery, and indeed from final doom, there must 
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be an act of faith in the European family and an act of oblivion against all the crimes 
and follies of the past.”1 
 
Invoking the nineteenth-century Liberal statesman William Gladstone’s ad-
dress to the British House of Commons on the question of Irish Home Rule, 
Churchill had called for a deliberate act of forgetting in the name of social 
peace and a new Franco-German understanding as the basis of restoring 
harmony within the “European family” – a community that was “the foun-
tain of Christian faith and Christian ethics” and now aspired to live accord-
ing to the democratic principles of Franklin Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms.2 
Churchill ended his speech with an extraordinary appeal for Franco-
German reconciliation. “The first step in the creation of the European fami-
ly must be a partnership between France and Germany”, he declared. 
“There can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France and a 
spiritually great Germany.”3 
Just as Gladstone had miscalculated the depth of feeling against Home 
Rule in 1886, Churchill underestimated just how deep the scars of the war 
and occupation were in France, where the trials of collaborators were still 
underway and fears of a resurgent Germany were the overriding factor in 
shaping French foreign policy. The French government had no official 
comment, while the speech “dumbfounded” and “shocked” French opinion 
by ignoring the intensity of their fears of reviving German power, accor-
ding to British reports.4 Centrist newspapers such as Le Monde and the 
MRP organ L’Aube expressed skepticism or polite bemusement regarding 
Churchill’s lack of realism, pointing to France’s need for definite guaran-
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tees on its eastern borders among other delicate questions.5 The Socialist 
party organ Le Populaire ignored the speech altogether. Pierre Courtade of 
the communist daily L’Humanité claimed that Churchill spoke of “Europe” 
as a “smokescreen” for the formation of a “western bloc”, another step in 
the process that had begun in 1925 with the Locarno accords.6 Such views 
were not limited to the French alone. In Britain, The Times not only thought 
it unlikely that Churchill’s plan was feasible given current French attitudes 
towards Germany but it feared that the proposal would jeopardize British 
relations with the Soviet Union: “Many will see in his speech a call, not for 
a United States of Europe but for a United States of Western Europe.”7 The 
News Chronicle reported that Churchill had given delegates at the ongoing 
international conference in Paris “new ground for mistrust and suspicion” 
and that the “early reactions are that nobody is happy about it. […] There is 
a widely expressed view that Mr. Churchill has picked a curious time to ad-
vocate a policy which was certain, as he must have known, to embarrass the 
hard and uphill effort which 21 nations are now making in Paris to hold to-
gether the victorious war alliance.”8 
In the months to come, Churchill and other advocates of European unity 
rearticulated their calls for Franco-German cooperation through European 
unity in a new idiom: the language of international human rights norms. 
Human rights discourse had entered the vernacular during public discus-
sions over Allied war aims before becoming the subject of intense negotia-
tions at the United Nations Human Rights Commission from 1947 onwards. 
The human rights projects of the European unity movements would cata-
lyze the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights by the 
member states of the Council of Europe in November 1950 and the subse-
quent establishment of a European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. 
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This chapter examines three moments in which European unity move-
ments inflected their visions of international reconciliation with the idiom 
of human rights: the May 1948 Congress of Europe in The Hague, the Feb-
ruary 1949 conference of the European Movement in Brussels and the sum-
mer 1949 session of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. In all three in-
stances, transnational networks of civil society elites and opposition politi-
cians fashioned an ideational basis for future reconciliation efforts by ima-
gining the form of community that needed to be created – or in their words, 
recreated – for reconciliation to be achieved. This initiative, it will be ar-
gued, was backward-looking as well as forward-looking, retrospective as 
well as prospective. European unity movements invoked the language of 
human rights in order to recall a lost European civilization, one that had 
supposedly existed before the First World War. The temporal orientation of 
rights-based reconciliation pointed away from the divisions and crimes of 
the recent past and towards a Christian and liberal Europe of the deeper 
past. Moreover, although rights-based visions of reconciliation after 1945 
distinguished themselves from fin-de-siècle visions of “Peace through Jus-
tice” by employing democratic rhetoric, they continued to be fundamentally 
elitist projects. Both early twentieth-century efforts to create a legal and in-
stitutional framework for Franco-German reconciliation and postwar rights-
based reconciliation were rooted in a profound fear of the nationalist or rad-
ical ideological impulses of mass politics. 
 
 
THE 1948 CONGRESS OF EUROPE AND THE  
ANTI-POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The Congress of Europe was one of the greatest transnational meetings of 
European elites witnessed in modern times. It was not sponsored by any 
state but rather had been organized by a transnational network of European 
unity movements coordinated by the Joint International Committee of the 
Movements for European Unity. The national delegations that this interna-
tional non-governmental organization had invited to the Congress of Eu-
rope corresponded to the sixteen member states of the Organization for Eu-
ropean Economic Cooperation: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Eire, France, 
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The western zones 
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of Germany, Liechtenstein and the Saar were also represented. In addition 
to this official first tier of participants, the Congress hosted a number of un-
official “observers” without voting privileges – many of them émigrés – 
from Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Ruma-
nia, Spain, the United States and Yugoslavia. The largest contingents of 
delegates came from Britain and France, which combined made up almost 
half the total presented at the Congress. Each national contingent was com-
posed of politicians and representatives from the arts, humanities, sciences, 
law, industry, trade unions, women’s movements and religious organiza-
tions. Among those present at the Congress were twenty-two former prime 
ministers and twenty-eight former foreign ministers.9 
The stated objective of this gathering was to develop a blueprint for 
progress towards greater European cultural, economic and political unity. 
Before the convening of the Congress, there had been much disagreement 
amongst the participants over a united Europe’s institutional framework 
and political boundaries. The organizers believed that agreement on the 
ideal or “spiritual” bases of their project would facilitate the realization of 
an accord on such temporal matters. They hoped that a common affirmation 
of human rights and democratic principles would encourage Congress dele-
gates to transcend national and party differences while delimiting the fron-
tiers of a united Europe. In the name of securing the moral foundations of 
European unity, the Congress organizers proposed that these principles be 
enshrined in international law. Delegates obliged by calling for the estab-
lishment of a supranational court empowered to adjudicate claims brought 
by individuals or groups against states for alleged violations of a binding 
human rights charter. 
When, during the opening ceremonies of the Congress of Europe on 
May 7, Churchill touched on the controversial subject of German participa-
tion in the European unity project, his words were received with mixed ap-
plause.10 This contrasted with the sustained ovation given to Churchill 
when he affirmed, “The Movement for European Unity, as our Draft Report 
declares, must be a positive force, deriving its strength from our sense of 
common spiritual values. It is a dynamic expression of democratic faith 
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based upon moral conceptions and inspired by a sense of mission. In the 
center of our movement stands the idea of a Charter of Human Rights, 
guarded by freedom and sustained by law.”11 Churchill implicitly compared 
the system of human rights guarantees proposed by the Congress organizers 
to the “Grand Design” that Henry IV of France and his advisor Sully had 
devised during the first decade of the seventeenth century, using the analo-
gy of the religious warfare that had wracked Europe at that time. He fo-
cused in particular on Henry IV’s plans for a pan-European council, which 
was, in his words, a “permanent committee representing fifteen – now we 
are sixteen – leading Christian States of Europe. This body was to act as ar-
bitrator on all questions concerning religious conflict, national frontiers, in-
ternal disturbance, and common action against any danger from the East, 
which in those days meant the Turks.”12 As he would do throughout the ad-
dress, Churchill hinted at the identity of the “danger from the East” without 
addressing it by name. 
The Congress of Europe’s final resolutions recommended that the states 
of Europe establish a supranational European human rights court, i.e. one 
that could adjudicate on claims lodged by both state and non-state actors. 
This constituted a radical challenge to the Westphalian order and has right-
ly been regarded as an important milestone in the twentieth century’s ‘hu-
man rights revolution’. The requirement that all member states be democra-
cies contrasted with the absence of such criteria in interwar schemes for Eu-
ropean federation. The Congress of Europe did not, however, represent a 
complete sea change in the ideational framework of international law or 
European unity projects. The Congress’s human rights proposals marked a 
recasting of the elite anti-politics that had long shaped the cultural under-
pinnings of these fields. It was the residue of this elite anti-politics at the 
Congress that enabled the emergence of an ephemeral political consensus. 
Nearly fifty years before the Congress of Europe, The Hague had been 
the site of a peace conference that catalyzed the construction of a spectacu-
lar Peace Palace that housed the new Permanent Court of Arbitration and 
later the Permanent Court of International Justice. This Peace Palace an-
chored the culture of international law in the ideals of ancient Rome and 
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medieval Christendom. Its irenic utopias gave no purchase, however, to 
democratic principles and the defense of human rights. Instead, they 
masked the weak legal prerogatives of its courts, which remained bound to 
the Westphalian system of sovereign states. Their cosmopolitan, aristocratic 
sensibility suited well those Good Europeans who saw themselves as above 
politics and yet remained fearful of those political and social changes that 
threatened to sweep their class from power. Although the First World War 
witnessed a refashioning of the international legal field, the Peace Palace 
continued to embody that depoliticized vision of ‘Peace through Justice’ 
where culture and conciliation provided the surest foundations for a Europe 
of perpetual peace.13 
The community of international law had long positioned itself defiantly 
above politics. Just as civilizational discourse had demarcated membership 
in the society of sovereign states, so had social class provided the shared 
cultural sensibility that structured the rules for participation in the interna-
tional legal field. This field had crystallized social distinctions across na-
tional boundaries, discouraging diplomats and international lawyers from 
being tempted by the “petty” nationalism embraced by lower social orders. 
Such elitism had been meant to inoculate international relations from the 
ideological struggles that the rise of mass politics had engendered. Even af-
ter the advent of the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution, when 
civilizational discourse became infused with democratic rhetoric and the 
League of Nations coordinated a system of minority rights protections, 
there continued to be no universal requirement that members of internation-
al organizations be democracies or respect fundamental rights. Although 
some advocates of European unity insisted that the member states of a Eu-
ropean federation respect certain fundamental rights, even they defined the 
criteria for entry on the longstanding mores of European elites rather than 
on democratic principles.14 
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Churchill’s strategy for achieving Franco-German reconciliation 
through appeals for the “spiritual” unity of Europe anchored in the defense 
of human rights contrasted with that of Aristide Briand, who had alternated 
roles as French foreign minister and delegate to the League of Nations from 
the mid-1920s to the early 1930s. In September 1929, Briand had made a 
dramatic appeal in front of the League Assembly for new measures to pro-
mote international peace.15 In addition to touching on subjects such as dis-
armament, Briand had told his audience “I am convinced that, of those peo-
ples that are grouped geographically, such as the peoples of Europe, there 
must exist a kind of federal bond.”16 Briand’s rhetoric had alluded to twen-
tieth-century theories of solidarism, which posited that interlocking net-
works of communities would eventually break down barriers between peo-
ples, whether erected by class distinctions or states.  His scheme had been 
purportedly inspired in part by the Pan-American solidarist writings of the 
Chilean diplomat Alejandro Alvarez.17 Briand’s language had also echoed 
that of nineteenth-century liberals who believed that peace would emerge 
from closer contacts between peoples without infringing on the sovereign 
prerogatives of the Great Powers. 
Most striking was Briand’s insistence on preserving the principle of ab-
solute sovereignty, or as he put it, “without affecting the sovereignty of any 
nations that could be part of such an association”.18 This wording had left 
ambiguous the question of which “nations” would be admitted to the pro-
posed “association”. Briand had implied that “bonds of solidarity” would 
emerge primarily through economic exchanges.  He had spoken of the need 
for “a federal bond” arising from geographical proximity and “common in-
terests” without specifying those attributes that formed the basis of a com-
mon European civilization. As European culture had long framed the inter-
national diplomatic and legal field, Briand had felt no need to articulate its 
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qualities. They were implicit in the aesthetics of The Hague’s Peace Palace, 
relying more on cultural sensibility than on a precise set of characteristics 
that could serve as criteria for admission into a European regional organiza-
tion. 
None of this should obscure Briand’s primary objective, which had 
been to contain the rising power of Germany by embedding its relations 
with France within a broader regional framework. His stress on economics 
had stemmed from the enthusiasm for European unity projects amongst 
French and German industrialists who wished to form a continental cus-
toms union in order to protect their business concerns from competition 
with the United States. Briand’s proposal had also been warmly received on 
the part of British businessmen and advocates of Imperial Preference who 
wished to undermine the free-trade system favored by both the United 
States and the dominant political factions in Whitehall.19 The loudest criti-
cisms of Briand’s scheme had stemmed from the perception that, first, it 
would undermine the authority of the League and, secondly, that it would 
be directed against “non-European” powers, particularly Turkey, the Soviet 
Union and the United States.20  
The stunning results of the German legislative elections of September 
1930, which made the National Socialists the second-largest party in the 
Reichstag, had made the failure of the Briand initiative all but inevitable. 
Whereas the Nazi party had appealed to the primordial racial bonds that 
united the German Volk, the Briand memorandum had not rooted its vision 
of a European union in a shared history or culture. His proposed European 
union had no means of defining its external and internal frontiers other than 
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fall back on the criteria of geography and mutual interests, which in prac-
tice corresponded to the existing organization and membership of the 
League. 
Briand’s distinctly temporal vision of Franco-German reconciliation 
through European unity contrasted distinctly with his collaborator Richard 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, the Czech count who had founded the transnational 
Pan-Europa Movement shortly after the First World War. Coudenhove-
Kalergi had been the most prominent proponent of a rights-based approach 
to European unity in the interwar period. He was an outspoken opponent of 
National Socialism from its inception, writing at length on the fallacies of 
its racial and anti-Semitic theories. The Czech nobleman was, however, no 
democrat. Although he often cited contemporary Switzerland as a template 
for a future European federation, his writings strongly implied that the most 
salient historical model was the “cosmopolite and polyglot” Austro-Hun-
garian Empire, whose aristocratic political class had formed a “superna-
tional” government that for many years checked the nationalistic tendencies 
of the middle classes.21 He justified his contacts with dictators such as Be-
nito Mussolini and Engelbert Dollfuss by claiming that Europe was above 
all a “cultural community” that should be governed by its “greatest genius-
es,” those “really educated statesmen” who would save Europe from the 
“half-educated” masses swayed by populist agitators of the extreme left and 
right.22 Mussolini’s reputation as an uncultured demagogue did little to de-
ter Coudenhove-Kalergi from courting the Duce’s favor, as the Count be-
lieved that Bolshevism and Nazism were greater evils than what he per-
ceived as “moderate” authoritarianism.23  
Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that a comprehensive and enlightened so-
lution to the minorities question was essential for the peace of Europe. In 
1923, he proposed in his book Pan-Europa “a true protection of minorities 
by the universal enforcement of a national edict of toleration – a Magna 
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Carta of all European nations”.24 This “Pan-European edict of toleration 
deprives the state frontiers of their national meaning” and thus “inter-
European points of friction which might lead to another war disappear”, he 
wrote.25 Shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, Couden-
hove-Kalergi’s issued a new program for his Pan-Europa Movement that 
required “all European states, regardless of differences in their constitu-
tions, to respect the rights of the human personality and the equality of their 
citizens belonging to ethnic or religious minorities”. Coudenhove-Kalergi 
explained, “Only if this principle of national human rights is accepted can 
there be European reconciliation and perpetual European peace.”26 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s program had been drafted in conjunction with a 
committee of British notables organized by the Conservatives Leo Amery 
and Duff Cooper. He had initially placed Britain outside the frontiers of a 
united Europe.27 In the late 1930s, however, he began to look across the 
Channel. In June 1938, he told an audience at Chatham House in London 
that they should view Europe as a second Commonwealth or “the Lebens-
raum of England”, as British rule was preferable to German domination of 
the continent.28 In 1939, Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote, “[O]ur common Euro-
pean culture is today rooted in a humanist education, in a Christian morali-
ty, and in the spirit of chivalry now incorporated in the civic ideal of the 
English gentleman.”29 
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s address at the opening ceremonies of the Con-
gress of Europe echoed Churchill’s speech by embedding a future European 
organization in a broader rapprochement between peoples. “I hope that our 
Congress will serve not only the cause of European Union, but also that of 
European reconciliation”, he announced. Though Coudenhove-Kalergi in-
sisted that “Europe needs a thorough reeducation and denazification,” he 
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immediately followed this statement with a qualification. “We must reject 
the barbaric and totalitarian notion of collective guilt and collective pun-
ishment”, he insisted. “We all must learn more tolerance, more generosity, 
more mercy.”30 
One of the British delegates on the Congress’s Cultural Committee was 
David Maxwell Fyfe, former deputy chief prosecutor at the International 
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. Alongside Churchill, Maxwell Fyfe would 
be one of the most influential British Conservatives in the early stages of 
the European human rights project. Maxwell Fyfe was the first to make a 
forceful intervention against attempts by other delegates to omit references 
to a charter and court of human rights in the Congress’s Cultural Resolu-
tion. Citing his work at the Nuremberg trials, Maxwell Fyfe stated he felt it 
his “individual responsibility” to fight for the establishment of international 
human rights safeguards.31 He claimed that the Nuremberg trials had posed 
the fundamental question, “What is the duty of a good European?” The tri-
als were necessary for “the establishment of a sounder and saner Europe”, 
reaffirming the principles of international law and offering Germans the 
opportunity to enter “back into the European stream of thought and devel-
opment”.32 Reflecting on Nuremberg in retrospect, he observed, “I am cer-
tain that the Nazi leaders felt and resented most keenly that they were con-
sidered by those who watched the trial to have poisoned the great stream of 
western European civilization. Again and again they displayed almost what 
the Romans termed ‘desiderium’ and the Greeks ‘pothos’ – a vain longing 
to be recognized as part of the European family.”33 Subsequently, in July 
1948, Maxwell Fyfe would contribute an article to the review Round Table, 
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writing that the resolutions of the Congress of Europe “indicate the im-
portance of the condition of ‘membership of the club’ being the acceptance 
of a Charter of Human Rights with its implementation assured by a Su-
preme Court”.34 The question of which nations would qualify as members 
of the Council of Europe was a subject of great concern within the Europe-
an Movement, which began increasingly to employ the new idiom of inter-
national human rights norms as a means of facilitating the entry of Germa-




THE GERMAN QUESTION AT THE 1949 BRUSSELS 
CONFERENCE OF THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT 
 
The organizers of the Congress of Europe could claim much success in the 
year that followed the conclusion of that event. In July 1948, French for-
eign minister Georges Bidault asked the Brussels Pact countries to support 
the creation of a European Assembly. British foreign minister Ernest Bevin 
initially resisted the idea but relented in January 1949 after Bidault’s suc-
cessor, Robert Schuman, informed him that France would proceed without 
Britain, if necessary. On May 5, 1949, representatives of ten countries – 
Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Neth-
erlands, Norway and Sweden – concluded the drafting of a statute forming 
a Council of Europe composed of a Committee of Ministers and a Consul-
tative Assembly. The first session of the Council of Europe was scheduled 
to take place in August and September 1949. Here was a set of state-
sponsored initiatives often driven by ulterior strategic considerations, but 
directed to giving form to a vision of European peace through unity.35 
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During this period, the Joint International Committee of the Movements 
for European Unity renamed itself the European Movement and assumed 
responsibility for developing recommendations to governments concerning 
future steps towards juridical, economic, cultural and political unification. 
It did so through a series of conferences, the first of which took place in 
Brussels from February 25 to 28, 1949. This conference was dedicated to 
drafting a proposal for a binding European Convention and Court of Hu-
man Rights. It was also responsible for issuing a more general resolution 
entitled “Principles of a European Policy”. 
Meanwhile, the U.N. General Assembly had adopted the Universal De-
claration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948. The 30 articles of this 
nonbinding resolution enumerated a broad spectrum of civil, political, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights. Its content, although drawing on a diverse 
array of philosophical traditions, Western and non-Western, reflected pri-
marily the emergence of social democracy as the fulcrum of political con-
sensus among anti-fascist forces during the course of the Second World 
War. Despite the disagreements and machinations that characterized the 
negotiations over the document, as well as the abstention of the Soviet bloc 
on the final vote, the Universal Declaration was premised on the illusory 
hope that a common statement of social democratic principles could bridge 
the ideological divide between Western democracies and communist states. 
Some of the leaflets dispersed at the open-air meeting of the European 
Movement at the Brussels Bourse stated, “United Europe is letting in the 
former Nazis but keeping out the victors of Stalingrad”, and asked, “What 
are ex-Nazis doing on the platform of the European Movement?” “Dirty 
German!” cried the protestors when Churchill mounted the stage. The 
communists were incensed at the suggestion that the Western zones of 
Germany join a Council of Europe and that Germans participate in the 
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Brussels Conference on the same terms as the other delegates.36 Germans 
had maintained a low profile at the Congress of Europe, keeping largely to 
themselves, intervening only sporadically in the discussions and having dif-
ficulty making their mother tongue understood.37 At the Brussels Confer-
ence, by contrast, they played a more active role. 
At the Brussels Conference, the Belgian communist daily Le Drapeau 
Rouge denounced Karl Arnold, the head of the German delegation and 
Catholic Christian democrat (CDU) minister-president of the land North-
rhine-Westfalia, for hindering the denazification of German industry.38 Ar-
nold did not hesitate to advocate a policy of leniency towards the Germans 
on the part of the occupying forces and to stress the need to integrate West 
Germany into Western European regional organizations. He asked his fel-
low delegates after the rally to consider that “probably every European 
people has experienced turbulent times in which its duty towards the Euro-
pean community has been disregarded”. The misery that Hitler had visited 
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upon the German people had allowed them to undergo a process of “spir-
itual purification”, he argued.39 
Arnold was on the left-wing of the CDU and was co-founder of the 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund trade union.40 Like the majority of the Ger-
man delegation at the Brussels Conference, Arnold had been persecuted by 
the Nazis for his political activities and been imprisoned during the war in a 
German Lager. In his view, these terrible hardships made the Germans 
uniquely suited to advancing the objectives of the European Movement. 
“Who is better qualified to lead the way to a better future than those who 
have learnt wisdom through suffering?” he asked.41 Arnold was an early 
and adamant supporter of the economic integration of France and Germany 
as a means of advancing a rapprochement between the two countries.42 His 
words at the Brussels Conference echoed those that Churchill had uttered in 
the House of Commons on December 10, 1948, the same day that the U.N. 
General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. At 
that time, Churchill had stated: 
 
“The recent elections in Berlin have been a proof of the resurrection of the German 
spirit and a beacon casting its light on the minds of a mighty race without whose ef-
fective aid the glory of Europe cannot be revived. I hope nothing will be done by the 
Government – or, so far as we can avoid it, by our allies – to chill or check this im-
portant evolution of German sentiment. It is for this reason that I look forward to the 
day when all these [sic] hateful process of denazification and even the trials of lead-
ers and prominent servants of the Hitler regime may be brought to an end.”43 
 
Churchill then had stressed the importance of Franco-German reconcilia-
tion, once again asking the French to “take the lead in bringing the German 
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people back into the European family. In this way alone can they revive 
their own fame and regain their place in the world.”44  
The Political Resolution of the Congress of Europe had affirmed that 
“the integration of Germany in a United or Federated Europe alone pro-
vides a solution to both the economic and political aspects of the German 
problem.”45 The French delegation, however, had stymied efforts to press 
for the immediate inclusion of Germany in a United Europe. German feder-
alists had responded that West Germany should be admitted without delay 
because it respected human rights and this was the only legitimate criterion 
for entry into that body.46 At the Brussels Conference, in contrast, the initia-
tive to invite Germany to join a Council of Europe came from the French 
delegation. This reflected a broader shift in French policy towards Germa-
ny. As a French foreign ministry memorandum explained, Germans would 
be more amenable to satisfying French security needs if France were to ap-
peal to the strong “European” sentiment in that country. Without embed-
ding Germany in a Council of Europe, Germans would either dream of Hit-
ler’s Europe or succumb to Stalin’s Europe.47 
The French Christian Democrat Robert Bichet secured votes for a mo-
tion in favor of the immediate entry of Germany into a Council of Europe, 
arguing that delegates should not even wait until Germany adopted a feder-
al constitution.48 He was president of the Nouvelles Équipes Internationa-
les, a pan-European organization dedicated to supporting progressive Ca-
tholic causes and coordinating the activities of Christian Democrats across 
the continent. One of its primary objectives was the incorporation of Ger-
many into a United Europe and its second meeting, which took place in 
Luxembourg in early 1948, had been the first postwar international con-
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gress in which an official German delegation, including future German 
chancellor Konrad Adenauer, had participated.49 The final recommenda-
tions issued by the Brussels Conference stated, “Henceforth, West Germa-
ny, and all of Germany when it will be possible, must be invited to integrate 
itself in this new community, in which all peoples will have the same rights 
and the same responsibilities.”50 
 
 
GOOD GERMANS AT THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
 
The inaugural session of the Council of Europe was held in the summer of 
1949 in Strasbourg. The choice of Strasbourg as the site of these meetings 
was a daring move. The most prominent international institutions of the in-
terwar period had been located on neutral ground, with the League of Na-
tions headquartered in Geneva and the Permanent Court of International 
Justice situated in The Hague. Strasbourg, by contrast, had been at the epi-
center of international conflicts for over two centuries. It had changed 
hands four times during the past eighty years alone, annexed by Germany 
after the Franco-Prussian War, restored to France at the conclusion of the 
First World War, seized by the Germans again during the Second World 
War and now once more finding itself on French soil. 
The founders of the Council of Europe had calculated that their choice 
of locale would transform Strasbourg from a site of Franco-German antag-
onism into a symbol of a new age of peace through unity. Yet, scars ran 
deep. A great number of Alsatian youth had been conscripted to fight with 
the Germans on the Russian front, many never to return. For some, talk of 
European unity invoked Hitler’s plans for a “New Order”. Although no 
Germans would participate in the proceedings of the Council of Europe that 
summer, some of the residents of Strasbourg worried that the formation of a 
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United Europe would facilitate the return of German hegemony in the name 
of greater “European” ideals.51 With the West German general election 
scheduled to occur six days after the start of the Committee of Ministers’ 
first session, there was much trepidation that the Germans would once 
again opt for nationalism over reconciliation. This time, the Alsatians 
feared, revanchism might take a more insidious form. 
On the same day that Churchill sponsored a proposal to add human 
rights to the agenda of the Council of Europe’s Consultative Assembly, the 
British opposition leader proclaimed at a European Movement rally that 
“[t]he life of free Europe depends on association with Germany”.52 German 
elections took place on August 14, 1949, paving the way for a center-right 
coalition government. On August 17, in a speech calling for the creation of 
a European court of human rights, Churchill became the first delegate to 
argue in the Consultative Assembly for the admission of Germany into the 
Council of Europe. He asked his fellow delegates to adopt a resolution in 
favor of an extraordinary session of the Consultative Assembly in Decem-
ber 1949 or January 1950 that would welcome a German delegation in its 
midst.53 Konrad Adenauer understood that Germany’s path to redemption 
in the eyes of the world lay through joining the Council of Europe. A week 
after Churchill’s speech, he announced, “As things stand at present, Ger-
many in my opinion would not be eligible to join the Atlantic pact. First we 
must be a member of the Council of Europe. Then we must quietly await 
further developments.”54 “It is completely obvious”, Pravda subsequently 
observed, “that the European Council is one of the organs of the North At-
lantic bloc system – a particular sort of servants’ entrance into this sys-
tem”.55  
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The bicentennial of Goethe’s birth coincided with the first session of 
the Consultative Assembly, providing an opportunity to cast Germans as 
fundamentally Good Europeans that had lost their way through succumbing 
to the temptations of militant nationalism during the past century. Officials 
from the Council of Europe laid a wreath at a statute of Goethe in Stras-
bourg University. In Mainz, André Poncet, the French High Commissioner, 
called Goethe “the great European”.56 Sandro Volta argued in Il Corriere 
della Sera Germans should not consider Goethe as part of their “national 
glories” but rather as a “citizen of Europe”.57 Alfio Russo, writing in the 
same newspaper, had already remarked on the “paradox of a Europe that 
includes Asiatic Ankara and, instead, excludes Frankfurt”.58 
At least one Goethe retrospective argued that the German author’s hu-
manism represented a point of synergy between Germanic and Latin under-
standings of human rights. Pierre Corval wrote in L’Aube that the bicenten-
nial should remind Europeans that Goethe’s understanding of the European 
spirit was based on a respect for the dignity of the human person, which 
was the foundation of the European Movement’s human rights proposals.  
Europe would continue to be a “fiction” until Goethe and the European 
Movement’s vision of “European man” prevailed over the slavery of Soviet 
totalitarianism.59 
Churchill’s efforts to secure a resolution in favor of an extraordinary 
session of the Consultative Assembly that would include German delegates 
were unsuccessful, due primarily to the opposition of British Labourites 
and the French delegates. Anxieties over the possibility of a rearmed and 
resurgent Germany were still too great. Yet, for those in the European 
Movement advocating the creation of a European court of human rights, the 
means to prevent the revival of antidemocratic forces in Germany had al-
ready been defined in its Draft Convention. They hoped that its eventual 
adoption by Germany would reassure skeptics that Germany was prepared 
to be a Good European.  
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Even after Churchill’s gambit failed, the leadership of the European 
Movement would not be deterred from its advocacy of immediate German 
entry. On September 7, 1949, Sandys called a press conference, declaring, 
“The European Movement will do all it can to facilitate her admission”.60 
On September 8, Layton announced in the Consultative Assembly,  
 
“This list [of rights] which we are proposing, coupled with the right of intervention 
in some form or another – in the first place by protest, negotiation, and so on, and ul-
timately in terms of enforcement – constitutes the club rules for this Council. We are 
therefore drawing up the terms which will decide the admission of any future appli-
cant or country which may be admitted here. We are drawing up conditions which 
Spain or Germany – to be perfectly frank – or any other country must fulfil, both as 
regards the items in the list, and as regards accepting the right of intervention, before 
they can become Members of this Council of Europe.”61 
 
As Raymond Millet explained in Le Monde, the European human rights 
project was intended to “render possible the admission of other states, that 
is, Germany. Because, they tell us, suppose that participating nation one 
day flouts the principles of the Council of Europe. Would it be necessary to 
exclude it? That would exacerbate its nationalism. By contrast, a decision 
from the Supreme Court of Human Rights would set it back on the right 
path without a confrontation.”62 
The European Movement was successful in presenting a European con-
vention of human rights as a means of ensuring the peaceful integration of 
Germany into the Council of Europe. The Greek and Turkish representa-
tives in the Consultative Assembly’s Committee on Legal and Administra-
tive Questions, for example, had initially objected to the drafting of a bind-
ing human rights convention but dropped their opposition after it was made 
clear to them that a convention on human rights was necessary to admit 
Germany into the “European community”.63 On November 10, 1949, Paul-
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Henri Spaak, the president of the Consultative Assembly and an honorary 
president of the European Movement, would write to Gustav Rasmussen, 
president of the Committee of Ministers, to express his dismay that the 
Committee of Ministers had not yet acted upon the human rights resolution 
approved by the Consultative Assembly. It was imperative that the Council 
of Europe act quickly, Spaak argued, because its objective was to reinforce 
reciprocal confidence in the democratic institutions of “present and future 
members”. Spaak was clearly signaling that it was vital to conclude a hu-
man rights convention before the admission of Germany.64 
If members of the European Movement deployed their human rights 
project as a mechanism for the inclusion of Germany, they also used it as a 
means to justify the exclusion of communist regimes from the Council of 
Europe. As Maxwell Fyfe told the Assembly on August 19,   
 
“I realise that when we lay down tests, those who fail to pass the tests must be ex-
cluded. Therefore I appeal to those nations who belong to and revere the great fami-
ly of Western Europe and Christian civilisation. I make no reflection on those who 
do not, but I turn to the problem as it exists. Will they not adapt their Governments 
so as to conform to opinions which are so redolent of that tradition and of that spirit? 
We seek only to delimit the conditions in which alone the dignity of the human spirit 
will stand, free, firm and unassailed. May this test which we have propounded be-
come not an exclusion but a passport to our midst.”65 
 
Just as Churchill had done in his speech at the Albert Hall in May 1947, 
Maxwell Fyfe did not state outright that countries in the Soviet sphere of 
influence would be forever ineligible to join a united Europe. Yet, his met-
aphor of the human rights “passport” implicitly created a two-tier system, 
whereby states that were members of “the great family of Western Europe 
and Christian civilisation” had priority over those that were not. Under this 
logic, there was little doubt that a Germany governed by a coalition of 
CDU/CSU and FDP under Adenauer would soon be welcomed into the Eu-
ropean club. 
                                                 
64  Paul-Henri Spaak to Gustav Rasmussen, 10 November 1949, ADP, Europe 
(1945-1960), Conseil de l’Europe, 1949-1955, Box 26. 
65  First Session, Reports, Part II, 452, COEA.  
“A BLESSED ACT OF OBLIVION” | 137 

On the first day of the first session of the Committee of Ministers, 
Derek Kartun of the Daily Worker had called the Council of Europe a 
“massive stunt”. “Figuring large in the great stream of United Europe prop-
aganda is the insistent plea that Germany must be brought back into the 
fold and that the existence of this new body will in some undefined – and 
indeed undefinable – way guard against a revival of aggressive Nazism”, he 
wrote.66 Kartun had not anticipated that the drafting of a binding European 
convention on human rights would provide those advocating German entry 
with a potent argument for constructing a united Europe whose frontiers 
would extend east of the Rhine but – with the inconvenient exception of 
Turkey – not beyond the pale of Christendom. 
The question of German participation in common European institutions 
thrust the language of international human rights norms into mainstream 
British political discourse. The 1950 general election manifesto of the Con-
servative Party, issued in January, stated, “Hand in hand with France and 
other friendly powers we shall pursue the aim of closer unity in Europe. 
The admission of the Government of Western Germany into the Council of 
Europe will be supported on the understanding that she accepts freely and 
fully the Western democratic conception of human rights.”67 The use of the 
phrase ‘human rights’ was in marked contrast with the appeal to ‘our an-
cient liberties’ in the Conservative Party’s previous general election mani-
festo. International human rights norms were presented as a means of safely 
reintegrating Germany into the ‘West’. On 6 September 1946, US Secretary 
of State James Byrnes had stated that “it never was the intention of the 
American Government to deny to the German people the right to manage 
their own internal affairs as soon as they were able to do so in a democratic 
way, with genuine respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”.68 
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The official title of the European Convention on Human Rights signed in 
Rome on 4 November 1950 was the Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  
West German newspapers would describe the Federal German Repub-
lic’s signing of the European Convention in November 1950 as a signal 
diplomatic achievement, for it was the first time that it had entered into an 
international accord on an equal basis with other states.69 After West Ger-
many became a full member of the Council of Europe in May 1951, Aden-
auer gave a speech to the Consultative Assembly in December of that year 
in which he described adherence to the European Convention as part of the 
German people’s commitment to “European values”, for “[a] bitter and 
very dangerous experience has taught our people that it is necessary to ex-
pend all one’s energies to maintain, develop and defend the culture of the 
West, if it is to survive”.70 The West German government’s declaration of 
27 September 1951 stressing the measures that it had taken to effectuate 
reconciliation between Germans and Jews stated,  
 
“The attitude of the Federal Republic of Germany to its Jewish citizens is clearly de-
fined through the Basic Law [...]. These legal norms are the law of the land and 
oblige every German citizen, and especially every state official, to reject any form of 
racial discrimination. In the same spirit, the German government has also signed the 
Human Rights Convention adopted by the Council of Europe and has pledged itself 
to the realization of the legal concepts laid down in this Convention.”71 
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The West German government’s statement marked an important initial step 
in the process of reconciliation between, not only Germans and the Jewish 
people, but Germany and a wider European civilization. The use of the lan-
guage of European human rights law in this document was an outcome of 
both the broader revolution in international human rights norms of the 
1940s and the particular transnational civil society initiatives that had 
emerged from the Congress of Europe. On the surface nothing could have 
been more different than the fin-de-siècle vision of a common European 
civilization in which culture trumped ideology as the basis of the communi-
ty of international law and the vision of European civilization expressed by 
the postwar European unity movements in which the basis of a united Eu-
rope rested on the respect for human rights and democracy. Moreover, the 
postwar European unity movement challenged the Westphalian principle of 
absolute state sovereignty rather than accommodate it. 
Even so, there were also striking continuities between the rights-based 
reconciliation initiatives of the European unity movements after the Second 
World War and the fin-de-siècle mantra of ‘peace through justice’. The im-
agined community that was the end goal of international reconciliation con-
tinued to be framed by a backward-looking and elitist worldview. It is im-
portant to keep in mind the retrospective as well as prospective nature of 
visions of reconciliation after the Second World War. These were visions 
that looked back not to the fractured Europe of the age of total war but to an 
imagined Christian and liberal Europe of an earlier era. While the creation 
of European human rights law was a new means of bringing Germany 
“back” into the “European family”, the civilizational discourse that framed 
rights-based reconciliation was not novel. It is these continuities that we 
must keep in mind when telling the story of both postwar reconciliation and 
the postwar genesis of European human rights law. 
 

Reconciliation in the Aftermath of 
World War II

Franco-German Rapprochement and 
Reconciliation in the Ecclesial Domain  
The Meeting of Bishops in Bühl (1949) and the Congress 
of Speyer (1950)1 




The Franco-German friendship is largely regarded as a prime example of 
the successful rapprochement of two hostile nations. Through nearly a cen-
tury filled with resentments, conflicts, and wars, the so-called hereditary 
enmity of Germany and France developed. Rapprochement efforts, such as 
attempts by the politicians Gustav Stresemann and Aristide Briand,2 or of 
the Catholic Marc Sangnier,3 in the interwar period ended with the emer-
gence of National Socialism and at the latest with the outbreak of the Se-
cond World War. Incorporated into the process of European integration and 
partly following previous endeavours, the remarkable history of the Franco-
German friendship began after this war. The new togetherness of the “coup-
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le franco-allemand”4 became visible particularly through great symbols and 
in emotional gestures exhibited in the political realm. The signing of the 
Treaty of Friendship by Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle in 19635 
or the handshake between Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand in 19846 
serve as examples of this alliance. 
Right from the start, this political-diplomatic sphere was in the focus of 
historical research on Franco-German relations in the post-war period.7 
However, actual efforts by French and German politicians to form an un-
derstanding with their neighbours began relatively late.8 In contrast, many 
initiatives for rapprochement from civil society started already immediately 
after World War II, and since the 1990s, these efforts attracted increased re-
search interest.9 Institutions and organisations such as the Deutsch-Fran-
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schaftliche Annäherungen, ed. Corine Defrance et al. (Tübingen: Attempto, 
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zösisches Institut (Franco-German Institute) in Ludwigsburg10 or the Comi-
té francais d’échanges avec l’Allemagne nouvelle (French Committee for 
Exchange with the New Germany)11 were established at the end of the 
1940s. Moreover, since then numerous town twinnings12 and countless 
youth meetings13 took place to bring French and German people into a clo-
ser understanding of each other. Franco-German journal projects14 or the 
role of prisoners of war and of former soldiers15 also played an essential 
role in the Franco-German rapprochement. All these initiatives began sig-
nificantly prior to political efforts and served politicians as starting bases 
and points of contact.16  
                                                                                                  
2010); Defrance, Société civile et relations franco-allemandes, in: Wege der 
Verständigung, 17-31, here: 17. 
10  Projekt deutsch-französische Verständigung. Die Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft am 
Beispiel des Deutsch-Französischen Instituts in Ludwigsburg, ed. Hans Manfred 
Bock (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1998). 
11  Carla Albrecht, Das Comité français d’échanges avec l’Allemagne nouvelle als 
Wegbereiter des Deutsch-Französischen Jugendwerks, Lendemains 27 (2002), 
177-189. 
12  Manfred Bock, Europa von unten. Zu den Ursprüngen und Anfängen der 
deutsch-französischen Gemeindepartnerschaften, in: Gemeindepartnerschaften 
im Umbruch Europas, ed. Annette Jünemann et al. (Frankfurt a.M.: P. Lang, 
1994), 13-35; Corine Defrance, Les premiers jumelages franco-allemands, 1950-
1963, Lendemains 21 (1996), 83-95. 
13  Kirsten Hoyer, Deutsche Jugendorganisationen und deutsch-französische Ju-
gendkontakte in der Nachkriegszeit 1945-1955 – ein Überblick, Lendemains 21 
(1996), 110-125. 
14  René Wintzen, Private und persönliche Initiativen in der französischen Besat-
zungszone. Die Zeitschriften Documents und Dokumente, Vent debout und 
Verger, in: Französische Kulturpolitik in Deutschland 1945-1949. Berichte und 
Dokumente, ed. Jérôme Vaillant (Konstanz: UVK, 1984), 143-151. 
15  Francois Cochet, Le rôle des anciens prisonniers et des anciens déportés français 
dans le rapprochement franco-allemand, in: Le rôle des guerres dans la mémoire 
des Européens, ed. Antoine Fleury and Robert Frank (Neuchâtel: P. Lang, 
1997), 123-135. 
16  Defrance, Société civile, 24; Albrecht, Comité français. 
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Although there is now substantial research about many actors and 
groups favouring the Franco-German friendship, the churches and church-
related groups remained largely unexplored.17 This lack of attention is as-
tonishing because the churches played a crucial role in the German situa-
tion after 1945. After the war, they were the only functioning organisations 
and the only institutions that were not regarded as politically compromised. 
They were engaged in societal and political tasks, were dialogue partners of 
the allies, and were advocates and benefactors to the German population.18 
At the same time, varied initiatives for the Franco-German rapprochement 
came from the ecclesial sphere on both sides of the Rhine, as Joseph 
Zouame-Bizeme concludes:  
 
                                                 
17  One volume of the journal Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte (KZG 14, 2001/2) deals 
with the relations between German and French Protestants and Catholics in the 
19th and 20th century. Further examples are: Martin Greschat, Widerstand und 
Versöhnung. Der Beitrag des europäischen Protestantismus zur Annäherung der 
Völker, in: Christliches Ethos und der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialis-
mus in Europa, ed. Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Joachim Mehlhausen 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1995), 139-144; Frédéric Hartweg and Daniela Hei-
merl, Der französische Protestantismus und die “Deutsche Frage” 1945-1955, 
part 1 and 2, KZG 3, 1 (1990), 386-412, KZG 4, 1 (1991), 202-235; Michael Ki-
ßener, Ein “ragendes Denkmal” des christlichen Abendlandes. Der Bau der 
Friedenskirche in Speyer 1953/4, Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte 9 
(2008), 93-106; Michael Kißener, Boten eines versöhnten Europa? Deutsche Bi-
schöfe, Versöhnung der Völker und Europaidee nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, 
in: Die europäische Integration und die Kirchen. Akteure und Rezipienten, ed. 
Heinz Duchhardt and Malgorzata Morawiec (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rup-
recht, 2010), 53-72; Michael Kißener, Der Katholizismus und die deutsch-
französische Annäherung in den 1950er Jahren, in: Wege der Verständigung, 
89-98; Joseph Zouame-Bizeme, Aspects des relations réligieuses franco-
allemandes de 1945 à 1955 (Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 
1990). 
18  Michael Strobel, Kirchen und Besatzungsmächte in der deutschen Nachkriegs-
geschichte 1945-1949 (Tübingen: Universität Tübingen, 1992), 1, 76, 146; Mar-
tin Greschat, Protestanten in der Zeit. Kirche und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 
vom Kaiserreich bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994), 180-183. 
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“The churches of France and Germany were the avant-garde of the policy of German 
reconstruction. In doing so, they undertook different projects of the Franco-German 
reconciliation and different efforts to create peace in the world.”19  
 
Individuals such as the Jesuit, Jean du Rivau,20 who set up the Bureau In-
ternational de Liaison et de Documentation (International Office for Liai-
son and Documentation), or the pastor Georges Casalis21 in Berlin worked 
towards reconciliation between the French and the Germans. Face to face 
with them on the German side stood Lothar Kreyssig, the founder of Aktion 
Sühnezeichen (Action Reconciliation),22 or Bishop Isidor Emmanuel,23 who 
took an active part in the building of the Friedenskirche St. Bernhard (St. 
Bernhard Peace Church) between 1953 and 1954 in Speyer. 
In the middle and in contact with these individuals were Robert Picard 
de la Vacquerie and Marcel Sturm,24 the French chief military chaplains in 
both Germany and Austria.25 Picard de la Vacquerie (1893-1969) was or-
                                                 
19  Zouame-Bizeme, Aspects, 372. 
20  René Wintzen, L’influence de personnalités, d’institutions et d’initiatives pri-
vées sur la politique culturelle française en Allemagne après 1945, in: Frank-
reichs Kulturpolitik in Deutschland, 1945-1950, ed. Franz Knipping and Jacques 
Le Rider (Tübingen: Attempto, 1987), 335-348; Emmanuelle Picard, Le rôle des 
Catholiques français dans le rapprochement franco-allemand après la Seconde 
Guerre Mondiale, KZG 14, 2 (2001), 513-532. 
21  Kurt Anschütz, “Der ökumenische Glaube ist primär...”. Georges Casalis in Ber-
lin 1946-1950 – Einblicke in seine Korrespondenz, Evangelische Theologie 54 
(1994), 79-101. 
22  See the contribution by Christiane Wienand in this volume. 
23  Kißener, Ein ragendes Denkmal, 93-106. 
24  Marcel Sturm and Robert Picard de la Vacquerie are the focus of my dissertation 
in process. One aspect of the dissertation is presented in this article. 
25  There is no study on Robert Picard de la Vacquerie and there are only some arti-
cles about Marcel Sturm. Jörg Thierfelder and Michael Losch, Der evangelische 
“Feldbischof” Marcel Sturm – ein “Brückenbauer” zwischen den evangelischen 
Christen Deutschlands und Frankreichs, Blätter für württembergische Kirchen-
geschichte 99 (1999), 208-251; Martin Greschat, Marcel Sturm: l’église évang-
élique en Allemagne depuis mai 1945, Revue d’Allemagne et des pays de langue 
allemande 21, 4 (1989), 567-575; Christophe Baginski, Zuerst Christ, dann 
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dained as a Catholic priest in 1921, after which he held various clerical of-
fices in several Parisian parishes. He was also interested in international ex-
changes. In 1944 he was arrested by the Gestapo for his critical sermons but 
was later liberated by the allies. Between 1946 and 1951 he was stationed 
in Germany. In 1951, the Pope enthroned him as bishop of Orléans where 
he died in 1969.26 Sturm (1905-1950) was a protestant reformed pastor in 
South-Alsace from 1929 to 1939 and was affiliated with the ecumenical 
movement. In World War II, he was injured and captured by the Germans, 
but was able to escape to North Africa. In 1945, he began his duties in 
Germany where he died five years later.27  
As chief military chaplains in the French occupied zones of Germany 
and Austria,28 Robert Picard de la Vacquerie and Marcel Sturm were res-
ponsible to their respective church leadership and to General Pierre Koenig, 
the French supreme commander in Germany and director of the military 
government. Their engagement in Germany branched out in four directions 
that were interrelated to each other: First, Picard de la Vacquerie and Sturm 
had to attend to the pastoral care of the French in Germany and the Ger-
mans in French war captivity.29 Second, they acted as special consultants in 
religious questions for General Koenig. In this respect, they had a certain 
influence on the French church policy.30 For example they handled matters 
                                                                                                  
Franzose. “Militärbischof” Sturm setzt sich für die Versöhnung ein, Evangeli-
scher Kirchenbote. Sonntagsblatt für die Pfalz 36 (1995). However, there is no 
broad analysis of his engagement in Germany and his efforts on rapprochement.  
26  Xavier Boniface, Picard de la Vacquerie (Robert), in: Dictionnaire des évêques 
de France au XXe siècle, ed. Dominique-Marie Dauzet and Frédéric Le Moigne 
(Paris: Cerf, 2010), 528-529. 
27  Thierfelder and Losch, Feldbischof, 210-214. 
28  In 1949 the authority of both aumôniers inspecteurs was expanded to Austria 
and the Saarland. Xavier Boniface, L’aumônerie militaire française (1914-1962) 
(Paris: Cerf, 2001), 427. 
29  Martin Greschat, Die Kirchenpolitik der französischen Besatzungsmacht in 
Rheinland-Pfalz, in: Beati qui custodiunt. Festschrift für Ekkehard Kätsch zum 
65. Geburtstag, ed. Holger Bogs et al. (Darmstadt: Verlag der Hessischen Kir-
chengeschichtlichen Vereinigung, 2001), 175-188, here: 179. 
30  Jörg Thierfelder, Die Besatzungsmacht Frankreich und die evangelischen Kir-
chen in der französischen Zone. Fälle und Konflikte, Revue d’Allemagne et des 
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of education policy31 or the discharge of the Germans as prisoners of war32. 
Therefore, they often became “intermediaries” between the military gov-
ernment and the local churches, in which they actively engaged themselves 
on the behalf of the Germans.33 Within these activities, the two chaplains 
were thirdly representatives of their churches and tried to realize the inter-
ests of those in Germany.34 Last but not least they were engaged in favour 
of the rapprochement between the French and the Germans. 
Picard de la Vacquerie and Sturm had a special impact on Franco-Ger-
man reconciliation in the ecclesial domain after the Second World War. 
Contemporary witnesses thanked them, deeming them “bridge builders” of 
the international understanding.35 Their approaches were diverse and partly 
connected with other initiatives.36 Both military chaplains looked for perso-
nal contact with their German counterpart, and were important contact per-
sons for the French and the Germans. They endorsed the concerns of the 
German churches towards the French authorities, and moderated between 
both interests. Their pioneering work37 also included the organisation of 
reconciliation-motivated get-togethers of the French and the Germans.  
                                                                                                  
pays de langue allemande 21, 4 (1989), 557-566, here: 560; Jörg Thierfelder, 
Die Kirchenpolitik der Besatzungsmacht Frankreich und die Situation der evan-
gelischen Kirche in der französischen Zone, KZG 2, 1 (1989), 221-238, here: 
227. 
31  Zouame-Bizeme, Aspects, 215-216, 329; Greschat, Kirchenpolitik, 185. 
32  Thierfelder and Losch, Feldbischof, 236; Christophe Baginski, Frankreichs Kir-
chenpolitik im besetzten Deutschland 1945-1949 (Mainz: Gesellschaft für Mit-
telrheinische Kirchengeschichte, 2001), 51. 
33  Boniface, L’aumônerie militaire, 430-431. 
34  Thierfelder and Losch, Feldbischof, 214; Zouame-Bizeme, Aspects, 328. 
35  Evangelisches Kirchenblatt, Nachruf Bender, 114, Zentralarchiv der Evangeli-
schen Kirche der Pfalz (hereafter: ZAPf), Abt. 150.47, Nr. 814, Blatt 60; Rauch 
to Picard de la Vacquerie, 25 October 1951, Erzbischöfliches Archiv Freiburg 
(hereafter: EAF), Nb 9/8 Vol. III. 
36  For example, Picard de la Vacquerie assisted Jean du Rivau with his center in 
Offenburg; Boniface, L’aumônerie militaire, 431. Georges Casalis reported to 
Sturm in Baden-Baden; Anschütz, Der ökumenische Glaube, 82. 
37  Boniface, L’aumônerie militaire, 433. 
150 | ULRIKE SCHRÖBER 

Two of these gatherings are particularly noteworthy as examples of how 
actors of the ecclesial domain engaged in favour of Franco-German rap-
prochement – the Meeting of Bishops in Bühl in 1949 and the Congress of 
Speyer in 1950. Due to the constant commitments of Robert Picard de la 
Vacquerie and Marcel Sturm, French and German catholic bishops and 
Protestants from both countries were brought together to become acquaint-
ed and to gain a mutual understanding of each other’s missions and 
thoughts. In the following I will describe and analyse these two meetings in 
detail. While in a first step both meetings will be presented separately, they 
are compared in a second step to point out the similarities as well as the dif-
ferences between these Catholic and Protestant approaches. I will ask for 
the outcomes and impacts of these meetings, and whether these meetings 
were successful. Special attention will be given to the specific meaning of 
rapprochement and reconciliation in the ecclesial context and therefore to 
the question what these concepts actually meant in these cases. 
 
 
THE MEETING OF FRENCH AND GERMAN BISHOPS IN 
BÜHL (1949) 
 
The meeting in Bühl had its forerunners in the successful pastoral con-
gresses of French, Austrian, and German priests in 1947 and 1948.38 At the 
end of 1948, Robert Picard de la Vacquerie saw the moment to address a 
higher ecclesiastical level. He asked archbishop Wendelin Rauch from 
Freiburg to provide assistance with a meeting between French and German 
bishops.39 Rauch who agreed to his colleague’s idea believed his church 
committed to such initiatives:  
 
“Certainly, the Catholic Church might be the first power that allows for the idea of 
the entity of peoples across borders and the respective actual situation to become 
visible and put it effectively in the world. And this out of her inmost nature. Through 
                                                 
38  Rapport de Picard sur la Rencontre Episcopale Franco-Allemande de Buhl 
(Bade), Archives de l’Évêché d’Orléans (hereafter: EO), 3 Z 58. 
39  Picard to Rauch, 20 December 1948, EAF, Nb 9/70, Vol. I. 
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her proper supernatural charge, she has most important forces to bring in and to pro-
vide for understanding, for unity, and for peace.”40  
 
The meeting received the agreement and mercy of Pope Pius XII and the 
benevolent consent of the French government and of the occupying authori-
ties.41 Despite facilitations from the French agencies,42 the meeting should 
be independent of the occupation, free and not imposed upon by any side.43 
In Bühl, it was to be a “private meeting” “for the understanding of both 
peoples” at which the participants mainly became acquainted with each 
other.44 From 24 to 26 September 1949 fourteen bishops from the French 
zone of occupation in Germany and from several parts of France came to-
gether, amongst them the archbishops of Besancon and Freiburg, Maurice 
Dubourg and Wendelin Rauch.45 They started with lunch at the house of Pi-
card de la Vacquerie in Baden-Baden. Towards the evening, the conference 
was opened by a blessing meditation and speeches at the convent of Maria 
Hilf (Bühl). During the next days, lectures were given on church-related 
and religious questions and on theological tasks.46 Jean-Julien Weber47 and 
Joseph Wendel48 spoke about previous and new developments of the for-
mation of the clergy in both countries. Maurice Dubourg49 and Karl-Joseph 
Leiprecht50 reported the social movements of the Catholic Church in France 
                                                 
40  Rauch to Picard, 24 March 1949, EAF, Nb 9/6, Vol. I. 
41  Montini to Picard, 22 January 1949, EO, 3 Z 58; Rauch and Dubourg to Pope 
Pius XII, EO, 3 Z 58. 
42  Picard to Schuman, 10 November 1949, EO, 3 Z 60. 
43  Rapport de Picard sur la Rencontre Episcopale Franco-Allemande; Montini to 
Picard, 22 January 1949, both in: EO, 3 Z 58. 
44  Rauch to Rusch, 28 April 1949, EO, 3 Z 58. 
45  See for participants: Teilnehmerliste, Erzbischöfliches Archiv München Freising 
(hereafter: EAMFr), 220, 21/1950. 
46  Wendel to Muench, 31 January 1950, EAMFr, 220, 21/1950. 
47  Les études ecclésiastiques et la formation des clercs dans les Séminaire de 
France, EAF, Nb 9/6, Vol. I. 
48  Le recrutement des nos séminaires – nos soucis nos espoirs, EO, 3 Z 58.  
49  Die französische katholische Aktion und ihre spezialisierten Bewegungen, EAF, 
Nb 9/6, Vol. I.  
50  La jeunesse catholique et son organisation en Allemagne, EO, 3 Z 59.  
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and Germany in retrospect and in relation to the actual situation. The con-
tent of the lecture by Albert Stohr was the liturgical commission of the 
bishop conference of Fulda.51 Léon-Albert Terrier showed the development 
of theological work in the last ten to fifteen years in France.52 Finally, Wil-
helm Kempf spoke about the problem of the German refugees with respect 
to the consequential religious effects at his diocese.53 The congress ended 
with a final meditation. For between times there were occasions for discus-
sion and prayers.54 
The topics that were covered in Bühl had no political content. Thus, the 
bishops could circumvent any possible difficulties and would not produce 
much furor. By remaining in the pure ecclesiastic-religious domain they 
dealt with issues, which were interesting to both sides. The several topics 
were not covered systematically, but rather the lectures answered the pur-
pose to inform the assembled church leadership about the present condi-
tions in both countries. In this way, they could recognise the situations they 
were in and the problems each of them had, which were in parts similar. 
They learned new insights, bringing about enrichment for all.55 At the end 
of the meeting, there were no resolutions or common guidelines for further 
procedures and acts. The reason for this was, as bishop Wendel explained, 
that “no conference of bishops took part, but rather a personal encounter 
and exchange. In fact it was also a real and brotherly gathering in the entity 
of our holy Church.”56 Mainly, the encounter should serve the bishops to 
become acquainted with each other. In the foreground of this congress was 
the goal to learn more about the practices in the other country, and to ex-
change ideas. Here it was possible for former strangers to create trust, and 
                                                 
51  Das Liturgische Referat der Fuldaer Bischofskonferenz, EO, 3 Z 59.  
52  Die gegenwärtige theologische Arbeit in Frankreich, EAF, Nb 9/6, Vol. I. 
53  Problèmes Actuels de la Misère Allemande, EO, 3 Z 59. 
54  Konferenz deutscher und französischer Bischöfe im Kloster ‘Maria Hilf’, Bühl, 
vom 24. bis 26. Oktober 1949, in: Das Kloster Maria Hilf, ed. Wilhelm Frei-
schlag (Bühl: Discher, 1959), 25-28; Programme de la Rencontre franco-alle-
mande des Evêques, Dom- und Diözesanarchiv Mainz (hereafter: DDAMz), Be-
stand 45, 1, Nr. 10; Bericht, EO, 3 Z 58. 
55  Wendel to Muench, 31 January 1950, EAMFr, 220, 21/1950; Presse-Kom-
muniqué, EO, 3 Z 58. 
56  Wendel to Muench, 31 January 1950, EAMFr, 220, 21/1950. 
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in so doing, they could establish a solid basis for further steps. With respect 
to these actions in particular, Michael Kißener, who analyses in his research 
the role of Catholics on the Franco-German rapprochement, deemed the 
congress successful.57 The common bond created by the Christian faith was 
also important for this meeting. It set the foundation for the good relation-
ship, and helped with facilitating understanding and rapprochement. Thus, 
the unity of the church, the fraternal gathering of French and Germans, and 
the very Christian idea of reconciliation were accentuated by the bishops 
and were experienced at the meeting. Rauch stressed to his colleague, Du-
bourg, that all had felt in Bühl that “the Holy Spirit, the spirit of love and 
understanding, is the best interpreter”.58 In a report on the meeting Picard 
de la Vacquerie explicated further:  
 
“It is even to underline that the principal charm of the meeting consists in the honest 
openness, in the effort to understand each other, in the cordial simplicity of the liai-
son between all participants. Nothing separated the bishops, not even the lan-
guage.”59  
 
According to the bishops, the meeting would also have positive effects on 
further sectors. The relations established in Bühl had, as Picard de la Vac-
querie noted, a real benefit for Germany, France, and the Catholic Church.60 
On the one hand they could “serve the policy of rapprochement of our two 
countries”61 and on the other hand, as Bishop Dubourg believed, they could 
strengthen the connections of Catholicism “that might unify us in Christ. It 
is also an effective contribution to the establishment of a peace that might 
be not only human, but primarily Christian […].”62 Such meetings as in 
Bühl were understood as essential ways of Franco-German reconciliation 
and the task of the church was to support the basic idea of the togetherness 
of the peoples in the world.  
                                                 
57  Kißener, Boten eines versöhnten Europa, 64-65. 
58  Rauch to Dubourg, 29 November 1950, EAF, Nb 9/8, Vol. III. 
59  Rapport de Picard sur la Rencontre Episcopale Franco-Allemande, EO, 3 Z 58. 
60  Picard to Rauch, 5 November 1949, EAF, Nb 9/6, Vol. I. 
61  Picard to Robert Schuman, 10 November 1949, EO, 3 Z 60. 
62  Dubourg to Rauch, 7 November 1950, EAF, Nb 9/7, Vol. II. 
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According to the opinion of all participants, the basis for a long-term re-
lationship was now built with the meeting of Bühl. For example, Picard de 
la Vacquerie wrote to Rauch: “You may be convinced that the mental 
bridges that are now tied up on the stable foundation of Christian love will 
not break down at any time.”63  
How far the bridges that were built between the French and Germans 
actually persist in the aftermath of this meeting is difficult to evaluate. 
Nevertheless, further meetings were contemplated and requested by both 
sides.64 However, in the sources little or no evidence can be found. Some 
exceptions are the letters of condolence by the bishops Weber and Dubourg 
on the occasion of the death of Heinrich Metzroth who had also participated 
at the meeting in Bühl. The letters suggest that at least some participants 
stayed in contact also after the meeting.65 In addition, the effect of this first 
encounter between French and German bishops should not be limited to 
solely the church leadership. Bishop Dubourg and Rauch would lobby for a 
Franco-German rapprochement also towards their priests and believers. 
Furthermore, there was an exchange created between seminarians of 
Besancon and Trier in 1950.66 Thus, the success of the meeting was mainly 
in the contacts of the bishops there. Except for the affiliated of Dubourg67 
there was little measurable effect beyond the conference. 
 
 
                                                 
63  Rauch to Picard, 25 October 1951, EAF, Nb 9/8, Vol. III. 
64  Rapport de Picard sur la Rencontre Episcopale Franco-Allemande; Picard to 
Francois-Poncet, 3 November 1949, both in: EO, 3 Z 58; Wendel to Muench, 31 
January 1950, EAMFr, 220, 21/1950. 
65  Weber to Bornewasser, 22 January 1951; Dubourg to Bornewasser, 24 January 
1951, both in: Bistumsarchiv Trier (hereafter: BAT), 84, 907. 
66  Dubourg to Rauch, 7 November 1950, EAF, Nb 9/7, Vol. II; Rapport de Picard 
sur la Rencontre Episcopale Franco-Allemande, EO, 3 Z 58. 
67  He also launched an exhibition on the Catholic Germany, which depicted the at-
titude of the German church during the Third Reich and described the German 
church and political life. Dubourg to Rauch, 7 November 1950, annex: L’Alle-
magne catholique, EAF, Nb 9/7, Vol. II. 
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THE CONGRESS OF FRENCH AND GERMAN 
PROTESTANTS IN SPEYER (1950) 
 
The Congress of Speyer68 had its origins in prior contacts between the 
French and German Protestants.69 It traced back to the initiative of Marcel 
Sturm who received assistance mainly from the German side.70 The first 
discussions about the gathering took place at a meeting in June 1948 at 
which Marc Boegner, the president of the Fédération Protestante de 
France (Protestant Federation of France), and Sturm came together with 
German representatives of the church.71 According to the French, the con-
tent of the Speyer meeting should have a clear political appearance and an 
actual vision.72 They thought about involving laymen as much as possible73 
and wished to associate with people who had been in active opposition to 
National Socialism.74 Because of several setbacks, the congress could take 
                                                 
68  Several Aspects of the Speyer meeting are also discussed in: Martin Greschat, 
Bemühungen um Verständigung und Versöhnung. Der Beitrag des französisch-
deutschen Bruderrates, in: Revue d’Allemagne et des pays de langue allemande 
36, 2 (2004), 155-174 
69  Une rencontre protestante franco-allemande à Spire (17 au 19 mars 1950), Foi et 
Vie 48 (1950), 293-294, here: 293; Zouame-Bizeme, Aspects, 252. 
70  Assistance came mainly from Martin Niemöller, the president of the Evange-
lische Kirche von Hessen und Nassau (Protestant Church in Hesse and Nassau) 
and head of the foreign office of the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (Pro-
testant Church in Germany), and Paul Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, the director 
of the Evangelisches Hilfswerk (Protestant Aid Organization) in the French zone 
of occupation. Yorck to Bender, 30 July 1948, ZAPf, Abt. 150, 47, Nr. 767; Dr. 
Federer to Dr. Klaus Mehnert, 10 July 1948, Archiv des Diakonischen Werkes 
der EKD (hereafter: ADW), Bestand ZB, Nr. 840; Bender to Niemöller, 4 Au-
gust 1948, Landeskirchliches Archiv der Evangelischen Kirche in Baden (here-
after: LKAB), Bestand GA, 5880. 
71  Hartweg and Heimerl, Der französische Protestantismus, 405. 
72  Yorck to Gerstenmaier, 26 June 1948, ADW, ZB, 840. 
73  Französisch-deutsche Kirchentagung, September 1949, Speyer, ADW, ZB, 840. 
74  Yorck to Bender, 30 July 1948, ZAPf, Abt. 150, 47, Nr. 767. This obsession 
with the Confessing Church provoked critics on the German side. Especially the 
chairman of the church in Baden Julius Bender was aware of a danger for the 
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place not until March 1950.75 They met on a private and unofficial level 
without the participation of state authorities and the nomination of official 
church representatives. An “ecclesial meeting between the French and the 
Confessing Churches” should be reached at the conference and a “pro-
gramme of a common function for the pacification of the occidental peo-
ples” should be developed.76  
From 17 to 19 March 1950 approximately 50 people from both coun-
tries met in Speyer. They were actors of the church on all levels, theologi-
ans, and laymen. The majority of the group was connected to the church in 
some way, but personalities of society, economy, and politics were also 
present. The German participants not only came from the French zone of 
occupation but also from all over Germany. They were nearly exclusively 
associated with the Bekennende Kirche (Confessing Church). The majority 
of the French had been members of the résistance.77  
At the conference they discussed the political responsibility of the 
church and the possibilities of a Franco-German rapprochement. For this 
purpose Heinrich Vogel, professor of theology in Berlin, Charles Westphal, 
director of the Protestant journal Foi et Vie, Hans Iwand from the Protestant 
Department at Göttingen University, and René Courtin from the Depart-
ment of Law in Paris gave lectures. Vogel supposed that the church was re-
sponsible for the human community, especially for disenfranchised people. 
In doing so, she will act by proclaiming the truth of the Word of God. 
Westphal referred to the responsibility of the church for all human activi-
ties. By preaching the Gospel the church must uphold the respect for the di-
vine sovereignty and thus the respect of the human person. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                  
union of the Protestant Church in Germany. For more see: Bender to Niemöller, 
4 August 1948, LKAB, GA, 5880; Aktennotiz über Besprechung in Bad Gleis-
weiler, 8 December 1949, Archiv der Evangelischen Kirche im Rheinland, Ar-
chivstelle Düsseldorf (hereafter: AEKiR-D), Handakten Präses Held 6 HA 004, 
Heft 352. 
75  Aktennotiz über Besprechung in Bad Gleisweiler, 8 December 1949, AEKiR-D, 
Held 6 HA 004, 352. 
76  Presse-Communiqué zur Speyrer Tagung; Yorck to Stempel, 20 January 1950, 
both in: ZAPf, Abt. 150, 47, Nr. 767. 
77  See for participants: Teilnehmerliste für Speyrer Tagung I + II, ZAPf, Abt. 150, 
47, Nr. 767. 
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the church should act as ambassador for the reconciliation of nations and 
peoples. Iwand spoke about the present danger of the restoration in Europe. 
To stand against this danger and for peace among peoples, one had to look 
on Jesus Christ and his message of reconciliation. In order to reach better 
mutual comprehension, the particularities of peoples that were conserved in 
the nations should be explored. Courtin explained that nowadays the focus 
should no longer be on Franco-German antagonism, but rather on the exist-
ence of the whole of Europe. Today the message of the brotherhood of all 
human beings could be successful. The most important task of the churches 
would be to facilitate mutual meetings between the Germans and the 
French.78 Although these topics had a deep reference to the Christian mes-
sage, they also related to the more ‘secular’ tasks of the church. If the lec-
tures remained relatively theoretical and abstract, behavior guidelines for 
the churches allowed for the deduction of political questions and interna-
tional understanding. They assigned a political responsibility for the actual 
events in the world to the church. The churches should especially be com-
mitted to the rapprochement of Germany and France. To this end, Courtin 
and Iwand made proposals that were partially included in the adopted com-
mon declaration. 
The lectures were discussed by the plenum and the “most delicate polit-
ical questions” were debated “without reserves”. Thus, they talked about 
the question of the Saar, the division of Germany, issues of war criminals, 
and the reconstruction of Europe. In accordance with the press release, the 
discussions were handled “in absolute openness”; divisive questions were 
solved in spiritual liberty and based on the common faith. Disagreement 
was “less between the two partners as within the respective delegations”. 
The influence of Marcel Sturm on the success of the congress was also 
highly accentuated.79  
                                                 
78  See the following articles in Foi et Vie, 48 (1950): Une rencontre protestante 
franco-allemande à Spire (17 au 19 mars 1950), 293-294; Heinrich Vogel, La 
responsabilité politique actuelle de l’église, 317-326; Charles Westphal, Res-
ponsabilité politique de l’église, 327-338; Hans Iwand, Que peuvent faire les 
églises pour le rapprochement franco-allemand?, 339-358; René Courtin, Sur la 
contribution des églises à la compréhension franco-allemande, 359-369. 
79  Une rencontre protestante franco-allemande à Spire, 294; Presse-Communiqué 
zur Speyrer Tagung, ZAPf, Abt. 150, 47, Nr. 767; Report Wehr for Sturm, Ar-
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Through the time spent together and through the intense discussions in 
Speyer, both sides had a chance to become acquainted with each other on 
an equal level, to understand each other’s points of view and to revise any 
existing prejudices. Together they worked out a program for the formation 
of a common future. At the end it was published in the Declaration of Spey-
er with concrete proposals for the collaboration of the churches with respect 
to the Franco-German rapprochement. In this official declaration, they stat-
ed, that they met “in the spirit of the ecumenical movement”. The aim was 
to recognize “together the political responsibility” of the churches and to 
contribute to the “mutual rapprochement” of Germany and France. The 
Christian faith was mentioned as an essential starting point and condition of 
rapprochement and finally reconciliation of both peoples:  
 
“In the belief in Jesus Christ, they find their unity and the reconciliation which God 
keeps ready for all humans and all peoples. Such an obedience in faith let them re-
late the validity of the divine promise also to the understanding and reconciliation of 
peoples.”80 
 
From the outset, the faith formed a common and cross-border bond; it stood 
over secular disputes and acted as an intermediary. Thus, Protestants from 
both countries where brought together. They acted jointly, cultivated soli-
darity, and contributed significantly to the comprehension and, specifically 
in the Christian sense, to their reconciliation. Moreover, they invoked over-
coming nationalism and the discussion of actual changes in the world. The 
aim was to clarify how to bring to “all people work, bread, and justice”.81 
On the last day, a common service was arranged to which state authorities 
and the public were invited.82 Gustav Heinemann, one of the participants, 
German home secretary and chairman of the synod of the Protestant Church 
in Germany, denoted the congress of Speyer as “the first and promising al-
                                                                                                  
chiv der Evangelischen Kirche im Rheinland, Archivstelle Boppard (hereafter: 
AEKiR-B), 72: 06-6/3-3. 
80  Speyrer Erklärung, Blätter für pfälzische Landesgeschichte und religiöse Volks-
kunde 64 (1997), 281-282, here: 281. 
81  Ibid. 
82  Sturm to Stempel, 20 February 1950, ZAPf, Abt. 150, 47, Nr. 767. 
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liance between both our churches”. There they also learnt to meet “as 
brothers of the common Lord Jesus Christ from now on”.83  
“Concrete resolutions” were published alongside the declaration. A pro-
visional commission of seven members per country should appoint a per-
manent Bruderrat (Council of Brothers)84 to serve as a constant liaison 
committee of German and French Protestants and to embody “the organic 
entity of the church”. The role of this transnational committee was an “ap-
proach to a necessary overcoming of national churchdom”.85 Until 1964 the 
Franco-German Council of Brothers met twice a year and discussed several 
subjects such as the German rearmament or the European question.86 The 
significance of the Franco-German Council of Brothers was noted in a let-
ter to the German members by Hans Stempel, the president of the Evange-
lische Kirche der Pfalz (Protestant Church of Palatinate) and after the death 
of Sturm in 1950 an important facilitator for the continuity of the institu-
tion:87  
 
“[…] the Council of Brothers was engaged to open a new relationship in a very dif-
ficult respect. […] There remain souvenirs of theological discussions, of the com-
mon listening to the Word, of the community of prayer, and of the deep solidarity on 
the table of the Lord. This is all not only a souvenir. It is also something gained for 
us, something is provided for our entire next life. [...] Again and again it was attested 
                                                 
83  Ansprache Heinemann vor Nationalsynode der Reformierten Kirche Frankreichs 
in Nîmes, 4 June 1950, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stif-
tung (hereafter: AsD), Abt. 1, Mappe 123, Blatt 59/60. 
84  Speyrer Erklärung, 281. 
85  Yorck to Evangelisches Hilfswerk, 23 April 1950, ADW, ZB, 355. 
86  Zentralarchiv der Evangelischen Kirche in Hessen und Nassau (hereafter: 
ZAEKHN), 62/1036b; Daniela Heimerl, Der deutsch-französische Bruderrat. 
Annäherung – Verständigung – Versöhnung, KZG 14, 2 (2001), 470-486, here: 
482-483, 485. 
87  Christophe Baginski, Aus der Isolation zum Neubeginn. Die Evangelische Kir-
che der Pfalz nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Die Pfalz in der Nachkriegszeit. 
Wiederaufbau und demokratischer Neubeginn (1945-1954), ed. Gerhard Nestler 
and Hannes Ziegler (Kaiserslautern: Institut für Pfälzische Geschichte und 
Volkskunde, 2004), 243-261, here: 261. 
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quietly to us how the engagement of the Council of Brothers has assisted to reduce 
misunderstandings, to overcome alienation, to create real reconciliation.”88  
 
Through the Council of Brothers, they came to a new perception in Christ, 
to a “new retention from the conciliatory power that he gives to all”.89 In 
fact, the Council of Brothers built an important element of connection and 
provided a transnational forum for discussions between French and German 
Protestants. It was a “new sort of working group”90 notably also for non-
church related topics. The break down in the 1960s did not diminish the 
success of the Council of Brothers.91 On the contrary, the institution that 
had emerged from the ecclesial domain created an essential basis for ex-
change and understanding between the French and Germans, especially in 
the phase in which “reconciliation” had not yet been obtained politically 
and within society. Community and solidarity in the faith could be exer-
cised in the council and the unity of the church could be clarified across na-
tional borders. 
In addition to this important element of connection, the participants of 
the Speyer meeting promoted the creation of a public discourse. The inter-
est of the official church institutions should be awakened and the churches 
should be represented at the respective synods. The official and private ex-
change was to be facilitated and the ideas were to be publicized in the me-
dia. A student exchange program was already planned in May 1950 and an 
exchange of pastors was arranged in the summer of 1950. In the following 
years, there were a number of reciprocal invitations to synods and church 
conferences, to enthronements, and church dedications. Additional projects 
                                                 
88  Stempel to German members of the Council of Brothers, 9 February 1966, 
ZAEKHN, 62/0714. 
89  Ibid. 
90  Martin Greschat, Das Hilfswerk der EKD und die Entstehung des deutsch-fran-
zösischen Bruderrates, in: Soziale Arbeit in historischer Perspektive. Zum ge-
schichtlichen Ort der Diakonie in Deutschland. Festschrift für Helmut Talazko 
zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Jochen-Christoph Kaiser (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 
1998), 135-188, here: 143. 
91  The French side limited the necessity of the council to the period following the 
war. Later, the problems with the colonies and the challenges from an ecumeni-
cal world became more relevant. 
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were contemplated in Speyer, e.g. the journey of a French commission to 
study the German problems regarding refugees in the German Democratic 
Republic. This study trip was scheduled between August and September 
1950. One Sunday of the year was to be devoted to international under-
standing and in the planning was the founding of a Franco-German board-
ing school. Raymond Schmittlein, the competent French chief executive of 
the Department of Cultural Affairs, soon gave his consent for this bi-
national school. In the aftermath of the Speyer meeting, official church au-
thorities and individual persons came together. Exchanges took place on 
various levels and their effects were felt beyond the directly church-based 





To conclude, the Catholic and Protestant efforts at rapprochement between 
France and Germany will be briefly contrasted to explore the particularities 
of these approaches in civil society.  
The analysis of the two meetings, the Bishop Meeting in Bühl and the 
Congress of Speyer, has revealed, firstly, that individuals had a certain sig-
nificance in this processes. The chief military chaplains were the initiators 
of the meetings on both sides.93 Robert Picard de la Vacquerie and Marcel 
Sturm were integrated in a broad network of church and policy formation. 
Both could count on the support of their church leadership and of General 
Koenig, who organizationally and individually had encouraged their efforts 
on rapprochement. In addition, they had socialized and communicated with 
numerous clergymen through their activities in Germany. This had been a 
starting point for the organization of the meetings. Thus, the two French-
men were in turn assisted by individuals on the German side.  
Secondly, both meetings had in common that the French and Germans 
met on an equal level to work and to pray together. However, there were 
                                                 
92  Speyrer Erklärung; Protokoll der Sitzung des letzten deutsch-französischen Bru-
derrates, ADW, ZB, 355; Zouame-Bizeme, Aspects, 254-255; Yorck to Evange-
lisches Hilfswerk, 23 April 1950, ADW, ZB, 355. 
93  It was also the personal commitment of Marcel Sturm at the meeting of Speyer 
that was stressed as the cause of its success. 
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differences when it came to the respective circle of participants. At the 
Catholic congress, it was only bishops that met. Primarily, their congress 
was about direct contacts and exchanges within the church itself. At the 
Protestant meeting, actors of the church on all levels as well as theologians 
and laymen were involved. The debaters came from all public domains, in-
cluding the political sphere and community in general. Right from the be-
ginning, the Protestant congress should have significance beyond church-
internal affairs.  
Thirdly, while on both sides encounters and discussions were important 
ways for the understanding between the French and Germans, there was a 
difference in questions and issues discussed at the respective meetings. The 
Catholic bishops came together to talk about church developments in both 
countries. Thus, they created trust through the meeting and the exchange 
and, in so doing, this trust formed a foundation for further steps. While po-
litical issues had thus been avoided at the Catholic gathering in Bühl, the 
Protestants in Speyer also discussed actual political questions. Concrete ap-
proaches on how to confront these questions were envisaged. With the pub-
lication of the program, it was hoped to reach the public and to produce a 
positive effect.  
Fourthly, both sides regarded their religion as the basis of rapproche-
ment. The Christian faith could act as a shared starting point and a connect-
ing bond. The brotherly love and the specific idea of ‘reconciliation’ which 
both were deeply anchored in the Christian faith, enabled rapprochement 
and understanding, reconciliation and peace. For this it is important to clari-
fy what ‘reconciliation’ for the Christian socialized participants of Bühl and 
Speyer meant. In the Christian sense, reconciliation is the re-constitution of 
the community with God that was destroyed by the sin and guilt of the hu-
man being. Reconciliation is the impact of the life, death, and resurrection 
of Jesus Christ and in this it is deeply based on the faith. It caused the re-
creation of the person before God.94 Thus, reconciliation is primarily relat-
ed to the relationship between God and mankind. It cannot be obtained by 
human acting but it is confirmed by the acting of God in Jesus for all times. 
                                                 
94  Dorothee Schlenke, Versöhnung / VI. Dogmatisch, in: Religion in Geschichte 
und Gegenwart. Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft, vol. 
8, ed. Hans Dieter Betz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 1059-1061, here: 
1059. 
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Reconciliation became true in faith and formed a new person. As reconcili-
ation is central to the motivation, identity and objective of Christian action, 
there is at the same time a new relationship among humans. The human be-
ing is also responsible to his fellowmen. The individual has to assume guilt 
to create the condition for community.95 ‘Reconciliation’ – such it is 
thought in Bühl and in Speyer – stood explicitly in this Christian context. 
For their international understanding, they adopted a theological concept 
that was different from the societal and political processes of rapproche-
ment. Differences amongst them could not exist because they were elimi-
nated by the reconciliation in the faith. Their community was created by the 
faith in the one Lord and by the entity of the church.  
It is, fifthly, worth mentioning that questions of guilt and responsibility 
for the past were hardly discussed at both meetings. One can assume that 
this absence was related to the Christian understanding of reconciliation de-
scribed above. Christian people at first and at last depend on the absolution 
of God and not of men, also if acceptance of guilt and forgiveness are nec-
essary within human communities.96 However, the Protestants discussed 
topics that were related to the past such as the question of the Saar, the divi-
sion of Germany or issues of war criminals. Yet, they did not speak about 
guilt. One can assume that this was caused by the fact that the Germans 
who met in Speyer were members of the Confessing Church. Furthermore, 
there was the Stuttgarter Erklärung (Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt) in 1945 
in which the Protestant church leadership confessed the German guilt and 
the joint responsibility of the church. This declaration caused the reopening 
of international relations for the German Protestants and was concretized in 
the Darmstädter Wort (Darmstadt Declaration) in 1947 by former circles of 
the Confessing Church.97 Thus, the participants might have assumed that 
                                                 
95  Dorothee Schlenke, Versöhnung / VII. Ethisch, in: Religion in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart, 1061-1062; Lothar Ullrich, Versöhnung, in: Lexikon der katholi-
schen Dogmatik, ed. Wolfgang Beinert (Freiburg: Herder, 1991), 536-540, here: 
539. 
96  Ibid.; Hans-Richard Reuter, Versöhnung / IV. Ethisch, in: Theologische Realen-
zyklopädie, vol. 35, ed. Gerhard Krause et al. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003), 40-43, 
here: 41. 
97  Wie Christen ihre Schuld bekennen. Die Stuttgarter Erklärung 1945, ed. Ger-
hard Besier and Gerhard Sauter (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985); 
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the German Protestants had already dealt with their past. On the Catholic 
side there was the Fuldaer Hirtenbrief (1945 Fulda Pastoral Letter) in 1945 
in which the German bishops noted the responsibility of Catholics during 
the Third Reich. However, in accordance with the Pope they denied a re-
sponsibility of the German people as a whole.98 Primarily they did not 
speak about the war and the Nazi period in Bühl because it was a meeting 
only concerning ecclesiastical matters in which political issues were avoid-
ed.  
Finally, coming back to the question of success and impact of these two 
conferences, it is reasonable to assume that both the Bishop Meeting in 
Bühl and the Congress of Speyer had been successful. Both sides imposed 
on their churches the obligation to promote the rapprochement of people 
and peace in the world. Such encounters as in Bühl and in Speyer had been 
important milestones in furthering the rapprochement. It is therefore not 
surprising that the meetings also had broad effects such as the Franco-
German exchange projects or the outstanding Council of Brothers. For the 
significance of the efforts on the Protestant and Catholic side it must also 
be emphasized that the meetings took place at a time at which the society 
still had objections to such attempts. In the ecclesial domain, rapproche-
ment between the peoples had begun quite early, even before political ef-
forts had been resumed. Nevertheless, the consent of the French authorities 
to the meetings already signaled the change of French policy towards Ger-
many.99 
The meetings of Bühl and Speyer are two prime examples of individu-
als and societal groups to bring about rapprochement immediately after 
World War II. The eclectic efforts of both chief military chaplains explain 
                                                                                                  
Martin Greschat, Zwischen Aufbruch und Beharrung. Die evangelische Kirche 
nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Die Zeit nach 1945 als Thema kirchlicher Zeit-
geschichte, ed. Victor Conzemius et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1988), 115-177; Karl Herbert, Kirche zwischen Aufbruch und Tradition. Ent-
scheidungsjahre nach 1945 (Stuttgart: Radius, 1989), 61-106. 
98  Konrad Repgen, Die Erfahrungen des Dritten Reiches und das Selbstverständnis 
der deutschen Katholiken nach 1945, in: Die Zeit nach 1945, 127-179; Vera 
Bücker, Die Schulddiskussion im deutschen Katholizismus nach 1945 (Bochum: 
Brockmeyer, 1989). 
99  Fritsch-Bournazel, Wende in der französischen Nachkriegspolitik. 
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the special and successful approach of the reconciliation through civil so-
ciety. Individuals from the Catholic and Protestant church have contributed 
simultaneously and at a very early stage to the rapprochement of France 
and Germany not only in the ecclesial domain but also in a broader public. 
They realized independent from each other, in a similar manner, but incor-
porating different approaches, the reconciliation on a religious and Chris-
tian basis. The entity of the church and the Christian idea of reconciliation 
served as starting points, triggering further initiatives of rapprochement. 
Thus, after the end of the Second World War, civil society – and therein re-
ligious people – had already started to work toward Franco-German rap-
prochement thereby creating an essential basis for the later incipient politi-
cal rapprochement of both countries.  

A Right to Irreconcilability?  
Oradour-sur-Glane, German-French Relations and the 





In September 2009, Pierre Lellouche, the French State Secretary for Euro-
pean Relations, visited Verdun for the 25th anniversary of the meeting be-
tween the French President François Mitterrand and the German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl. The picture of these two men shaking hands on the grounds 
of the battlefield of Verdun has become a symbol of Franco-German recon-
ciliation. Lellouche remembered 25 years later: 
 
“Neither the German Chancellor Kohl nor the French President Mitterrand knew on 
22 September 1984 with any certainty that the Cold War would end five years later 
[…], but they were fully aware that in some ways they closed the chapter of the 
mass graves of [19]14-18 and the chapter Oradour-sur-Glane; the chapter of the 
three major German-French wars […].”1 
 
On June 10, 1944, a unit of the Waffen-SS had completely destroyed the 
French village of Oradour-sur-Glane. 642 men, women, and children were 
killed in this massacre and the village was burnt down to a landscape of ru-
ins. For the French, Oradour became a symbol of their suffering under Ger-
                                                 
1  Speech delivered by Pierre Lellouche at Verdun on 22 November 2009, http:// 
www.france-allemagne.fr/Rede-von-Pierre-Lellouche-in,4741.html, accessed 5 
November 2011. All translations from French and German by the author. 
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man occupation during World War II.2 With the words of Pierre Lellouche, 
with the gesture at Verdun, the Second World War symbolized by Oradour, 
should have been a closed chapter. Indeed, this seems to hold true not only 
for official relations and symbolic politics, but also for transnational rela-
tions on the level of society. Today the new village of Oradour has ties with 
Germany by way of a partnership between the elementary school and the 
German Theo Schoeller Grundschule in Nürnberg. The school in Oradour 
has even included German into its curriculum. Moreover, with Gerda Has-
selfeldt, the former vice-president of the German Bundestag, an important 
political personality is committed to an exchange between Germany and the 
village.3 
However, if we take a closer look, this picture falls apart: Most of the 
relations with Germany are new and controversial; time and time again, 
there is resistance from members of the National Association of the Fami-
lies of the Martyrs of Oradour-sur-Glane (ANFM) against closer ties with 
Germany. For example, there were emotional discussions in 2004 when it 
became known that a German delegation of young people and former mem-
bers of the French résistance would attend the commemorative ceremony 
on June 10, following an invitation by the local mayor.4 Even a reconcilia-
tion concert given by a German choir 63 years after the crime, was contro-
                                                 
2  Standard works on Oradour include: Jean-Jacques Fouché, Oradour (Paris: Lia-
na Levi, 2001); Sarah Farmer, 10 juin 1944, Oradour: Arrêt sur mémoire (Paris: 
Perrin, 2007). 
3  Henning Meyer, Der Wandel der französischen ‘Erinnerungskultur’ des Zweiten 
Weltkriegs am Beispiel dreier ‘Erinnerungsorte’: Bordeaux, Caen und Or-
adour-sur-Glane (PhD diss., Universität Augsburg, 2006), http://opus.bibliothek 
.uni-augsburg.de/volltexte/2008/760/pdf/H_Meyer_Erinnerungskultur.pdf, 430-
435, accessed 30 May 2011. Concerning the pupils learning German in Oradour: 
http://www.theo-schoeller-grundschule.de/Unsere_Schule/Partnerschule/partner 
schule.html, accessed 30 May 2011. Concerning Gerda Hasselfeldt’s commit-
ment: Caroline Ischinger, Den Blick gemeinsam nach vorne richten, Dachauer 
SZ, 25 May 2010. 
4  Thomas Schober, Oradour – eine Warnung an die Menschheit, http://drafd.org 
/drafd_2001_09/htdocs/start40_3.html, accessed 23 November 2010; Béatrice 
Jérôme, Les élus alsaciens participeront aux ceremonies, Le Monde, 9 June 
2004. 
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versial.5 A town partnership with a German city is still unthinkable to the 
current day.6 Whereas on the level of symbolic politics – in the words of 
Pierre Lellouche – Oradour belongs to the past, the situation is much more 
complex when considering Oradour as a reality – an actually existing 
community. What can reconciliation possibly mean after a particularly bru-
tal crime like the massacre of Oradour? How did those who survived react 
to efforts of reconciliation from the Germans? How do the descendants of 
those who were killed deal with such reconciliation attempts today? More-
over, are the Oradour citizens actually reconciled with Germany today?  
This article will endeavor to answer these questions. It is a case study 
that will measure the scope and the success of initiatives from within civil 
society aiming at reconciliation at a place that was heavily struck and 
marked by World War II and its aftermath.7 In the next section, reconcilia-
tion will be defined in order to develop a framework for this analysis. Sev-
eral factors and conditions of relevance in the processes of reconciliation 
are identified and applied to the Oradour case. Section 3 will provide an 
overview of gestures of reconciliation in the context of Oradour as well as a 
discussion of its successes and failures, problems, and limits. Section 4 con-
tains an analysis of ‘Oradour’ in its different meanings in order to identify 
the addressees of the reconciliation gestures as well as the various actors 
involved in the reconciliation process. Furthermore, this analysis will focus 
on persons and collectives included in and excluded from the process of 
                                                 
5  Andreas Sichelstiel, Europahymne Höhepunkt, Pegnitz-Zeitung, 21 May 2007. 
6  In 1990 the mayor of Oradour, Robert Lapuelle, said in an interview with 
Jacqueline Deloffre from the German newspaper Die Zeit, that it was still too 
early for a town partnership, http://images.zeit.de/text/1990/40/Manche-Haende-
zittern-noch, accessed 24 April 2008. In an interview with Caroline Ischinger, 
the new mayor of Oradour, Raymond Frugier, was confident that a closer rela-
tionship between Dachau and Oradour would emerge, but didn’t speak about a 
town partnership. Was bedeutet Ihr Besuch in Dachau?, Dachauer SZ, 25 May 
2010. 
7  The following results are based on the research done for my PhD thesis, which 
deals with “Oradour and the Germans. Dealing with a war crime and its me-
mory: Criminal prosecution, indemnification, revisionism and gestures of recon-
ciliation in the FRG and GDR, 1949-2011”. In this article, I will limit myself to 
the relations between Oradour and the FRG. 
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reconciliation. Concluding, I will discuss the question of the right to irrec-
oncilability in the case of Oradour.  
 
 
RECONCILIATION WITH ORADOUR:  
DETERMINING FACTORS 
  
In 2009, Veit Straßner criticized the lack of discussion in the social sci-
ences on the concept of “reconciliation” and recommended a definition that 
will serve as the basis of our reflections: 
 
“Reconciliation is the state of being reconciled as well as the process that aims at 
this state. The fundamental condition of reconciliation is a burdened past, with 
which one shall come to terms in order to achieve a state that is defined by the be-
ginning or resumption of trustworthy and cooperative relationships. In this state of 
reconciliation, peaceful coexistence and cooperation are possible (again). Reconcili-
ation in the double sense of the word takes place on the individual level between 
perpetrators and victims as well as on the collective level. Reconciliation processes 
are highly complex internal processes that cannot be demanded, but can be support-
ed or obstructed by external factors.”8 
 
In looking more closely at some factors of Straßner’s definition and apply-
ing it to the Oradour case, we find several unfavorable conditions for the 
process of reconciliation. Firstly, the burdened past, which forms the pre-
requisite of every need for reconciliation, is in this case extremely cruel. In 
fact, the majority of the victims were women and children who were locked 
up in the village church. Those who were not killed by gas, shells, or gun-
shots were burnt alive. Only 52 out of 642 corpses could be identified and 
buried in individual graves.9 Such circumstances surrounding death consti-
tute great problems in the process of mourning, since the uncertainties of 
                                                 
8  Veit Straßner, Versöhnung und Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung – Ein Vorschlag zur 
Begriffsbestimmung und Konzeptionalisierung, in: Amnesie, Amnestie oder Auf-
arbeitung? Zum Umgang mit autoritären Vergangenheiten und Menschen-
rechtsverletzungen, ed. Siegmar Schmidt et al. (Wiesbaden: VS, 2009), 23-36, 
here: 29. 
9  Fouché, Oradour, 149-154, 159-166, 180-182. 
A RIGHT TO IRRECONCILABILITY? | 171 

the victims’ death often haunt the surviving family and friends for a life-
time.10 Furthermore, many of the schoolchildren, who had been the victims 
in this massacre, came from hamlets outside the village. Their death often 
left families behind who had lost more than one child or even all of their 
children on June 10.11 Jean-Jacques Fouché, philosopher and an expert on 
the Oradour case, goes so far as to say that “the dimensions of the massa-
cre, especially the fact that most of the victims were women and children, 
creates irreconcilability”.12 
The second unfavorable starting point for reconciliation concerns the 
beginning or resumption of trustworthy and cooperative relationships after 
the conflict. The prefix “re-” in “reconciliation” refers to a state prior to the 
conflict, and in this sense, the term means the re-establishment of the for-
mer community.13 In the Oradour case there was no initial point to go back 
to. On the one hand, it is doubtful that there are ways back to a former 
community after a crime like this. On the other hand, no relations had ex-
isted between the village and Germany or Germans before the massacre, 
thus nothing could be revived there. On the contrary, there was an “anti-
Boche” culture in the Limousin region and Oradour was no exception in 
this matter.14 Therefore, resumption was not at stake here. In fact, the very 
                                                 
10  Albert Valade, who lost his sister in the massacre, for example explains that his 
mother lived for a certain time with the hope that her daughter would come 
back. Albert Valade, La page de catéchisme. Oradour-sur-Glane. Les villages 
sans enfants, 2nd ed. (Neuvic Entier: Editions de la Veytizou S.A.R.L., 2004), 
94. Aline Perney describes that until today the question of how her brother and 
father died is haunting her. Tulle et Oradour, Table ronde, France 3 Limousin, 
2004, Archive of the Centre de la mémoire d’Oradour-sur-Glane (hereafter: 
ACMO), V4.5.2/03. 
11  Concerning the situation in the hamlets: Valade, Page. Considering the loss of 
several children also: Farmer, Oradour, 212-213. 
12  Jean-Jacques Fouché, Oradour. La politique et la justice (Saint-Paul: Souny, 
2004), 18. 
13  Sebastian Friese, Politik der gesellschaftlichen Versöhnung. Eine theologisch-
ethische Untersuchung am Beispiel der Gacaca-Gerichte in Ruanda (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 2010), 8. 
14  Fouché, Oradour, 92. Boches is a derogatory term for Germans. 
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beginning of the ‘relations’ between the village and the Germans was 
marked by a horrible crime. 
Thirdly, external factors have created an unfavorable context for recon-
ciliation in Oradour, specifically the actions of the French and German 
state. The French state has played a leading role in Oradour after the mas-
sacre. Under General de Gaulle, Oradour became the national symbol of the 
French suffering at the hands of the Germans during the Second World 
War. The ruins became public property and were declared historical mon-
uments. High representatives of the French state attended the annual com-
memoration ceremonies, and the French state financially supported the con-
struction of the new Oradour. A new village was built next to the ruins.15 
According to Straßner, generally external factors like public recognition of 
the crime and financial support for the victims should actually support a 
reconciliation process.16 However, the new village was not even finished 
when the close relationship between the French state and Oradour ruptured 
in 1953. As the Oradour trial in Bordeaux made known to the public, 
Frenchmen from Alsace who were nearly all forced into the SS had partici-
pated in the massacre. The question of their criminal prosecution turned in-
to a national crisis. Oradour demanded a prosecution of the French perpe-
trators together with the Germans whereas the Alsace region insisted that 
these forced recruited men were only victims. Finally, the French National 
Assembly granted an amnesty to the already condemned Frenchmen.17 In 
Oradour this was felt like a second martyrdom18 and the consequences were 
dramatic: the village disassociated itself from the state and retreated into 
isolation and mourning for years. Feasts and ceremonies were either pro-
hibited or strictly regimented. The streets were left without names, the 
houses without colour. Over the years, there were no trees or flowers in the 
village. In the 1960s, the ice covering Oradour started to melt very slowly. 
But even in the early 1990s, the houses still remained grey and without any 
                                                 
15  Farmer, Oradour, 79-120. 
16  Straßner, Versöhnung, 28. 
17  Only the man who had engaged voluntarily in the SS was not granted amnesty. 
Several studies deal with the trial. The most detailed are Fouché, Politique, and 
Guillaume Javerliat, Bordeaux 1953: le deuxième drame d’Oradour. Entre his-
toire, mémoire et politique (Limoges: Pulim, 2009). 
18  Farmer, Oradour, 194. 
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decorations. At that time, the streets were still empty and public events 
were forbidden in June.19 The amnesty created a national conflict and 
henceforth the need for reconciliation with the French state and the Alsace 
region. The isolation and bitterness that resulted from the Bordeaux process 
and characterized the double conflict within France is one of the external 
factors that inhibited the process of reconciliation in Oradour. The tensions 
between Oradour and the French state have weakened since the 1980s; and 
in the 1990s reconciliation initiatives followed between Oradour and Al-
sace.20 
At a first look, on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
two factors were given that theoretically intended to promote reconcilia-
tion: criminal prosecution and compensation. Altogether twelve preliminary 
proceedings were opened by the German public prosecutor’s offices regard-
ing the German crime in Oradour.21 In 1960, a French-German agreement 
of compensation for the crimes committed by the Nazis made it possible for 
most of those affected by the massacre to receive indemnification payments 
from the German state.22 However, looking at the issue more closely, it is 
doubtful whether these measures had a positive impact on the reconciliation 
process. Legally justified or not, the preliminary hearings never led to a tri-
                                                 
19  Farmer, Oradour, 204-217; Fouché, Politique, 467-476; Meyer, Wandel, 403-
410. 
20  Meyer, Wandel, 408-410, 415-418. 
21  As there is no study including all the preliminary proceedings in the FRG, I 
have to refer to the files that have been collected by the public prosecutor’s of-
fice in Stuttgart. When preliminary proceedings on the Oradour case were initi-
ated in 1995, the office received nearly all the former writs of prohibition. Stadt-
archiv Ludwigsburg, Js 48144/89, Roter Band II. Four preliminary proceedings 
don’t appear however and can be found in: Staatsarchiv Nürnberg, 1 AR 29/53; 
Staatsarchiv Bremen, 20 Js 50/81; Landesarchiv Münster, 45 Js 53/89; Claudia 
Moisel, Frankreich und die deutschen Kriegsverbrecher. Politik und Praxis der 
Strafverfolgung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004), 187-
188. 
22  Claudia Moisel, Pragmatischer Formelkompromiss: Das deutsch-französische 
Globalabkommen von 1960, in: Grenzen der Wiedergutmachung. Die Entschä-
digung für NS-Verfolgte in West- und Osteuropa 1945-2000, ed. Hans Günter 
Hockerts et al. (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), 242-284, here: 275-276. 
174 | ANDREA ERKENBRECHER 

al in the FRG. Thus, not a single man was ever condemned there.23 Besides, 
the West German government was active on behalf of German soldiers who 
had been condemned in Bordeaux in 1953 and finally achieved their early 
release.24 Regarding the compensation, we know that the majority of those 
entitled to receive payments did accept.25 Nevertheless, we know nearly 
nothing on how the agreement was perceived. What is certain is that the 
early release of the Germans convicted in Bordeaux as well as the fact that 
the General of the SS-Division Das Reich could live a normal life in Ger-
many are mentioned in the book about the massacre and its aftermath sold 
by the ANFM. However, the book totally ignores the compensation pay-
ment.26 
Regarding the official recognition of the crime as another element sup-
posed to support reconciliation, it was not until the year 2000 that with 
Gerhard Schröder a German chancellor officially recognized the massacre. 
He repeated this recognition four years later, but there was no apology for 
the crime, as some had expected.27 The long lasting silence of the German 
chancellors had a particularly negative effect because for several decades, 
former SS men and revisionists denied in their publications to have been 
guilty of having committed the massacre. While the French state censored 
                                                 
23  In 1983, the former officer Heinz Barth was condemned in the German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR) for having participated in the Oradour massacre. Henry 
Leide, NS-Verbrecher und Staatssicherheit. Die geheime Vergangenheitspolitik 
der DDR (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 131-142. Andrea Erken-
brecher, Der Prozess gegen Heinz Barth 1983. Eine Fallstudie zur politischen 
Instrumentalisierung von Kriegsverbrecherprozessen in der DDR (M.A. thesis, 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2006). 
24  Moisel, Frankreich, 183-188; Fouché, Oradour, 268. 
25  This is the result of an evaluation I made of the so-called “fiches de côntrole”, 
index cards that were established for every person who received compensation 
following the Franco-German agreement. Those cards are archived in the Ar-
chive du monde combattant, Caen.  
26  Guy Pauchou and Pierre Masfrand, Oradour sur Glane. Vision d’epouvante 
(Limoges: Melting Phot, 2003), 138-139. 
27  Meyer, Wandel, 433-434; Lucas Delattre, A Oradour, dernière étape de la ré-
conciliation franco-allemand, Le Monde, 30 May 2000. 
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several of those books, the German government did not.28 This revisionism 
offended the survivors and the relatives of the victims, which for some is 
Oradour’s third trauma.29 In conclusion, it can be stated that concerning the 
actions of the French and the West German state since the end of World 
War II, the events that obstructed a process of reconciliation outweighed 
those that supported it. 
 
 
RECONCILIATION INITIATIVES FROM WITHIN  
CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
Reconciliation between Oradour and Germany has not been a subject in ac-
ademic research so far. Nevertheless, the topic is en passant mentioned in a 
few studies, especially the following two aspects: The missing official 
apology from the German state and the question of Oradour’s readiness for 
reconciliation with Germany.30 Research on civil society’s gestures of rec-
onciliation towards Oradour is just at its beginning.31 This research desider-
atum is remarkable because numerous such gestures can be evidenced. Ger-
mans have offered help for the reconstruction of the village, they have 
raised money, they have laid wreaths, have brought their sympathy, memo-
rial plates, and gifts of atonement. They have celebrated church services of 
atonement and concerts of reconciliation in the new local church of Ora-
dour. When examining civil society’s involvement in the reconciliation pro-
cess, three aspects are particularly remarkable: Firstly, gestures aimed at 
reconciliation date back to 1947. Secondly, it can be evidenced that the ac-
                                                 
28  Meyer, Wandel, 340-344; Jean-Jacques Fouché, Le négationnisme et le symbole 
Oradour (2002), http://www.cerclegramsci.org/rubs/tribune10.htm, accessed 31 
May 2011.  
29  In his documentary film, Oradour, le rétour à la vie, 2009, Marc Desoutter 
speaks of the “three great traumas”, whereas Robert Hébras, one of the men to 
survive the massacre, uses the expression “injuries”. 
30  Notably: Fouché, Oradour, 241, 244; Jean-Jacques Fouché, Le Centre de la 
mémoire d’Oradour, Vingtième siècle. Revue d’histoire 73 (2002), 125-137; 
Henning Meyer, Oradour-sur-Glane und sein Rang in der französischen ‘Erin-
nerungskultur’ (M.A. thesis, Universität Augsburg, 2003), 109-113. 
31  Meyer, Oradour-sur-Glane, 109-113; Meyer, Wandel, 433-434. 
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tors and the chosen forms of reconciliation efforts are heterogeneous and it 
further can be established that within this heterogeneity Christian motiva-
tions and corresponding symbols have been dominant for quite some time. 
Thirdly, different phases and turning points can be observed. During the ten 
years following the massacre, the rejection of such gestures prevailed and 
the offers aimed at reconciliation remained unanswered. This was the case 
when in 1947 the German youth magazine Benjamin campaigned for young 
volunteers to support the construction of the new Oradour village. The ap-
peal received a positive response but the offer was vehemently rejected by 
the ANFM.32 Moreover, a goblet of atonement from the German branch of 
Pax Christi, a non-governmental Catholic peace movement, offered in 1955 
was not accepted.33 In 1953, a donation from a school in Castrop-Rauxel 
offered to pay for the planting of a tree in Oradour may have been used for 
the intended purpose, but there was still no direct contact with Oradour. Not 
the villagers, but the French High Commissioner André François Poncet 
signed the letter of appreciation.34 For the 10th commemoration day of the 
massacre a delegation of the descendants of the victims of Penzberg and the 
Rombergpark brought an insignia.35 As far as we know, this insignia was 
                                                 
32  Alfons Erb, Oradour gestern und heute, Dokumente. Zeitschrift für den deutsch-
französischen Dialog 4, 2 (1948), 86-93. 
33  Hedwig Groß, Das Geheimnis der Versöhnung heißt Erinnerung. Vor 50 Jahren 
verübte eine SS-Division das Massaker von Oradour-sur-Glane, in: Begeg-
nungsfahrt. 50 Jahre deutsch-französische Geschichte, 50 Jahre Pax Christi 
Frankreich, 25. April bis 4. Mai 1994, Bischöfliches Diözesanarchiv Aachen 
(hereafter: BDA), Ala Pax Christi, vol. 35. 
34  H.M., Laßt Bäume darüber wachsen, Die 7 Tage, 8 May 1953; Ulrich Brochha-
gen, Nach Nürnberg. Vergangenheitsbewältigung in der Ära Adenauer (Berlin: 
Ullstein, 1999), 162. 
35  The Rombergpark is a park in the German town of Dortmund where in spring 
1945 several hundred people, Germans as well as foreigners, were executed by 
National Socialists. Ulrich Sander, Mord im Rombergpark. Tatsachenbericht 
(Dortmund: Grafit Verlag, 1993). Concerning Penzberg, on 28 April 1945, units 
of the Wehrmacht and a group of Werwolf members killed 16 persons. Some of 
them had tried to save the local mine from being blasted by the National Social-
ists and therefore had taken over the local power. Among the victims were also 
persons who haven’t been involved in this action at all. Die tödliche Utopie. 
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never posted and the delegation’s invitation to people in Oradour to partici-
pate in the commemoration of the crimes of Penzberg and the Rombergpark 
was never answered.36 “Trustworthy and cooperative relationships” were 
not established in this phase, a time heavily marked by the crime itself and 
the so-called second martyrdom of the Bordeaux judgement and the amnes-
ty which followed. 
The first turning point in the relationship between Germans and the 
Oradour citizens took place in 1976 as the result of Vinzenz Kremp’s com-
mitment to the village. Born in 1915, Kremp participated in the Second 
World War as a soldier in the Wehrmacht. After the end of the war, he be-
came a member of the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge (VDK), 
engaging in the maintenance of war graves.37 He committed himself to rec-
onciliation out of his wartime experience, where he might or might not 
have been involved in a possible war crime.38 During a church service in 
Oradour in 1976, he donated, together with a youth group, a candelabra as a 
reconciliation gift. From this gesture emerged his long-lasting contact with 
the village and his deep friendship with the local priest, Henri Boudet. 
Kremp traveled regularly to Oradour and also welcomed Boudet and young 
people from Oradour to his home in Baden.39 
However, the election of Raymond Frugier as Oradour’s new mayor in 
1995 is the most important turning point. Since his inauguration, Frugier 
has been practicing an active reconciliation policy, first towards Alsace and 
                                                                                                  
Bilder, Texte, Dokumente, Daten zum Dritten Reich, fourth ed., ed. Horst Möller 
et al. (München and Berlin: Selbstverlag Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 2003), 285, 
314. Both executions were part of the so-called Kriegsendphasenverbrechen. 
36  Feierliche Ehrung der Märtyrer von Oradour, Die Tat, 19 June 1954; Man muß 
ihnen das Handwerk legen!, Die Tat, 19 June 1954.  
37  Joseph Spinner, Vinzenz Kremp (1915-1996), http://www.umkirch.de/ceasy/mo 
dules/cms/main.php5?cPageId=166, accessed 31 May 2011. 
38  Vinzenz Kremp, Oradour-sur-Glane, 2, manuscript, given to the author by 
Wolfram Kremp. Wolfgang Kremp, Interview with the author, 19 February 
2010. 
39  Correspondence between Vinzenz Kremp and Henri Boudet, 1976-1986, given 
to the author by Henri Boudet; Henri Boudet, interview with the author, 9 May 
2008. 
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later on towards Germany.40 Whereas Vinzenz Kremp’s contacts with Ora-
dour remained unofficial and progressed notably with the local parish, the 
contacts now shifted to another level. Not only did Frugier officially wel-
come German delegations but he also welcomed increasingly more people 
of higher political standing. In retrospect, many innovations took place dur-
ing his seventeen years in office: In 1997, he officially welcomed for the 
first time a German mayor in Oradour.41 In 2000, he officially received 
Reinhold Bocklet, a high-ranking official in the Bavarian state chancel-
lery.42 Then, in 2004, for the first time, he invited a German delegation of 
young people and former members of the French résistance to attend the 
commemoration ceremony for the 60th anniversary of the massacre.43 Lat-
er, in 2007, a German choir was invited to give a concert in Oradour.44 The 
same year and two years later, there was a visit from Gerda Hasselfeldt, the 
vice president of the German Bundestag.45 Most of these initiatives grew 
out of already existing relations or they led to long-lasting associations, 
which qualifies them as “trustworthy and cooperative relationships”. For 
instance, the visit of Gerda Hasselfeldt led to a return visit in 2010, when, 
for the first time, a large official delegation of Oradour traveled to Germany 
that included the mayor, members of the local council, a survivor of the 
massacre as well as one of the victims’ relatives, and the local soccer team. 
They were warmly welcomed in Dachau by Gerda Hasselfeldt and Peter 
Bürgel, the local mayor.46 Peter Bürgel then was the first German (local) 
                                                 
40  Meyer, Wandel, 415-418, 430-431. 
41  Meyer, Oradour-sur-Glane, 110. 
42  Gerd Kröncke, Stille in Oradour-sur-Glane, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29 May 2000. 
43  Meyer, Wandel, 434; Flyer Einladung zu einer Bildungsfahrt nach Oradour, 
http://www.drafd.de/files/flyer_oradour.pdf, accessed 31 May 2011; Deutsche 
auf dem Weg nach Oradour, Auswahl aus einer Ausstellung von Alexandra C. 
Schmidt, http://www.authentic-beauties.de/pdf/Oradour_Broschuere.pdf, acces-
sed 31 May 2011. 
44  Musik kontra Massaker, Pegnitz-Zeitung, 26-28 May 2007. 
45  Besuch in Gedenkstätte in Oradour, http://www.hasselfeldt.de/de/detail/aktuell 
es_2,737.htm, accessed 15 September 2007. Press release Bundestagsvizepräsi-
dentin Hasselfeldt reist mit Dachauer OB Bürgel nach Oradour, http://www. 
hansjoerg-christmann.de/htm/pm2009Juni17.html, accessed 31 May 2011. 
46  Laurent Borderie, Foot et émotion pour l’USO, Le Populaire, 2 July 2010.  
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politician to have been officially invited to attend the commemoration cer-
emony on June 10, 2011 – the last substantial welcoming gesture put forth 
by Raymond Frugier for the time being.47 
Looked at from this point of view, reconciliation between Oradour and 
Germany was a long and difficult process but it became a success story af-
ter all. Although, there is no doubt about the constant progress of these rela-
tions considering their official character, there are open questions concern-
ing the people who are not involved in this process, the problems this pro-
cess provoked and its boundaries. 
 
Successes and failures: Vinzenz Kremp and Pax Christi 
(1955-1994) 
 
The Catholic peace movement Pax Christi was founded in France in 1945 
with the aim of reconciliation with Germany. In 1948, the German section 
was founded.48 German delegations of Pax Christi visited Oradour several 
times. In 1955, Manfred Hörhammer, first secretary of the German 
branch49, and son of a German father and a French mother, visited Oradour 
for the first time, but he came incognito. Depressed, as he was to witness 
the ruins and what had happened there, he did not dare to reveal his identity 
to the local guide. After the visit, he described his experience in his public 
diary published in a Catholic magazine. As a result, a reader donated her 
family jewels to have them transformed into a goblet for the parish of Ora-
dour.50 The gift was not directly handed over to Oradour but rather the pres-
ident of the German branch presented it to the Bishop of Lourdes, Pierre-
Marie Théas, who was the founder of Pax Christi and its president in 
                                                 
47  Benoît Sadry, e-mails to the author, 27 April 2011 and 3 June 2011. 
48  Michael Kißener, Der Katholizismus und die deutsch-französische Annäherung 
in den 1950er Jahren, in: Wege der Verständigung zwischen Deutschen und 
Franzosen nach 1945. Zivilgesellschaftliche Annäherungen, ed. Corine Defran-
ce et al. (Tübingen: Narr, 2010), 89-98, here: 90-91. 
49  Ibid., 93. 
50  Manfred Hörhammer, Aus meinem Tagebuch, Pax-Christi-Zeitschrift 2 (1955); 
Heinz Theo Risse, Oradour beginnt überall. Reflexionen über einige Beispiele 
christlicher Friedensarbeit, in: Versöhnung: Gestalten, Zeiten, Modelle, ed. 
Heinrich Fries and Ulrich Valeska (Frankfurt a.M.: Knecht, 1975), 133-144. 
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France. Théas passed the goblet over to the bishop of Limoges, Rastouil, 
who was, in turn, to pass it on to the parish of Oradour, which, in the end, 
rejected the object.51 
In the following decades, the sentiments of the people in Oradour sof-
tened, but Manfred Hörhammers’ hope, that one day German priests would 
come to the town, accompanied by a bishop, German women and mothers, 
and “ask Mother Rouffange [sic] to lead us to the graves and to the grave-
yard”, never came true.52 Indeed, German delegations came in 1963, 1988 
and 1994. They visited the ruins, celebrated church services for reconcilia-
tion, brought additional gifts of atonement, and laid down flowers. Actual-
ly, the town of Oradour opened up when, in 1988, the parish accepted the 
once rejected goblet and some French women attended the service. A few 
years later, in 1994, the pilgrims were warmly welcomed by the local 
priest, Jean Robert, with whom they celebrated a moving church service 
and who gave them absolution. In the same year, the deputy mayor wel-
comed the pilgrims for the first time in the church. However, the reception 
was short and he told the pilgrims that anger no longer existed in Oradour; 
nevertheless, there were still resentments. Thus, the group of pilgrims had 
to conclude: “The way to reconciliation wasn’t easy in Oradour, and if 
we’re honest, hasn’t been reached yet. We prepared a church service, in 
which we wanted to ask for forgiveness [...] but our secret wish for inhabit-
ants of the village to share the Eucharist with us did not come true.”53 The 
outcome of their commitment was far from “trustworthy and cooperative 
relationships“, as Straßner would put it. But why did all efforts fail?  
To answer this question it is helpful to compare the commitment of Pax 
Christi to that of Vincenz Kremp, as both of them initiated reconciliation in 
nearly the same setting. As we recall, working with a youth group in Li-
moges in 1976 to take care of German war graves, Kremp decided to make 
a gesture of reconciliation towards Oradour by giving a candelabra as a pre-
sent to the local parish. As had done Pax Christi, he established contact 
                                                 
51  Risse, Oradour; Groß, Geheimnis. 
52  Hörhammer, Tagebuch. Marguerite Rouffanche was the only woman to survive 
the massacre in the church. 
53  Pax Christi in Oradour. ‘Wir wollen versuchen, uns christlich dem Grauen zu 
stellen’, Pax Christi 9/10 (1963); Alice Rapp, Sonntag, 10. Juli 1988, BDA, Ala 
Pax Christi, vol. 33. Quotation: Groß, Versöhnung. 
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with the bishop of Limoges first to assess the situation. The bishop consult-
ed the local priest and the ANFM, who both gave the all clear for the de-
posit of the candelabra in the new church; nonetheless, on the condition that 
“this deposit is done in a discreet way”. Kremp was asked to contact the lo-
cal priest, Henri Boudet, for more details.54 They agreed that the gift should 
be handed over during a Sunday morning church service. That the contact 
on that Sunday did not end with the church service was due to a coinci-
dence and Henri Boudet. As Boudet had to baptise a child after the church 
service, he could not welcome the Germans himself. Instead of sending 
them alone to the ruins of the city, he had organized a meeting in the pres-
bytery and had asked some young people of the parish to welcome the 
guests. Furthermore, the president of the ANFM and some other people at-
tended the reception. When Boudet finally joined the group, contact had al-
ready been made between the young people. The young French invited the 
German group to come back in the afternoon to visit an exhibition in the lo-
cal town hall.55 
From that day on, Kremp kept up the freshly established contact. He in-
vited Boudet and young people from Oradour to an event of the VDK and 
to his home in Baden. He also traveled regularly to Oradour.56 In Germany, 
Kremp’s commitment to the village not only resounded in the press, but it 
also initiated more gestures of reconciliation. The first gesture came from 
the Freiburg criminal investigation department that donated money to the 
church of Oradour. Then, the Catholic parish of Umkirch signed a charter 
to “forever” pay for the church’s candles. Several of Kremp’s friends came 
along with him to Oradour in the following years.57 Aside from these ges-
tures, in the early eighties Kremp contributed in another way to the recon-
ciliation with Oradour. As the revisionist publications on the massacre be-
came increasingly more aggressive in Germany, Kremp, who had some ex-
perience in historical research, started working on the events surrounding 
                                                 
54  Letter Bishop of Limoges to Archbishop of Freiburg, 1 July 1976, given to the 
author by Henri Boudet. 
55  Henri Boudet, interview with the author, 9 May 2008. 
56  Correspondence Kremp-Boudet. 
57  Freiburger Kriminalbeamte sammelten für die neue Kirche von Oradour, 
Kriegsgräberfürsorge 4, 11 (1977), 234; Isolde Doelfs, Die Versöhnung vertie-
fen, Konradsblatt 38, 23 September 1979; Correspondence Kremp-Boudet. 
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the war crimes committed on June 10 in Oradour, and rectified the lies writ-
ten by former SS men.58 He thereby advocated for something that Straßner 
qualifies as an external factor to further the process of reconciliation mostly 
carried out by the state: “an earnest process of coping with the past wrongs 
as well as solid research into these past wrongs”.59 
Reading the German newspapers reporting on Kremp’s commitment to 
Oradour, one gains the impression that a true “fairytale of reconciliation” 
had taken place at that time.60 However, while also other sources prove that 
on the German side increasingly more people were interested and became 
involved in Kremp’s project, it is difficult to estimate its effect on Oradour. 
We know that at the time Vinzenz Kremp was well known in the village 
and, to some extent, he became integrated in the parish. When he came to 
Oradour, for example, he sometimes read the lesson during the church serv-
ices. We also know that he was in contact with various other people in Ora-
dour. Among them was the deputy mayor, but above all people of the par-
ish.61 However, we do not know how strong the bond grew between Kremp 
and the citizens of Oradour and what this bond meant for the people of 
Oradour. What is certain is that Kremp’s closest friend was Henri Boudet. 
Their relationship was not only “trustworthy and cooperative”, but it had 
grown into a close friendship. A highlight in this long-lasting friendship 
was the day in 1986, when Henri Boudet received the Bundesverdienst-
kreuz (Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany) for his commit-
ment to the reconciliation of Oradour and Germany.62 
It should be noted in this respect that this deep friendship grew with a 
man who himself was not affected by the massacre. Although, as the priest 
of the village, Henri Boudet in a way “married” the population,63 but – to 
stay with the metaphor – he was not born into the family. It is likely that 
                                                 
58  Correspondence Kremp-Boudet; Kremp, Oradour-sur-Glane. 
59  Straßner, Versöhnung, 28. 
60  For example: Karl-Heinz Darweger, Die Messe von Oradour, given to the author 
by Henri Boudet. 
61  Correspondence Kremp-Boudet; Henri Boudet, Interview with the author, 9 
May 2008. 
62  Ludwig Wien, Kommt! Wir wollen es wagen!, Evangelische Kirchenzeitung 6 
(1986). 
63  Henri Boudet, Interview with the author, 9 May 2008. 
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this position enabled Boudet to become some kind of mediator between 
Kremp and the population.64 How hard it can be for people, who suffered 
through the massacre to engage in “trustworthy and cooperative relation-
ships” with Germans, is illustrated by the following scenario. Vinzenz 
Kremp was for several years in touch with the Cordeau family in Oradour. 
They were part of the parish and very close to Henri Boudet. During the 
events of June 10, 1944, the Cordeaus had lost their only daughter, Berna-
dette. Fourty years after the massacre, their apartment still looked like a 
museum commemorating their beloved child. One day in the 1980s, Kremp 
was visiting them with his son and his son’s family. Vinzenz Kremp’s son 
had brought with him his just several months old son but Mrs. Cordeau re-
fused to touch the baby since to her it was a “German male”.65 
Coming back to the comparison with Pax Christi, we recall that Vin-
zenz Kremp found in Henri Boudet not only a person with whom he sym-
pathized, but also a mediator to the local population. Contrary to the pil-
grims of Pax Christi, who had visited Oradour in more or less long inter-
vals, Kremp came back mostly once a year since the contact had first been 
established. When Henri Boudet left Oradour in 1985, the contact between 
the two men and between Kremp and different people from Oradour con-
tinued. Both factors were responsible for Kremp’s contacts to Oradour not 
to break off after Henri Boudet left the village in 1985.66 How close these 
contacts were actually related to the two men is shown by the fact that after 
Kremp’s death all relationships to Oradour stopped. Kremp’s children 
maintained the contact to Boudet, who was visited almost yearly by part of 
the family until his death in 2011. But their contact with other people from 
Oradour ended long ago.67 Even if Kremp had created more solid ties to 
Oradour than Pax Christi, ultimately he did not succeed to establish the 
kinds of „trustworthy and cooperative relationships” between the inhabit-
                                                 
64  There are a lot of indications in the correspondence between the two men point-
ing to this role. 
65  Wolfram Kremp, Interview with the author, 19 February 2010; Henri Boudet, 
Interview with the author, 9 May 2008. 
66  Correspondence Kremp-Boudet. 
67  Wolfram Kremp, Interview with the author, 19 February 2010; Wolfram Kremp, 
e-mail to the author, 21 February 2010. 
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ants of Oradour and the Germans that would have outlasted his own en-
gagement and his own death. 
The commitment of Pax Christi and Vinzenz Kremp took place in what 
can be considered a period during which Oradour had been increasingly 
open to such gestures of reconciliation. However, these gestures might not 
have been approved by all inhabitants of the village. In fact, the church ser-
vices aimed at reconciliation celebrated by Pax Christi, met no response. 
This lack of involvement showed that the people of the French village were 
not that enthusiastic about reconciliation efforts. Nevertheless, all these ini-
tiatives were tolerated. This tolerance seems to be rooted in the fact that 
these actions were part of civil society and that the German actors had nev-
er asked for an official response. Shortly after the 50th anniversary of the 
massacre in 1994, the local mayor, Robert Lapuelle, stated in an interview 
that until this day there were “nuances” in Oradour’s dealing with Germans. 
As could be gathered from his remarks, there were mainly two criteria that 
decided between acceptable and problematic contacts: The age of the Ger-
mans and the nature of the exchange. While there would be no problems on 
the level of private exchange, it would be difficult once mayors, ambassa-
dors or Members of Parliament were involved. Lapuelle reported that peo-
ple trampled with rage on wreaths that had been laid down regularly by the 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), the state party of the for-
mer German Democratic Republic (GDR) and that they were just thrown 
away later. If the German ambassador had asked to lay a wreath during the 
commemoration ceremony on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 
massacre, he would have had to send him away because the ANFM would 
not have accepted him. The mayor assured that this was not an act of hostil-
ity, but the disposition of the surviving families that would have to be re-
spected.68 A year later, Raymond Frugier followed Lapuelle in office and in 
spite of the “disposition of the families”, the new mayor abandoned the pol-




                                                 
68  Stefan Endel, Tröste meine Trauer!, http://www.endell.de/infos/philosophie/inde 
x.html, accessed 31 May 2011. 
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Official relations between Oradour and Germany since 1995 
and the role of civil society 
 
We have already mentioned all the new contacts with Germany that had 
been accepted and to some extend had been accelerated by Raymond Fru-
gier as mayor of Oradour. Analyzing them from the view of civil society, 
we can see two developments: Firstly, civil society continued playing an 
important role. Indeed, the first German delegation to have been invited of-
ficially to attend the commemorative ceremony on June 10, 2004 in the 
French village consisted of civil societal actors. Frugier made an interesting 
choice in inviting German former members of the French résistance and 
youth groups. Because of their role during the war and their age, both were 
far from sharing any guilt with the perpetrators of the massacre. The head 
of the delegation was Gerhard Leo, one of the founding members of the 
Verband Deutscher in der Résistance, in den Streitkräften der Antihitlerko-
alition und der Bewegung ‘Freies Deutschland’ (Association of Germans in 
the French Resistance, DRAFD). Together with different trade unions, 
DRAFD had looked for young people to join the delegation.69 Civil society 
played also an important role as far as the visits of the mayor of Bad Wind-
sheim, Eckhardt, in 1997, and the Bavarian minister Bocklet in 2000 are 
concerned. Both visits emerged in the context of Franco-German town and 
regional partnerships. While Eckhardt visited the twin town of Bad Wind-
sheim, located one hour away from Oradour, Bocklet stayed in Limousin to 
attend to events of regional partnerships between Bavaria and some French 
regions.70 Even if Oradour refused to engage in a partnership with a Ger-
man city, the civil society network of Franco-German town twinnings and 
regional partnerships had an impact on Oradour’s relations with Germany 
after all. 
Secondly, the new relations between Oradour and Germany are excel-
lent examples of the constant interaction between civil society, the private 
sphere, and the state. To illustrate with two examples: The concert of rec-
                                                 
69  Flyer Einladung; Schober, Oradour. 
70  Ansprache des Ersten Bürgermeisters der Stadt Bad Windsheim, Diplom-
Ingenieur (univ.) Wolfgang Eckhardt anläßlich des Besuchs der Gedenkstätte 
Oradour-sur-Glane mit Kranzniederlegung am 04.10.1997, given to the author 
by Wolfgang Eckhardt; Kröncke, Stille. 
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onciliation, given by the choir of Schwaig in 2007, was the highlight of an 
already long term relationship that had involved actors on a private level as 
well as on the level of civil society and the state. In 1985, one of the survi-
vors of the massacre, Robert Hébras, was invited to the peace talk organ-
ised by the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). He was seated next 
to Willy Brandt and therefore spent the whole day with the former German 
chancellor.71 On this occasion, Hébras met Fritz Körber, member of the 
SPD and of the Bezirkstag Mittelfranken (District Council of Central Fran-
conia). Körber was member of the commission for partnership and interna-
tional understanding in the Bezirkstag Mittelfranken and also the political 
commissioner for this field since 1982. He had started traveling to Limou-
sin with youth groups from the local Arbeiterwohlfahrt (Workers Welfare 
Association, AWO) one year before.72 Since he planned to visit Oradour 
again just a few weeks later, he asked Hébras if he could give the youth 
group a guided tour through the ruins. Hébras accepted and from that day 
on, they became friends.73 When Körber later became mayor of Schwaig, 
he organised an exhibition on Oradour in his hometown and invited Hébras 
and Frugier.74 Körber left his position as mayor in 2006 but the contacts 
continued on the political and on the private level. In 2007, Körber was at 
the head of the invited group, including the choir of Schwaig and the cham-
ber orchestra of Fürth. In this gesture of reconciliation even representatives 
at a higher state level became involved with the German Consul General 
sending representatives to Oradour to attend the concert.75 This example 
draws our attention to the continuous and complex interconnection between 
the private, the public, and the state in processes of reconciliation.  
The second example demonstrates that the politically highest-ranking 
contact between Oradour and Germany has its origins in private contacts 
                                                 
71  Robert Hébras, interviews with the author, 7 May 2008 and 14 May 2008. 
72  Fritz Körber, e-mail to the author, 31 October 2011. 
73  Fritz Körber, interviews with the author, 31 May 2010 and 2 June 2010. 
74  Rede von Bürgermeister Körber zur Eröffnung der Fotoausstellung ‘Oradour-
sur-Glane – Ruinen als Mahnmal’ am 18.10.2005; Begrüßung von Bürgermeis-
ter Körber zum Abend der Vorträge mit Bürgermeister Raymond Frugier und 
Robert Hébras aus dem Limousin am 21.10.2005 im Schwaiger Schloss, both 
given to the author by Fritz Körber. 
75  Andreas Sichelstiel, Europahymne Höhepunkt, Pegnitz-Zeitung, 21 May 2007. 
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and in activities by actors from civil society. Florian Förster worked as a 
volunteer for the Protestant organization Aktion Sühnezeichen (Action Rec-
onciliation, ASF) in the Centre de la mémoire d’Oradour-sur-Glane 
(CMO), which officially opened in 1999. In the light of this experience, he 
suggested to the vice-president of the German Bundestag Gerda Hasselfeldt 
to officially visit Oradour. Förster and Hasselfeldt had met before on sever-
al occasions. The director of the CMO agreed upon inviting Hasselfeldt 
and, she then became the first representative of the German state to official-
ly visit the village.76 Here again different levels of society and state became 
involved. Hasselfeldt advocated that Oradour be one of the destinations of 
the youth exchange organized by the German Bundestag on the Day of re-
membrance of the victims of National Socialism in 2009. During her se-
cond visit to Oradour with the mayor of Dachau, Peter Bürgel, in 2009,77 a 
friendly match between the Oradour and Dachau soccer teams had been or-
ganised.78 A year later, it was Hasselfeldt’s and Bürgel’s turn to welcome a 
delegation from Oradour for a rematch in Dachau.79 When Peter Bürgel 
was the first local German politician to officially attend the commemorative 
ceremony on June 10, official political and private contacts played an im-
portant role again. Peter Bürgel had accepted a private invitation to spend a 
few days with Raymond Frugier at his seaside house after the commemora-
tion.80 
By welcoming the different delegations and politicians in an official 
manner, Frugier, as head of the village, spoke in the name of Oradour. In 
this sense and by applying the criterion of “trustworthy and cooperative re-
lationships”, it could be argued that Oradour had reached the decisive stage 
of reconciliation with Germany. It is here that we reach a crucial point in 
                                                 
76  Gerda Hasselfeldt, interview with the author, June 2008. 
77  Besides her position as vice president of the Bundestag, Hasselfeldt is represent-
ing the constituency of Dachau-Fürstenfeldbruck at the German Parliament for a 
long time. Therefore she is closely linked with the Bavarian town of Dachau. 
Concerning her constituency: http://www.hasselfeldt.de/de/main/im_wahlkreis_ 
2.htm, accessed 31 May 2011. 
78  Press release Bundestagsvizepräsidentin Hasselfeldt. 
79  Laurent Borderie, Foot et émotion pour l’USO, Le Populaire, 2 July 2010. 
80  Benoît Sadry, e-mail to the author, 27 April 2010 and 3 June 2010. 
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the analysis: What is actually meant when we are talking about reconcilia-
tion with ‘Oradour’? 
 
 
“ORADOUR, THAT’S COMPLEX…”:  
DIMENSIONS OF ‘ORADOUR’ 
 
“Oradour, that’s complex... ”, is the title of one chapter of Jean-Jacques 
Fouché’s book about the martyred village.81 The statement accurately cap-
tures the complexity involved when trying to define the meaning of ‘Ora-
dour’ in the context of reconciliation processes. “Reconciliation”, Straßner 
writes, “takes place on the individual level between perpetrators and vic-
tims as well as on the collective level”.82 As far as the German actors are 
concerned, none of them were men who had participated in the massacre. 
The actors were part of a collective, which Straßner describes as “the envi-
ronment concerned by the effects or affects [of the past wrongs], or the so-
ciety as such”.83 As far as ‘Oradour’ is concerned, the name takes on sever-
al meanings. Oradour represents two places, the ruins of the previously ex-
isting town as well as the new village nearby. On a symbolic level, Oradour 
can be understood as a lieux de mémoire (Pierre Nora). Additionally, it be-
came a “common term” “designating the massacre of a civil population 
without being able to defend itself by a military force”.84 Oradour as the 
addressee of gestures of reconciliation could be representative of the vic-
tims who died in the massacre and who were addressed with gestures like 
laying down commemorative wreaths in the destroyed village or the local 
cemetery. However, the commitments for reconciliation with Oradour were 
foremost directed to the survivors of the massacre, e.g., people living there 
and having been touched by the atrocities.85 At this point, additional as-
                                                 
81  Fouché, Oradour, 16. Fouché quoted the mayor of Saint-Junien and General 
Council of the canton to which Oradour belongs. What the mayor wanted to say 
exactly wasn’t clear. 
82  Straßner, Versöhnung, 29. 
83  Ibid., 27. 
84  Fouché, Oradour, 8. 
85  Fritz Körber for example, said in an interview that he had tried for years to es-
tablish contacts with the inhabitants of Oradour; Sichelstiel, Europahymne. An-
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pects need to be considered. The people living in Oradour today can be 
seen either as individuals or as part of different collectives. On the individ-
ual level, there are the survivors of the massacre, the victims’ relatives, 
their descendants, and those who moved to Oradour after the massacre and 
who are without any connection to the crime. On the collective level, we 
can distinguish between different groups. Firstly, there is the municipality 
that includes all the individuals mentioned above. Secondly, as we have 
seen, the parish seems to be, or seems to have been at a time, a relevant col-
lective as well. In addition, there is the ANFM whose active members were 
personally affected by the massacre or were related to a victim.86 Taking in-
to account that only opponents themselves can reconcile87 one has to recon-
sider the question about who was involved in the reconciliation processes 
and who was excluded. This question is of great significance, especially 
with regard to Frugier’s active policy of reconciliation initiated in 1995: Is 
mere symbolic politics as initiated by mayor Frugier at stake here, is this in-
itiative supported by people other than the mayor, and, above all, who are 
the people involved?  
As has been pointed out, mayor Frugier was the engine and protagonist 
of most of the initiatives aimed at reconciliation from 1995 onwards. His 
role as an actor is ambivalent since on the one hand he is the representative 
of a town in which today the people having been touched by the crime are 
in the minority.88 On the other hand, Frugier was himself – in contrast to his 
                                                                                                  
other example is the already cited disappointment of the pilgrims of Pax Christi 
contained in their statement that their “secret wish for inhabitants of the village 
to share the Eucharist with us did not come true”. I include here those affected 
by the massacre, who moved away from Oradour but remained active in the 
ANFM or the local environment, as did for example Robert Hébras. 
86  The conditions for the kindredship have been expanded since 2001. Benoît Sad-
ry, e-mail to the author, 17 October 2011. The different statutes of the associa-
tion from 1944, 1988 and 2001 can be found in ACMO, 5FP1. The statutes from 
1944 have been given to the author by Benoît Sadry. Besides from the ANFM I 
will elide here different other associations in Oradour. 
87  Friese, Politik, 89. 
88  Meyer, Wandel, 374-375. The number of inhabitants grew from 1,145 in 1946 to 
2,060 in 2000. Most of the new inhabitants haven’t been touched by the massa-
cre. 
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predessor in office – affected by the massacre. When the German troops ar-
rived in Oradour on June 10, 1944, Frugier’s father took his wife and chil-
dren and fled to the forest. From their hideout, a provisory built cabana in 
which they stayed for about two weeks, the then four-year-old Frugier saw 
the church of Oradour burning. Although, the family survived, Frugier feels 
that the crime left its marks on him.89 But in public Frugier rarely speaks 
about his personal experience, although it would extend his policy of rec-
onciliation and his actor role for the dimension of the personally affected. 
This reluctance may have been nourished from a certain respect for those 
who more narrowly escaped death than he himself. His reluctance may, 
however also be seen against the background that he is barred from active 
membership in the ANFM to this day because no member of his immediate 
family was murdered and the house of the family escaped the destruction.90 
Therefore, because Frugier operates his reconciliation policy – at least offi-
cially – in the role of mayor, Robert Hébras’ support of Frugier’s policy 
plays an important role, particularly since Hébras is one of the five men 
who survived the shootings and managed to escape.91 Those five men as 
well as Marguerite Rouffanche, the only women to escape the massacre in 
the church, had been named “miraculeux”, which means “miracles”.92 After 
the death of Madame Rouffanche in 1988, Robert Hébras became the “in-
carnation of Oradour”.93 For years now, he is a much or even the most 
sought-after interlocutor for journalists, mostly neglecting those who sur-
                                                 
89  Raymond Frugier, interview with the author, 23 July 2011. 
90  Frugier lost distant relatives in the massacre, the place where the family lived, 
however, was not destroyed. After the modification of the statutes of the ANFM 
in 2001, Frugier became some sort of honorary member of the association, but 
he is still excluded from active membership. Benoît Sadry, e-mail to the author, 
15 June 2011, 15 June 2012. 
91  Robert Hébras, Oradour-sur-Glane. The tragedy. Hour by hour (Montreuil-
Bellay: Editions C.M.D., 1994). 
92  Farmer, Oradour, 129-130, 138. 
93  Oradour-sur-Glane. Profession rescapé, Libération, 29 September 2011, http://w 
ww.liberation.fr/societe/01012362613-oradour-sur-glane-profession-rescape, ac-
cessed 16 December 2011. 
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vived because they flew in time or managed to hide without being discov-
ered by the SS.94 
Robert Hébras’ way to reconciliation with Germany was a long one. In 
2003, he explained in a discussion that soon after the massacre he had felt a 
lot of hate. He concluded that not all people should pay for a massacre they 
were responsible for just gradually. In retrospect, he saw a turning point in 
the invitation he received to attend the SPD peace talk by Willy Brandt.95 
Looking at the life of Robert Hébras, one can find several examples of 
“trustworthy and cooperative relationships” with Germans and his com-
mitment to reconciliation takes on different forms. He has been conducting 
guided tours through the ruins of Oradour for French and German school-
children or other delegations. He has also been working with the Centre de 
la mémoire d’Oradour-sur-Glane where he is constantly available to talk to 
young people about his experiences, and he has traveled to Germany sever-
al times to talk to young people here.96 Finally, yet importantly, he has 
played an important role in the policy of reconciliation developed by Ray-
mond Frugier since 1995. The two men form some kind of dual spearhead 
of the reconciliation process. They often traveled together to Germany or 
Robert Hébras guided the invited delegations through the ruins of his 
hometown.97 His warm-hearted attitude and his openness made a strong 
                                                 
94  Referring to the problems between different groups of survivors for example: 
Fax Jérôme Durix, Directeur départemental, [Ministère des] anciens combat-
tants, 9 October 2000, ACMO, 1ETUD13. 
95  Zeitzeugengespräch mit anschließender Fragerunde Robert Hébras, Überleben-
der des Massakers der SS 1944 in Oradour, in: Pädagogik wider das Vergessen. 
Dokumentation. Aus der Vergangenheit für die Zukunft lernen?! Eine Fachta-
gung zur Bedeutung der Internationalen Jugendarbeit im Kontext von Gedenk-
stätten und Dokumentationszentren zur NS-Vergangenheit vom 29.05.-1.06. 
2003, ed. Bezirksjugendring Mittelfranken, 10-13. 
96  Robert Hébras, interviews with the author, 7 May 2008 and 14 May 2008. Mey-
er, Wandel, 394-395, 431. 
97  Meyer, Wandel, 394-395, 431; Bundestagsvizepräsidentin Hasselfeldt in Ora-
dour, Dachauer SZ, 5 September 2007, 1. Erfahrungsbericht zur 4. Truppen-
wehrübung des Pionierbrückenbataillon 704 (GerEinh) vom 3.-9.09.2006 in 
Frankreich mit offiziellem Besuch der Gedenkstätte “Centre de la mémoire 
d’Oradour”, 29, given to the author by Wolfgang Eckhardt. 
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impression on his guests.98 But is he representative of all those who have 
been touched by the massacre? This question gains strength if one consid-
ers that Hébras had to leave the presidency of the ANFM in the 1990s. 
Among other reasons, he was criticized for being to open towards Germa-
ny.99 We know that Hébras is not the only person who was affected by the 
massacre and who openly favored reconciliation,100 but after all, the hesita-
tion of the ANFM when it comes to Germany is remarkable.  
The standpoint of the ANFM since 1995 vis-à-vis Frugier’s policy of 
reconciliation has been indistinct.101 When the Bavarian minister Bocklet 
was welcomed by Frugier in 2000, the ANFM stayed away and told the 
press that they were not in favor of such an initiative. The president of the 
association, Claude Milord, added, that there had not been a German apolo-
gy for the massacre yet and that this was taken badly.102 Even if the ex-
pected apology did not come,103 one year later the President of the ANFM 
stressed the need of the Association for more openness – also towards Ger-
many: “Our association has more than ever to accept its responsibilities, 
maintain its presence and its role when it comes to […] relations and ex-
changes with German associations in the name of memory and of Ora-
dour.”104 This new policy found its expression in 2004, when Claude Milord 
supported the invitation of a German delegation to attend the annual com-
memoration ceremony in June. However, not all the members of the associ-
                                                 
98   Bundestagsvizepräsidentin Hasselfeldt in Oradour; Erfahrungsbericht, 44-45. 
99   Meyer, Wandel, 366. 
100  Camille Senon, interviews with the author, 6 and 12 May 2008; Albert Valade, 
interviews with the author, 17 and 18 October 2007, 10 May 2008; Marcel 
Darthout, interviews with the author, 15 October 2007 and 5 May 2008. 
101  Meyer, Wandel, 431-435. 
102  Lucas Delattre, A Oradour, dernière étape de la réconciliation franco-alle-
mand, Le Monde, 30 May 2000. 
103  In fact the Bavarian minister Bocklet apologized for the massacre but appar-
ently this was not the apology expected, as one of the survivors explained. In 
his speech on 8 May 2000, the German Chancelor Schröder recognized the 
massacre but this recognition did not become known in Oradour before June 
2001. Meyer, Wandel, 433. 
104  Claude Milord, réélu président de l’Association des familles de martyrs, 
L’Echo, 8 April 2002, quoted in Meyer, Wandel, 364. 
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ation shared his position as could be read in the press and seen in a local 
television show.105 In 2007, the question of inviting a German choir to give 
a concert of reconciliation met with resistance, obviously from some mem-
bers of the ANFM. However, toward the German press its president tried to 
dispel this impression.106 In 2007, the president of the ANFM did not attend 
Gerda Hasselfeldt’s reception whereas he did attend it two years later. 
However, he did not send a representative to Dachau in 2010.107 Once more 
in 2011 when the mayor of Dachau attended the commemorations of June 
10 in Oradour the critical voices came from within the ANFM.108 To sum it 
up, although, the president of the ANFM is increasingly more present at the 
receptions organized by the mayor, the Association still remains passive. 
On behalf of the ANFM he tolerated such gatherings, and supports them 
sometimes. The ANFM itself does not, however, act as the initiator of such 
relations with Germany. Even if the association has also shown itself in-
creasingly more open toward Germany, this new openness has to date not 
led to “trustworthy and cooperative relationships” to use Straßner’s words. 
The most intricate question is what underlies this hesitation. Officially 
the president of the ANFM is repeating how difficult and delicate relations 
or efforts of reconciliation are when it comes to Germany. Here he refers 
particularly to those families who never integrated109 the loss of their be-
loved ones, and to mothers who lost their children in the massacre. Fur-
                                                 
105  Meyer, Wandel, 434; Oradour 2004 – Erinnerung von André, http://drafd.org/ 
?Oradour_04_Andre, accessed 23 April 2011. 
106  Sichelstiel, Europahymne; Andreas Sichelstiel, Versöhnung mit Feingefühl, 
Pegnitz-Zeitung, 26-28 May 2007, 11. 
107  Concerning 2007 and 2009: Information given to the author by Elisabeth Woh-
land, member of Gerda Hasselfeldt’s staff; concerning 2010: Speech delivered 
by Raymond Frugier, Visite à Dachau, 22-23 mai 2010 d’une Délégation 
d’Oradour-sur-Glane, given to the author by Raymond Frugier. 
108  Marianne Buisso, 67ème anniversaire du massacre d’Oradour-sur-Glane, 11 
June 2001, http://limousin.france3.fr/info/67eme-anniversaire-du-massacre-d-o 
radour-sur-glane-69163509.html, accessed 15 December 2011. 
109  Milord used the French expression “n’ont jamais fait leur deuil”. Using the 
term “integration” I refer to Hansjörg Znoj, Komplizierte Trauer (Göttingen: 
Hogrefe, 2004), 35, who states: “Mourning is understood as the active integra-
tion of loss.” 
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thermore, he indicates inter-generational discussions within the associations 
but is anxious to assure that the ANFM does not put today’s Germany on a 
par with Nazi-Germany.110 Apart from that, not much is known about the 
critical voices from within the association – names are never given, details 
are never referred to. Most of the members of the ANFM remain in the 
background and do not raise their voice in public.111 Critical voices in pub-
lic are rare as was the statement in 2004 of a survivor whose sister was 
murdered in the church: “I won’t go to the commemoration. The mayor has 
invited Germans!”112 Thus, vital questions concerning those opposed to rec-
onciliation within the ANFM stay in suspense: Are those who oppose nu-
merous? What actually disturbs them and for what reasons? 
The most significant source we can refer to is a discussion on the eve of 
the massacre’s 60th anniversary, organized and broadcasted by the local te-
levision. Apart from mayor Frugier, the ANFM-President and the last two 
miraculeux still alive, Robert Hébras and Jean-Marcel Darthout, several 
women affected by the massacre had also been invited.113 In some of their 
statements it has not only become obvious that the trauma of the massacre 
still has an extremely emotional impact on them, but also the limits of rec-
onciliation and particularly the conflict between cognition and emotion 
have become visible for some of them. Renée Maneus for example survived 
as a child while being hidden with her mother and sisters but lost other 
members of her family. She reported that in theory she of course knew that 
kind Germans exist and in fact, she personally knew at least one. Neverthe-
less, it took a long time for her to accept Germans. What Renée Maneus de-
scribes here can be seen as an example for the limits of the will to reconcile. 
Reconciliation is not something that can rationally be decided upon. Some 
                                                 
110  Questions a ..., ANFM, Bulletin d’information, January 2003, ACMO, 5FP6; 
L’avenir: Avec l’Allemagne?, Le Populaire, 11 June 2004; Sichelstiel, Ver-
söhnung. 
111  Meyer, Wandel, 366. 
112  Béatrice Jérôme, Les élus alsaciens participeront aux ceremonies, Le Monde, 9 
June 2004. 
113  The following statements are taken from: Tulle et Oradour, Table ronde, 
France 3 Limousin, 2004, ACMO, V4.5.2/03. 
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people cannot reconcile even if they would like to.114 Aline Perney, who 
lost her four-year-old child and other family members on June 10, 1944, 
stated that even if she would be a religious person, it would be impossible 
for her to forgive those who killed her beloved ones. Nevertheless, whereas 
others would agree with her when it comes to the perpetrators,115 she is able 
to describe the impossibility to respond positively to those Germans who 
had not been involved in the crime: 
 
“I went to Germany, believe me, when I met them I knew that they weren’t those 
who committed the massacre. They apologized but it was stronger than me, it gave 
me goose flesh, I turned my back on them, I couldn’t. I can’t, it’s impossible.” 
 
Not only forgiving, even accepting a German delegation in Oradour was 
impossible for her. The point of conflict is not how to deal with the perpe-
trators of the massacre among the different actors in Oradour but how to 
deal with the other Germans. Jean-Marcel Darthout, one of the miraculeux, 
is one of those persons who cannot understand why some people cannot 
make a difference: 
 
“Sixty years ago, I know it well, me too I lost people in Oradour! Me too, I have 
mourned the loss of a wife! Me too, I have mourned the loss of a mother! Me too, I 
suffered! However, the Germans who come to Oradour today are not those who 
killed my mother and killed my wife, thus I can receive them. Voilà, [that is] my po-
sition.” 
 
                                                 
114  Thomas Hoppe, Erinnerung, Gerechtigkeit und Versöhnung. Zur Aufgabe 
eines angemessenen Umgangs mit belasteter Vergangenheit – eine sozialethi-
sche Perspektive, in: Versöhnung, Strafe und Gerechtigkeit. Das schwere Erbe 
von Unrechts-Staaten, ed. Michael Bongardt and Ralf K. Wüstenberg (Göttin-
gen: Edition Ruprecht 2010), 29-53, here: 45; Straßner, Versöhnung, 2. 
115  This is even the case for Robert Hébras as he explained during an interview in 
December 2011. Un procès des suspects allemands ‘improbable’, 8 December 
2011, video Réaction de Robert Hébras, rescapé d’Oradour, http://limousin.fr 
ance3.fr/info/un-proces-des-suspects-allemands-improbable-71548619.html?o 
nglet=videos, accessed 17 December 2011. 
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Demeanor and statements made by the President of the ANFM during the 
local television discussion in 2004 revealed his difficult position: What 
looks like an unclear policy of the ANFM since 1995 seems to be the result 
of the difficulty to integrate various opinions.116 Compared with the policy 
of the mayor this policy takes more account of those who are more hesitant. 
As the Association is going ahead slower than the mayor, those members of 
the ANFM who support an active reconciliation policy find a leader in 
Raymond Frugier rather than in the president of their association. As both 
collectives overlap, members of the ANFM can, depending on the subject 
area, switch to another collective relevant to them. When in 2010, the may-
or traveled to Dachau, the ANFM did not send a representative. Neverthe-
less, several of those accompanying the mayor were members of the 
ANFM.117 Since several participants of the delegation have been affected 
by the massacre personally or are members of victims’ families, we can 
conclude that the reconciliation policy of mayor Frugier today is more than 
a symbolic gesture. However, as long as the ANFM does not engage in 
“trustworthy and cooperative relationships” a crucial part of ‘Oradour’ has 
not yet reached the state of reconciliation with Germany. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS: A RIGHT TO IRRECONCILABILITY? 
 
In 1948, Alfons Erb, an advocate of the Franco-German reconciliation and 
the founder of the Maximilian Kolbe-Werk, a relief organization for the sur-
vivors of concentration camps and ghettos, made an interesting observation. 
When Oradour refused the aid of the youth groups to rebuild their home-
town, he criticized the German offer: 
 
“Anyone who reads the above documents, will, profoundly moved, have the burning 
desire to contribute with all his or her might to make amends, especially with Ora-
dour. It is therefore more so understandable that ‘Benjamin’ chose Oradour. Howev-
er, this might have not been a lucky choice. Admittedly, everything that Germans 
                                                 
116  Meyer, Wandel, 434-435, comes to the same conclusion. 
117  This is the case for Robert Hébras and Albert Valade. Valade lost inter alia his 
sister in the massacre. It is also the case for Benoît Sadry, who is both district 
council in Oradour and deputy secretary of the ANFM. 
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can contribute by the suggested actions with regard to outwardly visible reparation, 
is in no proportion to what Germany and the Germans have done (it can all just be a 
humble contribution to reparation as well as to reconciliation). But this disproportion 
would have to emerge in the case of Oradour particularly blunt.”118 
 
Erb pointed out the gap between a crime like the massacre in Oradour and 
every attempt to make up for it. Considering the hesitation of the ANFM 
and especially the difficulties of some of the surviving dependents when it 
comes to Germany, it has to be concluded that Erb’s analysis proved right 
until today. In spite of the multitude of gestures from within civil society, 
the stage of reconciliation the actors aimed at is not fully reached today. In 
this respect, we may consider that the greatest possible commitment does 
not necessarily lead to the greatest possible reconciliation, especially when 
a great deal of suffering lies beneath. 
Different conclusions can be drawn from this result. One could be 
tempted to argue that against the background of such a horrible crime 
“trustworthy and cooperative relationships” are ambitious objectives and 
that a more minimal understanding of reconciliation seems reasonable. In-
deed, in his reflections, Straßner refers inter alia to Tuomas Forsberg, who 
pleads for removing the idea of “mutual harmony or a togetherness of 
souls” from the concept of reconciliation. Instead, he simply refers to the 
“degree of tolerance or absence of severe disputes, between the antago-
nists”. This “can be concretely defined in terms of behavioral criteria such 
as lack of offensive conduct”.119 Nevertheless, in the case of Oradour it 
seems that this operation would mean to neglect the important outcome that 
“trustworthy and cooperative relationships” are impossible and undesirable 
for some of the survivors or surviving dependants. Therefore, the conclu-
sion to be drawn here is a plea for a right to irreconcilability. 
Giving reasons for their commitment or policy, different German actors 
in the Oradour case as well as mayor Frugier stress the link between recon-
ciliation and peace for the future.120 According to Straßner, the possibility 
                                                 
118  Alfons Erb, Oradour gestern und heute, Dokumente und Erwägungen, Doku-
mente, 4, 2 (1948), 86-93, here: 92. 
119  Straßner, Versöhnung, 27. 
120  For example Fritz Körber in Sichelstiel, Europahymne, and Wolfgang Eck-
hardt in Erfahrungsbericht. Raymond Frugier doesn’t use the word reconcilia-
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to reconcile plays a “central role, to make a peaceful living together possi-
ble”.121 Thus, the notion of reconciliation is highly normative. This “moral 
surplus”122 of reconciliation is accompanied by the negative connotation of 
irreconcilability. The necessity of a plea for a right to irreconcilability is 
however closely linked to one specific aspect of reconciliation. As Straßner 
explains, reconciliation processes are “highly complex internal processes 
that cannot be demanded”. Reconciliation, he says, “is always volun-
tary”.123 This voluntary nature has to be emphasized as the victims had been 
robbed of their self-determination by the perpetrators during the massacre. 
Their freedom of decision-making is therefore an essential part of regaining 
this self-determination.124 This is why it is regrettable that the president of 
the ANFM is apparently giving less or little voice in public to those who do 
not agree with the policy of mayor Frugier. 
A further argument for the right to irreconcilability becomes apparent 
if, after having studied Oradour, we put the individual case back into the 
national and international context of Franco-German reconciliation. As we 
have seen in the beginning, Pierre Lellouche used Oradour to symbolize the 
Second World War as a chapter that had been closed by the Franco-German 
reconciliation. Because today the Franco-German friendship can be consid-
ered solid and robust, relevant actors should be able to accept the refusal of 
“trustworthy and cooperative relationships” from those who suffered and 
                                                                                                  
tion but means what Straßner defines as such. For example: Raymond Frugier, 
Le mot du maire, in: Oradour-sur-Glane. Bulletin Municipal, Le Radounaud, 
December 2005, Archive of the municipality of Oradour-sur-Glane. 
121  Straßner, Versöhnung, 23. 
122  Ibid., 33. 
123  Ibid., 28-29. 
124  My thanks go to Prof. Hans Günter Hockerts who drew my attention to this 
important aspect. The American psychiatrist Judith Herman is stressing a simi-
lar point concerning the process of recovery after endured traumas: “The trau-
ma evokes in the victim a sense of powerlessness and loss of control. For the 
recovery it is therefore essential that the patient regains his/her strength and 
the control about him or herself and his life.” Judith Herman, Die Narben der 
Gewalt. Traumatische Erfahrungen verstehen und überwinden (Paderborn: 
Junfermann, 2006), 221. 
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are just not in the position to reconcile. In other words, the French-German 
reconciliation does not need to be crowned by a totally reconciled Oradour. 
Furthermore, concerning the national level it has to be emphasized once 
more that while actors from within civil society committed themselves to 
reconciliation with Oradour, the contribution of the German State was limi-
ted. It is here that signs and gestures are still missing. Last autumn the legal 
authorities of Germany reopened preliminary proceedings in the Oradour 
case 67 years after the crime. Despite of the great dedication of the public 
prosecutor in charge, it is likely that these preliminary proceedings will be 
abandoned, as were the twelve others before.125 At least the crime of Ora-
dour gained once more attention and perhaps thoroughly carried out inves-
tigations are in some way a compensation for some of the survivors and the 
surviving dependants. Apart from that, the German State has not exhausted 
its possibilities to support reconciliation yet. As the generation of the con-
temporary witnesses is nearly gone, there is almost no time left. 
 
                                                 
125  Razzia bei mutmaßlichen SS-Kriegsverbrechern, 5 December 2011, http:// ww 
w1.wdr.de/themen/panorama/massakeroradour100.html, accessed 18 February 
2011; Karen Krüger, Oradour, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 January 
2012. 

From Atonement to Peace? 
Aktion Sühnezeichen, German-Israeli Relations and 
the Role of Youth in Reconciliation Discourse  





In 1958, Protestant church functionary Lothar Kreyssig (1898-1986) found-
ed Aktion Sühnezeichen (ASF, literally: Action Sign of Atonement) as an 
organization that was meant to atone for the National Socialist past. 
Throughout the 1960s, the organization established itself in the Federal Re-
public as a valued civil society actor.1 In the founding appeal with the title 
Wir bitten um Frieden (We ask for Peace), Kreyssig sets the conceptual 
framework for ASF’s reconciliation efforts, which is characterized by the 
ideas of peace, reconciliation, atonement, and forgiveness. The starting 
                                                 
1  In the following decades, the organization received awards for its civil society 
commitment, such as the Theodor Heuss Prize in 1965 and the Buber-Rosen-
zweig-Medaille in 1993. For comprehensive studies about ASF, see Gabriele 
Kammerer, Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste. Aber man kann es einfach tun 
(Göttingen: Lamuv-Verlag, 2008) and Anton Legerer, Tatort: Versöhnung. Ak-
tion Sühnezeichen in der BRD und in der DDR und Gedenkdienste in Österreich 
(Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2011). I would like to thank Aktion Süh-
nezeichen/Friedensdienste e.V., which kindly granted permission to explore its 
archival material in the Evangelisches Zentralarchiv Berlin (hereafter: EZA) and 
its Berlin headquarters. 
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point in Kreyssig’s appeal was the acceptance of guilt for the crimes com-
mitted during the years of the National Socialist regime.2 Therefore, the ap-
peal was specifically directed towards those countries, which, according to 
Kreyssig, had suffered the most from German crimes: Israel, Poland, and 
Russia. They were asked to allow Germans “to do something good for them 
in their own country, with our hands and our means […] as a sign of atone-
ment”.3 
Kreyssig had initially intended to call the organization Aktion Versöh-
nungszeichen (sign of reconciliation), yet became convinced that Sühne-
zeichen (sign of atonement) would be a more fitting term: atonement is of-
fered by or on behalf of the one who has become guilty, whereas reconcilia-
tion already describes the next step of a mutual agreement between two 
sides.4 However, the terms “atonement” (Sühne) and “reconciliation” (Ver-
söhnung) were not kept strictly separate, but rather appeared to be synony-
mous in many texts by ASF functionaries, and also in the reflections of 
ASF volunteers.5 
                                                 
2  According to Legerer, Tatort Versöhnung, 37, a first draft of Kreyssig’s appeal 
written in 1954 did not contain the reference to the extermination of the Jews. 
Legerer further argues that the intrinsic motivation of an acknowledgment of 
guilt sets ASF apart from other German and international Christian reconcilia-
tion and peace services. Legerer, Tatort Versöhnung, 16. 
3  Lothar Kreyssig, Gründungsaufruf der “Aktion Versöhnungszeichen”, recited 
by Kreyssig in Berlin on 30 April 1958, quoted according to Martin Huhn et al., 
Abstand vom bürgerlichen Leben: eine empirische Untersuchung über Freiwil-
lige im Friedensdienst am Beispiel der Aktion Sühnezeichen / Friedensdienste 
(Heidelberg: Wissenschaftlich-Theologisches Seminar der Universität, 1977), 
20. All German quotes were translated by the author. 
4  He became convinced by his friend Erich Müller-Gangloff, director of the Pro-
testant Academy in Berlin. Kammerer, Aktion Sühnezeichen, 14. 
5  See my explorations below; see also the fact that Aktion Sühnezeichen in Eng-
lish would be Action Sign of Atonement, yet the organization officially calls it-
self Action Reconciliation; see furthermore Christine Gundermann, Leiden ohne 
Täter? Deutsch-niederländische Kommunikation über die nationalsozialistischen 
Verbrechen, in: Diktaturüberwindung in Europa. Neue nationale und transnati-
onale Perspektiven, ed. Birgit Hoffmann et al. (Heidelberg: Winter, 2010), 132-
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The founding appeal contains a further aspect that was also to become a 
recurring narrative of ASF’s self-conception and the self-perception of its 
volunteers: the practical reconciliation work was not meant as a form of 
Wiedergutmachung, the official German term for compensation and restitu-
tion payments. For one ASF activist, Wiedergutmachung represented a 
“Wiedergutmachungshandel”,6 a compensation bargain. ASF therefore ex-
plicitly distanced itself and its work from the post-war international politics 
of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who used the compensation payments for 
Israel to support West Germany’s efforts of reintegration into the Western 
community of states.7 ASF activists also explicitly supported the establish-
ment of official diplomatic relations with Israel years before the Federal 
Republic would finally consent to it in 1965.8 
It is noteworthy that Kreyssig, himself a judge in Nazi Germany who 
was imprisoned due to his protest against the so-called “Euthanasia” pro-
gram, explicitly included his generation, even those who had opposed the 
                                                                                                  
150, here: 144-145, who observes this with respect to the activities of ASF in 
Rotterdam. 
6  Abschrift Generationengespräch, EZA 97/63. For a critical stance see also the 
report of volunteer Matthias K., Report 10/72, EZA 97/39.  
7  About the practice of Wiedergutmachung see Die Praxis der Wiedergutma-
chung. Geschichte, Erfahrung und Wirkung in Deutschland und Israel, ed. Nor-
bert Frei et al. (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005). 
8  See paper by the volunteer group Israel IV, EZA 97/45; Legerer, Tatort Versöh-
nung, 211-212, mentions that also the executive board of ASF published a dec-
laration in favour of taking up diplomatic relations. The Federal Republic re-
frained from establishing official diplomatic relations with Israel for several 
years in an attempt to avoid antagonising neighbouring Middle Eastern states. 
This strategy was intended to reduce the risk of an Arab diplomatic recognition 
of the German Democratic Republic, which in turn would have further reduced 
the chances of reuniting the divided Germany. Hannfried von Hindenburg, De-
monstrating Reconciliation. State and Society in West German Foreign Policy 
Toward Israel, 1952-1965 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007). In this context, 
the West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his government did not wish 
to establish official diplomatic relations with Israel, but nevertheless supported 
the establishment of unofficial contacts through West German civil society ac-
tors.  
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Nazi regime, in his statement of guilt.9 He followed the tradition of the 
1945 Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt by the Protestant Church,10 which con-
stituted one example among various attempts in the immediate post-war pe-
riod to reflect on and to acknowledge German guilt, such as the famous uni-
versity lecture by Karl Jaspers Die Schuldfrage (The Question of Guilt).11 
Yet Kreyssig went an important step further by turning rhetoric on guilt and 
reconciliation into his plea for active, hands-on reconciliation work. 
Through this practical work, ASF functionaries12 and the volunteers them-
selves13 sought to ask those who had bitterly suffered under the National 
Socialist regime for forgiveness.  
In his founding appeal, Kreyssig did not specifically call upon young 
Germans to be involved in ASF. Yet de facto, in particular young Germans 
from their late teens to their early thirties followed the appeal to spend sev-
eral months working with ASF. While the ASF functionaries, at least in the 
early years, mainly belonged to the war generation, the actual activists of 
atonement and reconciliation in Israel were to a large degree young Ger-
mans, who had not themselves (or only as children) experienced or sup-
ported the National Socialist regime. Thus, the reconciliation activity of 
                                                 
9  Apart from this statement, the former perpetrators did not play a role in the rec-
onciliation activities of ASF. The organization’s functionaries in the post-war 
years represented a sub-group of German society, as they had mainly belonged 
to the milieu of the Bekennende Kirche (Confessing Church).  
10  See Legerer, Tatort Versöhnung, 28-29, for further references to the Stuttgart 
Declaration of Guilt as background of ASF. 
11  Jaspers differentiates four categories of guilt, of which the metaphorical guilt 
concerns all, not only those who have actually become guilty in a judicial, polit-
ical or moral sense. Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage (Heidelberg: Schneider, 
1946), 31-32, 63-65. With his concept of metaphysical guilt and his plea for ac-
tive purification of guilt, he does not explicitly extend guilt upon the young and 
the following generations. However, given the context of his lecture to students 
at the University of Heidelberg, it can be assumed that he also referred to them.  
12  See the text Probleme der Aktion Sühnezeichen, written by Franz von Hammer-
stein in 1964 or 1965, EZA 93/692; and the text by Otto Schenk, leader of an Is-
rael volunteer group in the early 1960s, for New Year 1964, EZA 97/693. 
13  See report by Klaus K. who explained the idea of his reconciliation activity to a 
fellow Kibbuznik in 1971, EZA 97/391.  
FROM ATONEMENT TO PEACE? | 205 

ASF was understood as a representative form of atonement and reconcilia-
tion that addressed young Germans, but did not involve the former perpe-
trators in its active reconciliation practice.14 The young Germans were not 
only the object of various debates about the role of the young generation for 
reconciliation between Germany and Israel; they also exerted an impact on 
the ways in which reconciliation was discursively perceived and practically 
implemented.  
This chapter explores the role the young generation played in reconcili-
ation practice and in discourse about reconciliation in West Germany and 
Israel in the 1960s and 1970s. It demonstrates that the inclusion of young 
Germans was one of the crucial characteristics of the representative, hands-
on reconciliation approach of ASF and that this inclusion led towards vari-
ous and controversial debates about the young Germans as reconciliation 
activists. The chapter further argues that this integration of young people in 
reconciliation work created a dynamics due to which the reconciliation ac-
tivities of ASF in Israel oscillated between the ideas of atonement and 
peace. In the 1970s, the idea of peace became more and more important, yet 
this shift towards peace never resulted in giving up the idea of atonement 
either.  
In order to develop the arguments, the chapter provides an empirical 
chronological analysis of the activities of ASF in Israel starting in 1961, 
when the first volunteers entered the country and the Eichmann trial took 
place. It further focuses on the 1970s during which the political situation in 
Israel had changed to an extent that the need for peace in the Israeli-Arab 
conflict had become too obvious to be overlooked. The exploration of these 
activities is placed within the wider context of German-Israeli relations 
from the 1950s onwards, and within the various accompanying debates in 
Germany and Israel about ASF activities in particular and about issues of 
reconciliation and guilt in general. The chapter thereby outlines the charac-
                                                 
14  This representative form of atonement and reconciliation was based on the un-
derlying theological concept of ASF. Referring to the New Testament (particu-
larly to 2 Corinthians 5), founding father Lothar Kreyssig highlighted the analo-
gy of the death of Jesus Christ as a representative act of atonement for the sins 
of mankind with the activities of Sühnezeichen volunteers for the sins of their 
fathers. Legerer, Tatort Versöhnung, 62. 
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teristics as well as the problematic and controversial aspects of the reconcil-
iation activities of ASF in Israel. 
 
 
CALLING THE YOUNG GENERATION IN THE 1950S 
 
Before ASF was founded in 1958, various civil society actors had launched 
initiatives in the post-war years in order to create a better understanding be-
tween Germans and (Israeli) Jews. Already in the late 1940s, Societies for 
Christian-Jewish Cooperation were founded, which since 1952 organize a 
so-called Woche der Brüderlichkeit (Week of Fraternalism) in the Federal 
Republic. At the end of the 1950s, German-Israeli study groups (Deutsch-
Israelische Studiengruppen, DIS) were initiated at several West German 
universities. By 1962, DIS groups existed at nine West German universities 
with about 300 members in total.15 Some of them were linked to the Protes-
tant background, such as the one at the Freie Universität Berlin, whose 
foundation was supported by Protestant theologian Helmut Gollwitzer. In 
an article about the German-Israeli study groups, Dieter Fleck explicitly 
placed the activity of the study groups in the context of reconciliation16 and 
he emphasized the role of youth on both sides for overcoming prejudices, 
which, according to him, were “almost not bridgeable”17 for the older gen-
eration. 
Young Germans were fascinated by the Holy Land and by the lifestyle 
of Israeli Kibbutzim and travelled there for shorter work stays and visits 
during the late 1950s and early 1960s.18 These groups connected their quest 
                                                 
15  Dieter Fleck, Deutsch-Israelische Studentenbeziehungen, Israel-Forum. Zeit-
schrift für israelisch-deutsche Beziehungen 4 (1962), 26-28, here: 26. 
16  Ibid., 27 
17  Ibid. 
18  See the report by ten German students in Israel-Forum. Zeitschrift für israe-
lisch-deutsche Beziehungen 6/7 (1959), 3-4. See also Rudolf Weckerling, Le 
Chaim – Zum Leben. Reise nach Israel (Berlin: Käthe Vogt Verlag, 1962) about 
a work and travel stay of students in Israel. For journeys of young Germans in 
the early 1950s, see also Martin Kloke, Israel und die deutsche Linke. Zur Ge-
schichte eines schwierigen Verhältnisses (Frankfurt a.M.: Haag und Herchen, 
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for dealing with the Nazi past with reconciliation activities directed towards 
Israel and Israeli Jews. Young Germans were to play an important role 
within these activities – repeatedly called upon, for instance, by the Pro-
testant theologian provost Heinrich Grüber (1891-1975),19 who was one of 
the founding fathers of the Society for Christian-Jewish Cooperation in 
Berlin and of the group Pro Israel, which supported the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between Germany and Israel during the 1950s.20 Grü-
ber asked the youth to “build a bridge between Israel and Germany, be-
tween Christians and Jews […], as they are not as burdened by the past as 
the elderly”.21 According to Grüber, the young generation’s personal non-
involvement in the past constituted the main factor that qualified them for 
reconciliation activity. As we will see below, the fact that the youth has not 
been personally involved, responsible, or guilty for the past, yet was never-
theless asked to atone and to reconcile for it, also caused irritation.  
Young Germans were not only called upon by members of the war gen-
eration, such as Heinrich Grüber and Lothar Kreyssig, but also became ac-
tive themselves, for instance in 1957 when a Hamburg student proposed a 
gesture of reconciliation towards the Israeli youth on the occasion of a re-
membrance celebration for Anne Frank in Bergen-Belsen. In her talk, the 
Hamburg student explicitly referred to the future, and to the responsibility 
of the young generations to build a joint future by means of reconciliation. 
She furthermore asked the Israeli youth not to reject the hand offered by 
young Germans.22 The Bergen-Belsen meetings were set within a frame-
work of atonement, as the introduction of an atonement mass (Sühne-
Messe) in 1960 demonstrates. According to the newspaper The Jewish Way, 
                                                                                                  
1994), 78, and Inge Deutschkron, Israel und die Deutschen. Zwischen Sentiment 
und Ratio (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), 176-177. 
19  In 1961 Grüber was the only witness for the prosecution from Germany who 
testified against Adolf Eichmann in the Jerusalem trial; in 1964 he was named a 
Righteous among the Nations by Yad Vashem.  
20  For more information on Pro Israel: http://www.deutsch-israelische-gesellsch 
aft.de/dig_information/der_schwierige_begin.htm, accessed 18 December 2011. 
21  Geleitwort by Heinrich Grüber in Weckerling, Le Chaim, 5. 
22  Kloke, Israel und die deutsche Linke, 81. 
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this event brought together 70,000 young people and “united [them] to 
atonement and contemplation”.23 
The importance of the youth for German-Israeli understanding can also 
be found on the Israeli side. For Israeli Prime-Minister David Ben-Gurion 
references to the German youth constituted part of his aim to propagate the 
Federal Republic under Konrad Adenauer to the Israelis as the “new”, the 
“different” or the “other Germany”.24 Ben-Gurion needed this construction 
in order to legitimize and support his policy of accepting compensation 
payments by the Federal Republic, which were highly controversial among 
Israelis.25 Soon after the end of the war, Ben-Gurion’s policy towards West 
Germany was dominated by his wish to consolidate the Israeli state by inte-
grating it into the evolving West European community and by receiving fi-
nancial aid from the Federal Republic. In May 1960, Ben-Gurion and Ade-
nauer met at the hotel Waldorf Astoria in New York City where they dis-
cussed further financial support for Israel. On this occasion, Ben-Gurion 
emphasized his belief that the young Germans, once they would learn about 
the crimes committed under the National Socialist regime, would feel “sor-
row and disgrace”26 for them. Even if Ben-Gurion’s emphasis on the new 
Germany was part of his political calculations – aimed at both sides, his Is-
raeli voters as well as his German political counterparts – he was an im-
portant, though controversial voice in the Israeli public that set the tone cre-
ating an atmosphere of belief in the existence of a new Germany in which 
also other voices would join in.  
 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE EICHMANN TRIAL 
 
On April 11, 1961, the trial against former Nazi functionary SS-Obersturm-
bannführer Adolf Eichmann began before the Jerusalem District Court. The 
Eichmann trial can be regarded as a turning point in Israel and the Federal 
                                                 
23  The Jewish Way, Nov./Dec. 1961, 2.  
24  For corresponding descriptions of the Federal Republic see for instance Tom 
Segev, The Seventh Million. The Israelis and the Holocaust (New York: Holt 
Paperbacks, 1991), 191. 
25  Segev, Seventh Million, 190, 206. 
26  Quoted according to Segev, Seventh Million, 319-320.  
FROM ATONEMENT TO PEACE? | 209 

Republic in terms of their ways of dealing with the past,27 as in both coun-
tries, the first 15 years after the end of the Second World War were largely 
characterized by a silence about the victims of the Holocaust.28 The media 
reception of the trial strongly affected the public discourse on the Holocaust 
in West Germany and Israel, and about the youth in Israel and Germany 
and their relationship to the National Socialist past.  
For many young Israelis the broadcasting of the trial was the first occa-
sion to directly encounter the history and the atrocities of the Holocaust.29 
As Israeli scholars Tom Segev and Idit Zertal have shown, the Eichmann 
trial in 1961 was intended by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and the 
governing Mapai party as a historical lesson to educate the Israeli youth.30 
Within the West German media, the question to what extent the trial would 
help to historically educate the German youth was controversially debated, 
as shown by Peter Krause. While several journalists and publishers opted 
for providing the youth with the unadorned historical facts, others – most 
prominently Henri Nannen, the publisher of the Stern magazine – feared 
                                                 
27  For the public reception of the trial in the German media see Peter Krause, Der 
Eichmann-Prozess in der deutschen Presse (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2002). 
28  A developing intellectual discourse of guilt in the immediate post-war years 
soon faded away. In the Federal Republic from the late 1940s onwards stories 
about the “German victims” were much more publically present than those 
about the “victims of the Germans”. Robert Moeller, War Stories. The Search 
for a Useable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2003). In Israel, the victims of the Holocaust were publically 
pushed aside in order to foster the idea of Jewish resistance against the Holo-
caust. Memorials and memories of Jewish heroes, for instance the resistance 
fighters during the Warsaw Ghetto uprising dominated the public narrative in 
the 1950s, such as the Ghetto Fighters House museum Beit Lohamei Haghetaot, 
founded in 1949, and Yad Vashem – The Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance 
Authority, founded in 1953. In the early 1950s, the Holocaust was primarily un-
derstood as an individual fate and not as a collective experience. Segev, Seventh 
Million, 226. 
29  Idit Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 92. 
30  Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust, 97; Segev, Seventh Million, 338, 351, 353. 
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that a confrontation of the German youth with these facts would overburden 
the young generation with feelings of guilt and shame.31  
In the context of the Eichmann trial Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt 
also reflected on the German youth and its relationship to the past. In her 
controversial Report on the Banality of Evil (1963), Arendt referred to Mar-
tin Buber’s claim that Eichmann’s execution might “serve to expiate the 
guilt felt by many young persons in Germany”.32 Arendt continued with a 
statement about the German youth in which she vehemently rejected public 
expressions of emotions of guilt by the young generation in Germany. 
Within German society, she distinguishes two groups: young Germans who 
feel guilty and those former functionaries who are again in high positions, 
who are guilty but do not feel guilty. Yet she does not appreciate emotions 
of guilt expressed by young Germans, but rather delivers a negative judge-
ment: 
 
“Those young German men and women who every once in a while […] treat us to 
hysterical outbreaks of guilt feelings are not staggering under the burden of the past, 
their fathers’ guilt; rather, they are trying to escape from the pressure of the very 
present and actual problems into a cheap sentimentality.”33 
 
In Arendt’s perspective, feelings of guilt of the young generation are not 
the same as admittance of real guilt and repentance for this guilt. She sug-
gested that an involvement with the past by expressing feelings of guilt on-
ly results in ignoring the problems of the present. Indeed, there are accounts 
in which young Germans referred to sentiments of guilt, which also even 
might have resulted in a motivation to become engaged in reconciliation ac-
tivity in Israel.34 However, the example of ASF volunteers contradicts Ar-
endt’s assumption, since their activities were not only shaped by a wish to 
                                                 
31  Krause, Eichmann-Prozess, 265-277. 
32  Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil (New 
York: Penguin, 2006), 251. 
33  Ibid. 
34  In the course of an essay competition of the journal Israel-Forum, young Ger-
mans Sybille von Foelkersamb and Helga Leonhardt answered the question 
“Why am I interested in Israel” by referring to feelings of guilt. Israel-Forum. 
Zeitschrift für israelisch-deutsche Beziehungen, 11 (1962), 23, and 2 (1963), 25. 
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deal with the past, but also by direct confrontation with the present political 
situation both in Germany and in Israel.  
The Eichmann trial not only had an impact on larger debates about the 
National Socialist past and on the ways in which young people in Israel and 
Germany should be involved in this reflection of the past. The trial also af-
fected reconciliation efforts by young Germans in Israel both in discursive 
and practical terms. During the time of the trial, Protestant student pastor 
Rudolf Weckerling from West Berlin travelled to Israel with a group of 
young German students and young professionals.35 In the light of the trial, 
the fact that the group mainly consisted of young Germans was used as an 
argument both for and against such a trip. Before the group had left Germa-
ny, people in Germany and in Israel had advised the group to postpone their 
stay to the time after the trial; one argument was that young people could be 
overburdened by such a trip, as it would require consciousness of the past 
and a willingness to take over responsibility for the past. Other Israelis, 
however, supported the journey of the young Germans and differentiated 
the Germans in young people looking for ways to reach the Israeli people, 
and in those who were personally guilty.36  
While Weckerling’s group was allowed to pursue its two-month jour-
ney through Israel which also included some work activity in a Kibbutz, the 
trial against Eichmann had postponed the work stay of the first group of 
ASF volunteers in Israel for several months until fall 1961. In January 1961 
the Israeli mission in Germany had declared that it would not support visits 
of German groups because of the trial.37 Another problem was to find an in-
                                                 
35  The trip was organized by the Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft Christlicher Auf-
baulager (Weckerling, Le Chaim, 9) and supported by ASF (Legerer, Tatort 
Versöhnung, 188). Apart from Weckerling himself (born in 1911) and a secre-
tary (born in 1923), the group consisted of young Germans born between 1929 
and 1940, thus the participants were between 32 and 21 years old at the time. 
See the list of participants in Weckerling, Le Chaim, 176. Like Lothar Kreyssig 
and Heinrich Grüber, Weckerling was also former member of the Confessing 
Church. About Weckerling see 100 Jahre Rudolf Weckerling. Festschrift, ed. 
Freyja Eberding et al. (Berlin: Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste e.V., 
2011). 
36  Weckerling, Le Chaim, 10. 
37  Legerer, Tatort Versöhnung, 202. 
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stitution or a Kibbutz that would host the ASF group for a period of several 
months. Yet thanks to a combination of individual initiatives and institu-
tional requests ASF volunteers were finally allowed into the country by in-
vitation of the Kibbutz Urim in the Negev desert.38 This first work stay was 
preceded by finally unsuccessful plans of the ASF headquarters together 
with the Catholic Una Sancta Movement and Catholic Church functionaries 
to build a triconfessional atonement monastery (trikonfessionelles Sühne-
kloster) in Jerusalem, which was meant to bring together Jews, Catholics, 
and Protestants.39 While the Sühnekloster would have emphasized the spir-
itual aspect of atonement and reconciliation, the work stays stood for the 
practical reconciliation concept of ASF.  
In early October 1961 the first eleven volunteers finally entered Israel 
to conduct social work in the Kibbutz Urim in the Negev desert. More vol-
unteers followed in the next years, and by 1968, twelve ASF groups, each 
consisting of around 15 volunteers – mostly young professionals, but also 
university and school students – had worked in various other Kibbutzim 
and in social institutions.40 For ASF volunteers, their practical work and the 
opportunity to live with Israelis for several months was a means to demon-
strate their reconciliation efforts.41 This hands-on approach of reconciliation 
activity and the fact that the volunteers did not complain about, and partly 
even volunteered for hard work was also valued by people who became to 
know the volunteers as working colleagues.42 Yet, the developing images of 
                                                 
38  For a description of the preceding negotiations between various ASF functionar-
ies and Israeli institutions and individuals in order to set up the start of the first 
volunteer group see Legerer, Tatort Versöhnung, 200-205; Ansgar Skriver, Ak-
tion Sühnezeichen. Brücken über Blut und Asche (Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag, 
1962), 120-130; Kammerer, Aktion Sühnezeichen, 78-79.  
39  Legerer, Tatort Versöhnung, 189-199.  
40  Legerer, Tatort Versöhnung, 490, provides an overview over the projects of the 
twelve groups up to 1968. Most of the activities were of a social nature, while at 
three sites, a home for the blind in Jerusalem, a children’s home in Alyn and in 
Kibbutz Bachan, ASF volunteers were involved in building activities. 
41  Report 32/71, Dieter H., August 1971, EZA 97/391; Report 23/71, Klaus K., Ju-
ly 1971, EZA 97/391. 
42  See the encounter between Christel Eckern and her Kibbutz colleague Ada, re-
counted in Christel Eckern, Die Straße nach Jerusalem. Ein Mitglied der “Akti-
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German volunteers also depended on the circumstances in which they 
worked and on the people they met. Members of the ASF working group in 
Kibbutz Nir Eliahu in 1962 realized there was no interest among their Kib-
butz chaverim – among them many young Israelis who had only heard of 
the Nazi crimes in the context of the Eichmann trial – to talk about German 
guilt or about the specific atonement task of the ASF group.43 According to 
one observer the young Israelis lived for the future and for a new society,44 
and therefore much less in the past.  
Even if the ASF volunteers were not the first Germans working in Isra-
el,45 their presence provoked public interest within the Israeli media reach-
ing beyond the walls of the Kibbutzim in which the volunteers worked. In 
his article in the newspaper Jerusalem Post, the journalist Ben-Adi ex-
plained the main goals of the organization to his readers, by also pointing 
                                                                                                  
on Sühnezeichen” berichtet über Leben und Arbeit in Israel (Essen: Ludgerus-
Verlag, 1962), 68-69. See also the letter of the director of the Ahava Home for 
Children and Youth in Haifa who appreciated the work of the ASF volunteers in 
her institution. Ullmann to von Hammerstein and Schenk, 14 August 1964, EZA 
97/693. See also letter by Jehuda Riemer to the editor of the New York Times 
about the participation of Sühnezeichen volunteers in the work and social life in 
Kibbutz Urim, 1 December1962, quoted according to Geschichte(n) erleben. 
Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste in Israel 1961-2011, ed. Aktion Sühnezei-
chen (Berlin: Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste e.V., 2011), 24, and the ar-
ticle Some do repent! by Jehuda Riemer, Jewish Frontier, 17 July 1962. 
43  Diary entry, 23 June 1962, EZA 97/395. 
44  Diary entry, 1 July 1962, EZA 97/395. As the number of Kibbutzim that would 
allow Germans to stay and work with remained limited – according to a report 
from 1965 only 7 out of around 240 Kibbutzim accepted German youth groups 
– it even happened that once the young people from Germany arrived, the Kib-
butz members had already lost interest in them, as there had been so many other 
youth groups before them. This frustrating experience was reported by a youth 
group from the Bonn Society for Christian-Jewish Cooperation. Bericht über ei-
ne Begegnungs- und Studienreise nach Israel, 54, Politisches Archiv des Aus-
wärtigen Amts (hereafter: PA-AA) B36/193. 
45  Apart from those already mentioned, Legerer, Tatort Versöhnung, 202, refers to 
groups of the Christlicher Friedensdienst and of the Herz-Jesu-Orden who 
helped building streets. 
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out it was young Germans who sought to take over collective responsibility 




AFTER THE ARRIVAL: GERMAN AND ISRAELI DEBATES 
ON THE ROLE OF YOUTH FOR RECONCILIATION 
 
The young German reconciliation activists operated within various realms 
of political and societal tensions in Germany and Israel, tensions that 
evolved out of diverging assessments of the past and the present. Through-
out the 1960s, discourses about German youth continued in Germany and 
Israel, now often explicitly linked to the presence and the activities of ASF 
volunteers in Israel Kibbutzim, social institutions, and at Yad Vashem. 
Both the term atonement and the idea of reconciliation connected with the 
fact that the young generation was to pursue atonement and reconciliation 
on behalf of their fathers raised debate in both countries and among various 
social groups, producing positions that ranged from consent to objection.  
Even if the young Germans provoked public attention, this did not mean 
that Israelis who commented on their presence would easily regard them as 
protagonists of the “new Germany”, as propagated by Ben-Gurion. The Is-
raeli journalist Michael Schaschar from the newspaper Haaretz, for in-
stance, remained reluctant in his evaluation of the young Germans. He had 
visited the ASF group in Kibbutz Hasolelim in July 1964 and engaged the 
volunteers in a talk about their worldviews, about their parents, and their 
knowledge of the past. He particularly remarked that the relaxed and open 
atmosphere of the talk changed when he asked the young Germans about 
their own parents, which only lead to vague answers. According to Scha-
schar, the young Germans acknowledged the past crimes, but they referred 
to the perpetrators as to an anonymous part of the population. The journalist 
remained critical and refrained from praising the reconciliation activity of 
the volunteers. He also wanted to know whether the young Germans be-
lieved that a new Hitler could rise in today’s Germany. The answers did not 
                                                 
46  Germans work in the Negev, Jerusalem Post, 9 January 1962; see also Skriver, 
Aktion Sühnezeichen, 135, who refers to an article in the Hungarian newspaper 
Nj-Kelet published in fall 1961. 
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satisfy Schaschar and he even concluded his article with the remark that a 
large part of the German population still did not express moral regret for 
the past.47  
While many German and Israeli politicians regarded the exchange of 
ambassadors between Germany and Israel in summer 1965 as an important 
step for the bilateral relations between the two countries, sentiments among 
the Israeli population were not that unanimous. The German magazine Der 
Spiegel, for instance, reported in July 1965 that many Israelis feared that 
the Germans would see the exchange as a “final act of reconciliation”, 
while for them “the atonement of the sons is not yet finished”.48 An open 
rejection of everything connected with Germany was particularly common 
amongst the conservative and orthodox milieu in Israel.49 Politicians such 
as the founder of the conservative Herut party Menachem Begin, whose 
parents had been murdered during the Holocaust, counteracted German-
Israeli relations for decades, also on the level of cultural exchange.50 Yet 
one particular German of the young generation also earned Begin’s respect. 
This was the “Nazi hunter” Beate Klarsfeld (*1939). In a recent interview, 
Klarsfeld explained her good relationship with Menachem Begin: she ar-
gues that Begin was impressed by the fact that young Germans like her de-
monstrated their responsibility for the crimes committed under the National 
Socialist past.51 
Negative or sometimes even hostile attitudes towards the German rec-
onciliation activities were not limited to elderly people or Holocaust survi-
vors. Young Israelis had their problems with the presence of Germans seek-
                                                 
47  Michael Schaschar, Sie kamen, die Verbrechen ihrer Väter zu sühnen, Haaretz, 
24 July 1964, German translation in EZA 97/45. 
48  Der Spiegel, 28 July 1965, 50. 
49  Report by German ambassador von Puttkamer, 13 April 1972, 3, PA-AA, AV 
Neues Amt 2.357. 
50  Segev, Seventh Million, 382-383, argues that the closer the relations between 
Germany and Israel became on the diplomatic, political and economic level, the 
more those who were against reconciliation with Germany concentrated on agi-
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51  Interview Klarsfeld with Esther Schapira, Hessischer Rundfunk, Sonntagsge-
spräch, 30 January 2011.  
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ing reconciliation, too.52 In November 1966, German ambassador Rolf 
Pauls reported on a demonstration of Israeli students belonging to the con-
servative Herut party in front of the German embassy in Tel Aviv. The stu-
dents showed banners reading, “There is no other Germany” or “No friend-
ship with the murderers of six million Jews”.53 Yet these open rejections 
did not remain uncommented among Israeli politicians. Knesset member 
David Hacohen, for instance, criticized the young Israeli’s unwillingness to 
support the Germans in their efforts to overcome the National Socialist 
past.54  
Within the West German society of the 1960s, the reconciliation activi-
ties of ASF and other organizations provoked ambivalent attitudes, reach-
ing from support to indifference55 and open rejection; this ambivalence doc-
uments the existence of a highly fragmented West German society with re-
spect to the issue of how to deal with the Nazi past in the present. Hostile 
antipathy towards ASF was expressed from notoriously known revisionist 
right-wing circles in their newspapers and in anonymous hate letters that 
reached the ASF headquarters.56 Even though ASF evolved from a Pro-
                                                 
52  At the occasion of the Eichmann Trial, for instance, German observers reported 
back to Germany that many young Israelis were reluctant towards Germany and 
the Germans. Report by Gerhard von Preuschen, 13, PA-AA, B36/541. 
53  Report German Embassy to Foreign Office, PA-AA, AV Neues Amt 2.357. 
German ambassador Pauls – a former decorated Wehrmacht officer – was, at 
least at the beginning of his service in Israel, a controversial person for many Is-
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Amt und die Vergangenheit. Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der 
Bundesrepublik (München: Karl Blessing Verlag, 2010), 500-502. 
54  See the German translation of Hacohen’s statement in PA-AA, AV Neues Amt 
2.357. 
55  In October 1963, for instance, four ASF functionaries traveled through Lower 
Saxony, Hamburg and Bremen in order to give lectures about the organization’s 
work. As newspaper articles document, there was only little interest in these 
events. Kein Interesse für die Sühne, Hamburger Echo, 5 October 1963; Nur 
fünf kamen zum “Sühnezeichen”, Landeszeitung für die Lüneburger Heide, 21 
October 1963. 
56  Deutschland muss sühnen – sühnen – sühnen, Deutsche National Zeitung, 10 
May 1963; letters to the editors of Schlesische Rundschau and Deutsche Natio-
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testant background – which means that Protestant church functionaries and 
pastors had not only signed Kreyssig’s founding appeal, but also subse-
quently supported the organization idealistically and financially – ASF and 
its work in Israel were by no means equally praised in all parts of the 
Protestant church circles. In his Report from the Biblical Land in the Evan-
gelisches Gemeindeblatt München (Protestant Church Newspaper Munich) 
journalist Helmut Winter wrote in November 1966 about his experiences in 
Israel and the reception of the work done by ASF. He raised doubts whether 
the activities of the young Germans in Israel were at all worthwhile. Ac-
cording to Winter, the Israelis were much more interested in receiving Ger-
man weapons, and to see former Nazis punished than to acknowledge and 
approve of the reconciliation work done by the ASF volunteers. He even 
concluded that Jews would lack understanding for the Christian ideas of 
reconciliation and forgiveness.57  
A critical stance towards reconciliation activities in Israel in general and 
those of ASF in particular was not limited to the right-wing background or 
to critical Protestant circles that raised doubts whether Christians and Jews 
could really speak the same language when it comes to reconciliation. Cri-
tique also arose from other parts of West German society. It was the con-
nection of youth, guilt, and atonement that caused problems of understand-
ing, particularly among young Germans. In a letter to the editor an anony-
mous reader of the Neue Illustrierte Köln from 1964 declared:  
 
“Recently, I was asked to participate in an ‘atonement trip’ to Israel. I refused. I 
have nothing against the Jews. But I also never did them any harm. Thus, what 
should I atone for? […] What do we have to do with the sins of our fathers? I am fed 
up with this talk about our guilt! I am not aware of being guilty of anything. […] 
Why should we atone when the real perpetrators of the Third Reich lead a rather 
happy life as judges, politicians, and globetrotters!”58 
                                                                                                  
nal Zeitung, both in EZA 97/983. The anonymous writer of a postcard that 
reached ASF in den mid-1960s, calls the ASF functionaries “Volksverräter” and 
one anonymous hate letter was even written on grey toilet paper. See collection 
in EZA 97/582. 
57  Helmut Winter, Bericht aus biblischem Land III, Evangelisches Gemeindeblatt 
München, 27 November 1966, 8. 
58  Neue Illustrierte Köln, 43, 1964. 
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The author of the letter refused to be held responsible for “the sins of our 
fathers”, particularly when the perpetrators were still alive, and thereby 
pointed at a generational conflict. Linked with a dissent against the West 
German politics towards Israel, this attitude was also widespread among the 
young Left in Germany, which becomes apparent in a statement by trainee 
lawyer Eberhard Sommer who wrote to author Günter Grass in June 1967. 
In his letter, Sommer explicitly rejected the idea that the older generation 
would transfer their guilt to the young Germans.59 These critical attitudes 
towards an involvement of young Germans in activities of reconciliation in 
and for Israel, centred on the same issues also young German reconciliation 
activists in Israel – those working for ASF as well as others – dealt with: 
the question of why the young generation should be involved in overcom-
ing the past by means of reconciliation activities as representatives for 
those who had actually committed crimes in the past and had actually be-
come guilty?  
When in April and May 1965 a group of young Germans organized by 
the Gesellschaft für christlich-jüdische Zusammenarbeit in Bonn travelled 
to Israel, the young people aimed at building personal contacts with Israelis 
and also expressed their hope to contribute towards reaching mutual under-
standing.60 During their trip, various occasions occurred during which the 
young Germans were not only faced with the German past, but at which 
they came to discuss about this past and their own relationship to it. The 
discursive framework in which these discussions took place was grounded 
in talks of the young Germans with Israelis about the German politics of 
Wiedergutmachung payments and about the diplomatic recognition of the 
state of Israel through the Federal Republic. These talks apparently trig-
gered various and controversial debates about the West German policy to-
wards Israel and about the role the German youth should play in the Ger-
man-Israeli relations. Did young Germans have a specific responsibility re-
sulting from the annihilation of the Jews and did this responsibility neces-
sarily result in a particular political attitude towards Israel? Discussions 
reached a point at which the leaders of the study group proposed a model 
for further discussion according to which the youth was regarded responsi-
                                                 
59  Letter in Kloke, Israel und die deutsche Linke, 119.  
60  The group wrote a lengthy report about their Begegnungs- und Studienreise, 
which can be found in PA-AA, B36/193. 
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ble, not based on an individual guilt, but through the “concrete, historically 
imposed obligation of all Germans to publically rehabilitate the German 
name”.61 Yet this model was not accepted by all discussants and remained a 
point of open debate, as some regarded the answer as being too obvious, 
too often expressed in a society that was not open about the past.  
A constant debate about these questions can also be found among the 
volunteers and functionaries of ASF. As already mentioned above, texts 
written by ASF functionaries suggest that the personal non-involvement of 
the ASF volunteers in the Nazi regime was understood as a representative 
form of atonement. Yet as Anton Legerer explored, the concepts of atone-
ment and reconciliation in the programmatic texts were not clearly de-
fined.62 This might have been one reason for a constant debate about these 
terms among young ASF volunteers. Particularly the question of how to 
bring together the threefoldness of guilt, atonement, and youth was at the 
core of ongoing debate and reflection. This question was also closely con-
nected with the practical reconciliation work of the volunteers. In October 
1964, a group of volunteers working in Kibbutz Hasolelim visited the ghet-
to exhibition in Lochamei Haghetaot, which they described in their group 
diary as an intense experience that made them feel ashamed and sorry for 
the past. In this situation, the group that until then had several encounters 
with Israelis who all had expressed their appreciation for the young Ger-
mans, started to doubt whether they could at all atone for the past.63 Asked 
by an Israeli student magazine to comment on the motivation for his recon-
ciliation activity, a member of the same volunteer group explained that 
he/she as a German felt affected by what the German people had done dur-
ing the National Socialist regime. In this context, the volunteer connected 
the guilt of the Germans with the practical reconciliation activity of ASF 
and explained: “I have to take over the guilt of the fathers […]. Guilt de-
mands atonement and I have to go to the people and tell them how sorry I 
am about what has happened”.64 The volunteer furthermore explicitly re-
                                                 
61  Ibid., 31. 
62  Legerer, Tatort Versöhnung, 54. 
63  Diary entry of the group Israel IV, 23 October 1964, EZA 97/396.  
64  Diary entry of the group Israel IV, 2 February 1965, EZA 97/396. 
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ferred to his activities in Israel as a representative activity for the parents’ 
generation.65  
ASF volunteers also connected their reflections about their role as rec-
onciliation activists in Israel with political aspects. In July 1966, the volun-
teer group criticized that the West German ASF functionaries did not com-
ment upon current political developments in the German-Israeli relations in 
their regular newsletters. According to the volunteers, these newsletters 
contained “only pious words” and were “only about the past”.66 The volun-
teers argued that the lessons from the past were useless if they were not ap-
plied to the present situation: “Should we not see the past in its connection 
with the present and the future?”67 The fact that the idea of atonement and 
the integration of young people for pursuing atonement was and remained 
problematic in the understanding of the reconciliation activity of ASF not 
only was a repeatedly discussed topic among volunteers, but can also be 
seen in statements by those functionaries and supporters of the organization 
who through their theoretical reflections sought to set a framework for the 
reconciliation work of the volunteers.68  
                                                 
65  This issue of representative reconciliation activity was also repeatedly reconsid-
ered by ASF functionary and author Volker von Törne (1934-1980), for whom 
the question of generational responsibility and guilt also played a personal role. 
Von Törne was the son of an SS soldier, a fact he also reflected upon in his writ-
ings and his poetry. See his texts and poems as well as the speeches delivered on 
the occasion of his funeral in Volker von Törne, Zwischen Geschichte und Zu-
kunft. Aufsätze – Reden – Gedichte (Berlin: Aktion Sühnezeichen / Friedens-
dienste e.V., 1981), which document the strong feelings of guilt that constituted 
a central topic for him.  
66  Diary of the group Israel VII, 22 July 1966, EZA 97/399. 
67  Ibid. 
68  See the text Was heißt Sühnezeichen? about atonement and guilt by the director 
of the West German ASF branch Franz von Hammerstein, in EZA 97/10. While 
Hammerstein wanted to adhere to the idea of atonement, theologian and ASF 
supporter Helmut Gollwitzer declared in a letter from August 1966 that one 
cannot urge the young people to always solidarize with the guilt of their fathers, 
but that they have a natural desire for looking more towards the future. Goll-
witzer concluded that the work of the organization must therefore be extended. 
Gollwitzer to K. Scharf, August 1966, EZA 97/10. 
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A critical (self-) evaluation of the connection of reconciliation and the 
youth is largely missing in 1960s diplomatic and political rhetoric of Ger-
man-Israeli relations, in which a focus on youth and the young generation 
was also much prevalent.69 There, the young generation was addressed as 
an important actor for German-Israeli cooperation, but without reflections 
about why young people should take up this role, and without a critical as-
sessment of the inherent problematic aspects. In the context of establishing 
a German-Israeli commission that coordinated German-Israeli youth ex-
change, the German Minister for Youth, Family and Health Käte Strobel 
wrote to her Israeli counterpart Zalman Aran in 1969,  
 
“I very much hope that we can achieve a partnership between the young generations 
of our countries. We would like to attract the young people to become engaged with 
reconciliation and peace by having a clear knowledge about guilt and the past.”70  
 
To highlight the importance of the young generation for further developing 
German-Israeli relations and for reconciliation became a common theme in 
the diplomatic exchange between German and Israeli politicians. When 
German ambassador Jesco von Puttkamer presented his credentials in Jeru-
salem to Israeli president Zalman Sbazar in May 1971, they both put spe-
cial emphasis on the continuation of the German-Israeli youth exchange. 
Sbazar made explicit that he shared Puttkamer’s aspiration that through the 
young generation in Germany “the good-will to open new pages in the rela-
                                                 
69  This also resulted in practical political consequences in the sense that there were 
various efforts on the German and the Israeli sides to establish and institutional-
ize a German-Israeli youth exchange, which was established already in the mid-
1950s through visits of student groups, but became more institutionalized only 
after official diplomatic relations were established in 1965. For the history of the 
German-Israeli youth exchange see for instance Irma Haase, Deutsch-Israe-
lischer Jugendaustausch, in: 20 Jahre Deutsch-Israelische Beziehungen, ed. 
Deutsch-Israelischer Arbeitskreis für Frieden im Nahen Osten e.V. (Berlin: 
Deutsch-Israelischer Arbeitskreis für Frieden im Nahen Osten e.V., 1985), 85-
135; Der deutsch-israelische Dialog. Teil III: Kultur, Vol. 8, ed. Rolf Vogel 
(München: K.G. Saur, 1990), 244-374. 
70  Strobel to Aran, 4 December 1969, PA-AA, AV Neues Amt 2.232. 
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tions between the two peoples may be promoted”.71 The political function 
of young German reconciliation activists in Israel became also apparent al-
ready before the official establishment of the German embassy in Tel Aviv 
in 1965. The ASF building Haus Pax in Jerusalem had already previously 
served as a meeting point for non-accredited diplomats and ASF mem-
bers.72 Moreover, after Rolf Pauls was officially appointed German ambas-
sador in Israel, he met there with ASF volunteer groups in order to discuss 
the German-Israeli relations and his plans as ambassador.73   
This positive attitude towards young Germans who traveled to and wor-
ked in Israel can also be found within the discourse in Israel. In the early 
1960s, a volunteer group of ASF met David Ben-Gurion personally, who 
had retired in the meantime, and who called the young volunteers “ambas-
sadors for Israel in Germany”.74 Ben-Gurion’s perspective signifies the po-
litical impact that he attached to the ASF volunteers, as in his eyes they 
should help to support Israel and the Israeli case back home in Germany. In 
addition, other ASF supporters in Israel – such as the religious philosopher 
Martin Buber – argued that the main task of the ASF volunteers was not 
situated in Israel, but at home in Germany. When Otto Schenk, the leader of 
a volunteer group, visited Buber in his Jerusalem home in November 1963, 
he asked him what the young German volunteer could do once returned to 
Germany. Buber’s stance on this issue was that reconciliation with the peo-
ple of Israel was not a question of German-Jewish relations but a mere Ger-
man issue. For him, the young Germans were responsible for bringing 
about reconciliation among Germans, not between Germans and Jews.75 
Buber therefore rejected the idea of atonement and reconciliation of the 
young generation with Israelis or Jews, but he emphasized the need that the 
young generation was able to do something for the inner reconciliation 
                                                 
71  Inaugural speech von Puttkamer and reply by the President of Israel, PA-AA, 
AV Neues Amt 2.353. 
72  Legerer, Tatort Versöhnung, 21. 
73  For instance, diary of the group Israel VIII, 19-25 November 1966, EZA 
97/399; Dietrich P., Kritische Stellungnahme zum Einsatz der Sühnezeichen-
gruppe Israel IX, 25 October 1967, EZA 97/710. 
74   Otto Schenk, Als Deutscher in Jerusalem, EZA 97/693. 
75  Abschrift Protokoll von Otto Schenk über das Gespräch mit Martin Buber, No-
vember 1963, EZA 97/692. 
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within German society.76 Buber and Ben-Gurion were not the only Israelis 
whom the young Germans encountered and who emphasized that the main 
task for their reconciliation activities was not in Israel, but in Germany.77 
The idea that young Germans who had visited or lived in Israel could exert 
a positive impact on German society was not limited to the young volun-
teers of ASF as an article in the German-speaking Israeli newspaper Jedioth 
Chadashoth from April 1964 demonstrates, highlighting the role of German 
visitors to Israel for fighting against antisemitism in Germany.78 
Young Germans in general and ASF volunteers in particular had also 
other prominent supporters in Israel. One of them was the author and jour-
nalist Schalom Ben-Chorin (born in Munich in 1913 as Fritz Rosenthal), 
who placed the German youth at the centre of one of his articles in Jedioth 
Chadashoth in June 1964. In his article, Ben-Chorin recounted an interview 
with Gideon Hausner, the attorney general and chief prosecutor in the Eich-
mann trial. The starting point for the interview was a public statement by 
Hausner in which he negated Ben-Gurion’s claim that there is an “other 
Germany”. Ben-Chorin did not consent with Hausner in this point and en-
gaged him in a discussion about the German youth as a representative of 
this new Germany. In the end Ben-Chorin found a consensus with Hausner 
and both agreed that the efforts of German youth for a new Germany are to 
be acknowledged and supported.79  
                                                 
76  This aspect was also emphasized by Helmut Gollwitzer. In 1978, he stressed the 
special responsibility of young Germans – who deliver those signs of atone-
ments their parents were not able to perform – for securing a positive develop-
ment of Germany in present and future times. Helmut Gollwitzer, Die Aktualität 
der Aktion Sühnezeichen – einige theologische Anmerkungen, zeichen, Septem-
ber 1978, 5. 
77  See reports about conversations between volunteers and Israelis in the diary of 
group Israel IV, 2 June 1964, EZA 97/396.  
78  Die Motive des neu-deutschen Antisemitismus, Jedioth Chadashoth, 10 April 
1964. 
79  Gibt es kein anderes Deutschland?, Jedioth Chadashoth, 19 June 1964. Ben-
Chorin and his wife Avital backed the activities for Jewish-Christian under-
standing by Protestant church circles in various ways; they were among the Is-
raeli friends of ASF, and Ben-Chorin used his publicity to campaign for the 
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Even the Israeli parliament Knesset discussed about the issue of Ger-
man youth activities.80 In a Knesset discussion in March 1966, Knesset 
member David Hacohen took a positive stance towards young Germans. He 
showed himself convinced that many young Germans were ashamed of the 
crimes of the parent generation. He also made clear that these crimes could 
not count as a valuable reason to reject activities of young Germans in Isra-
el. For Hacohen, the fact that the German youth showed emotions of dis-
gust and shame regarding the deeds of their fathers laid the ground to ac-
cept their presence in Israel and their wish to become friends of Israel by 
compensating for the past.81  
Asher Ben Nathan, the first Israeli ambassador in the Federal Republic, 
also belonged to those Israeli politicians to whom it was important to ad-
dress and to make contacts with the youth.82 While serving as an ambassa-
dor in Bonn, Ben Nathan frequently met with young Germans and toured 
through various West German universities, giving talks and participating in 
discussions.83 He also supported German-Israeli youth exchange, advertis-
ing this idea in the Israeli public, for instance in an interview with the Israe-
li newspaper Jedioth Achronoth in April 1966. In fact, for Ben Nathan the 
exchange between young Germans and Israelis was much more desirable 
                                                                                                  
German youth and its good intentions in Israel. Ablehnung auf sich nehmen, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 March 2011. 
80  ASF volunteer Albrecht E. mentions a poll in the Knesset about his ASF group 
in a letter to his mother from 2 May 1963, EZA 97/712. Inge Deutschkron refers 
to a Knesset debate in January 1962 after Protestant pastor Dieckmann had vis-
ited Israel; Dieckmann had used this occasion to discuss with Israeli school stu-
dents and their parents the Jewish-German relations and had then asked the 
young Israelis to establish an exchange of letters with young Germans. Deutsch-
kron, Israel und die Deutschen, 185. 
81  German translation of Hacohen’s statement, PA-AA, AN Neues Amt 2.357. 
82  Asher Ben Nathan, Herausforderungen im Schatten der Geschichte, in: Israel 
und Deutschland. Dorniger Weg zur Partnerschaft. Die Botschafter berichten 
über vier Jahrzehnte diplomatische Beziehungen (1965-2005), ed. Asher Ben 
Natan et al. (Köln: Böhlau, 2005), 24-41, here: 31. 
83  Ibid., 36-38. At the time of the student revolts in the Federal Republic, Ben Na-
than was frequently met by students in tumultous situations in which he was ac-
cused as the ambassador of the aggressive state of Israel. 
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than, for instance, partnerships between German and Israeli towns as they 
would, he claimed, interfere with the sentiments of Holocaust survivors in 
Israel.84 Young Germans, in contrast, would not harm these survivors due 
to their presence. Once back in Israel, Ben Nathan continued to support ac-
tivities of young Germans in Israel and he sought understanding for their 
good intentions among Israelis, particularly among young Israelis.  
However, it is noteworthy that even those Israelis who emphasized the 
positive character of the German youth and its role for German-Israeli rela-
tions, such as Ben Nathan, did so without explicitly referring to the activi-
ties of the young Germans as acts of “reconciliation”. Ben Nathan once 
wrote, “instead of reconciliation I was talking about understanding”.85 This 
also was the case among decided supporters of the activities of ASF. In 
November 1962 the American magazine Time had published an article 
about German ASF volunteers in Israel. In response to this publication, Je-
huda Riemer, leader of Kibbutz Urim in which ASF volunteers had worked, 
wrote to the editors of Time magazine: “The dreadful memories of the Hit-
ler period and the successful survival of undiscovered Nazis in present-day 
Germany (both East and West) prevent a reconciliation of the German and 
Jewish Peoples.”86 Nevertheless, Riemer explicitly appreciated and sup-
ported personal efforts of young Germans to help bridging the gap the past 
had opened between the older generations. 
 
 
IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE SIX-DAYS-WAR 
 
With the Six-Days-War in 1967, the debates surrounding guilt, responsibil-
ity, reconciliation, and atonement continued, yet were supplemented with 
intensifying discourses about the notion of peace. Within West German so-
ciety, the Six-Days-War constituted a turning point with respect to the over-
all attitude towards Israel. On the one side, there were increasingly radical-
ized left-wing students to whom Israel constituted the oppressive occupier, 
while the Palestinians were regarded as the suppressed or the “victims of 
                                                 
84  Interview Asher Ben Nathan with Jedioth Acharonoth, 15 April 1966, German 
translation in PA-AA, AV Neues Amt 2.357. 
85  Ben Nathan, Herausforderungen, 30.  
86  Riemer to Time Magazine, 1 December 1962, EZA 97/708.  
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the victims”.87 On the other side, there was an increasing support for Israel 
and for its military successes among conservative Germans. This support 
was publically articulated through the West German Springer publishing 
house, owned by Axel Springer who regarded reconciliation with Israel a 
moral duty.88 
Functionaries and Israel volunteers of ASF took a position between  
these extreme poles. Reports demonstrate that the volunteers’ stance on Is-
rael spanned from Israel-romanticism, pro-Israeli attitudes and a strong 
identification with Israel’s politics throughout the 1960s, to emerging am-
bivalence and criticism in the late 1960s and early 1970s.89 The conflict be-
tween Israel and its Arab neighbours, and the need for peace in the Middle 
East region were felt by ASF volunteers in their practical daily work in 
Kibbutzim and social institutions,90 and in their every-day experiences.91  
                                                 
87  For this complex relationship between the German Left and Israel see Kloke, Is-
rael und die deutsche Linke.  
88  Unternehmensgrundsätze of the Axel Springer publishing house, http://www.ax 
elspringer.de/artikel/Grundsaetze-und-Leitlinien_40218.html, accessed 20 May 
2011. Springer’s personal engagement in reconciliation between Germans and 
Israeli Jews still raises ambivalent evaluation, as the conference Axel Springer. 
Juden, Deutsche und Israelis (Frankfurt a.M., 27-28 March 2011) demonstrated.  
89  A romantic view on Israel can particularly be found among the first Israel volun-
teers in the early 1960s, for instance in Eckern, Straße nach Jerusalem; Legerer, 
Tatort Versöhnung, 215-219. Those volunteers who had experienced the Six-
Days-War in Israel even shared the enthusiasm for Israel’s military success 
when they enthusiastically wrote on 28 June 1967 about the war as a new strug-
gle of existence of the Jews in Israel who mainly belonged to the survivors of 
the Holocaust. Sühnezeichen, Geschichte(n) erleben, 26. 
90  The diary of the volunteer group Israel VI provides a detailed account about a 
struggle between a group of Arab farmers and the Kibbutzniks of Kibbutz 
Bachan about the use of land. Diary entry of the group Israel VI, 21-23 July 
1965, EZA 97/398. See also diary entry of group Israel II, 9 February 1962, 
EZA 97/737. See furthermore the report by Klaus K., EZA 97/391, who men-
tions that his Israeli counterparts were not much interested in his wish to atone 
for the past, as the present conflict was much more important to them. 
91  This reached a critical peak in April 1978 when two ASF volunteers were killed 
and several injured through a bombing attack of a Palestinian terrorist. This 
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For several volunteers, it became more and more difficult to differenti-
ate between the “Jewish victims” to whom they offered their signs of atone-
ment, and the “Israeli perpetrators” whose behaviour they regarded as 
worthwhile criticizing. This situation was particularly problematic for those 
who went to Israel with ASF from the late 1960s onwards as Kriegsdienst-
verweigerer (conscientious objectors) who had opted against military ser-
vice in the Federal Republic for pacifist reasons.92 Volunteers told in their 
reports that they encountered barriers, when they wanted to discuss the Ar-
ab-Israeli conflict with Israelis, particularly elderly ones.93 Among the vol-
unteers were some who were very cautious whether they as young Germans 
were at all in a position to criticize the political situation in Israel,94 where-
as other volunteers exposed themselves and their criticism openly and iden-
tified with the Palestinians.95  
It is not astonishing that the presence of German conscientious objec-
tors was regarded as a problem in parts of the Israeli public, for which the 
Israeli wars and the Palestinian conflict meant to secure the threatened ex-
istence of the state of Israel. Even supporters and friends of ASF in Israel 
felt increasingly at unease with the organization and with some of its volun-
teers,96 the more the ASF volunteers began to question or to criticize Israeli 
politics towards Palestinians and the more the aspect of peace became im-
portant to the practical work. In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s the 
                                                                                                  
event intensified an already ongoing debate about the role of the organization in 
Israel and within this conflict. 
92  In 1969, ASF was officially appointed to offer Peace Service (Friedensdienst) 
for those young male Germans who rejected military service. In the 1970s, two-
third to three-fourth of all ASF activists in all countries were conscientious ob-
jectors. Lilach Marom, ‘On Guilt and Atonement’. Aktion Sühnezeichen Frie-
densdienste and Its Activity in Israel, Yad Vashem Studies 35 (2007), 187-220, 
here: 200. 
93  Rolf T., Report 22/71, EZA 97/391. 
94  Ibid. 
95  See the book by ASF volunteers Jan Metzger, Martin Orth and Christian Ster-
zing, Das ist unser Land – Westbank und Gaza-Streifen unter israelischer Be-
satzung (Bornheim-Merten: Lamuv, 1980). About the book and the discussions 
within ASF about the book see Legerer, Tatort Versöhnung, 225-226. 
96  Marom, On Guilt and Atonement, 201. 
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ASF programs in Israel were complemented by projects with Arabs, and ac-
tivities to foster peace between Israelis and Palestinians.97  
The emphasis on the aspect of peace in the everyday work of ASF in Is-
rael, but also elsewhere, even led to a change of the organization’s name. In 
1968, the name was extended to become Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedens-
dienste (the official English name from then onwards is Action Reconcilia-
tion Service for Peace). At that time, many ASF volunteers and functionar-
ies required the organization to also look forward towards peace instead of 
only looking backwards to atonement. Nevertheless, even the change in the 
organization’s name did not stop discourses about the name and the future 
contents of the ASF activities. In spring 1970, the term atonement was once 
again highly debated within the organization.98 In an official letter to mem-
bers and friends of the organization, the organization argued that to aban-
don the term atonement would mean a trivialization of the work; further-
more, the letter explained that atonement and peace well belonged together 
as atonement is meant to lead towards peace.99 
Reports by ASF volunteers and conscientious objectors from the early 
1970s suggest that the aspect of reconciliation and the importance to deal 
with the Nazi past remained crucial to the activists in Israel, which they al-
so took as a starting point for their engagement for peace.100 ASF volun-
teers in Israel in the early 1970s found different, partly diverging answers 
                                                 
97   For instance through work in Neve Schalom (Oasis of Peace), which sought to 
provide an interconfessional meeting space for Christians, Jews and Muslims. 
Report Edeltraud M. and Gottfried R., February 1973, EZA 97/392. 
98   See the documents in preparation of the general meeting on April 10 and 11 
1970, EZA 97/10. 
99   Letter, 19 March 1970, EZA 97/10.  
100  In 1974, a group of conscientious objectors wrote a joint report about their 
self-understanding as pacifists working in Israel. The reason why they chose 
ASF as organization for their peace service was, according to their report, their 
belief in the necessity of an active dealing with the past as precondition for 
reconciliaton. As post-war generation they did not regard the question of guilt 
as central, but their active engagement for reconciliation between Jews and 
Christians, Jews and Germans as well as Arabs and Jews. This should be ac-
companied by a critical solidarity to both Israelis and Palestinians. Report by 
Michael D. and Hans-Volker K., March 1974, 7-8, EZA 97/392. 
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to the question of how to link the idea of atonement to their work in Israel 
and to their presence there as young Germans. Volunteer Hans-Joachim M., 
who worked in the Kibbutz Shaar Haamakim, reflected about his work with 
ASF in April 1972. He considered how he, born in 1947 – “two years after 
the liberation of the Concentration Camps” – and other young Germans of 
his age, could contribute towards atoning for the “misdeeds of the Nazi 
time”.101 In his account, the crimes committed in the past are depersonal-
ized, as he does not refer directly to his parents or his parents’ generation. 
For Hans-Joachim M. the caritative work with elderly Jews in his Kibbutz 
constituted the way in which he as a young person actively contributed to 
bringing forward the idea of atonement and understanding between the Ger-
man and the Jewish people.102 He thereby emphasized the character of the 
hands-on reconciliation approach by ASF, which he favored over a mere 
rhetoric of reconciliation. Other volunteers thought along similar lines by 
claiming that the personal contacts with people in Israel would contribute to 
improving the image of the German youth.103  
But there were also generational discrepancies among the young Ger-
man volunteers in Israel, discrepancies that led towards a diverging under-
standing of the issues of guilt and atonement. After Barbara G., a 22-year-
old ASF volunteer in Israel in 1970/71 returned to her hometown Fulda, she 
gave an interview to a regional newspaper. She claimed that she and her 14 
co-volunteers had not gone to Israel in order to atone; with their service 
they “did not want to nor could they atone for something for which they as 
young Germans did not feel responsible”.104This provoked vehement criti-
cism of another volunteer, Lutz M., born in 1940, who was still in Israel at 
the time, and who expressed his unease with Barbara G.’s rejection of the 
young generation’s responsibility and the impossibility of atonement. Lutz 
M. referred to the representative understanding of atonement and reconcili-
ation by young people who felt responsible for the guilt committed by the 
older generation. For him it was clear that “the age of the volunteers does 
not release them from the responsibility for Auschwitz, as it continues to 
                                                 
101  Report Hans-Joachim M., April 1972, EZA 97/392. 
102  Ibid. 
103  Report Elfie G.-H., February 1971, EZA 97/391. 
104  Quoted according to report Lutz M., 13/72, EZA 97/391. 
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exist in another form even in our present – and as long as we live we are al-
so affected by it”.105 
The idea of atonement not only remained a debated term among acti-
vists themselves, but also for their Israeli supporters106 and particularly for 
those at which the reconciliation activities were directed to. Even Israelis 
who did not in principle object to establishing contacts with the volunteers 
of ASF expressed their doubts about the name Sühnezeichen and the practi-
cal implementation of atonement by young Germans. In April 1968 Jedioth 
Chadashoth published a letter to the newspaper’s editor, written by a reader 
who had been in contact with some volunteers, in which we can read the 
following: 
 
“The name Sühnezeichen again has something to do with German fanaticism. How 
can the children of those who have become guilty wish to atone for something which 
they were not even part of? Their attitude is therefore unnatural right from the 
start.”107  
 
The writer of the letter questioned whether the young German volunteers 
could fulfill the claim for atonement at all. The letter continued to criticize 
the attitude of the young German volunteers with respect to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, which in the author’s opinion resulted in anti-Israeli 
sentiments that were also expressed by the German reconciliation activists. 
It concluded that “we should not have accepted this gesture of sacrifice, as 
this gesture resulted from a completely wrong view”.108  
Another term that caused unease among Israeli Jews was the underlying 
idea that atonement and reconciliation are connected to the notion of for-
giveness, a term that played an important role in the reconciliation concepts 
of the Christian churches and among reconciliation activists, such as 
                                                 
105  Ibid. 
106  See the texts by Israeli ASF supporters in EZA 97/785 about a discussion tak-
ing place in 1974.  
107  Jedioth Chadashoth, 11 April 1968, 3, quoted in Legerer, Tatort Versöhnung, 
215-216.  
108  Ibid. 
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ASF.109 The aspect of asking for forgiveness constituted a problematic issue 
for some of the recipients of reconciliation activities in Israel. Pinhas Ro-
sen, Israeli Minister of Justice from 1949 to 1961, and member of the 
Knesseth until 1968, stated to the Israeli newspaper Maariv in December 
1968 that he was far from hating all Germans and that he welcomed visitors 
from Germany in Israel. However, he continued to say that he was neither 
able to forget nor to forgive.110 His statement points at a crucial issue in rec-
onciliation matters. What if the one to whom reconciliation is offered can-
not forgive and therefore does not fulfill a prerequisite for reconciliation 
according to the Christian conception of reconciliation; a conception that is 
present within the conceptual framework of reconciliation and atonement of 
Protestant German groups active in Israel, such as ASF? Additionally, ac-
cording to Jewish moral law, it is not possible for Jews to grant forgiveness 
in the name of others.111 It has also been argued that in the aftermath of the 
Holocaust reconciliation could only be possible between the murderers and 
the murdered.112 
Even if the idea of peace became more central to debates about the 
young Germans for their reconciliation activities in Israel during the late 
1960s and early 1970s, also the idea of atonement, as problematic as it was 
for many volunteers, remained important for the self-understanding of the 
activists (if not in a positive sense than at least as a term that was constantly 
                                                 
109  See also Gundermann, Leiden ohne Täter, 144, who emphasizes this aspect of 
asking for forgiveness in her study about the activities of ASF in the Nether-
lands. 
110  See German translation of the interview in letter German Embassy Tel Aviv to 
the Foreign Office Bonn, 23 December 1968, PA-AA, B36/458. 
111  For the diverging Christian and Jewish conceptions of repentance, forgiveness 
and reconciliation see Peter J. Haas, Forgiveness, Reconciliation and Jewish 
Memory after Auschwitz, in: After-Words. Post-Holocaust Struggles with For-
giveness, Reconciliation, Justice, ed. David Patterson and John K. Roth (Seat-
tle and London: University of Washington Press, 2004), 5-16.  
112  See the argument by Theodor W. Adorno, refered to by Susan Neiman, Das 
Böse denken. Eine andere Geschichte der Philosophie (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhr-
kamp, 2006), 384. Such an understanding has to reject reconciliation efforts by 
ASF activists. 
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discussed) and for the debates taking place about their work and their pres-
ence in Israel.  
In the course of these debates, functionaries, volunteers and friends of 
ASF claimed that an “outward reconciliation” (Versöhnung nach außen) 
must be followed by an “internal change” (Wandlung im Innern).113 This in-
tensified an argument that ASF supporters in Israel had brought forward: 
that the main reconciliation task of the Sühnezeichen volunteers was not 
situated in Israel, but at home in Germany. In fact, already in the early 
1960s, the returning Israel volunteers were invited by city majors, local 
schools, and church groups to tell about their experiences.114 In the late 
1960s, these programs intensified, and it became common practice for 
many volunteers to continue with their engagement for ASF by giving lec-
tures to school classes and youth groups about their experiences as volun-
teers after their return home. At these occasions, the returned volunteers 
were met by other young Germans with interest, yet again with questions 
and partly criticism about the connection of atonement, guilt and the task of 






Based on the Christian idea of representative atonement for a guilt commit-
ted by others, the reconciliation practice of ASF was shaped by the engage-
ment of young Germans as reconciliation actors. Through the inclusion of 
young Germans the organization and its members showed that they regard-
ed atonement and reconciliation as an ongoing task pursued by the future 
generations who did not simply draw a Schlusstrich under the past. In this 
                                                 
113  Kammerer, Aktion Sühnezeichen, 114. 
114  Diary entries of Israel groups III, VII and VIII, 18 March 1964, EZA 97/396; 
21-24 September 1966 and 15-18 March 1967, both EZA 97/399. 
115  Reports by Joachim R. about a four-week information tour through Württem-
berg in February/March 1973 and by Martin B., Vincent B. and Marion R. 
about their information week in Cologne in March 1973, both EZA 97/392; 
see also report by Susanne P. who held an information week in Stuttgart 
schools and congregations in July 1972, EZA 97/391. 
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way the young generation became the central reconciliation activists who 
committed practical reconciliation work as representatives of those who 
had actually lived through the National Socialist regime. The young Ger-
mans reflected about their experiences as reconciliation activists in Israel in 
various ways. They also attracted attention from those Israelis they met dur-
ing their practical work, Israeli politicians, and the Israeli media. The inte-
gration of the young generation in reconciliation activities from the 1950s 
onwards provoked debates in West Germany and Israel, which centered on 
the issues of guilt, atonement, and peace, and which discussed the role the 
young generation was to play in reconciliation discourse and practice.  
As demonstrated in this chapter, discourses on reconciliation and prac-
tical experiences of young Germans as reconciliation activists in Israel bet-
ween 1961 and the 1970s oscillated between underlying ideas of atone-
ment, resulting from the past, and ideas of peace, directed towards the fu-
ture. While more and more importance was laid upon the idea of peace 
from the late 1960s onwards, the idea of atonement has not simply been 
displaced by the idea of peace, as both ideas were present in the ASF activi-
ties and concepts from the beginning, but were attached with different 
weight and importance at different times.116 The integration of young Ger-
mans in reconciliation efforts between Germany and Israel – in the dis-
course about the role of the young generation for reconciliation and in prac-
tical reconciliation activity – impacted on and accompanied this shift. The 
more every-day life in Israel became dominated by the problems among Is-
raelis and Palestinians and by the Middle East conflict, and the more young 
Germans tried to contribute towards achieving peace among Israelis and 
Arabs, the more these contemporary political issues became part of the 
young people’s considerations about the past and about their role as acti-
vists for reconciliation.  
The analyzed discourses on the role of the young generation for recon-
ciliation also contribute to further developing a differentiated understanding 
on how guilt and atonement were transferred in the post-war decades. In 
her study about the transfer of guilt and atonement to the following genera-
tions, theologian Katharina von Kellenbach argued that a combination of 
                                                 
116  In contrast to my understanding, Legerer, Tatort Versöhnung, 220, implies that 
the integration of the peace movement and the inclusion of conscientious con-
fessors has led to a “dilution of the original mission”.  
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rather unspecified confessions of guilt – for instance the guilt confessions 
by the Protestant and Catholic Churches after the Second World War – to-
gether with a general amnesia within West German society in the early 
post-war period has led to a transfer of the moral obligation to deal with the 
Nazi past to the second and third generations.117 Given the results of this 
chapter, it should be added to von Kellenbach’s argument that the transfer 
of guilt was not only – as she claims – rooted in an “unconscious participa-
tion in a solidarity community of guilt”.118 As demonstrated above, this 
transfer of guilt was also consciously promoted by the various political and 
personal discourses on the role of German youth as reconciliation activists, 
discourses that developed parallel to the silence on the crimes of the past in 
the post-war years and went, as could be shown, further right into the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
Looking beyond the timeframe discussed in this chapter, reports of ASF 
volunteers and other accounts of young people engaged in German-Israeli 
dialogue suggest that the debates about the role of youth in reconciliation 
discourse and in reconciliation practice did not cease, but continue to ex-
ist.119 Each “young generation” working in Israel tried and tries anew to ne-
gotiate its own position and its responsibility with respect to the past. And 
each young generation is anew an object of debate concerning the role of 
youth for reconciliation.120 These negotiations are influenced by contempo-
                                                 
117  Katharina von Kellenbach, Theologische Rede von Schuld und Vergebung, in: 
Von Gott reden im Land der Täter. Theologische Stimmen der dritten Genera-
tion seit der Shoa, ed. Katharina von Kellenbach et al. (Darmstadt: Wissen-
schaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2001), 46-67, here: 63. 
118  Ibid. 
119  Sühnezeichen Friedensdienste Forum. Rundbrief für die Mitglieder und den 
Freundeskreis, 35 (1986); Protokoll 2/86, EZA 97/68. For more recent stand-
points see the accounts of young Germans and Israelis in Dissonant Memories. 
Fragmented Present. Exchanging Young Discourses between Israel and Ger-
many, ed. Charlotte Misselwitz and Cornelia Siebeck (Bielefeld: transcript, 
2009). 
120  See, for instance, the report about German-Israeli relations on Kol Jisrael radio 
station, 28 January 1984, and the weekend insert of Haaretz, 7 November 
1986, both EZA 97/814. And most recently the former German President 
Christian Wulff who was accompanied by a delegation of young Germans on 
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rary developments such as the intensifying Israeli-Palestinian conflict, con-
temporary media debates about victims and perpetrators or own experi-
ences as volunteers. At the core of these discourses about reconciliation 
there remain attempts to deal with issues of guilt and responsibility, atone-
ment and peace.  
                                                                                                  
his state visit to Israel in November 2010, and who explained his idea of the 
youth delegation by explicitly referring to the concept of a generational re-
sponsibility for the past and the future. Interview with Jedioth Aharonot, 28 
November 2010. 

Reconciliation in Postcolonial 
Settings

Apologising for Colonial Violence  
The Documentary Film Regresso a Wiriyamu, Transitional 
Justice, and Portuguese-Mozambican Decolonisation 




When Aníbal Cavaco Silva, President of Portugal, went for a state visit to 
the Mozambican capital Maputo in March 2008, he was asked by a journal-
ist if he would apologise for the ‘colonial war’, namely for the massacre of 
Wiriyamu where about 400 people were killed by Portuguese special for-
ces. He responded: 
 
“People make history every day, with all its defects and virtues. Regarding history, I 
try to identify the positive facts, because, if we keep looking back at the past, we 
will lose the future.”1 
 
Cavaco Silva avoided a direct answer and instead tried to contextualise the 
violence committed by Portuguese troops during the war of decolonisation, 
as a seemingly ‘normal’ element of a universal history of humanity. The 
newspaper Jornal de Notícias also reports that Cavaco Silva emphasised 
                                                 
1  Quoted in Luís Andrade de Sá, Pr/Moçambique, Cavaco contorna Guerra Colo-
nial propondo o ‘Lado positivo da História’, Jornal de Notícias, 24 March 2008. 
This and the following citations from Portuguese sources are translations by the 
author. This paper forms part my PhD thesis on decolonisation and documentary 
films from Mozambique and Portugal at the International Graduate Center for 
the Study of Culture (University of Gießen). 
240 | ROBERT STOCK 
 
some of his positive recollections relating to previous stays in Mozambique 
back in the days of colonialism. This rather conservative and nostalgic 
point of view causes astonishment. However, it could also be assumed that 
perhaps the context of a press conference was not the proper place for 
speaking about such an issue since it did not provide the right setting and 
preparation for the demanded apology. Was the response by Cavaco Silva 
then appropriate? Did it not ignore the experience of the victims of this or 
other violent excesses, and the violence of the ‘colonial situation’ in gen-
eral?2 
About ten years before, the documentary film Return to Wiriyamu di-
rected by Felícia Cabrita and Paulo Camacho proposed a different perspec-
tive on the subject eschewed by Cavaco Silva.3 This Portuguese film pro-
duction deals with the massacre of Wiriyamu (northern Mozambique, Prov-
ince of Tête) conducted by Portuguese troops on December 16, 1972 and 
brings together one of the perpetrators and some of the survivors.4 As this 
paper will show, this film and its background provide the opportunity to re-
flect and think about the complexity and ambiguity of postcolonial and 
apologetic contexts. 
The two situations mentioned allude to a broader context, where the dis-
cussion of the colonial past and connected experiences of violence has be-
come an important issue in most societies of the former European colonial 
powers. These debates are not restricted to academic discourse but also 
                                                 
2  For a different attitude see the speech of Mário Soares, former President of Por-
tugal, that he gave in Maputo on 23 June 2005. There, he refers to his encounter 
with Samora Machel in 1974, when he was Foreign Minister and involved in the 
Lusaka Accord, where the transfer of power to the Frente da Libertação de 
Moçambique (Frelimo, Mozambican Liberation Front) was negotiated. He, too, 
speaks about his exile in France before 1974 and his participation in demonstra-
tions against Marcello Caetano in London in 1973. Mário Soares, Conferência 
de Mário Soares na Universidade Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo (Lisboa: Ar-
quivo & Biblioteca Fundação Mário Soares, 23 June 2005). 
3  Felícia Cabrita and Paulo Camacho, Regresso a Wiriyamu (SIC 1998, Portugal). 
4  It was broadcasted on 19 November 1998 as part of the series Grande Report-
agem (Great Report) on the private television channel Sociedade Independente 
de Comunicação (SIC, Independent Communication Society). Marina C. Ra-
mos, Regresso a Wiriyamu, Público, 19 November 1998, 44. 
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reach a wider public and influence political decisions.5 In France, the year 
2000 marked a turning point for the discussion of the Algerian War of In-
dependence (1954-1962). In fact, just one year before, the conflict in Alge-
ria had been recognized as a ‘war’ by the French parliament. A public de-
bate discussed the violence during the war,6 while historians analysed prac-
tices of torture utilized by the French Armed Forces.7 Despite this unset-
tling chapter of history, French politicians advocated the positive interpreta-
tion of colonialism.8 In the United Kingdom, studies of the decolonisation 
of Kenya troubled the image of the seemingly civilized British manner of 
                                                 
5  Andreas Eckert, Der Kolonialismus im Europäischen Gedächtnis, Aus Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte, 1/2 (2008), 31-38, here: 33. 
6  On 20 June 2000, Le Monde published an article in which a former member of 
the Algerian Liberation Front reported on the torture that she had experienced 
during her imprisonment. Shortly after, General Aussaresses wrote about such 
violent practices (not showing any sign of regret) that he and others had used 
against prisoners in the war. 
7  Robert Aldrich, Imperial Mise En Valeur and Mise En Scène. Recent Works on 
French Colonialism, The Historical Journal 45, 4 (2002), 917-936, here: 933. A 
detailed analysis is offered by Joshua Cole, Intimate Acts and Unspeakable 
Relations. Remembering Torture and the War for Algerian Independence, in: 
Memory, Empire and Postcolonialism: Legacies of French Colonialism, ed. 
Alex Hargreaves (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005), 125-141. See also Neil 
MacMaster, The Torture Controversy (1998-2002). Towards a ‘New History’ of 
the Algerian War, Modern & Contemporary France 10, 4 (2002), 449-459. 
8 Loi no. 2005-158 du 23 février 2005 portant reconnaissance de la Nation et con-
tribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés. Article 4 of the law states: 
“University research programmes [will] accord to the history of the French pres-
ence overseas, notably in North Africa, the place that it deserves. School curric-
ula [will] recognise, in particular, the positive role of the French presence over-
seas, notably in North Africa, and [will] accord the history and the sacrifices of 
the soldiers of the French Army who came from these territories the eminent 
place to which they have a right.” This law was retracted shortly after its intro-
duction. Quoted in Robert Aldrich, Colonial past, post-colonial present: History 
wars French-style, History Australia 3, 1 (2006), 14.1-14.10, here: 14.8. 
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withdrawing from its overseas territories.9 The out-dated permanent exhibi-
tion at the Musée Royal de l’Afrique Central in Tervuren, near Brussels, 
still holds a rather colonialist view on the history of the Congo, and hence 
provoked discussions regarding the mass murder in Belgian Congo that 
took place around 1900.10 
In Portugal, discussions about the colonial past can be observed as well 
even if they are shaped in a specific way.11 Since the 1990s, mainly veter-
ans of the decolonisation wars have been publishing an increasing number 
of memoirs and historical accounts. Over the last decade, the growing will-
ingness of veterans to speak about their experience in the wars of decoloni-
sation in the media – which, at the same time, became more open for these 
debates – has fostered an intensive and ongoing discussion about the colo-
nial past in Portugal. This phenomenon also extends to the film production 
since there is a continuously increasing number of documentaries and fea-
                                                 
9 Richard Dowden, State of Shame, Guardian, 5 February 2005, on the books by 
David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End 
of Empire (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005) and Caroline Elkins, Britain’s 
Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2005/feb/05/featuresreviews.guardianreview6, 
accessed 25 May 2011 
10 There are already plans for the renovation of the museum building and the 
whole exhibition. The latter “is taking place in collaboration with external ex-
perts and representatives of the African diaspora”. Permanent Exhibition. In: 
Royal Museum for Central Africa, http://www.africamuseum.be/renovation/ne 
wexhibition, accessed 28 March 2012. See also Sabine Cornélis, Colonial and 
Postcolonial Exhibitions, in: A Historical Companion to Postcolonial Litera-
tures in English, ed. Prem Poddar and David Johnson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2005), 21-23, here: 22. 
11 For a discussion of this issue that does not consider media representations see 
Isabel dos Santos Lourenco and Alexander Keese, Die blockierte Erinnerung: 
Portugals koloniales Gedächtnis und das Ausbleiben kritischer Diskurse 1974-
2010, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 37, 2 (2011), 220-243, here: 221. For a criti-
cal perspective regarding the memory of the Portuguese New State see Teresa 
Pinheiro, Facetten der Erinnerungskultur. Portugals Umgang mit dem Estado 
Novo, Neue Politische Literatur 55, 1 (2010), 7-22. 
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ture films dedicated to the wars of decolonisation.12 Many of them can be 
perceived as interventions in a context, where speaking about the ‘colonial 
war’ constitutes a difficult issue and often creates polemical debates. 
It is evident that many of the debates and studies mentioned focus on 
the consequences of colonial history, decolonisation and postcolonial im-
migration into Europe. At the same time, there is only little reflection on 
memory politics in the African context,13 where the colonial past – more 
than postcolonial excesses of violence committed by the independence 
movements against political opponents and other parts of the populations14 
– is also an object of public and political discourse.15 Moreover, if then the 
examination of African memory politics proves to be a rare topic of aca-
demic discourse, the analysis of postcolonial memories situated between 
Europe and Africa transcending national boundaries, and being appropri-
ated by different and sometimes competing social groups, really turns out to 
be a future task.16 
This article contributes to this rather unexplored field. Its focus lies on 
an apology for past wrongs in the lusophone context, namely Mozambique 
and Portugal, and its filmic representation. The following case study sheds 
new light on the postcolonial negotiation of transnational memory; a pro-
cess that takes place not only in the realm of official bilateral relations, but 
to which members of civil society such as veterans, survivors and journal-
ists make their contribution. To grasp this complex issue, the article ana-
                                                 
12 João Maria Grilo, O cinema da não-ilusão: Histórias para o cinema português 
(Lisboa: Livros Horizonte, 2006), 91. 
13 Richard P. Werbner, Memory and the Postcolony: African Anthropology and the 
Critique of Power (London and New York: Zed Books, 1998). 
14 Victor Igreja, Frelimo’s Political Ruling through Violence and Memory in Post-
colonial Mozambique, Journal of Southern African Studies 36, 4 (2010), 781-
799; Dalila Cabrita Mateus and Alvaro Mateus, Purga em Angola: O 27 de Ma-
io de 1977 (Porto: Asa Editores, 2007). 
15 Carola Lentz and Jan Budniok, Ghana@50 – celebrating the nation: An eyewit-
ness account from Accra, zeitgeschichte-online, December 2010, http://zeitgesc 
hichte-online.de/Themen-Lentz-Budniok-12-2010, accessed 27 February 2012. 
16 See for example one of the few studies in this respect: Andrea L. Smith, Colo-
nial Memory and Postcolonial Europe: Maltese Settlers in Algeria and France 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006). 
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lyses how the violent experience of Mozambican-Portuguese decolonisa-
tion is reflected in the documentary film Return to Wiriyamu. 
The film is a striking example for showing that it is important to con-
sider the procedure and effects of apologies, not only on the macro level of 
inter-state relations, but also on the micro level of social interactions. On 
this level, the physical wounds, emotions, and persisting images of the for-
mer adversaries that often continue to shape the relationships between per-
petrators and victims up to the present, can be re-negotiated. To observe 
how the moment of the apology emerges in particular situations, and to 
analyse the specific elements that are constitutive to such interactions, pro-
vides knowledge and understanding of apologies for past wrongs and relat-
ed dynamics along with new insights. For my argument, I am specifically 
interested in addressing two levels of analysis: the first explores the back-
ground of the making of the film drawing on an in-depth interview with the 
Portuguese journalist Felícia Cabrita; the second level deals with the specif-
ic perspective in which the film visualizes the encounter of both perpetra-
tors and victims. In other words, how does the film proceed when transla-
ting a process in which people meet that were on opposing sides during the 
war of decolonisation into moving images? I argue that there is a complex 
relation between the two levels because seemingly both personal and filmic 
memory are connected to particular contexts, truths, and related objectives. 
My examination starts with a brief overview of the concept of apologies 
for past wrongs in postcolonial settings. In sketching out some cases, it will 
become clear that there is still a great lack of approaches researching apol-
ogetic contexts at the level of social interactions and in relation to media 
representations. Subsequently, I outline the process of democratisation in 
Portugal and explore the attempts of transitional justice that occurred right 
after the revolution in 1974. This will provide the background for an in-
depth analysis of the documentary Return to Wiriyamu. The main parts of 
the paper constitute an analysis of an interview I conducted with Felícia 
Cabrita in July 2010 and an examination of some of the central scenes of 
the documentary. To conclude my analysis, I draw on some newspaper arti-
cles that point to the reception of the film in Mozambique and Portugal. 
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APOLOGIES FOR PAST WRONGS ON THE MACRO AND 
MICRO LEVEL 
 
One astonishing part in the documentary Return to Wiriyamu is the se-
quence, in which one of the perpetrators of the massacre comes back to the 
crime scene and meets with some of the survivors. In this encounter, the 
former Portuguese officer apologises for the deeds of the unit that commit-
ted the massacre. Even if this particular apology is in some ways unique, it 
can be related to similar attempts in postcolonial contexts. However, all 
these apologies are embedded in specific frameworks, as the following 
brief overview will show. One of the functions of apologies for past wrongs 
consists of demonstrating that a state, a social group or an individual holds 
at the time the apology takes place different values than from those held in 
the past when certain acts were committed. As Robert Weyeneth observes, 
 
“acknowledgment of historical wrongs comes in diverse forms: outright apologies, 
requests for forgiveness, […] expressions of regret, and payments of reparations and 
compensation. Apologies can be communicated in a wide range of ways through 
verbal statements issued publicly, joint diplomatic declarations, […] reports, legal 
judgments, […] days of observance, reconciliation walks, monuments and memori-
als, […]. Both individuals and institutions apologize, for personal transgressions and 
for collective wrongs.”17 
 
There are steps that precede and follow the processes mentioned: Remorse 
and regret are expressed in order to show that a conscience about the per-
formed wrong exists. This can open a possibility for a dialogue where vic-
tims and perpetrators speak about their experiences. Within this context, the 
different perspectives on the crime become evident. Perpetrators have the 
opportunity to acknowledge what they have done. Furthermore, an apology 
is able to show the change of attitude of a former adversary, and this could 
“pave the way for the former victims to forgive, and help construct a new 
image of the former enemy”.18 Nevertheless, as Nick Smith indicates – in 
                                                 
17 Robert R. Weyeneth, The Power of Apology and the Process of Historical 
Reconciliation, The Public Historian 23, 3 (2001), 9-38, here: 20. 
18 Jennifer M. Lind, Sorry States. Apologies in International Politics (Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press, 2008), 12. 
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contrast to the work of Tavuchis19 –, a “categorical apology” could be diffi-
cult to achieve because it involves several interdependent factors.20 Howev-
er, if an apology is indeed accepted and perpetrators are forgiven, then a 
process of reconciliation between two or more actors involved could be ini-
tiated. Yet, (attempts of) truth telling, acknowledgment, apology, and for-
giveness do not open perspectives for long-term reconciliation in every 
case. 
In the context of international politics, the specific language of apology 
in postcolonial contexts often emerges due to questions of material com-
pensation. The centenary of the outbreak of the annihilation war against the 
Herero in German South-West Africa was commemorated in 2004. It pro-
vided the reason for Heidemarie Wieczorek Zeul, then Minister for German 
development cooperation, to visit Namibia. In Okakara, the place where the 
war against the Herero had started, she gave an official speech that did not 
include an apology. However, she did add an important sentence: “Every-
thing I said in my speech was an apology for crimes committed by Germa-
ny.”21 
Until then, the German government and the Foreign Office had avoided 
an apology due to claims of reparations that were already in course.22 Offi-
cials stated that Germany already supported Namibia with a great amount 
of money in development cooperation. The Herero who attended the cere-
mony in Okakara were satisfied with the words and the contrition expressed 
                                                 
19 Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991). 
20 For Smith, a “categorical apology” is constituted by nine elements: corroborated 
factual record, acceptance of blame, possession of appropriate standing, identifi-
cation of each harm, identification of the moral principles underlying each harm, 
shared commitment to moral principles underlying each harm, recognition of 
victim as moral interlocutor, categorical regret, and performance of the apology. 
Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 140-142. 
21 Quoted in Larissa Förster, Jenseits des juristischen Diskurses. Die Entschul-
digung Von Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul in Namibia, afrika süd. zeitschrift zum 
südlichen afrika 5 (2004), 8-10, http://www.issa-bonn.org/publikationen/5-04f% 
F6rster.htm, accessed 25 February 2012. 
22 But the Namibian Government did not support the claims by the Herero. 
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by the minister. Shortly thereafter, rumours circulated that the Herero 
would eventually drop the charges; however, it turned out, this was not the 
case. 
In postcolonial contexts, one can find other examples in which regret is 
expressed, but due to fear of material reparation claims, the word “sorry” is 
usually avoided.23 This was the case with Tony Blair’s statements in 2007 
when the bicentenary of the abolition of slavery was commemorated in the 
UK. It was also the case in 1999, when the Australian Prime Minister John 
Howard regretted “that indigenous Australians suffered injustices under the 
practices of past generations” and refused to apologise to Aborigines for the 
government policy.24 As Howard-Hassmann and Lombardo observe, the 
expression of regret with simultaneous refusal of apology – often to avoid 
claims for material redress – is widespread in the postcolonial political 
sphere. However, the authors also question the progress that would be made 
by such gestures: 
 
“It is unclear whether the small, tentative steps to acknowledge and regret the harms 
perpetrated against Africa by Western powers will have any real impact upon inter-
national relations. Nor it is altogether clear that apologies might have any real mean-
ing or impact within Africa, or to African citizens.”25 
 
The mentioned apologies or the attempts to avoid them are part of complex 
processes where legal issues condition foreign relations. Nevertheless, for 
the following case study it is important to examine the different aspects of 
apologies not only on the level of inter-state relations or relations between 
governments and pressure groups from civil society, but rather on the micro 
level of social interactions. This level clearly differs from diplomatic, offi-
cial declarations or apologies by members of governments, who were not 
directly involved in historical wrongs. The aim here is to observe a com-
plex situation – seen through the prism of a film – that brings people to-
                                                 
23 Eckert, Der Kolonialismus, 36. 
24 Weyeneth, The Power of Apology, 18. 
25 Rhoda Howard-Hassman and Anthony P. Lombardo, Words Require Action: 
African Elite Opinion About Apologies from the West, in: The Age of Apology: 
Facing up to the Past, ed. Mark Gibney (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylva-
nia Press, 2008), 216-228, here: 218. 
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gether to re-negotiate their roles as victims and perpetrators that result from 
colonial violence and persist to influence their lives and relations to each 
other up to the present. One can explore how the moment for the apology 
emerges in specific settings, analyse the crucial elements constitutive to 
such interactions and hence shed a new light on apologies for past wrongs 
and related dynamics. To grasp such social processes, ethnographic ap-
proaches have proven to be particularly useful. One example is the method-
ological framework outlined by Tim Kelsall who acted as an observer of 
the hearings for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the Tonkolili 
District in Sierra Leone in July 2003. In discussing the specific conditions 
of this cultural-religious setting and the resulting difficulties in bringing 
forth the truth, and by highlighting the significance of the closing reconcili-
ation ceremony of the hearings where the perpetrators were forgiven, Kel-
sall concludes that: 
 
“One must look beyond the notion that after four days of telling the truth, reconcilia-
tion would logically follow, the ceremony merely underlining a state of affairs that 
truth had brought into being. It is more plausible to view the entire five days of the 
hearings as a ritual building to the climax of the final ceremony, upon which the 
purpose of the Commission hinged. […] ritual, at its most effective, has the power to 
transform perceptions and emotions and therefore situations, and it is for this reason 
that it ought to be taken seriously by truth commissions.”26 
 
His analysis of the perspectives of the different parties involved in the hear-
ings – victims, perpetrators, commissioners, and the audience – provides a 
productive framework through which the apology for the massacre in Wiri-
yamu can be considered. Kelsall’s analysis makes clear that such reconcili-
ation rituals are shaped by a series of factors such as speeches, body ges-
tures and emotional response. 
Besides this, other aspects can influence processes of apology and for-
giveness. Considering a case described by Marie Breen Smyth, who is very 
critical regarding forgiveness, one topic, as some observers noted, was of 
particular importance in the reconciliation process in South Africa. Breen 
                                                 
26 Tim Kelsall, Truth, Lies, Ritual: Preliminary Reflections on the Truth and Re-
conciliation Commission in Sierra Leone, Human Rights Quarterly 27, 2 (2005), 
361-391, here: 386. 
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Smyth affirms that “victims and survivors may feel under pressure to grant 
some form of absolution or forgiveness to perpetrators”27 by arguing that 
the media can constrain processes of apology and forgiveness. Her point of 
reference is the television series Facing the Truth produced by BBC in 
2006, in which in the presence of Archbishop Desmond Tutu encounters of 
victims and perpetrators of the conflict in Northern Ireland took place. In 
one of the three parts, Mrs Sylvia Hackett met Loyalist Michael Stone, the 
murderer of her husband. Although, at first unwilling, later in the program 
she was led to shake hands with Stone, but immediately afterwards, she had 
a breakdown: 
 
“Following the prompts from Tutu, an international figure, and under the glare of 
television cameras with the question of what millions of viewers would make of a 
refusal to forgive, the pressure on Mrs Hackett to shake the hand of Michael Stone 
was almost irresistible. It was almost impossible for her not to shake the hand of the 
perpetrator.”28 
 
The gesture of shaking hands thus can be a sensitive issue that at least in 
this case does not have a clear ‘message’. As it turns out, being on televi-
sion and therefore addressing a wide audience can create tensions and con-
tradictive emotions due to presupposed expectations on the part of oneself, 
the other participants and the viewers. Furthermore, there are other ques-
tions arising: Can such problems to be resolved in public? Is this helpful? 
Or should these sensitive issues rather be treated in a setting that would re-
spect the privacy of the victims and therefore not pressure them? It is, how-
ever, difficult to judge the television program solely from the analysis by 
Smyth. Donna Hicks, who was one of the participants, describes another is-
sue of the program Facing the Truth, which in her view turned out to be 
successful. Though, she carefully admits: 
 
“Even if one creates the right conditions for healing and reconciliation, not everyone 
is ready for it. There are steps along the way that are more difficult for some than 
                                                 
27 Marie Breen Smyth, Truth Recovery and Justice after Conflict: Managing 
Violent Pasts (New York: Routledge, 2007), 17. 
28 Ibid., 18. 
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others. For some, the reasons were personal and emotional, and for others, it was po-
litical.”29 
 
The examples given above point to the intricate relationships in situations 
involving former colonial powers and independent states in Africa, and 
show the complicated processes of apology and forgiveness that are taking 
place between victims and perpetrators in different social and political con-
texts. One can draw several connections from the outlined cases to Mozam-
bique and Portugal. First of all, there was no officially pronounced apology 
of Portugal for the committed violence during the ‘colonial war’.30 There 
were however moments of fraternization between Portuguese and Mozam-
bican politicians and militaries during the difficult situation in 1974-1975,31 
that became even more complex through the sudden and massive exodus of 
the Portuguese settler population.32 Secondly, Mozambique – similar to the 
case of Namibia and Germany – profits from the Portuguese development 
cooperation. Additionally, in contrast to the Herero, who managed to form 
a pressure group, it seems that rural populations in Mozambique, which 
during the war of independence were targets of attacks, continue to have 
‘no voice’ and remain in a subaltern position.33 This does not mean that an 
                                                 
29 Donna Hicks, Reconciling with Dignity, European Forum for Restorative Jus-
tice, http://www.euforumrj.org/readingroom/Terrorism/DHicks.pdf, accessed 9 
November 2011. 
30 Since there is no published work available, I gratefully acknowledge informa-
tion about this point provided by Dalila Cabrita Mateus (email to author, 21 
March 2012). 
31 Norrie MacQueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa: Metropolitan Re-
volution and the Dissolution of Empire (London: Longman, 1997), 133-134. 
32 Hundreds of thousands of Portuguese settlers left Mozambique in 1974-1975. 
Private property was mostly nationalized and claims for indemnity were about to 
be filed. However, this was “an unrealistic objective and the claims were never 
finalized”. Maria Beatriz Rocha-Trindade, The Repatriation of Portuguese from 
Africa, in: The Cambridge Survey of World Migration, ed. Robin Cohen (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 337-341, here: 338. 
33 This is not only due to economic factors but also to the general political situa-
tion in Mozambique. Although a multiparty system was introduced in the 1990s, 
it still remains a difficult task to discuss the colonial past or processes of the 
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attempt to bring some of them together with a perpetrator of colonial vio-
lence would bring ‘positive’ results more easily. On the contrary, it seems 
that staging an apology for the filming of a documentary also turns out to 
be a problematic issue. It not only causes potential constraints on the partic-
ipants imposed through the medium and seemingly forces apologies. It 
probably also constitutes the non-visibility of some interactions that took 
place but were either not filmed nor included in the final edition of the film. 
 
 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN PORTUGAL’S  
POST-REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD 
 
Following is a brief overview of the historical circumstances that character-
ised the post-revolutionary period in Portugal. It will discuss the transition 
from authoritarian rule to a democratic government as a troubled process 
where different approaches were chosen in order to achieve a solution that 
provided the conditions for a long lasting compromise forming the basis for 
the Portuguese republic. What is of interest here is the issue of “how socie-
ties address legacies of past human rights abuses, mass atrocity, or other 
forms of severe social trauma, including genocide or civil war, in order to 
build a more democratic, just, or peaceful future”.34 The background infor-
mation provided here sheds some light on the unfinished process of transi-
tional justice in Portugal that continued to inform the socio-political situa-
tion in the 1990s. This too affected to some extend the reception of the do-
cumentary film Return to Wiriyamu as will be shown below. 
The authoritarian regime of António de Oliveira Salazar lasted for about 
four decades. Since the beginning of the 1960s, several independent move-
ments challenged its power in the African territories because the Estado 
                                                                                                  
post-revolutionary period. Frelimo is still the most powerful party and tries to 
exercise control over the narratives of the past, be it colonial or socialist. M. 
Anne Pitcher, Forgetting from above and Memory from Below: Strategies of 
Legitimation and Struggle in Postsocialist Mozambique, Africa: Journal of the 
International African Institute 76, 1 (2006), 88-112. 
34 Louis Bickford, Transitional Justice, in: Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes 
against Humanity, Vol. 3, ed. Dinah Shelton (Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 
2004), 1045-1047, here: 1045. 
252 | ROBERT STOCK 
 
Novo did not accept negotiations with the movements. The coup d’etat on 
April 25, 1974 abolished the regime and ended the war in the colonies. 
When the revolution took place, there was only a small opposition to the 
regime; but this was sufficient to create a critical situation of political radi-
calisation. The resulting political instability characterised the transition to 
democracy. Whereas the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA, Move-
ment of the Armed Forces) solely aimed at stopping the war in the colonies, 
left wing groups demanded immediate decolonisation and the transfer of 
power.35 
In the period of transition from 1974 to 1976, one finds attempts to 
purge the institutions and the people that collaborated with the authoritarian 
regime.36 Compromised mayors, civil servants, headmasters of schools and 
universities were ousted from office; censorship was abolished; agents of 
the secret police Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) were 
arrested and waited for their judgement in prison. There was also a signifi-
cant change in the Armed Forces: Generals, officers and other ranks in the 
Army, Navy and Air Force were purged and a new generation of young mi-
litaries entered the institution.37 
One of the most important reactions to the purge (led mainly by cen-
tre/left wing militaries and politicians) was an attempted coup on Novem-
ber 11, 1975 planned by right wing militaries. This incident marked a turn-
ing point in domestic politics in Portugal. From this moment on, issues like 
“reconciliation” and “pacification” were emphasised by the politics of the 
government. Consequently, agents of the secret police that had been im-
prisoned after their arrest were not convicted but freed and reintegrated into 
the society. The militaries that were admittedly removed from their posi-
tions were not made responsible war crimes that they had possibly commit-
                                                 
35 Jorge Ribeiro, Marcas Da Guerra Colonial (Porto: Campo das Letras, 1999), 
272. 
36 António Costa Pinto, Purges and Counter-Purges, in: Transitional Justice. How 
emerging democracies reckon with former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washing-
ton, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 291-295, here: 291. 
37 António Costa Pinto, Ajustando Contas com o Passado na Transição para a De-
mocracia em Portugal, in: Política da Memória, Verdade ou Justiça na Tran-
sição para a Democracia, ed. Alexandra Barahona Brito (Lisboa: Imprensa de 
Ciências Sociais, 2004), 87-108, here: 93-94. 
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ted.38 Among them was also the former Commander-in-Chief of Mozam-
bique, General Kaúlza de Arriaga, a hardliner of the regime.39 After having 
returned from Mozambique, where the Wiriyamu massacre happened while 
he was in a leading position, this general was involved in a failed coup 
d’état in 1973.40 His attitude and political point of view contributed to his 
imprisonment in September 1974 because the MFA was concerned that he 
would perhaps head a movement that potentially could stop the decoloniza-
tion of Angola and Mozambique.41 
Therefore, those responsible for crimes like the massacre of Wiriyamu 
were not sentenced. This strategy to grant amnesty is well known in transi-
tional settings where newly emerging political players are still dependent 
on actors of the old regime, in this case the armed forces. Still, it caused an 
unresolved situation, were questions of guilt were suppressed. Like the ‘co-
lonial war’ in general, soldiers involved in excessive violence were hence 
not considered a topic for public debate. Particularly in the 1990 public at-
tempts to discuss certain incidents of the colonial past and their complex 
and ambiguous consequences slowly started to surface. This also extended 
to economic developments and social questions like the repatriation of Por-
tuguese settlers from Angola and Mozambique after 1975.42 The documen-
                                                 
38 Pinto, Ajustando Contas com o Passado, 102-103. 
39 Kaúlza de Arriaga, A Luta Em Moçambique, 1970/1973 (Braga: Intervenção, 
1977), 75; Malyn Newitt, History of Mozambique (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1995), 529-532. 
40 Hugo Gil Ferreira and Michael W. Marshall, Portugal’s Revolution: Ten Years 
On (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 29-30. 
41 Since 1977, Arriaga was involved in a lawsuit against the Portuguese state con-
cerning his ‘unjustified’ detention. The Supreme Court decided about this trial 
only in 1987 and convicted the Portuguese State to indemnify. Kaúlza de Ar-
riaga, Novas Sínteses. Politica, a Africa Portuguesa (Lisboa: Prefácio, 2001), 
125-126. 
42 Dalila Cabrita Mateus and Álvaro Mateus, Angola 61. Guerra Colonial: Causas 
e consequências; 04 de Fevereiro e o 15 de Março (Alfragide: Texto, 2011), 
209-211. 
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tary film Return to Wiriyamu made by Felícia Cabrita and Paulo Camacho 
is one of them.43 
 
 
THE DOCUMENTARY RETURN TO WIRIYAMU 
 
The decolonisation of the Portuguese territories in Africa was a prolonged 
and destructive confrontation characterised by violence. In Mozambique, 
the armed struggle against the colonial rule started 1964 and lasted for 10 
years. One of the most violent incidents of these wars that gained enormous 
public attention at the time was the massacre of Wiriyamu conducted by 
Portuguese special troops Comandos on December 16, 1972 in the village 
Wiriyamu, where nearly 400 persons were killed.44 It became known inter-
nationally through a report by Father Adrian Hastings published on July 10, 
1973 in the London Times, shortly before Marcelo Caetano, the successor 
of António de Oliveira Salazar, arrived in London for a state visit.45 Has-
tings received the information about the killing from Spanish Burgos Fa-
thers, who were working near the crime scene and had managed to smuggle 
their report out of Africa to Spain. After the violent attack, some of the sur-
                                                 
43 The film is thus a specific moment of a far reaching process of the negotiation in 
postcolonial relationships that here cannot be elaborated on in more detail. On 
the cultural dimensions of this process see Fernando Arenas, Lusophone Africa. 
Beyond Independence (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011); Car-
olin Overhoff Ferreira, Identity and Difference. Postcoloniality and Transna-
tionality in Lusophone Films (Münster: Lit, 2012). 
44 MacQueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa, 48-49; Mustafah Dhada, 
Contesting Terrains over a Massacre: The Case of Wiriyamu, in: Contested Ter-
rains and Constructed Categories: Contemporary Africa in Focus, ed. George 
C. Bond and Nigel Gibson (Boulder: Westview, 2002), 259-276, here: 265. 
45 Some Frelimo key leaders even hold the view that the revelations about the mas-
sacre and their impact on the image of Portugal did more for the “revolution 
than decades of fighting in Mozambique”. General Hama Tai quoted in Dhada, 
Contesting Terrains over a Massacre, 274. 
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vivors had come to the mission station and the fathers had collected their 
testimonies.46 
Nearly three decades had passed, when the documentary film Return to 
Wiriyamu was produced in 1998. There were many reasons for its produc-
tion. Among them was the changed relationship between Mozambique and 
Portugal. The end of the civil war in 1992, and the consequently new politi-
cal conditions47 offered a chance for a new beginning, regarding economic 
and personal connections between people in both countries that had been 
nearly stopped since the short period of rapprochement around 1980, and 
the official visit of the President of Mozambique Samora Machel in Lisbon 
in 1983.48 
                                                 
46 Adrian Hastings, Wiriyamu (London: Search Press, 1974); Álvaro B. Marques, 
Quem Matou Samora Machel? (Lisboa: Ulmeiro, 1987), 212. 
47 After gaining independence in 1975, the young Mozambican state, a socialist 
regime under the Frelimo, suffered from destabilization policies driven by 
Apartheid regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. This led to a violent war be-
tween Frelimo and Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo, National Re-
sistance Movement) that only ended in 1992, when Frelimo and Renamo signed 
the General Peace Agreement. The first democratic elections took place in 1994. 
Alice Dinerman, Revolution, Counter-Revolution and Revisionism in Post-Colo-
nial Africa: The Case of Mozambique, 1975-1994 (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 29-30. 
48 MacQueen, The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa, 44-50; William Minter, 
King Solomon’s Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of 
Southern Africa (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 329. This process was part of 
a broader change in foreign politics, particularly regarding cooperation policies 
in the Países Africanos de Língua Portuguesa (PALOP, Portuguese Speaking 
African Countries). Portugal, who had left the Development Assistance Com-
mittee in 1974, rejoined it in 1991, “when it was beginning to assist the impor-
tant new nation building processes in the PALOPs, involving peace building, 
democratisation and economic reform”; Development Co-Operation Review 
Series. Portugal, ed. OECD and DAC (Paris: OECD Publishing, 1997), 7. In 
1998, Mozambique was on the first place of the recipients of the Portuguese co-
operation; OECD and James H. Michel, Development Cooperation Report, 
1998. Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Com-
mittee (Paris: OECD Publishing, 1999), 123. 
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The Making Of 
 
The Portuguese journalist Felícia Cabrita began working on the massacre of 
Wiriyamu in 1992 and is thus part of the above mentioned process. In an 
interview, Cabrita explained her interest in the massacre of Wiriyamu and 
referred to the way that the Portuguese Army wrote its official history: 
 
“The only thing that exists is the official version, [there exist] some pages that are 
false. So, we didn’t have one single testimony of somebody who participated in that 
incident. And history, whenever it is possible, is obviously written with living peo-
ple, and at best with several people. It is clear that in a work like this, we could not 
limit ourselves to listen only to one witness.”49  
 
This also holds true in the broader societal context of Portugal where, after 
1974, inconvenient episodes of the wars in Africa were often silenced and 
kept away from the public. Therefore, speaking to the militaries who con-
ducted the massacre and finding the survivors in order to record their testi-
monies would provide material to contest the way the wars in Mozambique 
and elsewhere were historicised.50 
After having investigated information available about the massacre and 
after meeting some of the Portuguese soldiers involved in it, Cabrita en-
countered Antonino Melo who had commanded this operation. While oth-
ers talked about the committed violence without feelings of regret, the reac-
tion of Melo was different: 
 
“Obviously, I had the idea that he was a monster and postponed the interview with 
him until the end. I thought I would be badly received. […] many years have passed 
                                                 
49 Interview with Felícia Cabrita conducted by the author on 26 July 2010 in Lis-
bon. 
50 See for example the volume on the history of the war in Mozambique published 
by the General Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces: Comissão para o Estudo 
das Campanhas de África, Resenha histórico-militar das Campanhas de África: 
Dispositivo das nossas forças: Moçambique (Lisboa: Estado-Maior do Exército, 
1989). Recent publications in military history seem also to be characterised 
mainly by unilateral perspectives. See Santos Lourenco and Keese, Die block-
ierte Erinnerung, 239-240. 
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since then, but in contrast to what I had imagined, I met a suffering man who was 
conscious about what he had done and who was disturbed because of all this.”51 
 
The emotional state Melo was in, even two decades after the massacre had 
been committed, pointed to “a sense of remorse, regret, or sorrow that ac-
companies admission of a wrong”.52 Following the journalist, this constitut-
ed an important condition for his later participation in the documentary. 
Additionally, the recognition of an offense is often a first step in a process 
leading to a possible apology that can motivate gestures of forgiveness or 
even a process of reconciliation. 
When Cabrita had spoken to the Portuguese soldiers, she decided to go 
to Mozambique in order to search for the survivors of this extremely violent 
incident. She succeeded in finding some of them. Her encounters and inter-
views with the survivors resulted in an article published in the weekly Ex-
presso.53 Cabrita’s commitment in 1992 constitutes an important element in 
the later process of the production of the documentary film; it enabled her 
to establish relationships with persons in Portugal and Mozambique who 
had experienced the violence of Wiriyamu.54 This social interaction was a 
crucial basis for the making of the film and consequently provided the 
framework within which the apology of Antonino Melo would take place. It 
is, however, important to bear in mind that without the decision of the tele-
vision channel SIC to invest in the film project, hardly anything would have 
happened. 
The project was proposed to SIC as a part of the series Grande Report-
agem by Felícia Cabrita and Paulo Camacho, when the 25th anniversary of 
the massacre was approaching.55 Cabrita asked Antonino Melo to write a 
                                                 
51 Interview Cabrita. 
52 Howard-Hassman and Lombardo, Words Require Action, 219. 
53 Felícia Cabrita, Os Mortos não sofrem, Expresso. Revista, 5 December 1992, 
12-21. 
54 In her articles, Cabrita uses a journalistic style, mainly based on re-narration of 
the testimonies given by the survivors of the massacre. This proceeding is criti-
cised by Dhada who states that Cabrita leaves the villagers again “mute”. Dha-
da, Contesting Terrains over a Massacre, 271. 
55 Simultaneously, Cabrita did work on another article about the massacre for the 
journal Expresso, which was published shortly after the screening of the docu-
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diary about his experience in Mozambique, which later served as one of the 
main sources for the script of the documentary.56 Thus, Cabrita had to de-
cide which of the former Portuguese soldiers would be the protagonist of 
the film. She asked Antonino Melo, “because he had shown great regret du-
ring the first work [in 1992 and wanted to] […] apologise”.57 According to 
Cabrita, Melo almost immediately agreed upon participating in the film al-
though in similar cases “many former combatants [...] are reluctant or un-
willing to participate for fear of reprisal, prosecution or the stigma that 
could follow such disclosures”.58 
As the presence of a non-convicted war crime perpetrator in Mozam-
bique seemed to be a risky undertaking, the film team took some precau-
tionary measures: 
 
“Supposedly, his [Antonino Melo’s] name was horrifying in Mozambique. […] 
Therefore, I was very cautious and his name was always hidden. We went along 
with him pretending that he was our cameraman. Because we had two cameramen, 
one Portuguese and one from Mozambique that was also working for SIC.”59 
 
This kind of approach is of course highly ambiguous. On the one hand, An-
tonino Melo belonged to a unit of the Commandos involved in a war crime 
and had never been prosecuted for it. On the other hand, he was the only 
one of the Portuguese soldiers who had shown regret, was willing to go to 
Mozambique and to be confronted with the past. However, this obvious and 
inevitable dilemma has to be seen in the context of the film, where a kind of 
exculpation of Antonino Melo is proposed, as will be shown below. 
                                                                                                  
mentary on television. Felícia Cabrita, Wiriyamu, Expresso. Revista, 21 Novem-
ber 1998, 154-171. 
56 Interview Cabrita. As Melo was born in Mozambique, he did not only write 
about his military experience and the massacre but also about his life in Beira 
and in the capital Lourenço Marques (now Maputo). One can presume that this 
twofold narrative had a better chance to be accepted by SIC in comparison to a 
script that would only include the oral reconstruction of the massacre. 
57 Interview Cabrita. 
58 Breen Smyth, Truth Recovery, 10. 
59 Interview Cabrita. 
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In 1998, the film team went to Mozambique and filmed in Maputo, Bei-
ra and in Tête, at places connected to the biography of Antonino Melo. This 
included places such as the school he went to, the hotel where he spent his 
honeymoon, and the house in Beira where he used to live as a child. Then, 
in and near Tête, the team split up. While Paulo Camacho, the cameraman 
Karl de Sousa and Antonino Melo were filming at sites around Cahora Bas-
sa, at the river Mazói, and at other locations, Felícia Cabrita and the other 
cameraman Paulo Cepa were searching for the survivors: 
 
“[…] we managed to search for the individuals with whom I had talked five years 
before. The idea was to find the same persons, bring them to Wiriyamu, where a 
monument exists that contains some of the bones of the victims […] There, a meet-
ing with Antonino Melo would take place, but on the condition that neither they nor 
Melo knew the date on which the encounter would be happening.”60 
 
Cabrita found some of the survivors and interviewed them again on their 
experience of the massacre. She met again with the people whose families 
had been destroyed by the excessive violence of the Portuguese Comman-
dos and the involved PIDE agents. At the same time, she was trying to get a 
sense of how the survivors would react in case of meeting one of the perpe-
trators: 
 
“I would interview them again and pose always a question in the end: If one day, 
one of those men came back here in order to apologise for what he did, how would 
they react? […] After having talked to everybody, I understood that there was no 
danger. There was one young man, he was a bit nervous, but I thought that [due to 
the presence of the oldest] […] a lack of control was impossible. So, I was relatively 
calm about the situation.”61 
 
Taking into account the professionalisation of experts in the context of 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions nowadays,62 it is surely doubtful 
                                                 
60 Interview Cabrita. 
61 Interview Cabrita. 
62 See for example Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Intersubjectivity and Embodiment: 
Exploring the Role of the Maternal in the Language of Forgiveness and Rec-
onciliation, Signs 36, 3 (2011), 541-551. 
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whether a journalist has the capacity, the skills and time to prepare people 
who suffer from traumatic experiences, for an encounter with a perpetrator. 
Nonetheless, the survivors accepted to speak with her about the massacre; 
and despite the preliminary work and judging the potential consequences 
for Antonino Melo, it was all a risky task. Moreover, it was difficult to 
foresee the consequences for him in such a situation, as this was no “offici-
ally promoted truth recovery mechanism”63 but only a television project 
without the approval of the Mozambican authorities. At this point, it is im-
portant to mention two further aspects: first, Antonino Melo, as other for-
mer combatants of the ‘colonial war’, had already begun a psychological 
treatment with the well-known psychiatrist Afonso de Albuquerque before 
the work on the documentary had started.64 Secondly, regarding the victims 
and their preparation for the meeting with the perpetrator there is little in-
formation accessible. It can be presumed that they drew on the general 
background of national reconciliation in Mozambique when they were 
faced with the situation of how to deal with the presence of Antonino Melo 
and the film team.65 
                                                 
63 Breen Smyth, Truth Recovery, 8. 
64 The group around Albuquerque was the first to recognize the long-term conse-
quences of post-traumatic stress disorder in the case of the former combatants of 
the ‘colonial war’ in Portugal. Carlos Anunciação, ‘Stress Traumático’: Fenó-
meno, etiologia e tratamento, Revista de Psicologia Militar 10 (1997), 147-161, 
here: 150. 
65 A public judgment with a subsequent re-integration of the so-called traitors who 
collaborated with the colonial regime took place around 1980. It is reported that 
the ‘compromised’ showed generally gratitude and enthusiasm for the learning 
process at those staged meetings framed by a regime of a socialist one party sys-
tem. The long-term effect of this process is difficult to measure due to the 16-
year war. A process of national reconciliation and a silence followed the General 
Peace Agreement in 1992 over the conflict that had stopped immediately. For-
mer adversaries got along apparently without any “rancor over past abuses”. 
Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Chal-
lenge of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2011), 200; Andrea Bartoli, 
Forgiveness and Reconciliation in the Mozambique Peace Process, in: For-
giveness and Reconciliation. Religion, Public Policy & Conflict Transformation, 
ed. Raymond G. Helmick and Rodney Lawrence Petersen (Philadelphia: Tem-
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When the day of the meeting arrived, the teams made an appointment at 
the memorial of Wiriyamu. Until that particular moment, the protagonists 
in the film – the victims and the perpetrator – had only spoken about their 
experiences separately in the presence of a journalist, the camera, and the 
cameraman. The encounter was thus a particular situation because it im-
plied a personal face-to-face confrontation between victims and the perpe-
trator, who had not met before. 
When remembering the encounter between the survivors and Melo, Fe-
lícia Cabrita foregrounded three aspects. The first is connected to her per-
sonal experience and her work as a journalist. At the moment when Melo 
approached the group standing next to the monument and started to intro-
duce himself as the commander of the troops that had committed the mas-
sacre, 
 
“[…] it was somehow one of the most impressing moments in my work as a journal-
ist, and I always do complicated jobs. But I think it was the only time that I got emo-
tionally involved and had to turn around, when Melo started to speak […] I had to 
turn around, I could not hold it and started to cry.”66 
 
The second aspect mentioned by Cabrita relates to a reaction of one of the 
survivors who recognises Melo not primarily as a perpetrator but as the one 
who had spared some lives in the situation of the mass killing: 
 
“The girl [Augusta Creya] who had told me five years before, when I had done the 
first work, that a blond man had saved her and her mum in those conditions, gave 
                                                                                                  
pleton Foundation Press, 2001), 361-382. For the issue of the “compromised” 
see the homepage by Colin Darch: The Comprometidos, 1978-1982, Mozam-
bique History Net, http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/comprometidos.html, ac-
cessed 27 February 2012. Some information about this is also provided in a per-
sonal account of a former colonial soldier who also participated in the massacre 
of Wiriyamu: Dalila Cabrita Mateus, Valeriano Baúlque. Entrevista, in: Memó-
rias do Colonialismo e da Guerra, ed. Dalila Cabrita Mateus (Porto: ASA, 
2006), 649-659, here: 657-658. 
66 Interview Cabrita. 
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Melo a hug and thanked him. […] On the one hand, it is revolting […] It is difficult. 
[…] Because they knew that this man had destroyed their families.”67 
 
In this statement, the ambiguity regarding Melo as a brutal perpetrator be-
comes evident. The monstrousness of the soldier as a killing machine is hu-
manized. The gesture of embracing described by Cabrita underscores this 
view. It is however not evident that this is a gesture of forgiveness.68 One 
can presume that her reaction demonstrates mainly how grateful she is for 
not having been murdered. However, the question whether she forgives 
Melo for murdering parts of her family, is not explicitly mentioned and 
therefore remains open. 
The third aspect emphasised by Cabrita has to do with the local Chief. 
After Melo did apologise and after the spontaneous reaction of the girl, it 
was the Oldest to express his view regarding the apology brought forward 
by Melo. 
 
“And the answer of the oldest was ‘There were a lot of wars after that one, and even 
worse ones’. […] That people suffered a lot, not only with our presence but also af-
terwards continued to suffer. But there exists a capacity of accepting the adversary 
and accepting the other who comments on his behaviour and [and the deeds commit-
ted].”69  
 
Here, the excessive violence of December 1972 is contextualized in the 
postcolonial history of Mozambique. Following independence, the country 
did not reach peace but entered in another armed conflict due to its geopo-
litical situation as a neighbour of Apartheid states like South Africa. Anoth-
er fact mentioned by Cabrita is the virtue of those Mozambicans who are 
able to accept a perpetrator who explains his deeds done in the past. But in 
this case, such a reaction could at most be conceived as the starting point 
                                                 
67 Interview Cabrita. 
68 Gobodo-Madikizela describes a case where women forgive the person that had 
murdered their sons by expressing their forgiveness verbally and through the 
gesture of embracing. Both verbal explanation and gesture of the women are 
preceded by specific emotions that trigger feelings of empathy. Gobodo-Ma-
dikizela, Intersubjectivity and Embodiment, 346-347. 
69 Interview Cabrita. 
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for the beginning of a process of dialogue and acknowledgment, because 
there are no convincing signs and expressions of forgiveness or reconcilia-
tion. 
In Cabrita’s view, the apology of Antonino Melo was well received and 
accepted by the survivors. Therefore, the journalistic practice, the docu-
mentary film work and the interaction with and between the different actors 
involved in this process apparently had a positive outcome. She remembers 
that on the day after the encounter Melo was spending time with the survi-
vors on their machambas (vegetable garden, small territories for subsis-
tence agriculture), looking at the cattle and having lunch with them. It 
seems that “he had become a family member from one day to another”.70 
This comment suggests a constructive effect of Melo’s apology on the sur-
vivors who welcomed him and got along with him. It is however necessary 
to question this perspective, ask for other reactions to the apology of Anto-
nino Melo, and explore if his gesture led to forgiveness or even reconcilia-
tion. In order to do this, it will be necessary to analyze not only the making 
of the film but also the film in its final version as broadcasted on the televi-
sion channel SIC in November 1998. 
 
The edited version 
 
In order to reconstruct the historical events, the documentary Return to  
Wiriyamu relies mainly on personal accounts of eyewitnesses. The central 
figures of the film are the officer Antonino Melo who commanded the mas-
sacre and the surviving victims of Wiriyamu. The film is structured as fol-
lows: In the first part, it focuses on the biography of Melo, in particular on 
his childhood, youth and early manhood. These stages in his live are con-
nected to places in Maputo and Beira. Furthermore, his military education 
is highlighted in order to explain the ideological background and cultural 
context Melo’s generation was influenced by. In this section, a considerable 
amount of footage is used. Towards the second part of the film, the team 
gets closer and closer to Tête. There, the encounter takes place at Wiriyamu 
and Melo apologises for his deeds to the survivors of the massacre. After-
wards, the documentary brings together different points of view in order to 
reconstruct the massacre of Wiriyamu without any reference to archival im-
                                                 
70 Interview Cabrita. 
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ages. Among the collected voices are the testimonies of survivors, Spanish 
fathers and sisters of the mission in Tête, former colonial soldiers, and of 
Antonino Melo. Consequently, within the structure of the film the narrative 
gains a new dimension: the monologue of Antonino Melo is enriched by 
northern-Mozambican voices that give a view on the experience of the vic-
tims. Through the video interviews, the survivors are able to tell an experi-
ence firsthand that until then was just known to the public through the me-
diation of Spanish missionaries, a few newspaper articles, and scarce histo-
riographical accounts.71 
The encounter between Antonino Melo and the survivors took place at 
the memorial for the victims of Wiriyamu. Melo reaches the place by car 
and after leaving, the camera follows him while approaching the group wai-
ting for him. Here, a deep synthesiser sound is introduced and creates sus-
pense. Melo joins the group and since everyone knows about the purpose of 
the meeting, he comes straight to the point using the following words: 
 
“Good day. You are the Oldest? Many years ago, I was the commander of the 
Commandos that came to this village and killed a lot of people, like you remember, 
at that time we were all young and got orders from our generals to come here and 
kill the villagers. 25 years later I am here again, I want to honour the dead, those 
who died that day, and I would like to apologise to the survivors for everything that 
happened.”72  
 
In his statement Melo mentions different aspects. First, he chooses to ad-
dress Baera, the Oldest, whom he thus considers the most important person 
in this situation. The Oldest here is probably seen as a respected person 
with authority and decision power. Supposedly, there are hopes by Melo 
that if Baera would forgive him, the other survivors would follow his way. 
                                                 
71 See for example José Amaro, Massacres Na Guerra Colonial: Documentos Se-
cretos: Tete, Um Exemplo (Lisboa: Ulmeiro, 1976). The individual meaning of 
each testimony is modified by their inclusion into the narrative of the documen-
tary film. But in the separate shots, viewers are still confronted with the survi-
vors that tell the stories of their suffering, sometimes looking straight into the 
camera. Such records have definitely a different impact than a written re-nar-
ration of their experience.  
72 Cabrita and Camacho, Regresso a Wiriyamu, 00:32:38-00:33:20. 
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A second point consists in acknowledging the mass murder of the villagers 
in 1972 – an important point, since the Portuguese Armed Forces had offi-
cially denied the killing of the 400 people.73 But Melo does not fully admit 
his guilt. Instead, he expresses his leading role in the incident using the 
third person plural to indicate that he was part of a military unit that com-
mitted the massacre. Thus, he avoids connecting a specific deed to his very 
person. Thirdly, he makes a distinction between his identity as a young man 
and soldier that aims at attributing the guilt to the Commander-in-Chief or 
other commanders and therefore to factors that he as an individual obvious-
ly could not influence because he and the commandos unit were only ‘fol-
lowing orders’. Furthermore, he tries to introduce a broader human practice 
that respects the memory of the dead. This appears to be a universal condi-
tion, but in fact one has to be careful here, as perspectives on how the dead 
are to be honoured might differ in the context of military tradition, religion 
or in more broader terms of Portuguese and northern Mozambican society 
and culture.74 Melo finally states that he returned in order to apologise to 
the survivors. But an apology is not only addressed at a particular individu-
al or group, it also should include a specification of the wrongs committed. 
Melo dismisses such clarity by declaring “for everything that happened”. 
Considering the reflections of Smith one would have to problematize the 
status of this statement as an apology, for it does not correspond to what 
Smith defines as a “categorical apology”.75 It seems that this is a moment of 
avoiding to take responsibility. However, the way in which Melo articulates 
his apology can also be seen in relation to the emotions that appear in such 
situations: Commonly shame, guilt, embarrassment, remorse, and regret 
emerge.76 In the view of Cabrita, as Melo speaks, his “voice is faltering” 
                                                 
73 But since he comes as a private person embedded in a film project and not as a 
representative of the army, this acknowledgment has its limits, especially having 
in mind any kind of material reparations. 
74 For apologies in diverse religious and cultural context, see Smith, I Was Wrong, 
114-125. 
75 Among a variety of aspects, identification of harm is central to the categorical 
apology: “The offender will identify each harm, taking care not to conflate sev-
eral harms into one general harm or apologize for only a lesser offense or the 
‘wrong wrong’.” Ibid., 141. 
76 Ibid., 101. 
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and he “is ashamed” of the past wrongs.77 Moreover, it seems that there is 
another emotion to be considered. Notice that Melo is somewhat aloof as he 
speaks and that this uneasiness is potentially owed to feelings of prudence 
and/or fear. Both Felícia Cabrita and the cameraman Karl de Sousa are con-
vinced that Melo was seriously worried about the encounter. He even had 
an escape plan in case of an attempt of taking revenge. Therefore, the avoi-
dance to designate his particular deeds in the very beginning of the encoun-
ter possibly reveals a certain precaution. In this respect, one could also 
speak of a strategic character that informs the speech of Antonino Melo. 
After the apology, Baera, the Oldest, answers him in local language,78 
which is then translated into Portuguese by an interpreter who remains in-
visible: 
 
“[…] we don’t bear you any grudge, because we know very well that war is war, be-
cause it wasn’t you alone, it was an order to conduct the massacre here. Now it is 
necessary that we get along well with you.”79 
 
Baera asserts that there is no danger for Melo and sets the frame for a 
peaceful interaction without vengeance. He acknowledges the situation of 
war as well as the conditions mentioned by Melo, and is thus following the 
provided argument of attributing the guilt to others and not primarily to this 
specific person. However, what follows neither constitutes an explicit ac-
ceptance of Melo’s apology nor does it express any kind of forgiveness. In-
stead, the Oldest just points to a future process of getting closer and estab-
lishing a good relationship. In his position as authority he obviously pro-
ceeds in a cautious manner. 
Besides the verbal exchange, one has to consider another moment at the 
beginning of the encounter. After having expressed the apology and having 
received the answer from the Oldest, Melo moves towards him and reaches 
                                                 
77 Cabrita, Massacres em África, 277. 
78 Curiously, while he is speaking, Baera does not appear in a medium close up, as 
Melo does. Instead, the camera keeps focusing on Melo, in a medium shot/me-
dium close up shot. The voice of Baera is even lowered and an inner monologue 
by Melo who explains his nervousness is superimposed on the voice that speaks 
in a local language. 
79 Cabrita and Camacho, Regresso a Wiriyamu, 00:33:38-00:34:01. 
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out his hand. The offer for shaking hands is accepted by Baera who also 
moves towards the other. This physical interaction seemingly closes the 
scene in front of the camera and suggests that the apology might have a 
positive effect on the future relation between the former aggressor and the 
victims. Nevertheless, as I have shown above, such a gesture can have vari-
ous interpretations. Therefore, one could on the contrary presume that there 
is little empathy here between the protagonists, as they did not embrace.80 
Shaking hands in this case can also signal a gendered dimension of apology 
due to forms of masculinity that are connected to cultural and different so-
cial settings (e.g. military education). Somehow, as they do not show emo-
tions and as the film does not give any further clues of the recorded mo-
ment – at the level of the voice over, for instance – it is difficult to under-
stand whether there were other signs and/or gestures of acceptance or for-
giveness.81 
After Melo’s apology, conversations between the victims and the perpe-
trator took place near the monument where they talked about what had hap-
pened on the day of the massacre. The film puts parts of this encounter and 
parts of the previously recorded interviews with the respective protagonists 
together in order to reconstruct the massacre. Here, a series of tensions and 
difficulties become visible. 
As Cabrita mentioned, there was one of the survivors who was a bit 
“nervous”.82 But at least two survivors of the massacre in the film did not 
seem to welcome the presence of the Portuguese military: António Michone 
                                                 
80 Such a physical interaction happened for instance during the Lusaka Meeting in 
June 1974, where Foreign Minister of Portugal, Mário Soares embraced the fu-
ture President of Mozambique Samora Machel, “an attempt to fix the talks from 
the beginning in a non-adversarial context”. MacQueen, The Decolonization of 
Portuguese Africa, 133. The gesture of embracing plays also a significant role in 
other apologetic context as observes Gobodo-Madikizela, Intersubjectivity and 
Embodiment, 546-547. 
81 This view based on the film can be contrasted with Cabrita’s perspective. She 
writes that while Baera answered, the “rest of the group nods with every word of 
the Oldest. Tenente, the rudest, perhaps motivated by the reaction of the others, 
alleviates and greets him [Melo].” It is a moment that is not visible in the docu-
mentary. Cabrita, Massacres em África, 278. 
82 Interview Cabrita. 
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and Vasco Tenente. The case of Vasco Tenente deserves special attention 
because this specific case allows us to observe how through the use of cin-
ematic montage the different perspectives of the historical event brought 
forward by each of the participating protagonists come together. Further-
more, Tenente plays a crucial role in complicating the issue of apology that 
is at stake here. This will also become evident later when analysing the end 
of the film, where he and Melo appear.  
The problematic dimension of the encounter is already visible in the 
scene of the apology, where the camera focuses not only on the interaction 
between Baera, the Oldest, and Melo, but also observes the face of one of 
the survivors, Vasco Tenente. The viewers can see his rather hostile facial 
expression framed by a close up, which emphasises the expressed emotion-
al state associated to feelings like non-acceptance, anger, or grudge. This 
reaction of rejection is connected to the fact that he lost his whole family in 
the massacre. Framed by a medium long shot, Tenente stands in front of 
Melo and explains: “I am alone, my mother, my brothers died here because 
of the war. This is the only thing that I can tell you.”83 
In the beginning of this section of the film, Antonino Melo explains that 
there was an order to ‘clean up the zone’ which meant murdering everyone 
present there. In December 1972 the systematic murder started, although 
violent interrogations conducted by the PIDE agents did not reveal any 
connections between the locals and the Mozambican Liberation Front Fre-
limo. Melo acknowledges that due to a lack of ammunition it was not pos-
sible to kill all villagers by shooting and that it was he who took the deci-
sion to gather people in the huts and kill them by throwing grenades into 
the huts: 
 
“One began to put the people into the huts, in groups, and the soldiers threw gre-
nades in there, either they died burning or the ones that eventually managed to flee 
were shot.”84 
 
Melo’s explanations about the massacre given in the shade of a tree can be 
seen as a late oral confession that breaks with the conventions of military 
discipline – turning public a war crime as a former member of the armed 
                                                 
83 Cabrita and Camacho, Regresso a Wiriyamu, 00:34:08-00:34:19. 
84 Cabrita and Camacho, Regresso a Wiriyamu, 00:39:31-00:39:42. 
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forces. Interestingly, Melo uses the third person “one” in this instance indi-
cating therefore a collective action. Such a statement can be regarded as 
problematic in this apologetic context because the “active voice claims re-
sponsibility. The passive does not.”85 Only several scenes later in the film 
he affirms, “I reached the point, where I threw a grenade into a hut”. After 
the explosion, Melo remembers, the roof of the hut blew up. Finally, the 
huts were burned with the villagers inside. 
The survivors confirm this proceeding although with some differences. 
At the memorial site, Vasco Tenente, whose mother died in the massacre, 
speaks about his survival: “Then, they put us into the hut of my mother. 
When we were inside […] they closed the door and threw in a grenade.”86 
He continues:  
 
“When I was with my mother in the hut, […]. We did hide under the cereal pot. 
When we were under the cereal pot, the door opened with the explosion. I took that 
way and escaped.”87 
 
When Tenente explains how he escaped, images from the second camera 
show him together with António Melo at the memorial site and thereby 
make the dialogical structure of the meeting at the memorial visible. As 
Gobodo-Madikizela observes in the context of Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions in South Africa, such a dialogue can allow “victims and sur-
vivors to revisit the sites of trauma, […]. Through dialogue, victims as well 
as the greater society come to recognize perpetrators as human beings who 
failed morally.”88 
Another person who appears in the film and who contributes to Tenen-
te’s testimony is Baúque, a former colonial soldier of the Special Forces 
Commandos.89 He already affirmed in an earlier scene that villagers trying 
                                                 
85 Smith, I Was Wrong, 35. 
86 Cabrita and Camacho, Regresso a Wiriyamu, 00:40:33-00:40:47. 
87 Cabrita and Camacho, Regresso a Wiriyamu, 00:40:53-00:41:09. 
88 Gobodo-Madikizela, Intersubjectivity and Embodiment, 543. 
89 Like most of the former African soldiers that appear in the film, Baúque was in-
terviewed in Maputo and not in Wiriyamu. All these Mozambicans had passed 
through the process of the Comprometidos in the 1970s (see footnote 65). But 
they had not revealed details about the massacre at that time. Both Felícia Cabri-
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to escape were also shot and confirms here that he remembers a child run-
ning away during the massacre. As Vasco Tenente says it was not easy to 
escape from the murdering: “Then, they wanted to kill me and shot at me, I 
did not count how many times they shot at me.”90 His account is followed 
again by a statement of the former colonial soldier, who asserts, that he did 
not try to shoot at a child he saw running away. What remains open in the 
juxtaposition of these two statements is whether the child Baúque saw was 
in fact Tenente or another person or whether other soldiers of the Comman-
dos had tried to shot Tenente. 
In this scene, the perspectives of survivors and perpetrators on the mas-
sacre are spliced together in a particular way. The filmic montage of the 
different testimonies enables to confront the accounts of Vasco Tenente, 
Melo, and Baúque with each other. But there is no voice off that would ex-
plain or guide the viewer’s attention to assure the ‘truth’ of one of the ver-
sions. The viewer is left with an impression of uncertainty about whose me-
mories might be right. However, the survivor’s testimonies have a strong 
impact and the film foregrounds, although in a very particular way, the phy-
sical marks that the colonial violence had left on their bodies. In this con-
text, their scars provide evidence for the committed acts and authenticate 
their narratives. Consequently, the film assures that there is no doubt that 
the Portuguese commandos committed those violent acts. On the other 
hand, there is an impression that the veterans of the Commandos intend to 
safeguard the image of the colonial armed forces from crimes like killing 
children or raping women. Various survivors also address such aspects in 
the film; however, the perpetrators neither confirm nor deny them direct-
ly.91 In such particular scenes of the film, one is confronted with the fact 
                                                                                                  
ta and Camilo de Sousa confirm that it was only when Antonino Melo arrived in 
Maputo for the making of the documentary that they spoke about what happened 
in December 1972. The reason for this was firstly, that, they were still accepting 
Melo as their (former) superior. Secondly, they were assured that the documen-
tary was not to be broadcasted on Mozambican television. 
90 Cabrita and Camacho, Regresso a Wiriyamu, 00:41:09-00:41:39. 
91 Melo assumes that the massacre was a criminal act. Although in some moments 
of the documentary he does not fully recognise the violent acts of the massacre 
described by the survivors (rape for instance). He just affirms that the area of the 
village was so big that he could not control every move of the soldiers. There-
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that this documentary is no formal truth recovery process that can provide 
“a structure within which irreconcilable accounts can be juxtaposed and 
compared”. On the contrary, it appears, that sometimes “the contest be-
tween divergent accounts [...] occur[s] in a piecemeal […] fashion”.92 
The tension between Vasco Tenente and Antonino Melo is not resolved 
at the end of the film. Instead, both of them are shown in separate scenes at 
the memorial of Wiriyamu and this in turn highlights the ambiguous effects 
of the encounter and the apology. First, Tenente appears: 
 
“Twenty five years passed and we are still collecting the bones. Here, a lot of people 
died. […] A lot of people died in the forest and we were still not able to collect all of 
the bones. When I find some of the bones, I have to store them at the monument.”93 
 
After this statement, Tenente puts the collected bones into a small reposito-
ry at the monument. It seems that he, whose family was killed during the 
massacre, is still struggling with this loss. The images and his account 
about how he and others relate to this place that constitutes a crucial point 
in their biographies, suggest that Tenente did not forgive Melo for the 
things he had done. Like in other cases, “certain kinds of damage and 
judgments may nevertheless linger indefinitely”.94 This impression is un-
derscored in the film insofar as Tenente is shown alone at the memorial and 
not together with Melo. 
In the next sequence, Antonino Melo visits the memorial. As he ap-
proaches the monument the camera follows him and the voice off reflects 
his thoughts: 
 
“During many years, I tried to forget the hell of that day. I decided to go back in or-
der to resolve this story definitely and find some tranquillity. I even thought that 
they would kill me. But it turned out worse. Those who I destroyed welcomed me 
                                                                                                  
fore, Melo doubts some of the related acts and states: “I didn’t see such things 
and don’t know if they happened.” Cabrita and Camacho, Regresso a Wiriyamu, 
00:30:27-00:31:32. 
92 Breen Smyth, Truth Recovery, 9. 
93 Cabrita and Camacho, Regresso a Wiriyamu, 00:57:29-00:58:19. 
94 Smith, I Was Wrong, 133. 
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peacefully and without critique. It was hard for me to understand them. What we 
did, was a criminal act.”95 
 
The violence at Wiriyamu, it seems, marked also some kind of turning 
point in the biography of Antonino Melo. His memory of the incident per-
sisted and created feelings of remorse that he wanted to get rid of through 
the encounter with the survivors. As it turns out, it was he who could not 
forgive himself whereas some of the villagers showed a reconciliatory atti-
tude.96 Melo’s inner conflict is visualised by the image of the small reposi-
tory in the memorial with the bones inside and covered by a glass window. 
There, against the background of the mortal remains, the mirror image of 
Antonino Melo appears. 
The documentary proposes that the apology had limited effects. No em-
bracing, no hand shaking, not even a joint visit to the memorial in the end. 
These two sides of the story of the massacre of Wiriyamu seem to continue 
being irreconcilable. But the juxtaposition of solitary rites of mourning and 
persisting troubling memories suggests a very ambiguous idea, namely that 
both survivor and perpetrator are haunted by the past. Their present lives 
are conditioned by what they experienced in 1972. It seems contradictory, 
but this leads to the effect, that – to a certain extend – the figure of Melo 
becomes a ‘victim’ as well, as he ‘suffers’ from what he has done.97 Conse-
                                                 
95 Cabrita and Camacho, Regresso a Wiriyamu, 00:58:20-00:58:54. 
96 Others, of course, did not welcome the initiative of Melo as the example of Vas-
co Tenente shows. One has to be cautious here. The dramatic aspect created by 
the documentary film does not necessarily mean that there had been a real ten-
sion between Tenente and Melo. Rather, one could think of this also as a filmic 
relationship that is shaped by conventions of television film making that often 
try to produce effects of suspense or surprise in order to convince the viewers to 
stay watching the programme. 
97 In an earlier scene, Melo describes how he and his unit went a second time to 
the crime scene at the beginning of the year 1973 in order to remove the corpses. 
After ‘cleaning up’, the Commandos got into an ambush. It is suggested that this 
was an attempt by the Portuguese Armed Forces to kill those soldiers who were 
not only perpetrators but also eyewitnesses of that massacre. Thus, Melo claims 
that he was an aim for attack. However, he was only a quasi victim because he 
eventually managed to dominate the situation. 
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quently, and despite all the efforts of giving voice to those survivors with-
out a voice, the documentary also constructs a rather ambiguous ‘com-
munity of victims’98 that once participated in the same historical event. 
Here, one can observe a specific victimizing discourse that shapes the fig-
ure of the perpetrator; Melo is not only conceived as the confessing soldier, 
but his characterization in the documentary points to a dimension of a man 
who was part of a generation of about 800,000 male Portuguese who partic-
ipated in a mandatory military service in the ‘colonial war’.99 His psycho-
logical and filmic victimization corresponds to an often-articulated opinion 
in Portugal, stating that those young men were sacrificed by the Estado No-
vo while implicitly downplaying their potential agency and responsibility 
for violent acts committed in the former colonies.100 This argument is also 
brought forward by the documentary film: Although Melo admits in the end 
that the massacre was a crime, he is ultimately not the one to be sentenced 
to have been guilty of this violence. One could rather, as the film suggests, 
hold the former Commander-in-Chief of the then colony Mozambique re-
sponsible for it. This was, as a caption reads in the closing credits of the 
film, General Kaúlza de Arriaga. 
                                                 
98  This is a term used by Judith Keilbach in order to analyse the specific inclu-
sion and treatment of Zeitzeugen in television documentaries. She explains that 
there is a recent trend to present a community of people that exists due to the 
common participation in the same historical event. There, one can observe a 
blurred distinction between victims and perpetrators. Judith Keilbach, Zeugen, 
Deutsche Opfer und traumatisierte Täter: Zur Inszenierung von Zeitzeugen in 
bundesdeutschen Fernsehdokumentationen über den Nationalsozialismus, Tel 
Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 31 (2003), 287-306, here: 300-301. 
99  Additionally, as the film tells in its first half, Melo’s family belonged to the 
group of ‘returnees’ that after the end of colonial rule in Mozambique left the 
country and lost nearly all their belongings due to the political circumstances 
at the time. 
100  Such a victimizing discourse is for instance provided by the Monument to the 
Overseas Combatants in Lisbon, which also includes a memorial that honours 
the approximately 9,000 fallen Portuguese soldiers of the ‘War in Overseas’. 
Teresa Pinheiro, Portugiesische Erinnerungskulturen, http://www.tu-chemnitz. 
de/phil/europastudien/swandel/erinnerung/kolonialkrieg.htm, accessed 3 No-
vember 2011.  




The analysis shows that the documentary film by Felícia Cabrita and Paulo 
Camacho is a complex audiovisual articulation connected to specific socio-
historical circumstances of the postcolonial relationships between persons 
from Mozambique and Portugal. It reflects the sophisticated and ambiguous 
nature of apologies for past wrongs. Through the critical observation and 
examination of the micro level of social interaction of this particular apolo-
getic context, the difficulties, ambiguities and emotions connected to this 
situation were considered. The film and its background exemplify how vic-
timhood and perpetration can be re-negotiated and modified. Simultaneous-
ly it also demonstrates how the effects of past wrongs continue to have a 
persisting impact on relationships between survivors and perpetrators up to 
the present. 
The film provided a specific framework for the apology of Antonino 
Melo, who, as one of the perpetrators, came back to Mozambique and visit-
ed Wiriyamu in order to apologise for his deeds to the survivors. Although 
a respectable and courageous act, the apology situation captured by the film 
proves to be ambiguous possibly due to the fact that victims and perpetra-
tors had not spoken directly to each other before. In this context, the apolo-
gy seems to be a starting point rather than the outcome of a common en-
deavour. 
As this analysis indicates, the structure of the filming process and the 
final media product differ to a considerable extend. Whereas Felícia Cabrita 
highlights a rather productive outcome, the film centres on the antagonistic 
positions of Antonino Melo and Vasco Tenente. The confrontation and fil-
mic juxtaposition of the testimonies of Melo, other former colonial soldiers, 
and the survivors, does not only reveal difficulties in reconstructing the his-
tory of the massacre, but they, too, hint at the problematic filmic construc-
tion of a ‘community of victims’. The film argues to a certain extend that 
the issue of the massacre is resolved neither between victims and perpetra-
tors nor in relation to the former responsible leading militaries of the Portu-
guese Armed Forces. 
In Portugal, the latter alludes to unfinished processes of transitional jus-
tice and is reflected by the subsequent debate, after the broadcasting of the 
documentary on television that centred on the figure of the former Com-
mander-in-Chief of Mozambique. Several journalists took up the opportuni-
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ty to investigate the possibility of convicting General Kaúlza de Arriaga for 
the massacre committed during his service in Mozambique.101 However, the 
Portuguese law determined prescription of such crimes after 15 years and 
thus did not enable a judgment of General Arriaga. In other words, despite 
the public discussion, Arriaga was not charged and did not change his atti-
tude regarding the ‘allegedly’ mass murder. When speaking about Wiriya-
mu, he continued to communicate the ‘official’ version stating “that ap-
proximately 60 persons died, among them terrorists and non-terrorists”.102 
He thereby ignores 
 
“[…] the reality of much of the tragedy of the war. Not only does he deny the signif-
icance of the massacres of civilians by the troops under his command, he also denies 
the disastrous conditions of the war, preferring to see the events of 1974 and the 
subsequent independence of the colonies as acts of political treason.”103 
 
This point of view is contradicted by the documentary, despite all ambigui-
ties and problems resulting from the editing and framing of the accounts of 
the interviewed survivors.104 In this respect, one cannot underestimate the 
value of the collected testimonies of the victims included in the film; be-
cause they constitute a crucial element in constructing an audiovisual evi-
dence of the violence carried out by the Portuguese Armed Forces during 
the war of decolonisation in Mozambique. As a journalist wrote, “the tele-
vision documentary about the massacre of Wiriyamu […] recovered the 
                                                 
101  Miguel Carvalho, Amaral quer julgar Kaúlza, O Independente, 5. 
102  Kaúlza de Arriaga quoted in João Paulo Guerra, Descolonização Portuguesa: 
O Regresso das Caravelas (Lisboa: Oficina dos Livros, 2009), 61. 
103  Paulo de Medeiros, Hauntings. Memory, Fiction and the Portuguese Colonial 
Wars, in: The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration, ed. Timothy G. 
Ashplant (London: Routledge, 2000), 209-210. 
104  Here, one could still complicate the picture and point to the linguistic dimen-
sion of the audiovisual testimonies. Some are given in broken Portuguese, oth-
ers in local language, and then translated in subtitles. Does an account given in 
Portuguese offer the same opportunities for articulation of suffering as the 
mother tongue? Hence, this alludes to the broad field of postcolonial linguistic 
politics in the PALOP. 
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memory of this genocide of 400 Mozambicans – men, women and chil-
dren”.105 
These brief remarks point to a broader field of postcolonial relation-
ships, in which the complex consequences of the war of decolonisation are 
discussed. This unfolding panorama of transnational memory practices that 
in the meantime goes beyond questions of guilt and is thus enabling new 
and other forms of interaction needs further investigation in order to ac-
quire more detailed and differentiated insights. It appears to be an urgent 
task because the common future and relationships between people from Af-
rican and European states may also depend on the negotiation of the coloni-
al past and wrongs connected to this shared history. In this respect, it will 
be crucial to discuss in a productive manner not only wrongs of the colonial 
period but the post-revolutionary processes in the countries of both conti-
nents as well. Some attempts pointing in this direction are already visible in 
a series of countries.106 In the context of globalised media representation, 
this holds true also for documentary productions. Since Return to Wiriyamu 
a number of documentaries have been produced on the topic of decolonisa-
tion in Portugal and other countries as well. By and large, these films aim at 
the production and transmission of knowledge about decolonisation, by 
bringing together the actors in these processes.107 An analysis of these films 
is yet to be made and can be productive for the understanding of the com-
plex dimensions of decolonisation, the cultural dimensions of memory poli-
tics and their negotiation in moving images. 
                                                 
105  Comment by Fernando Couto about the film in the weekly Domingo on 14 
February 1999; Fernando Couto, Vivências Moçambicanas (Maputo: Ndjira, 
2010), 73. 
106  Regarding Portugal: Patrick Chabal, Nós e a África. A Questão do Olhar, 
Africana Studia 1, 1 (1999), 67-84; Pinheiro, Facetten der Erinnerungskultur, 
21; Robert Stock, ‘Zusammenhalt und Einheit aller Kämpfer’. Die museale 
Repräsentation des Portugiesischen Kolonialkrieges (1961-1974) in der Ge-
genwart, Berliner Debatte Initial 20, 3 (2009), 117-26. 
107  The effects and consequences of these films, such as the series by Joaquim 
Furtado entitled The War. The Colonial, The War of Independence, The Over-




Facing Postcolonial Entanglement and the 
Challenge of Responsibility 





As has been argued persuasively, Germany emerged in 1919 as the first 
“postcolonial nation in a still-colonial world”.2 Under the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, she was stripped of her colonial possessions, which entailed what 
has been termed “phantom pain”3 – at least to a point in time when German 
national identity and indeed, existence had been put to enormously more 
momentous hazards. The years following World War II were occupied by 
various efforts to grapple with the grave and violent heritage of the Nazi 
                                                 
1  This contribution reflects part of my research carried out within the research and 
capacity building project “Reconciliation and social conflict in the aftermath of 
large-scale violence in Southern Africa: The cases of Angola and Namibia”, 
which is based at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, Freiburg and funded by the 
programme “Knowledge for Tomorrow” of the Volkswagen Foundation. 
2  Marcia Klotz, The Weimar Republic: A Post-Colonial State in a Still-Colonial 
World, in: Germany’s Colonial Pasts, ed. Eric Ames et al. (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2005), 135-147, here: 141.  
3  Leo Kreutzer, Deutsche Heimat und afrikanische Wahlheimat in Hans Grimms 
Roman “Volk ohne Raum”. Zur Dekolonisierung eines “Kolonialismus ohne 
Kolonien“, in: Erinnern verhandeln: Kolonialismus im kollektiven Gedächtnis 
Afrikas und Europas, ed. Steffi Hobuss and Ulrich Lölke (Münster: Westfäli-
sches Dampfboot, 2007), 179-193, here: 179. 
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war of expansion and the Holocaust. Overall, the colonial past was side-
lined in this process in public memory. Such ‘colonial amnesia’ has been 
questioned in particular in connection with the genocide perpetrated by the 
Schutztruppe (German colonial army) in 1904-1908 in what was then Ger-
man Southwest Africa, today independent Namibia.4 One may speak of par-
tial re-activation of a repressed content of public memory, which at least in 
its mainstream is linked to a clear re-evaluation, in effect reversing former 
interpretations. At the same time, this process forms part of a larger, trans-
national process of remembrance linked to wider post-colonial concerns, 
focusing here particularly on memory politics going on in Namibia. In this 
way, we observe a further stage of entangled history between Namibia and 
Germany that has been initiated during the 19th century, even several dec-
ades before formal colonisation took place in 1884. Concurrently, this per-
spective leads, on several levels to the politics of such post-colonial, trans-
national remembrance. 
Along with a brief rehearsal of the historical record, the following paper 
addresses a case of transnational and post-colonial politics of apology and 
reconciliation, which is of considerable current relevance and presents an 
experience still in the making. Negotiations and conflicts about the past and 
its meaning have acted on strategies of amnesia and marginalisation on 
both sides. The over-all process involves a surprising array of actors in a ra-
ther complex web that cannot be exhausted here. Still, as will emerge from 
the exposition, governments and non-state actors have mobilised divergent 
meanings and understandings of reconciliation. However, all these concep-
tions relate to one set of historical events, the Namibian War of 1903-1908.  
I begin by sketching out the divergent trajectories of remembrance that 
relate to the genocide, both in Namibia and in Germany. In the former, 
complexity is added by regional differences while in the latter case the dis-
cussion is inserted into the broader issues of post-World War II memory 
politics. This is followed by a closer look at the mnemoscape in Namibia 
contrasting memory practices and concerns of German speakers with those 
of descendants from the victims of genocide. I then recount exemplary me-
mory practices amongst Ovaherero and Nama in Central and Southern Na-
                                                 
4  As is usual in the literature, the term ‘Namibia’ will pertain to the country even 
before it was finally officially adopted at the time of independence in 1990. Oc-
casionally, GSWA or SWA will be used.  
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mibia. These practices testify to communal resilience and contrast starkly 
with the hegemonic, nationalist master narrative of the ruling party South 
West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), which focuses on the expe-
rience of the Northern regions. What emerges is a tension-ridden web of 
concerns and claims, both to spaces and to recognition. With a view partic-
ularly to the ongoing negotiation process of historical memory between 
Namibia and Germany, a closer look at how Namibians of various strands 
construe ‘Germany’ then provides further background for an understanding 
of this process itself, which has evolved in highly conflictual ways since the 
Namibian independence in 1990. This account then contrasts in particular 
state and non-state actors, the latter, mainly Namibian victims, represented 
by traditional leaders, and German advocacy groups. Noting the turning 
point of the centennial of the genocide in 2004, the process is taken up to 
the dramatic events surrounding the return of human skulls in Berlin in 
September 2011. In this way, the difficulties involved in unravelling the 
complex post-colonial situation are highlighted. Further, light is shed on the 
ways in which clearly divergent interests and concerns link up with post-
colonial memory issues. 
 
 
THE FIRST GENOCIDE OF THE 20TH CENTURY AND  
ITS REMEMBRANCE 
 
Most serious scholars concur that the campaigns of the Schutztruppe during 
the Namibian War amounted to the perpetration of genocide.5 This refers 
above all to the intent to annihilate not just combatants, but entire ethnic 
groups by various means. The same goes for the chain of command reach-
ing to the General Staff and the government in Berlin as well as to the em-
peror. The genocide was perpetrated, in a first stage by sealing off the wa-
terless Omaheke steppe in Eastern Namibia not allowing Ovaherero fugi-
tives to return to areas where they could survive. A second phase, this time 
also targeting Nama, is marked by concentration camps where men, wom-
en, and children were interned and forced to labour under conditions that 
resulted in exorbitant death rates. This was complemented by deportations, 
                                                 
5  Marion Wallace, A History of Namibia. From the Beginning to 1990 (London: 
Hurst, 2011), 177-182. 
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both inside Namibia and to the German colonies of Togo and Cameroon. A 
third stage refers to the Native Ordinances that stripped groups deemed in-
surgent of their land and worked towards transforming them into a docile 
labour resource by means of stiff pass laws, ceilings on settlement strength, 
and a prohibition to own large stock, which destroyed the symbolic fabric 
of Herero society.6 The resultant structure of settlement and land ownership 
is the hallmark of the landscape and settlement pattern in Central and Sou-
thern Namibia still today. 
Nevertheless, the survivors did coalesce to reassert the communal nex-
uses that had been shaken to their foundations. South African rule of 1915 
did not bring an end to the tribulations of indigenous Namibians, as many 
had hoped for. The reserves the new administration introduced were de-
signed as little more than repositories for migrant labour. Still, they afford-
ed opportunities for communal resilience.7 We shall turn to the form of 
commemorations that were linked to this resilience in the following section.  
In Germany, the response to the war and the genocide it involved was 
also significant – not only since arguably this was the last victorious war a 
German army fought during the 20th century. One salient feature is the 
high public profile of the genocide and other atrocities committed by Ger-
man troops. The Great General Staff published a lavish two-volume ac-
count of the war.8 A mushrooming array of books of fiction and memoirs 
extolled the exploits of the German troops and pointedly justified the anni-
hilation of indigenous peoples who supposedly had not put to good use the 
                                                 
6  Jürgen Zimmerer, Deutsche Herrschaft über Afrikaner. Staatlicher Machtan-
spruch und Wirklichkeit im kolonialen Namibia (Münster: Lit, 2001), 68-94. 
7  Reinhart Kössler, In search of survival and dignity. Two traditional communities 
in southern Namibia under South African rule (Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmil-
lan, 2005), part 1; Wolfgang Werner, “No one will become rich”: Economy and 
society in the Herero reserves in Namibia, 1915-1946 (Basel: Schlettwein 
1998).  
8  Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika. Auf Grund amtlichen Ma-
terials bearbeitet von der Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abteilung I des Großen Gene-
ralstabes. Erster Band: Der Feldzug gegen die Hereros (Berlin: Mittler, 1906); 
Die Kämpfe der deutschen Truppen in Südwestafrika. Auf Grund amtlichen Ma-
terials bearbeitet von der Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abteilung I des Großen Gene-
ralstabes. Zweiter Band: Der Hottentottenkrieg (Berlin: Mittler, 1907). 
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land given by God.9 Such literature was included in set readings in school.10 
The fledgling production of post cards took to the theme and conveyed a 
range of images, which included scenes of emaciated prisoners and execu-
tions.11 In addition, the political realignment known as the Bülow Block was 
forged in the ‘Hottentot Elections’ of 1907, which saw intense campaigning 
on the issues of the colonial war.12 Broadly speaking, one may say that  
these developments coincided with the ascendancy of what Geoff Eley has 
termed ‘radical nationalism’ in Germany.13 
In contradistinction to other genocides of the 20th century,14 even some 
of the more gruesome aspects were aggressively exposed to the public. In 
this way, acts that today would be categorised without question as crimes 
against humanity found their way into everyday German life. They were 
banalised and thus became more acceptable. Moreover, adversaries were 
                                                 
9  Gustav Frenssen, Peter Moors Fahrt nach Südwest. Ein Feldzugsbericht (Wind-
hoek: Benguela Publishers, 2002, 1st ed. 1906); Medardus Brehl, Vernichtung 
der Herero. Diskurse der Gewalt in der deutschen Kolonialliteratur (München: 
Wilhelm Fink, 2007). 
10  Gunther Pakendorf, The Literature of Expropriation: “Peter Moor’s Journey to 
South-West” and the Conquest of Namibia, in: Namibia in Perspective, ed. Ger-
hard Tötemeyer et al. (Windhoek: CCN, 1987), 172-183, here: 176.  
11  Felix Axster, “… will try to send you the best views from here”: Postcards from 
the Colonial War in Namibia (1904-1908), in: German colonialism, visual cul-
ture, and modern memory, ed. Volker M. Langbehn (New York: Routledge, 
2010), 55-70. 
12  Frank-Oliver Sobich, ‘Schwarze Bestien, rote Gefahr’: Rassismus und Antisozi-
alismus im deutschen Kaiserreich (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2006); John Philipp 
Short, Colonisation, War and the German Working-Class: Popular Mobilisation 
in the Reichstag Elections 1907 (Paper presented at the conference “1904-2004 
– Decontaminating the Namibian Past. A Commemorative Conference”, Uni-
versity of Namibia, Windhoek, 17-21 August 2004). 
13  Geoff Eley, Reshaping the Right: Radical Nationalism and the German Navy 
League, 1898-1908, The Historical Journal 21, 2 (1978), 327-354.  
14  Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, The Spectre of Genocide: Mass Murder in 
Historical Perspective (Cambride: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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pointedly framed in racial terms.15 All this may be understood as one fur-
ther strand within a tendency that enabled many Germans three or four dec-
ades later to victimise also their immediate neighbours.16 
Moreover, even after the loss of the colonies, the colonial quest was 
kept alive and many former agents of colonialism as well as institutions ser-
ving it or economic enterprises involved in colonial ventures, turned to the 
new colonial sphere that was envisaged in Eastern Europe during World 
War II.17 In this way, the colonial discourse remained largely unbroken in 
Germany after the loss of the colonies. This experience could be integrated 
into the larger picture of unjust humiliation ostensibly inflicted by the vic-
tors through the peace terms and thus fed into colonial revisionism. That at-
titude was taken up and its aims were pursued, with varying intensity by the 
Nazi regime well into World War II.18 
After World War II, colonial revisionism was no more an option, and a 
clear discursive break occurred. In West Germany, nurturing the tradition 
of the Schutztruppe was relegated to rather marginal groups while a majori-
ty found themselves preoccupied with seemingly more pressing issues. 
Moreover, for those who undertook seriously to grapple with Germany’s 
dire past of the first half of the 20th century, the shadow of the Shoah tend-
ed to overwhelm all other concerns. At the same time, the early loss of the 
colonies could now be viewed with a certain ‘relief’ as not being implicated 
in the conflicts and dirty wars that accompanied the sustained independence 
movements of the day.19 It may be argued that such colonial amnesia is still 
prevalent, even if on the other hand there is a tendency in popular culture to 
                                                 
15  Pascal Grosse, What Does German Colonialism Have to Do with National Soci-
alism? A Conceptual Framework, in: Germany’s Colonial Pasts, ed. Eric Ames 
et al. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 115-134.  
16  Omer Bartov, Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Ho-
locaust, The American Historical Review 103 (1998), 771-816; Reinhart Köss-
ler, From Genocide to Holocaust? Structural parallels, afrika spectrum 40 
(2005), 309-317. 
17  Jürgen Zimmerer, Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz? Beiträge zum Verhältnis von 
Kolonialismus und Holocaust (Berlin: Lit, 2011), chapter 10.  
18  Karsten Linne, Deutschland jenseits des Äquators? NS-Kolonialplanungen für 
Afrika (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2008).  
19  Kreutzer, Deutsche Heimat, 179. 
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transpose dramatic and sentimental fiction or film to the erstwhile colonies 
or generally, to ‘Africa’ where then decidedly German stories are played 
out.20 
However, the centenary of the genocide in 2004 marks a certain shift in 
memorialisation also in Germany. Enhanced awareness of and debate about 
the events enforced the interrelated issues of remembrance, apology, repa-
ration, and reconciliation. The interrelationship between these concepts is 
quite controversial. As will become clear, polar positions are represented by 
a clamour for silence or denialism along the lines of the otherwise well-
known ‘final stroke’ rhetoric; and on the other hand, the linkage between 
active memorialisation and reparation based on an official apology by the 
German government. In this case, reparation denotes more than material 
compensation, namely an actual process of restoring victims’ integrity and 
dignity through the full acknowledgment of past wrongs and their recogni-
tion as equals.21 These issues can be understood from the vantage point of 
2004 and subsequent developments. In each case, actors include govern-
ments as well as various strands of civil society. Arguably again, such dy-
namism as can be discerned in the issue derives from non-state actors. 
Their array differs starkly on the Namibian and on the German side. 
 
 
ACTORS, SITES AND EVENTS ON THE  
NAMIBIAN MNEMOSCAPE 
 
As should emerge from the following, it makes sense to operate with an in-
clusive notion of a mnemoscape to encompass the entire array of contradic-
tory memory landscapes, actualised and potential memory contents, and ac-
tor formations. Especially with reference to a highly variegated historical 
record and associated differential claims and concerns, it is important to 
                                                 
20  Wolfgang Struck, The Persistence of Colonial Fantasies: Colonialism as Melo-
drama on German Television, in: German Colonialism and National Identity, 
ed. Michael Perraudin and Jürgen Zimmerer (New York: Routledge, 2010), 224-
231.  
21  To Repair the Irreparable. Reparation and Reconstruction in South Africa, ed. 
Erik Doxtader and Charles Villa-Vicencio (Claremont: David Philip, 2006). 
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stress the spatial, temporal, as well as social dimensions of mnemoscape.22 
One important dimension of the latter concerns the starkly diverse endow-
ment of actors with resources and power. As a result, actors’ chances to 
make themselves heard are distributed quite unevenly. This forms a crucial 
aspect of the memory process. 
In Namibia, the commemoration of the war and the genocide began 
quite early. It encompassed two main, structurally opposed strands. On the 
one hand, the German colonial power started almost immediately after the 
event the ritual memory of the supposedly victorious Battle of the Water-
berg, which according to this reading had sealed the German claim to Na-
mibian soil with German blood. From this stems an annual ritual that was to 
become a mainstay of identity politics of German speakers in Namibia. It 
underwent several important changes, in particular reflecting efforts at alli-
ance building after World War II, first with Afrikaners, later also with 
groups involved in the attempts at internal settlement, notably Ovaherero.23 
This event, which consistently featured the German imperial flag, was fi-
nally banned by the president in 2003, thirteen years after independence; 
there was little activity by German speakers during the centennial year of 
2004.24 Another important and related dimension of the memory politics of 
German speakers in Namibia concerns colonial buildings, which are repre-
sented as central features of national heritage.25  
Up to 2009, arguably the most important and certainly the most con-
spicuous site with respect to this, was the ensemble of the Christuskirche 
and the Rider Statue in central Windhoek. Both were built as markers of the 
German claim to the land after the defeat of primary African resistance. In 
                                                 
22  Reinhart Kössler, Facing a Fragmented Past. Memory, Culture and Politics in 
Namibia, Journal of Southern African Studies 33 (2007), 362-382. 
23  Larissa Förster, Postkoloniale Erinnerungslandschaften. Wie Deutsche und He-
rero in Namibia des Kriegs von 1904 gedenken (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2010), 
185-231. 
24  Larissa Förster, The German Cemetery at the Waterberg, in: Genocide in Ger-
man South-West Africa. The Colonial War of 1904-1908 and its Aftermath, ed. 
Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller (Monmouth: Merlin, 2008), 252-258; 
Förster, Postkoloniale Erinnerungslandschaften, 318-329. 
25  Andreas Vogt, National Monuments in Namibia (Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmil-
lan, 2004). 
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the words of the German governor in 1912, the Rider Statue was intended 
as a symbolic statement “to proclaim to the world that we are and will re-
main masters here”26 while the church forms part of an array of similar, and 
evenly named buildings in various German colonies that served the same 
purpose.27  
In terms of memory politics, the removal of the Rider Statue some 150 
meters away from its original site clearing the ground for a monumental In-
dependence Memorial Museum became a rallying point for German speak-
ers shortly after the turn of the millennium. At the same time, the issue 
served as one of the rare instances when various communities with stakes in 
memory politics related to German colonialism communicated amongst 
each other at least in a minimal way. When plans to move the Rider became 
first known in public in 2001, the local German language newspaper in a 
random survey elicited responses such as ‘They want to take from Namibi-
ans all our history. They only value their own’.28 Significantly, ‘our’ and 
‘their’ here referred to rather vague entities, but obviously were constructed 
to exclude from ‘Namibians’ the incumbent government, which could boast 
a massive and uncontested majority. A more elaborate argument against the 
removal stressed the monument’s reference to the fallen Schutztruppe sol-
diers, which from this view motivated the sacralisation of the periodic me-
mory rituals performed at the site, such as the laying of wreaths. The claim 
of a ‘sacrosanct’ nature of the statue was linked, in some hazy way with the 
physical dangers it would face when removed from its pedestal and reloca-
ted.29 Counterarguments pointed to the aggressive form in which the mon-
                                                 
26  Quote in: Joachim Zeller, Kolonialdenkmäler und Geschichtsbewußtsein. Eine 
Untersuchung zur kolonialdeutschen Erinnerungskultur (Frankfurt a.M.: IKO, 
2000), 120. 
27  Markus Braun, EKD im Schatten des Kolonialismus. Jubiläum von Hundert Jah-
re Christuskirche, in: Windhoek transparent (online) 99 extra, 2011, http://www 
.transparentonline.de/index.php?option=com_joomdoc&task=doc_details&gid=
145&Itemid=77, accessed 14 June 2011. 
28  Allgemeine Zeitung (Windhoek), 6 June 2001. 
29  Andreas Vogt, Status und Zukunft des Reiterdenkmals – eine Denkschrift, All-
gemeine Zeitung, 20 June 2008. 
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ument asserts colonial, and German, domination of the country.30 Subtexts 
and more subtle discourses should be noted as well. Thus, an Otjiherero 
speaker pointed out at one occasion that as his father had instructed himself 
and his brother, the Rider marked the spot where the concentration camp 
had been located during the Namibian War;31 prisoners had also been used 
for constructing the Christuskirche. The statue was eventually relocated in 
front of the Alte Feste, the colonial fortress, which has been rededicated as 
National Museum. Significantly, the painstaking process of carefully hoist-
ing it from its pedestal, disassembling the latter, storing the entire ensemble 
for several months and re-assembling the complete monument was financed 
by private donations. This speaks clearly not only to the zeal of a large sec-
tion of the German speakers in the country to preserve specifically markers 
of the German colonial past, but also to the material means at their disposal 
to do so. In this way, the economic power of a rather small but dispropor-
tionately privileged group enables them to project quite vigorously their 
particular vision of the past, which to a considerable extent revolves around 
the denial of the genocide.32 The latter dimension became quite clear once 
again at the rededication ceremony for the Rider. Speeches skirted the reali-
ties of the war, while traditionalist associations from both Namibia and 
Germany, in particular the Association for the Tradition of Former Protec-
tion and Overseas Troops – Friends of the Former German Protectorates33 
figured prominently. The trope of reconciliation, which, though rather ill 
defined, is ubiquitous in post-colonial Namibia, was on this occasion trans-
                                                 
30  Phanuel Kaapama, Memory Politics, the Reiterdenkmal and the De-Colonisation 
of the Mind, The Namibian (Windhoek), 22 August 2008. 
31  Luther Zaire, oral statement, Bahnhof Langendreer, Bochum, 17 March 2004; 
personal communication, 21 June 2004. 
32  Reinhart Kößler, Im Schatten des Genozids. Erinnerung in einer extrem unglei-
chen Gesellschaft, in: Genozid und Gedenken. Namibisch-deutsche Geschichte 
und Gegenwart, ed. Henning Melber (Frankfurt a.M.: Brandes & Apsel, 2005), 
49-77; Reinhart Kössler, Entangled history and politics: Negotiating the past be-
tween Namibia and Germany, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 26, 3 
(2008), 313-339, here: 320-328. 
33  Traditionsverband ehemaliger Schutz- und Überseetruppen und der früheren 
deutschen Schutzgebiete; see also http://www.traditionsverband.de/. 
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lated into a claim raised by German speakers for proper respect of their 
own culture, language and identity.34  
In many ways, the evolution of specific forms of African memory poli-
tics in Namibia took an inverse form in relation to this tradition of asserting 
colonial and settler dominance. This may be exemplified in particular by 
annual commemorations. These events took root from the mid 1920s on-
wards and may be considered as first public expressions of the processes of 
resilience of communal nexuses mentioned above. At the same time, they 
contribute importantly to the further reproduction of these nexuses. In vari-
ous ways, these endeavours in Central and Southern Namibia took their 
clue and reference from events and personages connected to the Namibian 
War. Moreover, they involved the symbolic and temporary re-appropriation 
of salient places and spaces that had been lost to the respective communi-
ties as a consequence of that war.35 However, this took the shape of subal-
tern practices that were marked by the colonial situation, which the actors 
had to confront on a daily basis. The systematic subjection implied by this 
situation was addressed and expressed in various ways at the very outset 
when these commemorations were first constituted. This becomes evident if 
we consider the two most important, Herero Day that even today refers to 
the momentous reburial of Samuel Maharero in Okahandja, the traditional 
capital of his group, the Red Band in 1923, and Heroes Day in Gibeon, the 
traditional centre of the //Khowesin or Witbooi. 
The reburial of Samuel Maharero in 1923 marked the emergence of 
Ovaherero as once again a vociferous and rather solid ethnic grouping.36 
                                                 
34  Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 November 2010, 2 November 2010, 3 November 2010, 
15 November 2010, 23 November 2010, 3 December 2010. 
35  Gesine Krüger, Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewußtsein: Realität, Deu-
tung und Verarbeitung des deutschen Kolonialkriegs in Namibia (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1999), 282-290; Reinhart Kössler, Communal Memo-
ry Events and the Heritage of the Victims. The Persistence of the Theme of Ge-
nocide in Namibia, in: German Colonialism and National Identity, 235-250, 
here: 243-244; Förster, Postkoloniale Erinnerungslandschaften, 256-259. 
36  Jan-Bart Gewald, The Funeral of Samuel Maharero and the Reorganisation of 
the Herero, in: Genocide in German Southwest Africa. The Colonial War of 
1904-1908 and its Aftermath, ed. Joachim Zeller and Jürgen Zimmerer (London: 
Merlin Press 2008), 207-216. 
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One particularly spectacular feature was and still is the “ceremonial occu-
pation of Okahandja” by the formations of the typical oturupa, when “the 
uniformed troops symbolized and demonstrated the vision of a united peo-
ple, reinforcing their claim to ancestral land”.37 In this, the event stunned 
contemporaries, and the spatial claim as well as the determination to con-
tinue a memory practice in which communal resilience and coherence crys-
tallised with such clarity was underscored by a vow to return each year to 
the graves in Okahandja.38 By now, this vow has been kept for nearly 90 
years. However, the annual commemoration was also marked by restric-
tions; thus, in 1923, Samuel Maharero’s heir apparent was allowed to re-
main in Namibia only on a temporary basis. During South African colonial 
rule, regular submissions to the colonial authorities were required. Consent 
was conditional on the banning of marching by the Herero oturupa – often 
misunderstood as a kind of mock army or quasi-military organisation. Once 
the Reverend Michael Scott had emerged as a champion of Herero griev-
ances and of opposition to the proposed incorporation of Namibia into 
South Africa after World War II, it was decreed that no white person must 
address the festive crowd.39 Today, these issues are largely forgotten. What 
remains is the festive appearance of ritually dressed men and women parad-
ing in long columns and visiting the chiefly graves, which are located in 
central Okahandja. Certainly not least because of its colour and the proxim-
ity of the event to the capital of Windhoek, some 80 km to the south, this 
has also become a tourist attraction. Apart from this more public form of 
commemoration, Herero Day takes place rather out of public sight at the 
Herero Kommando, which is located in the township a few kilometres 
away. Here, the recounting of history, as well as for some years claims for 
reparations from Germany, form the main contents of a long succession of 
speeches. 
                                                 
37  Gesine Krüger and Dag Henrichsen, ‘We have been captives long enough. We 
want to be free’: Land, uniforms and politics in the history of the Herero, in: 
Namibia under South African rule: Mobility and containment 1915-1946, ed. 
Patricia Hayes et al. (Oxford: James Currey, 1998), 149-174, here: 159.  
38  Krüger and Henrichsen, We have been captives long enough, 158. 
39  Kössler, Communal Memory, 242-247. On Michael Scott see Freda Troup, In 
face of fear. Michael Scott’s challenge to South Africa (London: Faber & Faber, 
1950).  
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Again, Heroes Day in Gibeon, still also known by its former name of 
Witbooi Festival or Witbooi Fees, harks back to a humble commemoration 
at the graveyard to honour the group’s prominent dead in 1930. Among 
these, Kaptein Hendrik Witbooi who in his advanced age was killed in ac-
tion in 1905 during the Nama-German War, stands out as a clairvoyant and 
militant fighter against colonialism.40 The communal commemoration of 
Hendrik Witbooi’s death can be traced back to 1930, when a small comme-
moration was held under the tutelage of the resident missionary and the 
magistrate.41 Under the guidance of his evenly named great-grandson, the 
event has been transformed into a pageant that links a long succession of 
elements and lasts for three days. Items range from the centrally important 
church service to historical re-enactment to cultural demonstrations inclu-
ding dances of various ethnic groups in Namibia to pure enjoyment, such as 
the informal dance in the evening. In this way, spiritual concerns connected 
to honouring the dead are closely related to educative and political aims: to 
instruct the youth in history, above all concerning the contribution of Wit-
booi to anticolonial resistance and the liberation struggle, and by the same 
token to advance claims in the context of present-day, independent Namib-
ia.42 
These two rather prominent examples may stand in here for an entire 
host of commemorations that are held today, mostly on an annual basis, 
across Central and Southern Namibia. The overwhelming majority of these 
periodic rituals refer to personages or events linked to the Namibian War.43 
                                                 
40  See his celebrated Diary (Witbooi 1995). 
41  Johannes Olpp, Eindrücke einer Reise über die sieben Rh. Missionsstationen des 
Namalandes (II), Berichte der Rheinischen Missionsgesellschaft 87 (1930), 136-
145; here: 140-141. For further context see Kössler, In search of survival, pt. III.  
42  Kössler, In search of survival, 249-253; Reinhart Kössler, “A luta continua”: 
Strategic Orientation and the Politics of Remembrance. The Example of the 
Witbooi “Heroes Day” in Gibeon, in: Genocide in German South-West Africa, 
217-230; Reinhart Kössler, Political Intervention and the Image of History: 
Communal Memory Events in Central and Southern Namibia, in: The Long Af-
termath of War: Reconciliation in Namibia, ed. André Du Pisani et al. (Frei-
burg: Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, 2010), 371-402, here: 284-393. 
43  See also Memory Biwa, Stories of the Patchwork Quilt: an Oral History Project 
of the Nama-German War in Southern Namibia, in: The Long Aftermath of War, 
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This  underscores the fact that for people relating to this region of Namibia 
– the area under effective colonial control in German times – the events of 
the Namibian War, the genocide, and the concentration camps still form the 
central feature of their historic memory. For people relating to the Northern 
regions on the other hand, different events and in particular, the liberation 
struggle of the 1970s and 1980s, figure much more prominently.  
The commemorations can thus be read as efforts by communities in 
Southern and Central Namibia to assert their historic role in anti-colonial 
resistance.44 Within the overall mnemoscape of Namibia, such endeavour 
has a two-pronged thrust beside the obvious reproduction of the communal 
nexus in a festive get-together linked with recounting the common past. On 
the one hand, the commemorations effectively address the specific national 
narration that has become hegemonic in post-independent Namibia. This 
narration pegs the construction of the nation not only to the trajectory of the 
ruling party SWAPO45 but also to an overwhelming emphasis on the mili-
tary aspects of the liberation struggle of the 1970s and 1980s. Significantly, 
President Hifikepunye Pohamba, when appearing at the Bondelswarts Fes-
tival in Warmbad in the southeastern-most corner of the country in October 
2008, responded to the rehearsal of the community’s exploits during the 
Nama-German War by confessing not only his utter ignorance but also the 
incompetence of his speechwriters who had failed to prepare him adequate-
ly for the occasion.46 The relevant information is obviously available, also 
                                                                                                  
331-70; Förster, Postkoloniale Erinnerungslandschaft, 247-268; Jan-Bart Ge-
wald, Herero Annual Parades: Commemorating to Create, in: Afrikaner schrei-
ben zurück. Texte und Bilder afrikanischer Ethnographen, ed. Heike Behrend 
and Thomas Geider (Köln: Köppe, 1998), 131-152; Kössler, Political interven-
tion and the image of history: Communal memory events in central and southern 
Namibia, in: The Long Aftermath of War, 371-402, here: 379-384, 293-399. 
44  Kössler, Facing a fragmented past. 
45  André du Pisani, The Discursive Limits of SWAPO’s Dominant Discourses of 
Anti-colonial Nationalism in Postcolonial Namibia – a First Exploration, in: The 
Long Aftermath of War, 1-40. 
46  Autor’s field notes, 25 October 2008; Kössler, Political intervention, 371-372; 
for historical background, see Andreas Heinrich Bühler, Der Namaaufstand ge-
gen die deutsche Kolonialherrschaft in Namibia von 1904-1913 (Frankfurt a.M.: 
IKO, 2003). 
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in accounts very close to SWAPO,47 even though the most extensive offi-
cial account available arguably downplays the agency of Ovaherero or Na-
ma.48 The point is that the image of history amongst Namibia’s liberation 
elite virtually excludes these contents. Yet in spite of mostly opposed, polar 
evaluations in particular by Otjiherero and Nama speakers on the one hand 
and by German speakers on the other, the events of the Namibian War still 
form a central and possibly the main historical reference for people refer-
ring to Central and Southern Namibia as their home region. The anecdote 
underscores graphically how this is marginalized in the official version of 
history, as well as the potential of staged oral accounts and performative 




THE CONSTRUCTION OF ‘GERMANY’ AND ITS 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Inevitably, these endeavours are intertwined with various references to 
‘Germany’ and the ‘Germans’. They occur in speeches, in claims and in ap-
pearances of specific personages at commemorations. This is partly due to 
one of the poles in the post-colonial relationship. In central and southern 
Namibia, the vestiges of German rule are obvious – less so in often careful-
ly renovated colonial buildings seen not least as attractions for German tou-
rists. More importantly, the re-ordering of space initiated and first under-
taken under German rule in the wake of the genocide49 – and indeed as one 
of its integral components – remains a ubiquitous feature of the landscape 
as well as of everyday life. Prevailing land property relations shape the re-
gion as a fairly rigidly ordered countryside, largely devoid of humans and 
geared to a market-oriented economic endeavour. This entails the right of 
admission to spots where the graves of ancestors of black Namibians are 
still remembered, and to areas many still consider as their ancestral land. 
                                                 
47  Peter H. Katjavivi, A history of resistance in Namibia (London: James Currey, 
1988), 10. 
48  SWAPO, To be born a nation: The liberation struggle in Namibia (London: Zed 
Press, 1981), 13-14. 
49  See also Zimmerer, Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz. 
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Even where this is not complemented by the position of a dependent farm 
labourer, these features serve as constant reminders of historic loss and 
trauma, which is transmitted through the oral tradition. The connection ap-
pears even more obvious on account of the large number of German speak-
ing commercial farmers and the high profile presence of German speakers 
at privileged positions in economic life in general. Further, some of this 
group have played a vociferous part in debates around the evaluation of 
German colonialism in the country, above all denying the colonial geno-
cide.50 
On a more personal, even intimate plane, a discourse mainly among Ot-
jiherero speakers refers to their own German ancestry. This is linked to the 
record of sexual violence during the Namibian War, rape and forced prosti-
tution, but also various forms of concubinage. Reference is made to physi-
cal features of the speakers, such as light skin or straight noses. One main 
issue concerns the difficulty with which children of such fathers are located 
within the complex dual kinship system. A more immediate concern, how-
ever, points to the distinct negligence of most German men who even when 
parentage was known and in some way acknowledged, on their return to 
Germany just left their offspring and their mothers to their own devices, 
cutting all ties and denying belonging or affiliation and above all, responsi-
bility. This discourse was strongly articulated at the centennial commemo-
ration of the fateful Battle of Ohamakari on 14 August 2004, most conspic-
uously by the wearing of placards showing the names of the German ances-
tors (sometimes several) of their bearers. This was complemented by indi-
vidual expressions of concern and distress.51  
An indispensable component of this discourse addresses German re-
sponsibility. This responsibility is couched in a three-pronged identifica-
tion, which is premised on the overarching idea of kinship that has been 
forged by the illegitimate relationships in question. Such kinship is con-
strued not only in relation to the families of common forebears, but to 
‘Germans’ and ‘Germany’ at large, which terms also tend to be construed 
within a framework of kinship. Further, this identification is extended to 
German speakers in Namibia, quite regardless of whether they actually 
claim a Namibian identity. Under the circumstances, this construct clearly 
                                                 
50  Kössler, Entangled history and politics, 320-328. 
51  Personal observation; Förster, Postkoloniale Erinnerungslandschaften, 319-321. 
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translates into responsibility that has been neglected not only by German 
progenitors of grandparents and great-grandparents, but also by ‘Germany’ 
at large. Neglect of parental duty – unquestionable in the case of the over-
whelming majority of German forefathers of living Ovaherero – in this way 
is transferred to Germany, and Ovaherero at large are seen as its victims. 
From a Namibian perspective, ‘Germany’ forms an integral part of the 
mnemoscape in question. ‘Germans’ and ‘Germany’ therefore are seen as 
actors, to some extent even as a kind of amalgamated collective actor with-
in this mnemoscape. Arguably, this looks different from a German vantage 
point, for two reasons. The first, most obvious and possibly also the most 
intractable one, concerns the clearly smaller amount of attention accorded 
in Germany to anything that happens in and about Namibia, including Na-
mibian-German relations, as opposed to the much greater attention given to 
Germany, and in particular to Namibian-German relations, in Namibia. At 
least on the face of it, this is related to the stark differences that exist be-
tween the two countries in population size and economic power, but at least 
the latter consideration clearly refers back to the colonial connection. Ex-
cept for a few fleeting moments and also regardless of the ideological con-
sequences of the Namibian War, Namibia was mostly rather marginal to 
Germany, whereas Germany on the other hand has been of quite central im-
portance to Namibia for some 150 years. As already mentioned, this ap-
plied to the violent imposition of a new social and spatial order; German 
speakers continued to occupy a central and influential position within the 
settler colonial structure. Regardless of some frictions, they arranged them-
selves with South African rule and even became a mainstay of the Apart-
heid regime.52 They remain an economically powerful and conspicuous 
grouping in independent Namibia. Moreover, Germany has recognised “a 
particular relationship” based on a special responsibility on account of co-
lonial rule53 and consequently, German presence in the development sector 
is also very conspicuous.  
                                                 
52  Martin Eberhardt, Zwischen Nationalsozialismus und Apartheid. Die deutsche 
Bevölkerungsgruppe Südwestafrikas 1915-1965 (Berlin: Lit, 2007); Brigitta 
Schmidt-Lauber, “Die verkehrte Hautfarbe”. Ethnizität deutscher Namibier als 
Alltagspraxis (Berlin: Reimer, 1998). 
53  Janntje Böhlke-Itzen, Kolonialschuld und Entschädigung. Der deutsche Völker-
mord an den Herero 1904-1907 (Frankfurt a.M.: Brandes & Apsel, 2004), 7. 
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This contrasts starkly to the low significance of Namibia as a foreign re-
lations or trading partner, seen from the perspective of the public sphere in 
Germany as well as German politics at large. Here, relevant government ac-
tivity is largely inconspicuous and civil society activity, while present, is li-
mited to special interest circles. Quite a few initiatives exist to provide links 
with Namibia, such as school partnerships, and a quite active German-
Namibian Society along the classic lines of a friendship society promoting 
general information, economic links, development projects, and in this con-
text also tourism.54 However, these bodies have and intend to have only li-
mited impact at best on memory politics related to the colonial past. This is 
left to small pressure groups that work towards a pro-active approach to the 
colonial past in Germany. Their limited potential is also due to a negligible 
post-colonial presence, clearly in contradistinction to Germany’s neighbour 
countries like Netherlands, Belgium or France.55 Still, these small, but ac-
tive groups can be understood as a rather new phenomenon, in the wake of 
the decline of the more conventional solidarity movement. They pursue an 
agenda of awareness rising about colonial issues, largely on a local level. 
As a result, a network of post-colonial initiatives has developed that active-
ly takes up memory issues.56  
 
 
BETWEEN AMNESIA AND REPARATIONS: 
NEGOTIATING THE PAST 
 
Up to Namibian independence on 21 March 1990, the country’s colonial 
past under German rule played a rather marginal role, even for (West) Ger-
man solidarity groups that supported the liberation struggle.57 On the other 
                                                 
54  http://www.dngev.de. 
55  Kolonialismus und Erinnerungskultur. Die Kolonialvergangenheit im kollekti-
ven Gedächtnis der deutschen und niederländischen Einwanderungsgesell-
schaft, ed. Helma Lutz and Kathrin Gawarecki (Münster: Waxmann, 2005). 
56  As a representative website, http://www.freiburg-postkolonial.de; http://www.fr 
eiburg-postkolonial.de/Seiten/Links.htm also gives an overview of similar activ-
ities in other German cities. 
57  Reinhart Kössler and Henning Melber, The West German solidarity movement 
with liberation struggles in Southern Africa: A (self-)critical retrospective, in: 
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hand, black Namibians did not have a chance of raising their voices effec-
tively before independence had been achieved.58 For such reasons, the in-
dependence date can be seen not only as a turning point in the political set-
up and fortunes of the country, but also as a point of departure for a novel 
politics of memory. Given this perspective, it should also be noted that in 
spite of latter-day triumphalist rhetoric, this was a classical case of pacted 
transition.59 The terms had been set to a large extent by prior agreements 
within the UN system. The process in terms of Security Council Resolution 
435 (1978) was set into motion in 1988 by the Tripartite Agreement be-
tween the US, South Africa and Angola about the ending of the war situa-
tion in that country, which had become closely linked to the Namibian lib-
eration struggle. The constitution was a product of very speedy deliberation 
by the Assembly that had been elected in late 1989. Here, SWAPO had 
been denied a two-third majority and depended on reaching an agreement 
with the opposition.60 These circumstances as well as the need to avoid so-
cial and economic disruption coalesced into an overall policy orientation of 
“reconciliation”, stalling any potential controversies and further struggles. 
This silencing of public controversy had profound consequences for the 
dealing with the past.61 In general, potential controversy was relegated to 
the realm of academic or more or less private pursuit. 
                                                                                                  
Germany’s Africa policy revisited: Interests, images and incrementalism, 2nd 
ed., ed. Ulf Engel and Robert Kappel (Münster: Lit, 2006), 101-123. 
58  Peter Katjavivi, From Colonialism to Bilaterality. Challenges of the Namibian-
German Relationship, in: The Division of the Earth. Tableaux on the Legal Syn-
opses of the Berlin Africa Conference, ed. Dierk Schmidt (Köln: Verlag der 
Buchhandlung Walter König, 2010), 91-93. 
59  Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore and Lon-
don: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 37-39. 
60  Lionel Cliffe, The Transition to Independence in Namibia (Boulder and London: 
Lynne Rienner, 1994), chap. 9; The Namibian Peace Process: Implications and 
lessons for the future, ed. Heribert Weiland and Matthew Braham (Freiburg: 
Arnold Bergstraesser-Institut, 1994). 
61  Justine Hunter, Dealing with the Past in Namibia: Getting the Balance Right Be-
tween Justice and Sustainable Peace?, in: The Long Aftermath of War, 403-433; 
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Nevertheless, independence also meant the possibility for issues to 
come into the open that had long been nurtured in the relative privacy of 
oral tradition and personal transmission through the generations. Now was 
the first chance to move beyond such subaltern practices and link such me-
mory contents to public initiatives. Most important amongst such initiatives 
were the forays by leading Ovaherero who aimed at reaching some under-
standing with the German government on the premise of its accession to the 
guilt incurred by the former Imperial government.  
Such forays met a rather stern rebuff on occasion of the state visits of 
the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1995 and the German President 
Roman Herzog in 1998, when Herero delegations were either not admitted 
or met only on an informal level. While Kohl praised specifically the ser-
vices of the German speakers towards Namibia’s development, President 
Herzog voiced concern about the future of the German language in the 
country.62 These experiences exacerbated the sensitivities of “ex-colonial 
Namibians about representatives of the former colonial power and their 
successors in the country”.63 Against this backdrop, the Herero People’s 
Reparation Corporation (HPRC) was formed. This body pursues a court 
case in the USA under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). The German 
state and German companies are held liable for reparations on account of 
the war crimes committed in Namibia under the German colonial regime 
and for the exploitative conditions that prevailed and from which the com-
panies had profited.64 This action resonates with cases brought under the 
same legislation also against the German state and German companies by 
former forced labourers during World War II, where an out of court settle-
                                                                                                  
Reinhart Kößler, Zweierlei Amnesie und die komplexe postkoloniale Lage Na-
mibias, Die Friedenswarte 86 (2011), 73-99. 
62  Henning Melber, “We never spoke about reparations”. German-Namibian rela-
tions between amnesia, aggression and reconciliation, in: Genocide in German 
South-West Africa, 259-273, here: 265-266. 
63  Ibid., 265. 
64  Jeremy Sarkin, Colonial Genocide and Reparations Claims in the 21st Century: 
The Socio-Legal Context of Claims under International Law by the Herero 
against Germany for Genocide in Namibia, 1904-1908 (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 
2008); Böhlke-Itzen, Kolonialschuld, 31-32. 
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ment was reached in 1999.65 In a whole series of events, the centennial 
commemoration of the Battle of Ohamakari (Waterberg) on 14 August 
2004 stood out.66 This brought together between 5,000 and 10,000 Ovahe-
rero from all over Southern Africa and beyond. This was an important step 
in the reproduction and re-constitution of Herero ethnicity. At the same 
time, quests for alliances amongst different ethnic groups in Namibia as 
well as of the difficulties in actually forging such alliances were evident. 
These problems existed above all between the two committees that had 
formed during the preceding year in order to organise the long commemo-
rative calendar of the centennial that culminated on August 14. The cleav-
age between the two committees reflected the unresolved juxtaposition of 
two forms of traditional leadership amongst Ovaherero as well as diverging 
party political orientations. Moreover, a certain amount of Herero exclu-
sionism found expression in a tendency to claim victim status solely for this 
group.67 On the other hand, the Ohamakari event was marked by efforts to 
underline historical bonds. Thus, the appearance of Ndonga King Kauluma 
from Northern Namibia, was linked to the successful attack on fort Na-
mutoni by Ndonga warriors during the Herero-German War in 1904. Again, 
Nama groups from Southern Namibia were clearly underrepresented on the 
programme, and the only scheduled speech did not materialise.  
The central feature, however, was the speech of the German Minister of 
Economic Cooperation, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul. She surprised many 
and went against the grain of established government policy when she ac-
knowledged that the crimes of the Schutztruppe and its leadership  
 
“would today be called genocide […]. We Germans accept our historical and moral 
responsibility and guilt incurred by Germans at that time. And so, in the words of the 
Lord’s Prayer that we share, I ask you to forgive us our trespasses and our guilt. 
                                                 
65  http://www.stiftung-evz.de, accessed 25 March 2009. 
66  Förster, Postkoloniale Erinnerungslandschaften, 278-308. 
67  Henning Melber, Namibia’s Past in the Present: Colonial Genocide and Libera-
tion Struggle in Commemorative Narratives, South African Historical Journal 
53 (2005), 98-119, here: 116-117. 
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Without a conscious process of remembering, without sorrow, without apology, 
there can be no reconciliation – remembrance is the key to reconciliation.”68 
 
This wording clearly referred to the prevailing idea in Germany that re-
membrance forms the basic legitimate approach towards dealing with a 
cruel past and mass crimes involved in it, and that this will engender recon-
ciliation. It did not quite work this way on this occasion. After the Otjihere-
ro version of the Minister’s speech had been read out, there was a loud in-
terjection: “Where’s the apology?” Only when the Minister had come back 
and had stressed that she thought she had given one, the audience seemed to 
be satisfied. This speaks to the importance of ritual wording in adequate 
dealing with the past in this context. At the same time, the inherent prob-
lems and contradictions of this carefully worded speech in terms of a viable 
reconciliation process were to be revealed through subsequent develop-
ments. These developments revolved around the interlinked issues of repa-
ration, which the speech had skirted, and of acknowledgment of the victims 
(in their descendants) as partners in dialogue. 
Wieczorek-Zeul’s speech clearly digressed from the line taken at that 
time by the German cabinet. Only a few weeks before, the Bundestag had 
passed a motion that carefully avoided the word ‘genocide’ and on that ac-
count, caused considerable irritation and stir in Namibia.69 The Minister’s 
speech therefore attested her personal courage, but it proved also an im-
portant limitation to her apology. Even though given by a Cabinet member, 
it still did not emanate from a Cabinet decision, but precisely the opposite, 
from the Minister’s personal resolve. Much less was the apology rendered 
by a representative of the German people as the sovereign body in question, 
such as the President or the Bundestag. 
Further, it soon became clear that this courage was not matched by a 
political strategy to reach a form of reconciliation that would be acceptable 
                                                 
68  http://www.inwent.org/E+Z/content/archive-eng/10-2004/stud_art3.html, acces-
sed 29 June 2011, quoted from Förster, Postkoloniale Erinnerungslandschaften, 
283, who uses a rendering of the oral delivery. 
69  Reinhart Kößler, Berlin weiß nichts vom Völkermord, afrika süd 4 (2004), 12; 
Luther Razemua Zaire, Enttäuschend – Beschämend – Historisch falsch. Offener 
Brief,  afrika süd 4 (2004), 13. 
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to all parties concerned, most of all to those in the victim position.70 The 
months following the Ohamakari event were marked by spurious activities 
that did not coalesce into such a meaningful dialogue driven by victims’ 
concerns. In particular, the Minister unilaterally announced in May 2005 a 
reconciliation initiative that would bring 20 million Euro to the regions of 
Namibia predominantly inhabited by victim communities. Not surprisingly, 
this announcement was met by objections from Herero spokespersons since 
there had been no prior consultations and the whole initiative therefore was 
seen as unilateral. Even in late 2005, on occasion of a visit of President Hif-
ikipunye Pohamba in Berlin, the Namibian delegation refused to sign the 
necessary agreement.71 The diplomatic éclat could be patched up, but at the 
time, it underscored a serious difference in approach of how to deal with 
the challenge to come to terms with a colonial genocide and to reach recon-
ciliation between the heirs of the victims and the perpetrators.  
Subsequent developments highlighted these differences. At the same 
time, the issue was drawn into a labyrinthine web of countervailing inter-
ests, including party political concerns on both sides. An interesting rea-
lignment concerned the linkage that developed between the German Left 
Party and the Namibian NUDO party headed by Paramount Chief Kuaima 
Riruako. Some Left Party deputies started to champion the concerns of the 
HPRC as well as other issues related to the genocide from 2005 onwards. 
On the side of the German Left, stalwarts from GDR times were hesitant 
about such a line up, as long as SWAPO, with whose formerly exiled lead-
ership they shared close bonds, had not pronounced clearly its approval.72 
                                                 
70  Since neither survivors nor perpetrators of what happened in 1903-1908 are still 
alive today, it is appropriate to clearly distinguish between personal experiences 
and guilt, and between longer term consequences and historic responsibility, 
such as that of German citizens. These considerations lead to the wordings of 
“victim position” and “perpetrator position”; but see on victims and perpetrators 
Don Foster et al., The theatre of violence. Narratives of protagonists in the 
South African conflict (Oxford: James Currey, 2005). 
71  Joachim Zeller, Festgefahren. Ratlosigkeit angesichts der vorläufig gescheiterten 
Versöhnungsinitiative zwischen Namibia und Deutschland, afrika süd 6 (2005), 
32. 
72  Personal observation at the seminar “Deutsche Kolonialverbrechen. Wie kann 
Wiedergutmachung für die Herero und Nama aussehen?”, Rosa Luxemburg 
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Still, a motion was tabled in the Bundestag, and Left MP Hüseyin Aydin, 
who had also been the main sponsor of that motion appeared as one of the 
speakers at Herero Day, 2006. He underscored the yet unfulfilled responsi-
bility of the “Federal Republic of Germany as the legal successor of the 
Imperial Reich […] towards the surviving victims of the genocide and their 
posterity”.73 This line of thinking, which focused on the continuity of the 
German state, differs distinctly from the discourse centring around obliga-
tions based on kinship and blood ties as articulated by Ovaherero (supra). 
Still, both coalesced in a common perspective, featuring an intimate con-
nection between apology, reparation and reconciliation.  
At the same time, SWAPO departed from its previous stance of not sup-
porting any demand for reparations on the grounds that this might entail the 
risk of fostering tribalism, favouring one or other ethnic groups over others. 
In October 2006, the National Assembly carried a motion tabled by Riruako 
with only one member abstaining.74 When introducing his motion, the Par-
amount Chief had reiterated the wish for “the German Government to con-
vene a consultative conference to set up an agenda for dialogue”.75 In the 
event, the passing of the motion by the National Assembly, which was 
clearly aimed at furthering such a process, has so far not contributed to-
wards a continued momentum as had emanated from Wieczorek-Zeul’s 
apology. Rather, the halting process of transnational and post-colonial me-
mory politics that had been given a new turn in 2004 has shifted once 
again. Namibian victim communities have by no means backed down on 
their demand for reparations. However, at least temporarily, symbolic poli-
tics have moved to the foreground. This is interlinked with important rea-
lignments in Namibia. 
 
 
                                                                                                  
Foundation, Berlin, 13-14 October 2006; see www.freiburg-postkolonial.de/Seit 
en/Rez-Linke-Seminar-Namibia2006.htm, accessed 4 June 2011. 
73  Hüseyin Aydin, MdB, Rede am Herero-Tag in Okahandja (Namibia), 27 August 
2006, as disseminated via email to author; see also New Era (Windhoek), 31 
August 2006; The Namibian, 1 September 2006. 
74  The Namibian, 27 October 2006.  
75  The Namibian, 20 September 2006.  
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INTRICACIES OF SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND 
RECONCILIATION 
 
This new turn, which rounds off this account, involves a fairly extensive 
range of changes. First, the number and to some extent the structure of civil 
society actors on the Namibian side has changed significantly. In 2004, the 
victim position was articulated and occupied largely by Ovaherero, even 
though split into two competing committees. During the following years, an 
array of further ethnic groups voiced their demands for recognition of past 
suffering and of the contribution of their forebears to the anti-colonial 
struggle, as well as for adequate redress. Thus, early in 2005, the newly for-
med Damara Cultural and Heritage Forum pointed out that regardless of the 
marginal role accorded to Damara within accounts of the Namibian War, 
17,000 of their people had disappeared during the war. In motivating the in-
tervention, Chief Gaseb stressed a widely inclusive notion of victim groups 
who all “have a history”, thus closely linking victim status and “history”.76 
The insistence on the latter by a spokesperson for a group that has been no-
toriously marginalized both in social terms and in historical accounts once 
again demonstrates the importance carried by inscription into the national 
record in this way.  
The issue of remembrance and claims connected with such quests also 
furthered closer cooperation among Nama traditional leaders. In late 2006, 
nine of them appealed for a “meaningful dialogue” with the German gov-
ernment, while insisting that the Namibian government should attend pro-
perly to the identification and further treatment of the human remains that 
had been found near the southern Namibian port of Lüderitz, and which 
were attributed to former prisoners at the concentration camp on Shark Is-
land.77 At this historic site, the commemoration in early 2007 of the cen-
tenary of the death of Chief Cornelius Frederick of Bethanië who had per-
ished in the concentration camp marked a galvanizing point.78 By late 2007, 
a joint declaration by Ovaherero and Nama traditional leaders was released. 
The text indicted the German government and the Bundestag as well as the 
Namibian government for denying direct negotiations between the repre-
                                                 
76  The Namibian, 26 January 2005. 
77  The Namibian, 19 October 2006. 
78  New Era, 19 February 2007. 
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sentatives of the victimised groups and the German government. The decla-
ration listed a series of measures to improve the lives of these groups based 
on “seeking redress for the wrongs of the past in order for the wounds to 
heal and for resultant genuine reconciliation and peaceful co-existence 
amongst the Nama/Ovaherero and the German people in our country and 
for a lasting friendly bilateral relations [sic] between the two countries”.79 
The conflations contained in this appeal are characteristic for the complex 
situation it addressed: The principle addressees are the two governments, 
but at the same time, the German state is seen as closely connected to the 
ethnic group of German speaking Namibians, and the aim is defined by the 
hope to reach friendly relations between the two countries, Germany and 
Namibia. This phrase, only seemingly ill construed, contains in a nutshell 
central difficulties that are involved in coming to terms with the post-
colonial relationship that exists between Namibia and Germany. 
These difficulties may be conceptualised precisely in problems involved 
in the identification, and indeed, in the construction of the relevant collec-
tive actors and protagonists. This concerns obviously the central issue of 
who should be held responsible on the one hand and who shall be entitled 
to claims for recognition and eventually, reparation on the other. This ques-
tion does not merely concern what may appear as a mere confusion be-
tween ‘Germany’, ‘Germans’ and ‘German speakers’. It also concerns the 
definition and constitution of ‘Namibia’, as well as that of the victim 
groups. 
These problems of definition and identity formation are bound up with 
the process of colonisation and subsequent transformations, right up to Na-
mibia’s independence as a sovereign state. The act of colonisation did not 
only entail the definition of boundaries, as occurred with the formation of 
any form of modern statehood, but it also set into motion a process whereby 
the sovereign rights of indigenous groups or their leaders were progressive-
ly reneged. In Namibia, this process came to an abrupt and decisive conclu-
sion through the genocide of 1904-1908. For most African groups within 
                                                 
79  Joint Position Paper from the Nama and the Ovaherero People on the Issue of 
Genocide and Reparation, 14 December 2007, signed by Ovaherero Paramount 
Chief Kuaima Riruako and Chief David Frederick (Bethanië); http://ovahererog 
enocideassociationusa.org/images/Document%20pdfs/New%20pdfs%202_20_0 
8/Ovaherero_NamaPosition%20Paper.pdf, accessed 10 July 2011. 
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the Police Zone, this event decisively terminated any chance for autonomy 
or for the exercise of sovereign rights, which at least according to some 
readings had still been implied by the protection treaties concluded with the 
fledgling German colonial power in the 1880s.80 While the difficulties en-
countered in asserting claims that emanate from this mass crime today can 
be related to the eurocentric bias of international law,81 the heritage of col-
onisation and spatial reorganisation also entails that today the sovereign 
power claiming to legitimately speak for all Namibians is the national gov-
ernment. This makes it quite difficult to arrange meaningful relations, let 
alone negotiations, between representatives specifically of victim groups 
and the German government. As can be observed, the Namibian govern-
ment is constantly mindful that such a process might be seen to subvert its 
own hard won sovereignty. The chagrin of representatives of victim groups 
who refuse to “accept that we have initially raised the issue and now it 
should be about us and yet without us”82 refers precisely to such structural 
underpinnings. 
At the same time, the quest to bring together relevant stakeholders in 
Namibia along the lines of civil society actors also runs into problems, 
which can be related to memories of past conflicts between ethnic groups, 
but more often, to current rivalries. Arguably, the most important issue here 
divides Ovaherero over the issue of legitimacy of traditional leadership, pit-
ting Paramount Chief Riruako, who claims popular election for lifetime, 
against the heads of the Five Royal Houses who rely on genealogical legit-
imacy. This cleavage is reinforced by opposing party political alignments. 
Similarly, Damara are divided over claims made by traditional leaders for 
legitimacy and jurisdiction, and again this is reinforced by opposing party 
loyalties.  
                                                 
80  Malte Jaguttis, Paths to a Hearing of the Herero Case under International Law. 
Beyond the Patterns of Colonial Self-Description?, in: The Division of the 
Earth, 76-84; Jörn Axel Kämmerer, The Persecution of the Herero from the Per-
spective of Public International Law, in: The Division of the Earth, 85-90. 
81  M.N. Kaapanda-Girnus, A Third World perspective on the History of Interna-
tional Law. The Herero Genocide as the Perfect Crime?, in: The Division of the 
Earth, 94-98. 
82  Joint Position Paper. 
304 | REINHART KÖSSLER 

Such divisions have made it difficult to constitute a joint body for ac-
tion. Still, during the 2000s an Association of Nama Traditional Authorities 
was formed, and this has worked as a core to assemble a broad coalition to 
work for reparations and reconciliation with reference to the genocide, 
which encompasses Ovaherero, Damara, San, and Basters. Yet, such an 
alignment turned out not to be all-inclusive, leaving out larger or smaller 
sections of most ethnic groups.  
Thus, there is a multiplicity of actors on the Namibian side, while it is 
only at first sight that the respondent to claims is easily identified to be the 
German state. As already mentioned, within the Namibian debate, this en-
compasses German speakers who live in Namibia as citizens, as well as de-
scendents of Schutztruppe soldiers, in particular with reference to the con-
cerns of their black descendants in Namibia. Such aspects make it quite 
clear how symbolic issues and concerns for recognition are in fact inextri-
cably intertwined with the demand for reparations that has occupied centre 
stage for some time but again cannot be construed exclusively as a demand 
for material benefits. 
It is against this backdrop that the dynamics around the restitution of 
human remains taken to Germany during its colonial rule in Namibia evol-
ved. The fate of severed heads, in particular those taken from fallen leaders 
during the war, had been a concern since a long time,83 but it had not been a 
public affair of particular note. This began to change with the discovery of 
human bones near Lüderitz in October 2006 and their obvious connection 
with the concentration camps, which had existed in this southern port town 
during the Namibian War.84 The issue gained further momentum through 
the centennial commemoration for Cornelius Frederick in February 2007 as 
mentioned above. Here, one main grievance articulated concerned Corneli-
us Frederick’s head. According to oral tradition, this head had been severed 
from the dead body and sent to Germany. This account has been contested 
by historians as not being factual;85 however, the more important social fact 
is the belief that in such a case spurs actors on. Here, it gave rise to the de-
                                                 
83  E.g., informal talk with Kaptein Petrus Koper of the Red Nation, Berseba, 3 
June 1995. 
84  New Era, 16 October 2006. 
85  New Era, 19 February 2007; Casper Erichsen, email to author, 20 February 
2007. 
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mand for the return of human remains from Germany. The Shark Island 
event proved an important stage in the process that at the end of 2007 
brought together Nama and Ovaherero traditional leaders in a joint effort to 
make claims towards the governments and parliaments of both states, de-
manding recognition above all by being included within any process of ne-
gotiation and reconciliation.86 Remarkably, this statement now treats the 
genocide perpetrated against both Ovaherero and Nama on an equal foot-
ing. It thus overcomes former tendencies towards victim competition and 
Ovaherero exclusionism. For nearly four years, subsequent efforts centred 
increasingly around the quest for returning human skulls taken from Na-
mibia to Germany during colonial times and housed in various research in-
stitutions in Germany. 
The story of the restitution and of the efforts bringing it into the range 
of possibility and even likelihood by the end of 2011 shall not be recounted 
here in full. Suffice it to say that beginning with some TV features in mid-
2008, there developed a certain heightened sensitivity for the issue in parts 
of the German public.87 In October 2008, the Namibian government formal-
ly requested repatriation, under the understanding that the skulls would be 
given a heroes’ burial at Heroes Acre outside Windhoek.88 However, the 
coalition of Ovaherero and Nama traditional leaders objected to this and in-
sisted the skulls should be placed into the proposed Independence Museum 
as a constant reminder of the great and often undervalued contribution Na-
mibians in the South and Centre of the country had made to anticolonial re-
sistance.89 
The negotiations about restitution of the skulls evolved haltingly over 
more than two years, precisely since the formal process also had to reflect 
the complex constellation of historical facts, of remembrance and of current 
agendas. Nama and Ovaherero traditional leaders took more than a year to 
                                                 
86  Joint Position Paper.  
87  For documentation on this process, see http://www.freiburg-postkolonial.de/Seit 
en/anthropologische-schaedelsammlungen.htm, accessed 10 July 2011; http://w 
ww.africavenir.org/de/projektkooperationen/restitution-namibian-skulls/datum/2 
008/02/26.html, accessed 10 July 2011. 
88  The Namibian, 21 October 2008. 
89  Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 October 2009; personal communication with Ida Hof-
mann, Windhoek, 25 October 2008, 5 May 2011. 
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hammer out their positions vis-à-vis the Namibian government. They final-
ly petitioned formally to act on the matter through diplomatic channels late 
in 2009.90 At the same time, consensus was reached that the skulls, once re-
turned, should be housed in a museum. In the words of Paramount Chief 
Riruako, “our history cannot be buried, they were beheaded in public, and 
thus we have to retain them in public”. At the same time, 28 May 2010 was 
announced as the date when representatives of the communities concerned 
would proceed to Berlin to receive the skulls and perform apposite rituals 
before bringing them to Namibia. The date was meant to commemorate the 
day in 1908 when the concentration camps were closed. A further demand 
concerned proper documentation about the fate of the skulls, including the 
research that had been undertaken on them.91  
In the event, negotiations between the various parties concerned drag-
ged on for more than another year. This involved also negotiations on the 
level of the two embassies in Windhoek and Berlin with their various coun-
terparts. Only late in March 2011, the Namibian government felt they were 
in a position to set the procedure into motion for actual repatriation of the 
skulls. One reason had been the time taken up by scientific work at the 
University hospital Charité in Berlin and at the University Archives in Frei-
burg, where skulls had been located which had to be identified first as actu-
ally coming from Namibia. At this occasion, it was stressed by Utjiua Mu-
injangue speaking for the 1904 Herero Genocide committee that “in our Af-
rican culture, we believe in ancestral spirits. When those skulls come home, 
I am sure the spirits of our ancestors will rest in peace.” On the other hand, 
the ultimate aim of reparations from Germany remained on the agenda.92  
Ensuing developments once again underscored the fallacies implied by 
the actor constellation in the repatriation and reparation issue.93 The envis-
aged date of 28 May 2011 eventually did not materialise on account of con-
flicts that surfaced around the composition of the delegation that was to 
                                                 
90  The Namibian, 1 and 2 October 2009; Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 October 2009.  
91  New Era, 2 October 2009.  
92  New Era, 25 February 2011. 
93  For the following see detailed documentation on http://www.freiburg-postkoloni 
al.de/Seiten/anthropologische-schaedelsammlungen.htm; besides, I rely on par-
ticipant observation in Namibia during May 2011 and in Berlin in late Septem-
ber 2011, as well as press documentation and email correspondence. 
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travel from Namibia to Berlin. Ostensibly, these conflicts revolved around 
the composition of the 54 proposed delegates. There was a contest between 
a coalition of two committees, bringing together Ovaherero and Nama on 
the one hand and another committee formed by Ovaherero and closely re-
lated Ovambanderu. The dispute also had party political dimensions, given 
the diverse allegiances of the two Ovaherero groups concerned, and it arti-
culated the pervasive leadership bifurcation amongst Ovaherero pitting Par-
amount Chief Riruako against the Royal Houses. In this way, the issue of 
how the delegation would be composed mobilised deep and central con-
flicts that were exacerbated by further competition to be included as a kind 
of recognition of an individual’s as well as their community’s importance 
and standing. Difficulties could not be resolved in time, and the entire event 
was called off. Subsequently, it was rescheduled twice, and a delegation of 
altogether more than 70 people finally arrived in Berlin, late in September 
2011. 
In the view of many, what followed was a communication disaster on 
the side of the German government. It became clear that official pro-
nouncements painstakingly avoided the term ‘genocide’. A press statement 
by the foreign office took official occlusion to the point of speaking merely 
of “skulls of deceased members of the population groups of Herero and 
Nama brought to Germany during colonial times”.94 In addition, the gov-
ernment was less than forthcoming in acknowledging the delegation or in 
engaging them into exchanges. They did not receive the cabinet minister 
who was at the head of the Namibian delegation and they were not repre-
sented at important side events. This concerned in particular the memorial 
service conducted by the venerable Namibian Bishop Zephania Kameeta at 
the Matthäuskirche (Berlin-Tiergarten), where the seats reserved for Ger-
man VIPs remained empty, safe for the presence of Wieczorek-Zeul. At a 
panel discussion, organised by civil society groups at the central Haus der 
Kulturen der Welt, representatives of the government or of the coalition 
parties were also absent. Added disappointment and resentment were  
                                                 
94  Pressemitteilung: Übergabe und Rückführung von Schädeln verstorbener Ange-
höriger der Volksgruppen Herero und Nama aus Namibia, 27 September 2011, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/sid_599AF8AB5706903D8C42417691EF7B18 
/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2011/110928-%C3%9Cbergabe-Sch%C3% 
A4del-Herero-Nama.html, accessed 13 October 2011. 
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caused by the announcement that contrary to expectations, the restitution 
document would not be signed at the core ceremony, by the Namibian min-
ister of culture and by a German minister, but rather by a representative of 
the Charité, on the German side. This was motivated by considerations of 
German cultural federalism.95 The unease and chagrin that had been build-
ing up within the Namibian delegation coalesced with similar feelings 
among parts of German civil society who had worked for publicity and side 
events, in particular for the panel discussion. In particular, groups of Afro-
Germans organised a protest at the actual hand over ceremony at the Chari-
té. When Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Cornelia Pieper, once 
again evaded the term genocide in her speech and merely asked for “recon-
ciliation” without stating clearly the reasons why she considered that neces-
sary, she was met with noisy demonstrations of displeasure and boos. The 
Minister then left the occasion without taking proper leave of the Namibian 
dignitaries. Regardless of the circumstances, this was seen as deeply disre-
spectful on the Namibian side, and in line with the German government’s 
previous behaviour, while they welcomed the protests.96 
This dissonance must also be related to the great symbolic importance 
of the delegation’s actions at various occasions.97 Take only the whole 
group entering the Charité for their first encounter with the skulls, announ-
cing their coming with solemn prayer, hymns and battle cries, or similar 
features at the church service and at the handover ceremony. Similar obser-
vations apply to seeing off and welcoming ceremonies in Windhoek. At the 
airport there, a crowd of a few thousand who broke the ranks met the dele-
gation and the skulls. There were extensive ceremonies on subsequent days 
in Parliament Gardens and Heroes Acre, which also underscored the em-
phatic meaning attached to the “repatriation”98 in Namibia. At the same 
time, the incongruence with the approach of the German government ap-
                                                 
95  Cornelia Pieper MdB, Staatsministerin im Auswärtigen Amt to Yvonne Ploetz 
MdB, Schriftliche Fragen für den Monat Oktober 2011, Fragen Nr. 10-14-16, 12 
October 2011. 
96  Interviews, Windhoek, March 2012. 
97  The following remains strictly impressionistic, pending more in-depth study un-
derway. 
98  Alexactus T. Kaure, On Repatriation, Reparation, Restitution and Reconcilia-
tion, The Namibian, 7 October 2011. 
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peared obvious. In part, this may also explain the enormous and certainly 
unforeseen media echo on the occasion of the handover and Pieper’s walk-
out. By insisting on formal niceties and legal considerations, above all to 
avoid by any means to utter words that might possibly be used in a legal 
case for reparations, German officials completely missed what moved their 
Namibian counterparts – quite regardless of the inference that such painsta-
king care actually attested implicitly to an awareness that there was really a 
cause also for material reparations. Pieper’s speech was a clear expression 
of this dilemma when she asked for reconciliation on account of circum-
stances she had not bothered or dared to spell out. Amnesia was replaced, 
in this way, by what appears as a half-official ban on a word or even on a 
factual statement. 
However, also on the Namibian side not everything was monolithic and 
harmonious. The skull issue and attendant events brought dormant, fester-
ing issues into the open. Obviously, this applies to the greatly divergent re-
gional experiences such as regional differences in historical trajectories that 
entail regionally tinted hegemonic narratives.99 This is further exacerbated 
by complaints about neglect by the SWAPO government for concerns of 
the communities affected by the genocide, ranging from advancing claims 
for reparations from Germany right to a more vigorous and equitably land 
reform.100 It may have been such considerations, besides obvious chagrin 
about high-handed German official behaviour that prompted Prime Minister 
Nahas Angula a week later to come out with a strong demand that Germany 
respond to an official submission about reparations the Namibian govern-






                                                 
99   Kössler, Facing a fragmented past.  
100  Alfredo Tjiurimo Hengari, The Republic Must Show Solidarity With The His-
tory Of Genocide, The Namibian, 7 October 2011. 
101  New Era, 13 October 2011.  
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OUTSTANDING DIALOGUE, PERSISTENT  
POST-COLONIAL SITUATION 
 
This episode, then, focused once again the issues that shape post-colonial 
conflict and negotiation between Namibia and Germany. Even though the 
skull issue itself is by no means concluded as the repatriation of further 
skulls has been envisaged for 2012, the event can be seen as setting a provi-
sional and temporary end to a trajectory of transnational memory politics 
set into motion at the Ohamakari commemoration in 2004. This trajectory 
revolves around the modalities and consequences of the recognition of gen-
ocide perpetrated under the authority of the German state, and the apology 
offered by the Minister. As has become clear in pronouncements, also from 
the delegation in Berlin, their quest for a dialogue with ‘Germany’ remains 
on the agenda. For them, such dialogue and the recognition it implies are 
prerequisite to the reconciliation they offer and strive for. Given the stance 
taken once again by the German government, a process with its potential 
consequences of making claims for reparations effective seems unlikely for 
the near future. Yet even moves in the realm of symbolic politics, while 
more feasible, seem to run into the difficulties that follow from the refusal 
to openly address and name facts that had been acknowledged already by 
Wieczorek-Zeul, albeit not in the capacity of a representative of the Ger-
man nation. With a pointer, one might say that with the partial exception of 
Wieczorek-Zeul’s departure, the official German attitude implies a quest 
for silent reconciliation and thereby, at best limited recognition of the other. 
As long as the Namibian counterparts are not prepared to play along, this 
strategy may work on the advantage of a privileged power position, but will 
hardly be able to silence protest on the Namibian side or indeed from active 
parts of German civil society.102 One may therefore argue that the commu-
nication disaster around the return of the skulls was due in part to diplomat-
ic misunderstandings and possibly incomplete negotiating during the run-up 
to the event. However, such contingent aspects do not exhaust the matter. 
The events underscore the complexity of the post-colonial situation and the 
quest for reconciliation. 
                                                 
102  For an account of a similar reconciliation strategy on the part of the Namibian 
government with respect to the liberation war of 1966-1989, see Kössler, 
Zweierlei Amnesie.  
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This complexity involves constellations of state and non-state actors in 
both Namibia and Germany and their at times difficult means and forms of 
communication. One main difficulty refers to the position of both govern-
ments who are styled as the main actors on the diplomatic level, but have 
demonstrated only limited potential in filling these roles. In Namibia, vic-
tim groups and affected communities continue to clamour for direct negoti-
ation and dialogue with ‘Germany’, focusing clearly on the German gov-
ernment. Conversely, the German government has relied on arguments re-
lating to cultural federalism and the niceties of the administration of cultur-
al goods to fend off an official role for itself at the handover ceremony that 
before had seemed obvious to most observers. The government therefore is 
mediating between their Namibian counterparts in government and various 
instances, such as scholarly institutions, in Germany in contradictory ways. 
Again, civil society actors in Germany have been to some extent in longer 
contact with affected communities and their leaders or linked up readily 
with members of the delegation in Berlin in September 2011. It remains to 
be seen whether these contacts will bring a new quality to transnational civ-
il society relationships between the two countries. So far, these did exist 
e.g. in the form of some school partnerships and close contacts between 
church bodies, but these have rarely addressed memory issues on a public 
scale.  
In this way, not only does the image of the past remain a contested ter-
rain both in Namibia and in Germany, but so remain the conclusions that 
are drawn even from widespread consensus about certain issues, such as the 
perpetration of genocide in 1904-1908. Namibia stands out, even among 
German ex-colonies, for the urgency with which this colonial past is ad-
dressed, and even though interest within Germany has arguably increased 
in recent years, there remains a huge hiatus between the levels of public in-
terest in both countries. Again, this reciprocates, at least to some extent, the 
asymmetrical colonial and post-colonial situation and thus for those con-
cerned remains an issue to reflect as well as to act upon. The post-colonial 
situation is here to stay for a foreseeable future and its acknowledgement 
remains a political challenge. Moreover, the experience of September 2011 
may be read as an emphatic assertion precisely of the post-colonial quality 
of the relationship that has been the subject of this paper – a relationship 
marked not only by highly unequal means of those involved to make them-
selves heard, but also by highly unequal needs actually to listen. This can 
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be considered as a hegemonic relationship in the sense of quite differential 
possibilities of agenda setting. It remains to be seen to what measure recent 
events have aroused further awareness in Germany about the country’s 
post-colonial dimensions and how existent and new actors both in Namibia 
and in Germany will be able to work together in possibly also changing this 
hegemonic relationship.  
 

Instruments of Reconciliation: 





Political Reconciliation in Northern Ireland 





On 29 January 1998, Tony Blair announced the establishment of a new ju-
dicial inquiry chaired by Lord Saville of Newdigate into the killings of thir-
teen unarmed civil rights demonstrators in Derry on 30 January 1972, 
claiming that 
 
“Our concern now is simply to establish the truth, and to close this painful chapter 
once and for all [...] I believe that it is in everyone’s interests that the truth be estab-
lished and told. That is also the way forward to the necessary reconciliation that will 
be such an important part of building a secure future for the people of Northern Ire-
land.”1 
 
Establishing the truth was not the only motive for re-opening the inquiry in-
to Bloody Sunday; the announcement came at a pivotal point in the negotia-
tions leading to the Belfast Agreement in April 1998, and played a key role 
in easing Anglo-Irish relations and relations with the Nationalist communi-
ty and their political representatives in Northern Ireland. However, the ap-
parent belief that establishing the truth of what had happened twenty six 
years earlier would lead to reconciliation in Northern Ireland is one which 
requires some examination, as it raises questions about the nature and inter-
pretations of the conflict in Northern Ireland (thus the nature of reconcilia-
                                                 
1  Tony Blair, House of Commons, Hansard, 29 January 1998, Vol. 305, Col. 502. 
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tion there), the impact of the past on contemporary politics and society, and 
how this legacy can be dealt with in a way that promotes reconciliation ra-
ther than recrimination. This chapter assesses the state and nature of recon-
ciliation in Northern Ireland, before examining the problem of dealing with 
the legacy of conflict and the initiatives which have aimed to address this 
issue. Finally, a case study of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry is employed to 
examine the use of public inquiries as a means of dealing with the past. The 
Bloody Sunday Inquiry was not the sole government initiative to address 
the past; Ken Bloomfield produced a report on the issue in April 1998, 
while the Consultative Group on the Past, chaired by Robin Eames and 
Denis Bradley, issued its recommendations in January 2009. Neither was it 
the only initiative aimed at addressing nationalist grievances; the govern-
ment introduced a series of measures, including parading legislation, and 
policing and justice reforms. Although the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was not 
operating in a vacuum, and cannot therefore be used as the only marker of 
reconciliation, it does highlight the problems posed by the past for reconcil-




THE STATE AND NATURE OF RECONCILIATION IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
In some ways, the Northern Ireland peace process itself can be understood 
as a process of reconciliation. Republicans reconciled their aspiration for a 
united Ireland to the fact that a majority of the population of Northern Ire-
land supported the union with Great Britain, and decided to pursue constitu-
tional, rather than violent, means of achieving Irish unity, with the excep-
tion of a small minority of dissidents. For their part, the majority of Union-
ists agreed to share power with Republicans, and formerly implacable poli-
tical opponents began to work together in a power-sharing executive at 
Stormont. Diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and the Re-
public of Ireland have been largely normalised, epitomised by the first state 
visit of a British monarch to the Republic of Ireland for one hundred years 
in May 2011. Of Bloomfield’s four peace processes – the peace process, the 
political process, the international process, and the community process – 
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three appear near completion.2 However, the fourth process, the community 
process, provides the  
 
“greatest grounds for continuing concern [...] Sectarian segregation is still deeply en-
trenched; physical separation between hostile communities remains inevitable in too 
many areas; contentious marches and parades heighten tension and reinforce ani-
mosity”.3 
 
The number of peace walls constructed after the paramilitary ceasefires in 
1994 provided a stark visual and physical reminder of the continuing divi-
sions between the two communities in Northern Ireland.4 In 2010, the 
Northern Ireland Life and Times survey reported that fifty five per cent of 
respondents lived in areas where the majority of their neighbours were of 
the same religion, while sixty-one per cent said that all or most of their 
friends were of the same religion as them.5 One could even interpret the ex-
istence of the power-sharing executive led by the Democratic Unionist Par-
ty (DUP) and Sinn Féin as representative of this failure of social reconcilia-
tion, as the presence of two sectarian blocs forced to share power with each 
other. 
Connolly suggests that reconciliation has three main elements: “a lack 
of bitterness in political and other public relationships, a dialogue between 
former enemies based on the present rather than the past, and a single, uni-
                                                 
2  Kenneth Bloomfield, A Tragedy of Errors: The Government and Misgovernment 
of Northern Ireland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007), 3. Bloom-
field was the head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service from 1984 to 1991, was 
appointed Victims Commissioner for Northern Ireland in 1997 and was also a 
member of the Independent Commission for the Location of Victims’ Remains. 
3  Ibid. 
4  BBC News, The walls that don’t come down, 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/n 
orthern_ireland/8121362.stm, accessed 20 May. 
5  http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2010/Community_Relations/SRELNGH.html, http://w 
ww.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2010/Community_Relations/SRELFRND.html, accessed 28 
November 2011. 
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fied version of past events”.6 Using this definition, it is clear that reconcilia-
tion in Northern Ireland is incomplete. The comments of Tom Elliott, then 
leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, after the 2011 Northern Ireland Assem-
bly elections, when he described Sinn Féin supporters as “scum” and said 
that he “would not forget” the past, reveal both bitterness and a failure to 
engage with his former enemies “based on the present rather than the 
past”.7 Powell has made the point that the two communities have their own 
“internally consistent and mutually exclusive” histories of Northern Ireland, 
indicating the absence of a “single, unified version of past events”, which 
Connolly suggests is a necessary element of reconciliation.8 Although it is 
debatable whether this is even possible, given the plurality of histories in 
any society, the use of these different pasts to legitimise and reinforce divi-
sion is clearly antithetical to reconciliation. However, if one adopts Porter’s 
argument about the two connotations of reconciliation, where “the negative 
connotation highlights our being reconciled to some state of affairs – such 
as one in which the claims of difference can no longer be dismissed or ig-
nored – the positive connotation highlights our being reconciled with those 
who are different from us”, perhaps post-conflict Northern Ireland offers an 
example where the negative connotation of reconciliation is dominant.9 Un-
ionists and Nationalists are becoming reconciled to each other, but not yet 
with each other. 
Kelly and Hamber argue that reconciliation can be achieved by pursu-
ing five interrelated strands: developing a shared vision of an interdepen-
dent and fair society; acknowledging and dealing with the past; building 
positive relationships; encouraging significant cultural and attitudinal 
                                                 
6  Christopher K. Connolly, Living on the Past: The Role of Truth Commissions in 
Post-Conflict Societies and the Case Study of Northern Ireland, Cornell Interna-
tional Law Journal 39 (2006), 401-433, here: 410. 
7  BBC News, Tom Elliott attacks ‘Sinn Fein scum’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
uk-northern-ireland-13323770, accessed 20 May 2011. 
8  Jonathan Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland 
(London: Bodley Head, 2008), 58. Powell was Tony Blair’s Chief of Staff and 
played a key role in facilitating discussion between the parties from 1997 to 
2007. 
9  Norman Porter, The Elusive Quest (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2003), 66. Italics 
in original. 
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change; and engaging in substantial social, economic and political change.10 
The British government has been particularly involved in promoting social, 
economic and political change in Northern Ireland, as part of its engage-
ment in the peace process, through a series of confidence-building meas-
ures aimed at addressing the alienation of nationalists from the state. This 
programme included legislation to deal with contentious parades, the incor-
poration of the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law, the 
encouragement of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, policing reform, 
prison reform, de-escalation of military operations in Northern Ireland in 
accordance with the levels of violence, a review of emergency powers le-
gislation, and action on employment equality.11 Barton and McCully point 
out that the existence of two parallel and separate educational systems in 
Northern Ireland is often blamed for the perpetuation of community divi-
sions, and therefore initiatives in educational policy aimed at overcoming 
those divisions, such as the mandated cross-curricular themes of Education 
for Mutual Understanding and Cultural Heritage, introduced in the 1989 
Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order, are “regularly promoted as im-
portant contributors to peace and reconciliation”.12 These initiatives were 
intended to play an important role in encouraging changes in attitudes, the 
construction of positive relationships with those from different traditions 
and in the development of a shared vision of an interdependent and fair so-
ciety. 
The failure of the various parties to the conflict to engage wholeheart-
edly in addressing the legacy of the past has nevertheless meant that recon-
ciliation remains an elusive goal. This is partly linked to the existence of 
two competing narratives of the conflict in Northern Ireland, which present 
the conflict either as an internal conflict between Nationalists and Union-
                                                 
10  Gráinne Kelly and Brandon Hamber, Reconciliation: a working definition (Bel-
fast: Democratic Dialogue, 2004). 
11  Colin Knox and Pádraic Quirk, Peace Building in Northern Ireland, Israel and 
South Africa: Transition, Transformation and Reconciliation (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2000), 46. 
12  Keith C. Barton and Alan McCully, History Teaching and the Perpetuation of 
Memories: The Northern Ireland Experience, in: The Role of Memory in Ethnic 
Conflict, ed. Ed Cairns and Mícheál D. Roe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), 107-124, here: 107-108. 
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ists, or as one in which external actors and forces, particularly the British 
state and British imperialism, played a significant role.13 These competing 
narratives have an impact on understandings of who is to be reconciled in 
Northern Ireland. In an internal conflict analysis, reconciliation is primarily 
between Nationalists and Unionists within Northern Ireland, whereas in an 
analysis, which highlights, for example, the role of British imperialism, rec-
onciliation must include British state actors. Connolly argues that the fail-
ure to address the legacies of the conflict means that “Northern Ireland has 
yet to establish ‘truth’ in the form of a broadly-acceptable narrative of the 
Troubles upon which peace and reconciliation may be built”.14 This sug-
gests that in the absence of a shared interpretation of the past (or at least in-
terpretations which are not diametrically opposed to one another), a post-
conflict society cannot move towards a shared future. It also has an effect 
on some of the other strands of reconciliation outlined by Kelly and Ham-
ber. Building positive relationships based on trust and tolerance, and chang-
ing cultures and attitudes are difficult where suspicion, prejudice and into-
lerance remain due to the legacy of past conflict. Cairns and Roe argue that 
unless the past, and memories of the past, are addressed,  
 
“groups are often left with a sense of ‘victimhood’ that stems from unacknowledged 
and unreconciled historic losses. These in turn present a powerful barrier to traditi-
onal methods of peacemaking and diplomacy and create new senses of wrong and 
injustice thus creating the potential for future conflict.”15  
 
Where loss and suffering is unacknowledged, groups and individuals re-
main alienated from the post-conflict society. 
Although there have been initiatives dealing with discrete aspects of the 
past, for example, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, there has been no initiative 
introduced to deal comprehensively, with the participation of all parties to 
the conflict, with the legacy of the past. This is partly due to the absence of 
                                                 
13  Bill Rolston, Assembling the jigsaw: truth, justice and transition in the North of 
Ireland, Race and Class 44, 1 (2002), 87-105, here: 88. 
14  Connolly, Living on the Past, 414. 
15  Ed Cairns and Mícheál D. Roe, Introduction: Why Memories in Conflict?, in: 
The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict, ed. Ed Cairns and Mícheál D. Roe (Ba-
singstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 3-8, here: 4-5. 
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consensus on who constitute the victims of the conflict. Although the draft 
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland suggests that “the loss and suffering of 
all victims of that conflict and the responsibility of State and non-State par-
ticipants are appropriately and independently established and/or acknow-
ledged”,16 Hamber refers to the notion of a hierarchy of victims in Northern 
Ireland where some groups refer to themselves as ‘innocent’ victims, which 
implies that ‘guilty’ victims also exist.17 He also argues that “[M]any vic-
tims of paramilitary violence feel that their suffering is seen as less im-
portant in light of the concessions to political (largely Republican) prison-
ers”;18 in this way, concessions and measures such as prisoner releases have 
had a negative impact on the way in which the past is perceived and ad-
dressed. 
The perception of ignored victimhood also exists for victims of state vi-
olence, who “feel they have always been secondary victims because the he-
gemony of the British state remains”.19 This is also linked to the issue of the 
two discourses about the Northern Ireland conflict; where the internal con-
flict narrative is dominant, the role of state violence in the problem of the 
past is ignored, and victims of state violence marginalised. In addition, 
there is reluctance amongst the parties to the conflict to engage in questions 
of truth recovery, particularly Sinn Féin and the British state.20 The com-
bined effect is that the past has been exploited for political advantage; as 
Marie Breen Smyth argues, “the uses to which suffering has been put in 
                                                 
16  Making a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: A Consultation by the Northern 
Ireland Human Rights Commission (Belfast: Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission, 2001), Cl. 8 (a) 1. Emphasis added. 
17  Brandon Hamber, Dealing with the Past: Rights and Reasons: Challenges for 
Truth Recovery in South Africa and Northern Ireland, Fordham International 
Law Journal 26 (2002-2003), 1074-1094, here: 1090. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Christine Bell, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland, Fordham Internation-
al Law Journal 26 (2002-2003), 1095-1147, here: 1107. In contrast, Lawther 
suggests that it is, in fact, Unionists and Loyalists who are opposed to the intro-
duction of formal truth recovery processes; Cheryl Lawther, Unionism, Truth 
Recovery and the Fearful Past, Irish Political Studies 26, 3 (2011), 361-382, 
here: 362. 
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Northern Ireland have often served an agenda more preoccupied with politi-
cal advantage than with healing or reconciliation”.21 For example, in March 
2011, Martin McGuinness and the DUP’s Gregory Campbell clashed in an 
Assembly debate on the past when Campbell asked McGuinness to make 
an “unambiguous statement of his involvement” in the Troubles; in re-
sponse, McGuinness accused Campbell of being “embedded in the past”.22 
 
 
DEALING WITH THE LEGACY OF THE PAST IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
Despite reluctance to examine the past comprehensively, there have been 
several initiatives examining aspects of the past in Northern Ireland. Within 
civil society, these have frequently taken the form of community story-
telling and oral history groups, such as the Dúchas Oral History Group 
which recorded testimonies about experiences of the conflict in nationalist 
West Belfast,23 and the Ardoyne Commemoration Project, which collected 
stories from the friends and relatives of all those from Ardoyne in North 
Belfast who died during the conflict.24 Although these are often based with-
in specific communities, such as that of nationalist West Belfast, and have 
therefore developed “specifically to address the historical experience of 
particular communities”, Graham Dawson suggests that this form of truth 
recovery need not necessarily be divisive, as it creates opportunities for 
“encountering other perspectives and narratives”.25 
                                                 
21  Marie Breen Smyth, Truth Recovery and Justice After Conflict: Managing Vio-
lent Pasts (London: Routledge, 2007), 85. 
22  Martin McGuinness and Gregory Campbell clash, http://www.belfasttelegraph.c 
o.uk/news/politics/martin-mcguinness-and-gregory-campbell-clash-15106734.ht 
ml, accessed 28 November 2011. 
23  http://www.rascal.ac.uk/index.php?CollectionID=205&navOp=locID&navVar= 
39, accessed 18 May 2011. 
24  Ardoyne Commemoration Project, Ardoyne: The Untold Truth (Belfast: Beyond 
The Pale, 2001), http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/victims/ardoyne/ardoyne02a.htm, 
accessed 25 May 2011. 
25  Graham Dawson, Making peace with the past: Memory, trauma and the Irish 
Troubles (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 25. 
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Alternatively, there are groups which campaign on behalf of specific 
groups of victims, such as Relatives for Justice (RFJ), campaigning for the 
recognition of victims of state violence,26 and Families Acting for Innocent 
Relatives (FAIR), who call for the recognition of the suffering of Unionists 
in South Armagh.27 However, Eilish McCabe of RFJ has pointed out that 
Unionist victims’ groups often refuse to cooperate with groups who have 
connections to Republican paramilitaries; Dawson argues that “this attitude 
demonizes not only the Republican paramilitaries, but nationalist families 
and whole communities […] In doing so, it reconstitutes traditional sectari-
an divisions and hampers any possibility of cross-community reconcilia-
tion.”28 Tonge highlights a similar problem for civil society groups engaged 
in conflict resolution; such groups need to develop “sufficient cross-
community contacts to make the group appear non-sectarian and afford 
[them] a genuine prospect of ameliorating the conflict from below”.29 
Where civil society groups are drawn solely from one community, particu-
larly when addressing the problem of the past, the danger is that the group 
will focus on the experience of their own community to the exclusion of 
other communities, and thus precludes the development of the “single, uni-
fied version of past events” which Connolly argues is necessary for recon-
ciliation. 
The past has also been examined through state-sponsored initiatives, 
from apologies for specific events to commissions on the past and inquiries 
into particularly controversial deaths. In October 1997, Kenneth Bloomfield 
was appointed as Victims’ Commissioner and asked “to look at possible 
ways to recognise the pain and suffering felt by victims of violence arising 
from the troubles of the last thirty years, including those who have died or 
been injured in the service of the community”.30 Bloomfield reported in 
                                                 
26  Rolston, Assembling the jigsaw, 95. 
27  http://victims.org.uk/s08zhk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1 
&Itemid=2, accessed 25 May 2011. 
28  Dawson, Making peace with the past, 285. 
29  Jonathan Tonge, The New Northern Irish Politics? (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 215. 
30  We Will Remember Them: Report of the Northern Ireland Victims’ Commis-
sioner, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/victims/docs/bloomfield98.pdf, accessed 25 
May 2011. 
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April 1998, but was heavily criticised for reinforcing the notion of the hie-
rarchy of victims; Lundy and McGovern suggest that this approach “sowed 
anew the old seeds of ostracism” by implying that there were more deser-
ving victims, and therefore less deserving victims.31 The Consultative 
Group on the Past, established in June 2007 to examine the legacy of the 
past in Northern Ireland, sought to move away from the hierarchy of vic-
tims perception, demonstrated by the recommendation of a £12,000 recog-
nition payment to the relatives of all those killed during the conflict.32 How-
ever, this particular recommendation proved highly controversial, as Union-
ist leaders vehemently criticised the suggestion that the families of dead 
paramilitaries should be treated the same as the families of civilians killed 
by paramilitary actions.33 
As various recommendations for dealing with the legacy of the past in a 
comprehensive manner failed to meet with sufficient cross-community con-
sensus, the past has instead been dealt with through examining discrete 
events, for example, the inquiries into Bloody Sunday, Billy Wright, Rose-
mary Nelson and Robert Hamill, as well as commissions dealing with spe-
cific groups of victims, such as the Independent Commission for the Loca-
tions of Victims’ Remains (ICLVR), focusing on the Disappeared.34 Bell 
suggests that this approach to dealing with the past was part of the confi-
dence-building strategy of the British government in relation to the peace 
process, that it amounts to little more than a “balancing of Unionist and Na-
tionalist demands” and therefore has done little to discourage the politicisa-
                                                 
31  Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, The Politics of Memory in Post-Conflict 
Northern Ireland, Peace Review 13, 1 (2001), 27-33, here: 29. 
32  Report of the Consultative Group on the Past: Executive Summary, http://cain.ul 
st.ac.uk/victims/docs/consultative_group/cgp_230109_report_sum.pdf, accessed 
25 May 2011. 
33  For example, Nigel Dodds of the DUP, who argued that “[T]here can be no mo-
ral equivalence between the people who were murdered in the Shankill Road 
bombing and the criminal Thomas Begley who murdered them”, BBC News, 
Reaction to Eames/Bradley Report, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/ 
7856590.stm, accessed 25 May 2011. 
34  The term Disappeared refers to “those killed and buried in secret by proscribed 
organisations prior to 10 April 1998 as a result of the Northern Ireland conflict”, 
http://www.iclvr.ie/, accessed 25 May 2011. 
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tion of the past.35 The only initiative which sought to examine comprehen-
sively and systematically every death relating to the Troubles was the His-
torical Enquiries Team of the Police Service of Northern Ireland; however, 
the team’s objective was to establish the circumstances of each death, rather 
than to promote reconciliation.36 
 
 
CASE STUDY: THE BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY 
 
On 30 January 1972, members of the First Battalion of the British Army 
Parachute Regiment opened fire on an anti-internment march organised by 
the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) after a small group 
of protesters were involved in low-level rioting and stone-throwing. Thir-
teen unarmed men were shot dead and a further fifteen people were woun-
ded, one of whom later died of his injuries. The next day, the Home Secre-
tary, Reginald Maudling, announced that an independent inquiry would be 
established to examine the “circumstances of the march and the incidents 
leading up to the casualties which resulted”.37 This inquiry was established 
under the chairmanship of the Lord Chief Justice, John Widgery, but could 
hardly be described as independent. In a meeting with Widgery, the Prime 
Minister, Edward Heath, instructed him to remember during his inquiry that 
“we were in Northern Ireland fighting not only a military war but a propa-
ganda war”.38 Central to this propaganda war was the internal conflict nar-
rative that Britain was a “neutral umpire between two warring tribes” in 
Northern Ireland.39 Accordingly, the Widgery Report exonerated the sol-
diers, claiming that “[T]here is no reason to suppose that the soldiers would 
                                                 
35  Bell, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland, 1101. 
36  Introduction from the Chief Constable, http://www.psni.police.uk/historical-enq 
uiries-team, accessed 27 May 2011. 
37  Reginald Maudling, House of Commons, Hansard, 31 January 1972, Vol. 830, 
Col. 33. 
38  Edward Heath, 1 February 1972, quoted in Dermot P.J. Walsh, Bloody Sunday 
and the Rule of Law in Northern Ireland (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 63. 
39  Rolston, Assembling the jigsaw, 88. 
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have opened fire if they had not been fired upon first”.40 Instead, Widgery 
concluded that “[t]here would have been no deaths in Londonderry on 30 
January if those who organised the illegal march had not thereby created a 
highly dangerous situation in which a clash between demonstrators and the 
security forces was almost inevitable”.41 Thus the organisers and the mar-
chers were condemned for engineering the situation, while the soldiers, 
though occasionally criticised for firing which “bordered on the reckless”, 
were cleared of responsibility for the deaths and injuries sustained on Bloo-
dy Sunday.42 
The combination of Bloody Sunday and the Widgery Report had pro-
found consequences for the relationship between the Nationalist community 
in Northern Ireland and the British state. It demonstrated that 
 
“the rule of law had been completely abandoned by Britain in its attempt to shore up 
unionist power in the State and that consequently, a state of war existed. For some, 
the killings on Bloody Sunday justified the use of violence against the State. For 
others, they indicated that peaceful protest was impossible and eventually the non-
violent street protest of the civil rights movement withered away.”43 
 
In doing so, it cemented the alienation of Nationalists from the British state, 
and increased doubts that they would ever be treated fairly within the Uni-
ted Kingdom. Furthermore, it had implications for the relationship between 
Nationalists and Unionists, as many Unionists adopted the official version 
of Bloody Sunday, as instituted in the Widgery Report, and blamed the pro-
testers for the events of that day.44 Dawson points out that although “there 
have always been some Protestants and Unionists sympathetic to the suffer-
                                                 
40  Lord Widgery, Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on 
Sunday, 30th January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the pro-
cession in Londonderry on that day (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 
1972), http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/widgery.htm, accessed 25 May 2011. 
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Angela Hegarty, The Government of Memory: Public Inquiries and the Limits 
of Justice in Northern Ireland, Fordham International Law Journal 26 (2002-
2003), 1148-1192, here: 1167. 
44  Dawson, Making peace with the past, 90. 
POLITICAL RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND | 327 

ing and injustice endured on and after Bloody Sunday, for many years this 
was given no effective public voice. Recognition of the atrocity was at best 
grudging.”45 This presents another example of the difficulty of reconcilia-
tion “when a section of the population can continue to deny that the state 
ever acted wrongly whilst another section feels their suffering has never 
been acknowledged”.46 With the British state denying its culpability in the 
events of Bloody Sunday and the majority of Unionists supporting this de-
nial, the families of those killed on Bloody Sunday and the wider Nationa-
list community felt that their suffering had been denied and marginalised. 
The sense of injustice engendered by Bloody Sunday and the Widgery 
Report meant that the families and the Nationalist community adopted “al-
ternative ways to remember it and to tell its version of the truth”.47 Annual 
commemorative marches were organised in Derry, initially by NICRA and 
then by Sinn Féin, from 1973 to 1989. The strong association of the Bloody 
Sunday campaign with Sinn Féin during a period when Sinn Féin was unre-
pentantly supportive of the IRA and armed struggle meant that the cam-
paign did not attract much support or sympathy outside militant Nationa-
lism. However, there was no specific organisation campaigning on behalf 
of the Bloody Sunday victims “as a cause in itself” until 1987, when the 
Bloody Sunday Initiative (BSI) was established.48  The BSI realised that “if 
the campaign was to succeed it would have to be made accessible to indi-
viduals and interest groups outside Republicanism” and therefore took over 
the organisation of the annual commemoration in 1989 and began to lead 
the campaign for the institution of a new public inquiry into Bloody Sun-
day.49 McCann suggests that this was “symbolic of a shift back from out-
right rejection of the legal and constitutional system, and tentatively to-
wards the pursuit of remedies within the system”.50  
                                                 
45  Ibid., 121. 
46  Lundy and McGovern, The Politics of Memory, 30.  
47  Hegarty, The Government of Memory, 1170. 
48  The Bloody Sunday Inquiry: The Families Speak Out, ed. Eamonn McCann 
(London: Pluto Press, 2006), 8. McCann was one of the organisers of the civil 
rights march on 30 January 1972 and was a prominent campaigner for a new in-
quiry into Bloody Sunday. 
49  Ibid., 7. 
50  Ibid., 8. 
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In parallel with the shift towards searching for remedies within the 
framework of the UK state and legal system and with the efforts to broaden 
the campaign’s support base, the Bloody Sunday campaign attracted in-
creasing support within Northern Ireland, in the Republic of Ireland and in 
Britain. In 1992, former Northern Ireland minister Peter Bottomley asked 
whether there would be a re-examining of the conclusions of the Widgery 
Tribunal.51 This request was echoed by his fellow chair of the cross-party 
New Consensus group, Harry Barnes, who wrote to the Prime Minister, 
John Major.52 In the same year, the leader of the Social Democratic and La-
bour Party (SDLP), John Hume, wrote to Major to request a new inquiry; 
although the request was denied, Major acknowledged that all those killed 
on Bloody Sunday should be regarded as innocent of the allegations that 
they had been handling explosives and firearms.53 The Irish Government al-
so pursued the call for a new inquiry through diplomatic channels, and sub-
mitted a report of all the new evidence about Bloody Sunday to the British 
government in June 1997. The report concluded that Widgery “must be re-
placed by a clear and truthful account of events on that day, so that its poi-
sonous legacy can be set aside and the wounds left by it can begin to be 
healed”.54 
While the expectation of the two governments in Dublin and London 
was that granting a new inquiry would aid reconciliation, the Bloody Sun-
day campaigners had different expectations. Hegarty points out that “it is 
sometimes the case that people call for public inquiries because they be-
lieve that they know the essential truth about a situation and simply want 
the state to ‘own up’. Long campaigns for ‘the truth’ or for new public in-
quiries to be set up also heighten this expectation.”55 The Bloody Sunday 
                                                 
51  Peter Bottomley, House of Commons, Hansard, 7 February 1992, Vol. 203, Col. 
325W. 
52  Michael Mates, House of Commons, Hansard, 15 June 1992, Vol. 289, Col. 
383W. 
53  McCann, The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 11. McCann suggests that Major thought 
that this acknowledgement would bring the matter to a close. 
54  Department of the Taoiseach, Bloody Sunday and the Report of the Widgery 
Tribunal: The Irish Government’s Assessment of the New Material (Dublin: De-
partment of the Taoiseach, 1997). 
55  Hegarty, The Government of Memory, 1158. Italics in original. 
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families had been campaigning for twenty-six years by the time Blair an-
nounced the Bloody Sunday Inquiry in January 1998. Hegarty argued in a 
later article that the families also expected the new inquiry to “operate 
much more as a truth commission than an orthodox public inquiry and that 
there would be less investigation of the events and rather more exposition 
of the local version”.56 This is echoed by McCann, who argued that 
“[C]ampaigners in Derry hadn’t demanded a new inquiry because they 
wanted to be told the truth. They didn’t need a report from Lord Saville to 
find out what happened, but to find out whether the state would acknowl-
edge what happened.”57 The expectation was that the narrative that the 
campaigners had maintained since 1972, in opposition to the official state 
version of Bloody Sunday, would finally be officially recognised and ac-
knowledged as the truth. 
Despite not coinciding with the reasoning of the Bloody Sunday fami-
lies and campaigners, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry also played a significant 
role in the Northern Ireland peace process. In his covering letter for the re-
port sent to the British government, the Taoiseach Bertie Ahern wrote that 
“I believe that your approach to this issue can help to remove a source of 
profound distress not only to the relatives but to the nationalist community 
generally”.58 This implied that a new public inquiry into Bloody Sunday 
might conciliate wider Nationalist opinion and increase Nationalist confi-
dence and support for the peace process. Walsh suggested that “[I]f justice 
is finally done with respect to Bloody Sunday, it is reasonable to suppose 
that nationalists will be more willing to place their trust in the promise of 
equal citizenship and the new political, social and cultural environment in-
herent in the peace agreement.”59 Blair wrote that his motivation for estab-
lishing the new inquiry was to “assuage Nationalist opinion”, but that 
“pressure from the Irish” also played a role in his decision.60 The Irish gov-
ernment announced that their report on the new evidence would be pub-
lished, and Walsh argues that “[I]t was hardly a coincidence […] that the 
                                                 
56  Angela Hegarty, Truth, Law and Official Denial: The Case of Bloody Sunday, 
Criminal Law Forum 15 (2004), 199-246, here: 225. 
57  McCann, The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 7. 
58  Ibid., 17. 
59  Walsh, Bloody Sunday and the Rule of Law, 284. 
60  Tony Blair, A Journey (London: Hutchinson, 2010), 165. 
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UK government announced the establishment of a new public judicial in-
quiry on the eve of the twenty-sixth anniversary, the same day that the Irish 
government published its report.”61 The fact that the new inquiry was estab-
lished partly in response to pressure from the Irish government may have 
contributed to the opposition to the inquiry mounted by anti-agreement Un-
ionists, who encouraged their followers to see it as “part-and-parcel of a 
wider sell-out of Protestant-Unionist interests” alongside parading legisla-
tion, policing reform and prisoner releases.62 
Another role that the Bloody Sunday Inquiry played in the peace pro-
cess was to “demonstrate to nationalists and republicans that we were even-
handed and that the British government no longer had anything to hide”.63 
This acknowledges that the Widgery Report had represented an effort on 
the part of the British government to obscure what had happened on Bloody 
Sunday. It is, however, interesting that Powell suggests that the Bloody 
Sunday Inquiry would demonstrate British neutrality in relation to Union-
ists and Nationalists in its handling of the peace process; in contrast, Daw-
son argues that the Bloody Sunday Inquiry “required a major shift in 
stance, away from the state’s ideological self-representation as the honest 
broker and towards an admission of its role as an active party to the con-
flict”.64 Powell’s description of the Weston Park talks in 2001 is more illu-
minating regarding his depiction of British even-handedness: 
 
“[The] SDLP had pressed hard for inquiries into murder cases where there was a 
suspicion of collusion by the security forces, including the case of Patrick Finucane 
[…] We were very reluctant to agree to this. After the continuing Bloody Sunday in-
quiry, the last thing Northern Ireland needed to do was to spend more of its time 
                                                 
61  Walsh, Bloody Sunday and the Rule of Law, 296. 
62  McCann, The Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 18. The Parades Commission was estab-
lished in 1998 to regulate contentious parades in Northern Ireland; Unionists 
viewed it as an attack on their culture. The policing reforms recommended by 
the Patten Commission in 1999 were criticised by Unionists as an insult to the 
role of the RUC in combating terrorism during the Troubles. The release of Re-
publican prisoners from 2000 onwards was also opposed by Unionists, given the 
failure of the IRA to commit fully to decommissioning. 
63  Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room, 45. 
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looking back rather than preparing for the future. But in the end, in order to get the 
SDLP to accept the police reforms, we had to support the idea of an international 
judge looking at whether there were grounds for public inquiries into a series of in-
dividual cases. For their part, the Unionists wanted the list of cases to be considered 
to include Billy Wright, the LVF [Loyalist Volunteer Force] leader murdered in the 
Maze prison, to balance the otherwise exclusively Catholic bias.”65 
 
With regards to these inquiries, British even-handedness amounted to little 
more than trying to balance Nationalist and Unionist demands.  
The balancing act approach was evident in other areas of the British 
government’s involvement in the peace process; the former Northern Ire-
land Secretary, Mo Mowlam, wrote that the role of the British government 
was “like walking a tightrope, weighing the interests of one side against 
another and trying not to lose anyone”.66 One of the drawbacks of this ap-
proach, however, was that it was difficult to balance the demands of the 
two sides. Mowlam argued that it was “easier to move on some of the na-
tionalists’ issues – because they were often about making N. Ireland a fairer 
and more equal place to live for everyone – than on unionist demands”.67 
Nationalist demands required recognisable change, whereas Unionist de-
mands involved maintaining the status quo; as a result, the level of pro-
posed change was frequently insufficient for Nationalists, but too much for 
many Unionists. As Porter argues, the balancing act approach can mean 
that “reconciliation ceases to function as a substantive moral ideal entailing 
a genuine reaching out to others and the requirements of balancing and in-
clusion are easily reduced to tactical ploys useful in the game of maximi-
sing one’s cultural and political advantage”.68 Understanding this point is 
essential in understanding the differing reception of the Bloody Sunday In-
quiry in the two communities in Northern Ireland (and, to a certain extent, 
amongst the two main political parties in Britain), and the reasons for its 
failure to fulfil the projected aim of promoting reconciliation. 
The differences in reception are particularly evident in the parliamen-
tary debates surrounding the announcement of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry 
                                                 
65  Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room, 199. 
66  Mo Mowlam, Momentum (London: Hodder and Staughton, 2003), 164. 
67  Ibid., 167. 
68  Porter, The Elusive Quest, 78. 
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and the announcement of the report, and in the reactions in Northern Ire-
land, Britain and the Republic of Ireland. McCann highlighted the spectrum 
of opinion in the responses to the inquiry in Northern Ireland in his descrip-
tion of the Inquiry as “an achievement in which the Catholic/Nationalist 
community might rejoice and which Protestants/Unionists might accept, 
whether grudgingly or in a spirit of generosity, in the interests of the new 
accord”.69 Given the nature of zero-sum politics in divided societies such as 
Northern Ireland, the simple fact that the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was wel-
comed by the Nationalist community was sufficient reason for it to be op-
posed by sections of the Unionist community, as any gain for one commu-
nity was interpreted as necessarily entailing a loss for the other. 
At the very least, the establishment of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was 
interpreted by many Unionists as indifference to the suffering sustained by 
the families of other victims of the Troubles, particularly those from the se-
curity forces. The DUP MP Sammy Wilson asked why it was considered 
necessary to re-open the inquiry into Bloody Sunday when “it was not con-
sidered necessary to hold an inquiry into the deaths of many RUC [Royal 
Ulster Constabulary] soldiers and innocent civilians who had been killed by 
terrorists”.70 This opinion is particularly echoed by those victims’ groups 
who represent Protestant and Unionist victims, for example, Leslie Finlay, 
a representative of the West Tyrone-based victims’ group, Voice: 
 
“These big inquiries now that I hear tell about, on Bloody Sunday and Pat Finucane 
and Rosemary Nelson, all right, then, they can enquire as much as they like, these 
people, but [...] [there] were no enquiries in Castlederg [...] over twenty murders in 
the Castlederg area and they couldn’t get anybody out to investigate it.”71 
 
As Dawson argues, “Protestant and Unionist victims also have tended to re-
spond to the success of those campaigns where some public recognition has 
been secured from the State [...] as a denial and exacerbation of their own 
communities’ memories of trauma, suffering and loss”.72 The perception 
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that the British government’s approach to the past and truth recovery was 
too heavily focused on addressing the grievances of the Nationalist com-
munity was elaborated by Jim Shannon: 
 
“I want truth for the people at Darkley Hall, the people at La Mon, the people who 
were at Enniskillen on Remembrance Sunday, and the people who were murdered at 
Ballydugan. I want the truth for all those people. If we are to have truth, we must 
have it for everyone, not just for selected people. The fact that this process seems to 
be trying to obtain the truth for selected people is what annoys me.”73 
 
The dangers of this perception going unaddressed were highlighted by the 
leader of the Irish Labour Party, Eamon Gilmore: 
 
“I recognise that righting one particular wrong done to one particular group is a sen-
sitive issue when so many wrongs have been done to so many other innocent vic-
tims. Some people in the Unionist community have criticised the cost of the Saville 
inquiry and the extent of the media attention given to the killings on Bloody Sunday. 
They can point, accurately, to the contrast with so many major atrocities involving 
paramilitaries, which received much less attention.”74 
 
This highlights the hazards of an approach to the past, indeed an approach 
to peace-making and reconciliation, which relies on the balancing of inter-
ests. 
Another factor in the differing reception of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry 
was due to its role in building the confidence of the Nationalist community 
in the peace process. Jeremy Corbyn suggested that the Bloody Sunday In-
quiry “will help to give an awful lot of people confidence that the Govern-
ment are serious about the search for peace in Northern Ireland”.75 Indeed, 
Corbyn’s colleague and former Northern Ireland Secretary, Paul Murphy 
even proposed that had the Bloody Sunday Inquiry not been established, 
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“there would not have been a successful peace process”.76 Although the 
Bloody Sunday families felt that the inquiry should not take place solely as 
a confidence-building measure,77 they also acknowledged that 
 
“even if the establishment of the Inquiry came about as part of the manoeuvring and 
quid pro quo of the peace process, and was not simply the results of our own efforts, 
the fact remains that the British government was willing to take this step towards 
some sort of resolution, and we in the spirit of reconciliation have to accept that”.78 
 
However, the role of the Inquiry as a confidence-building measure contri-
buted to its negative reception amongst Unionists. An editorial in the Un-
ionist-leaning Daily Telegraph argued that 
 
“The decision to launch the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, the plans for demilitarisation as 
a bargaining chip with terrorists and the suggestions that there should be a ‘day of 
reconciliation’, in which British soldiers are somehow equated with the IRA, are all 
offensive and all highly political. They show that our security policy is now not 
shaped by a sense of the national interest and by the need to keep the peace, but an 
obsession with a process of concession that has no bottom line.”79 
 
The News Letter pointed out that “Bloody Sunday has become so bound up 
in republican propaganda that unionists find it difficult to sympathise with 
the plight of relatives who are seeking an official apology from the Gov-
ernment”.80 Rather being seen as “a search for truth and justice, which su-
rely is in the interests of all the people of Northern Ireland, whatever their 
political or religious beliefs”,81 the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was interpreted 
by many Unionists as “a one-sided sop to buy nationalist and Republican 
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support for the peace process”.82 Given the Inquiry’s role in building Na-
tionalist confidence in the talks leading to the Belfast Agreement, it is un-
surprising that the Inquiry was primarily opposed by anti-Agreement Un-
ionists. 
Finally, there was considerable scepticism over whether the Bloody 
Sunday Inquiry would result in the anticipated outcome of societal healing 
and reconciliation. Views on this tended to be split along communal lines, 
with John Hume arguing that the Inquiry would hopefully “be a major part 
of the healing process in our divided community”.83 By contrast, his Union-
ist counterpart, David Trimble, suggested that this hope was misplaced, and 
that “[O]pening old wounds like this is more likely to do more harm than 
good”.84 This was echoed by Conservative MP John Wilkinson who argued 
that “reinvestigating these matters will just exacerbate the pain, sorrow and 
grief, and lead to further alienation of loyal people in Northern Ireland”.85 
Although scepticism tended to be located within the Unionist community, 
Jean Hegarty, one of the Bloody Sunday campaigners, suggested that rec-
onciliation through the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was impossible “because I 
don’t think feelings in Derry towards the army about Bloody Sunday have 
changed. And the Inquiry has probably alienated the Unionist community 
even more.”86 
The range of opinion, and often bitter feelings, towards the Bloody Sun-
day Inquiry is indicative of the difficulties surrounding the achievement of 
political and social reconciliation in Northern Ireland. It has raised many 
questions over the use of public inquiries as a method of dealing with the 
legacy of the past. As Lord Bew, one of the historical advisers to the Bloo-
dy Sunday Inquiry, has pointed out,  
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“[T]he government has a legacy from the Bloody Sunday Tribunal – not just the 
heavy financial cost – but also the claims from other victims of the ‘Troubles’ to 
have their stories respected by the state. It has unfinished business here, and it needs 
to reflect on the way it has gone about its work thus far.”87  
 
Breen Smyth has related these issues to the question of reconciliation, and 
how new approaches might be developed: 
 
“Concern about the scale and costs associated with the Bloody Sunday Inquiry [...] 
have led some to question the feasibility of judicial, adversarial processes as the way 
forward in dealing with Northern Ireland’s past. Concern about the adversarial ap-
proach and its culture which is largely antithetical to negotiation, compromise or re-
solution have led some towards favouring a restorative over a retributive model. 
Others favour a more interactive, dialogical approach, where the history is rewritten 
by participation at all levels of society through a narrative process.”88 
 
By contrast with public inquiries, the latter model would theoretically lead 






It would be unfair to suggest that there have been no successes in the cur-
rent approaches to the legacy of the Northern Ireland conflict. The Bloody 
Sunday families welcomed the Saville Report and the subsequent apology 
from Prime Minister David Cameron, with the majority finding some de-
gree of closure in the report; Tony Doherty, one of the campaigners, sug-
gested that 
 
“The vast majority of the families felt that what we had brought about, what we had 
achieved on 15 June, with the Saville Report as an exoneration, with the words of 
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David Cameron, with apology and accepting political responsibility for the atrocity 
of Bloody Sunday, that it was now time for us all to consider moving on.”89 
 
The work of the ICLVR in locating the remains of the Disappeared, and the 
role of the Historical Enquiries Team (HET), have both been welcomed by 
the families and friends of those killed as a result of the conflict. The role of 
the various civil society groups, both single- and cross-community, has 
been important in supporting families and victims, in raising awareness of 
the issues involved, and in engaging with state-sponsored initiatives on dea-
ling with the past. The state-sponsored initiatives, such as the Bloomfield 
Report and the work of the Consultative Group on the Past, have highlight-
ed the issues surrounding the past and the difficulties involved in address-
ing those issues. 
However, the consultations of these initiatives have also revealed the 
wide disparity in attitudes towards the past and how to deal with the legacy 
of conflict, and the single-community victims’ groups in particular have of-
ten played a role in reinforcing the social divide, rather than overcoming it. 
As Breen Smyth argues, both civil society and state-sponsored initiatives 
for dealing with the past “have failed to achieve a comprehensive paradigm 
shift in the wider society, but rather have been configured into the conflict 
itself, which persists, at least in the minds and rhetoric of the main protago-
nists and their followers”.90 The past remains an arena of conflict, which re-
flects the nature of the peace process as a means of transforming the Nor-
thern Ireland conflict from violence to politics, rather than resolving said 
conflict. The lack of consensus over suggested means of examining and 
dealing with the legacy of the past is an example of the conflict being con-
tinued by other means and is reflective of the lack of reconciliation that ad-
dressing the past is supposed to engender. 
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From Truth to Reconciliation 
The Global Diffusion of Truth Commissions 




On April 14 to 15 in 2011, an international conference took place in Tunis 
under the topic “Addressing the Past, Building the Future: Justice in Times 
of Transition”.1 This conference was hosted jointly by different non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) as the Arab Institute for Human Rights, 
the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the Tunisian 
League for Human Rights in cooperation with the United Nations Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights and with support from the Open 
Society Foundations. Besides discussions on criminal justice and security 
sector reforms, truth commissions were a major topic. José Zalaquett, a 
former member of the Chilean National Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion, gave insights into the Latin American experiences and mentioned the 
need for implementing measures such as truth seeking. Priscilla Hayner, 
founding member of the non-governmental International Center for Transi-
tional Justice and currently a Senior Adviser at the Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue, was invited to talk about the Argentine truth commission. Toge-
ther with Tawfik Bouderbla, the President of the Tunisian “Committee for 
Investigating the Truth on the Violations During the Last Events”, a com-
mission of inquiry on the human rights violations during the revolution, she 
discussed the establishment of a truth commission for dealing with the 
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long-lasting dictatorship, highlighting the importance of looking into the 
broader context of human rights violations. 
This recent event demonstrates that truth commissions have obviously 
become a well-known and widely recognized tool for dealing with past re-
gime crimes after political transitions. With the support from NGOs and 
even from the United Nations, international experts advise countries in po-
litical transition in establishing a truth commission by sharing their experi-
ences with the national political elite and civil society activists. 
Yet, truth commissions were firstly recognized as a particular phenom-
enon in the realm of transitional justice research only a little more than fif-
teen years ago.2 With the breakdown of Latin American military dictator-
ships, the question of how to deal with past regime crimes drew attention of 
political actors, NGOs, and the academia. It led to the rapid development of 
transitional justice as both, practice and research. Besides questions of legal 
prosecution or amnesty, another emphasis was put on the “right to know” 
and the acknowledgement of committed crimes via truth commissions.  
Since the 1980s, about 40 truth commissions3 have been established 
worldwide to uncover the truth about past human rights violations in order 
to bring reconciliation to societies after violent conflict and repression. The 
definition of a particular practice of dealing with past crimes as a “truth 
commission” and its establishment in various countries as well as interna-
tional demands for truth commissions after political transitions demonstrate 
that truth commissions have become recognized as an adequate solution to 
national past politics.  
In this context, I am addressing truth commissions as a global phenom-
enon. I will shed light on the question why truth commissions are estab-
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lished across the world although in every country the political conflict, the 
level of violence or the cultural environment differ distinctively from the si-
tuation in other countries. I draw attention to the institutionalization and 
global diffusion of a specific cultural practice of coming to terms with the 
past, which we can find as an empirical fact in many countries all over the 
world independent of a particular cultural background or political conflict. 
In other words, I will not attempt to answer why sometimes truth commis-
sions are established and sometimes they are not. Nor do I focus on the spe-
cific cultural or political context in which a particular truth commission has 
been set up. Instead, I ask why have truth commissions become globally ac-
cepted as a legitimate standard tool in the transitional justice repertoire? 
This approach differs from most of the extensive research literature on tran-
sitional justice and truth commissions, which has focused mainly on ques-
tions of national past politics and its effects on national democratic consoli-
dation. In order to answer this question, I will proceed in four steps. First, I 
will introduce truth commissions as a transitional justice standard as well as 
an object of transitional justice research. I will provide some insights into 
what truth commissions are and what they do. Secondly, I will take a closer 
look on the history of truth commissions, the process of their institutionali-
zation as a well-known standard of transitional justice and their global dif-
fusion. In a third step, I will highlight the formation of an epistemic com-
munity as the promoter of truth commissions. I will conclude by discussing 
the expectations related to truth commissions and the rationale they provide 
in the context of their institutionalization as a widely recognized answer to 
gross human rights violations. 
 
 
TRUTH COMMISSIONS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
RESEARCH 
 
With the breakdown of Latin American dictatorships, the question how to 
deal with past regime crimes in the context of democratic consolidation be-
came a prominent issue. In the years of military dictatorships in Latin Ame-
rica, a widespread network of human rights activists developed that collect-
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ed information in particular about the “disappeared”4 and worked on draw-
ing public attention to the massive human rights violations.5 Now, after the 
collapses of the Latin American autocratic regimes, human rights activists, 
who had already demanded to stop and investigate current human rights vi-
olations for many years, turned their claims towards the disclosure of and 
accountability for past regime crimes, which in many cases had been com-
mitted already years ago.6 A new political issue surfaced that became 
known as transitional justice. With the breakdown of the Soviet Union and 
its satellite states and, furthermore, with the overcoming of the apartheid re-
gime in South Africa, the geographic scope of transitional justice also ex-
panded beyond Latin America.  
Transitional justice comprises a wide range of different practices of 
dealing with past regime crimes. However, here I will focus on one particu-
lar practice of transitional justice that has spread across the world since the 
1980s. Along with special courts – such as the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda (ICTR)7 or most prominently the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in The Hague8, truth commissions have become of major inter-
est in the research on transitional justice procedures.9 According to Hayner 
and Freeman, truth commissions are officially established by a presidential 
or royal decree, a parliamentary decision, or a peace agreement, but exist 
only for a limited time. They consist of several commissioners who range 
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from politicians to human rights activist or even churchmen. They are sup-
ported by a staff providing technical support for the investigations and in 
some cases even psychological assistance to the victims.10  
Truth commissions differ significantly from courts. Instead of judicially 
proving individual responsibility of single perpetrators,11 truth commissions 
try to draw as complete a picture as possible of the extent of serious human 
rights violations and their structural background. By writing up the truth in 
an end report, truth commissions construct a historical narrative about the 
past as well as about their own role in overcoming it. This collective narra-
tive shapes the understanding of the past by contributing to the collective 
remembrance of it.12 Truth commissions thus take part in the formation of a 
new collective identity by constructing an “imagined moral community”13 
which is based on a clear normative demarcation from the past. 
Courts legitimate their actions by referring to (international) law; truth 
commissions as non-judicial organizations do not have this kind of legiti-
mation. Regarding the question of legitimacy, the global acceptance of truth 
commissions as an appropriate means for transitional justice becomes an 
empirical puzzle. On which grounds are they expected to be a legitimate 
answer to gross human rights violations besides the courts? To tackle this 
puzzle, I will sketch out the historical process in which truth commissions 
emerged and how they became institutionalized as a widely accepted transi-
tional justice standard. 
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THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
 
The first official truth commission was established in Bolivia in 1982. It 
was inspired by an unofficial commission of inquiry in Brazil that had been 
established by the archdiocese of Sao Paulo under the military dictatorship 
in 1979 in order to collect information about the disappearances of civil-
ians. In contrast to the Bolivian truth commission, which never published 
an end report, the first truth commission that finished its work by handing 
over a final report to the government was held in Argentina in 1983. Al-
though the Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (Nation-
al Commission on the Disappeared, CONADEP) was contested to some ex-
tent, because it was not allowed to publicly name individual perpetrators,14 
its end report called Nunca más (Never again) became a national bestseller 
and founded the “literary genre of truth reports”.15 In 1985, another Latin 
American truth commission was established by the Uruguayan parliament. 
As in the case of its predecessors, it was set up in order to find out the fate 
of the “disappeared”.  
The first African truth commission took place in Uganda after the re-
gimes of Idi Amin and Milton Obote in 1986.16 With the financial support 
of the Ford Foundation, which sent the Chilean human rights activist José 
Zalaquett to assist the commission in 1987, this truth commission finally 
published an end report in 1994.17 Already before, in 1974, the Ugandan 
                                                 
14  But the names leaked through and were published by the media. Ruth Fuchs and 
Detlef Nolte, Die Aufarbeitung von Regimeverbrechen und der Demokratisie-
rungsprozess in Lateinamerika: Argentinien und Chile in vergleichender Per-
spektive, in: Nach Kriegen und Diktaturen – Umgang mit Vergangenheit als in-
ternationales Problem: Bilanzen und Perspektiven für das 21. Jahrhundert, ed. 
Alfons Kenkmann and Hasko Zimmer (Essen: Klartext, 2005), 29-48.  
15  Anika Oettler, Einmal „nunca más!” und nie wieder? Die Dynamik der histori-
schen Aufklärung in Argentinien und Guatemala, in: Bilder nach dem 
Sturm: Wahrheitskommissionen und historische Identitätsstiftung zwischen Staat 
und Zivilgesellschaft, ed. Christoph Marx (Berlin: Lit, 2007), 36-73, here: 40. 
All translations in this article were made by the author. 
16  Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 239-240. 
17  http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-uganda-86, accessed June 
2011. 
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president Idi Amin had established a commission of inquiry into the disap-
pearances of people in Uganda. Some refer to this commission as the first 
truth commission.18 But the results were neither published nor did Idi Amin 
have to face any consequences. He was in power before and after the com-
mission took place. Instead, the members of this commission had to face se-
rious consequences afterwards such as trials or even assaults.19  
In the literature, the Nepalese Commission of Inquiry to Locate the Per-
sons Disappeared during the Panchayat Period has also been integrated into 
the collection of truth commissions.20 Like in the first Latin American and 
African Commissions, it was set into office in early 1990 to disclose infor-
mation about the persons who “disappeared” under the Panchayat Regime 
from 1961 until 1990.  
These first cases show that fact-finding about the “disappearances” be-
came a major concern in the political transformation processes of the 
1980s. To collect information about this secretly performed practice and to 
acknowledge its victims became a substantial factor for the credibility of 
the new political elite. While the consequences of judicial prosecution were 
discussed controversially, “the right to know” emerged as a widely shared 
assumption about what should be done about past crimes.21 
In 1990, another Latin American truth commission, the Chilean Comi-
sión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación (National Truth and Reconcilia-
                                                 
18  Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions; Hayner, Unspeakable Truths; Lutz Niet-
hammer, Wahrheitskommissionen im Vergleich, in: Bilder nach dem Sturm, 15-
35. For critical comments, see Freeman, Truth Commissions. 
19  Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions, 612. 
20  http://www.usip.org/resources/commission-inquiry-nepal-90, last accessed June 
2011. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) does not consider the Nepa-
lese commission to be a truth commission but a commission of inquiry. Hayner, 
Unspeakable Truths, Dancy et al., The Turn to Truth, and Freeman, Truth Com-
missions, instead define this commission as a truth commission. 
21  Gloria Park, Truth as Justice: Legal and Extralegal Development of the Right to 
Truth, Harvard International Review 31, 4 (2010), http://hir.harvard.edu/bigidea 
s/truth-as-justice?page=0,1. Park talks about the “right to truth”. I will use in-
stead the “right to know” because this term has been used by the United Nations 
in the Joinet-Report on transitional justice. UN document, Economic and Social 
Council, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1, 2 October 1997. 
346 | ANNE K. KRÜGER 

tion Commission), was set into office by a presidential decree of newly 
elected president Patricio Alwyn. It was the first truth commission that 
called for “truth” and “reconciliation” already in its title. Human rights ac-
tivist José Zalaquett was appointed as a member of this commission that 
was chaired by the politician Raúl Rettig. When the truth commission was 
established, the country was still in a tense political situation, because for-
mer dictator Augusto Pinochet continued to be the supreme commander of 
the military forces. To underline its credibility and to foster public as well 
as political acceptance, President Aylwin distributed the appointment of the 
commissioners equally among the opponents of the Pinochet regime and its 
supporters.22 In contrast to its predecessors, this truth commission’s man-
date included more than disclosing the truth about the “disappeared”. 
Against this volatile political backdrop, the Chilean truth commission was 
supposed to reach towards a collectively accepted picture of the past and 
the origins of the dictatorship.23  
By signing the UN brokered peace agreement in 1991, the government 
of El Salvador and the guerilla organization Frente Farabundo Martí para 
la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) agreed to establish a truth commission for 
El Salvador. Referencing the Argentine and Chilean examples, the end re-
port from El Salvador declared that in order to guarantee the commission’s 
sovereignty only international commissioners should be appointed.24 
Against this backdrop, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
announced former Columbian president Belisario Betancur, former presi-
dent of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Thomas Buergenthal 
and former Venezuelan minister of foreign affairs Reinaldo Figueredo 
Planchart as commissioners of the Comisión de la Verdad para El Salvador 
(Truth Commission for El Salvador).25 It was the first time that the United 
                                                 
22  Guido Klumpp, Vergangenheitsbewältigung durch Wahrheitskommissionen: 
Das Beispiel Chile (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2001). 
23  Decreto Supremo No. 355 on the establishment of the Comisión Nacional de 
Verdad y Reconciliación, 25 April 1990. 
24  UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador: 
Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, S/25500, 1993, Annex, 
12. 
25  Wolfgang Pasternak, Wahrheitskommissionen: Dargestellt an den Beispielen 
von El Salvador, Guatemala und Südafrika (Aachen: Manz, 2003), 58. 
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Nations took part in the establishment of a truth commission. Their en-
gagement shows that already in the early 1990s an international awareness 
of this particular practice of coming to terms with the past had emerged. 
The references to the Argentine and the Chilean example underline that na-
tional transitional justice practices had been recognized as being transfera-
ble to other countries in transition to democracy. Truth commissions be-
came thought of as a viable solution to assist peaceful and democratic con-
solidation.  
In 1992, the German parliament established the Enquête-Kommission 
zur Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutsch-
land (Enquête Comission for the Inquiry into the History and Consequences 
of the Socialist Dictatorship in Germany). The parliament drew on a pre-
existing instrument for advising the parliament in complex political, econo-
mic or social affairs.26 Germany was the first country to establish a truth 
commission although trials had already taken place before. However, the 
results of these trials had caused disappointment especially among former 
GDR human rights activists.27 Legal restrictions posed a problem to sanc-
tioning officially committed regime crimes.28 Markus Meckel and Martin 
Gutzeit, the co-founders of the GDR social democrats in October 1989, ini-
tiated an officially sanctioned Enquête-Kommission, which was then estab-
                                                 
26  Christian Heyer and Stephan Liening, Enquete-Kommissionen des Deutschen 
Bundestages: Schnittstellen zwischen Politik und Wissenschaft (Berlin: Deut-
scher Bundestag, 2004). It is important to note that an Enquête-Kommission dif-
fers significantly from a commission of inquiry, which is another parliamentari-
an investigation instrument. It has no judicial powers. Instead, besides politi-
cians, external experts are also members of this commission and serve to pro-
vide broad knowledge about a particular issue. Commissions of inquiry instead 
are designed to focus more specifically on singular events. For a further distinc-
tion of truth commissions and commissions of inquiry see http://www.usip.org/ 
publications/truth-commission-digital-collection, accessed June 2011. 
27  Petra Bock, Von der Tribunalidee zur Enquete-Kommission. Zur Vorgeschichte 
der Enquete-Kommission des Bundestages “Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und 
Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland”, Deutschland Archiv 11 (1995), 1171-
1182. 
28  Klaus Marxen and Gerhard Werle, Die strafrechtliche Aufarbeitung von DDR-
Unrecht: Eine Bilanz (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999). 
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lished unanimously by all parties in the Bundestag. Like in other countries 
before, it was mandated to disclose the structural circumstances of the so-
cialist dictatorship and the individual suffering of the victims in order to 
come to a clearer picture of the communist past, to acknowledge its victims 
and to strengthen a democratic political culture.29 The establishment of the 
German Enquête-Kommission thus presents truth commissions not only as 
an appropriate solution for dealing with the past, but also as an expedient 
addition to trials.  
To date, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) has been the most prominent truth commission. It was established by 
the Promotion of Reconciliation and National Unity Act of 26 July 1995 
and chaired by Arch Bishop Desmond Tutu. Human rights activist Alex 
Boraine became the deputy chairperson. Although, the South African con-
cluding report also refers to Argentina and Chile as two examples of truth 
commissions,30 the TRC had some unique features. It was the first commis-
sion that had the power to grant amnesties in cases of an extensive confes-
sion. Yet, the underlying mission of the TRC was even more important. Tu-
tu emphasized “reconciliation” achieved by “forgiveness” as the main goal 
of the commission in reaching for the “rainbow nation”.31 The public hear-
ings of this commission were therefore not only designed to educate people 
about the severe and structural human rights violations during the apartheid 
regime but also as a public arena for the collective catharsis of the South 
African people.32  
                                                 
29  Andrew H. Beattie, An Evolutionary Process: Contributions of the Bundestag’s 
Inquiries into East Germany to an Understanding of the Role of Truth Commis-
sions, International Journal of Transitional Justice, 3, 2 (2009), 229-249; Anne 
K. Krüger, “Keine Aussöhnung ohne Wahrheit”: Die Enquête-Kommissionen 
zur “Aufarbeitung” und “Überwindung der SED-Diktatur”, in: Nach Krieg, Ge-
walt und Repression: Vom schwierigen Umgang mit der Vergangenheit, ed. Su-
sanne Buckley-Zistel and Thomas Kater (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 131-
149. 
30  Truth & Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Report, Vol. 1 (London 
and New York: MacMillan, 1999), 111-112. 
31  Desmond Tutu, No future without forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999). 
32  Martha Minow, Between vengeance and forgiveness: Facing history after geno-
cide and mass violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998). 
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This brief and only partial overview of first truth commissions demon-
strates already that – despite different cultural, political, and societal back-
grounds – this transitional justice practice has become widely accepted as a 
legitimate solution to the problem of how, after political transitions, to deal 
with systematic human rights violations committed by a former regime or 
during a civil war. In the initial phase in the 1980s, first commissions 
emerged defining their goals and their means in a similar way. They ema-
nated from the concern, shared across national borders, about the fate of 
“disappeared” relatives and friends. In a second phase in the early 1990s, 
this kind of dealing with past human rights crimes was recognized as a pos-
sible option for transitional justice. Truth commissions enlarged their focus 
from individuals towards the structural and historical background; their task 
developed into drawing an exhaustive picture of the past crimes and their 
context. Furthermore, truth commissions were installed via peace agree-
ments under the auspices of the United Nations. Moreover, even where tri-
als had already been held before, truth commissions were established in ad-
dition. With the establishment of the South African Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission, the institutionalization of truth commissions as a recog-
nized transitional justice standard had reached its crucial point. The huge 
national and international public attention to the TRC and its professionally 
organized outreach made this commission a referential point or even a pro-
totype for future truth commissions. Today, we can find truth commissions 
all over the world in Asian countries like South Korea or Timor Leste, in 
Islamic countries such as Morocco, in ex-Yugoslavian Serbia and Monte-
negro. And also in Latin America and Africa, further truth commissions 
have been set into office. Thus, truth commissions have developed from a 
tool to publicly disclose information about the “disappeared” towards a 
widely applied practice of dealing with past crimes and their structural 
background in order to account responsibility to the culprits and to ac-
knowledge their victims. 
This brief overview of the global diffusion of truth commissions has al-
so shown that in many cases truth commissions have built on the experi-
ences of earlier commissions. In order to better understand these transna-
tional processes, it is necessary to focus on actors and organizations that 
have contributed to the worldwide spread of truth commissions. 
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PROMOTING TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
 
During the military dictatorships in Latin America, relatives and friends of 
“disappeared” persons organized to gather information on the whereabouts 
of their loved ones. One of the most prominent examples is the Argentine 
Asociación de las Madres de Plaza de Mayo. After the political transition, 
they claimed that it was indispensable “to understand the truth, otherwise a 
shadow of sadness will forever hang over the descendants of this shattered 
generation”.33 These NGOs pressured the newly elected governments not to 
ignore the severe human rights violations of the past. They demanded an 
officially mandated fact-finding about the “disappearances” in order to pub-
licly acknowledge these secretly committed human rights violations as well 
as to provide assistance to the relatives.34 Members of these NGOs took 
part in discussions about the establishment of a truth commission. In Boliv-
ia, Carmen Loyola Guzmán even became the executive secretary of the Co-
misión Nacional de Desaparecidos, representing the Bolivian Asociación 
de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos y Mártires por la Libertad Na-
cional (ASOFAMD), a NGO committed to finding the whereabouts of the 
“disappeared”.  
This NGO was also among the founders of the Federación Latino-
americana de Asociaciones de Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos 
(FEDEFAM). The FEDEFAM was founded in 1982 as a transnational um-
brella organization for the investigation on “disappearances” of civilians. In 
order to exchange information about the kidnappings, these locally founded 
and then nationally organized groups had started to cooperate with other 
such groups in neighboring countries already during the military dictator-
ships. Nowadays, the FEDEFAM has members in many Latin American 
states, which in most of the cases have also established truth commis-
sions.35  
First academic discussions entering the human rights activists discourse 
on transitional justice date from the 1980s. They centered on questions of 
                                                 
33  Argentina: Self-Amnesty, Time, 3 October 1983, http://www.time.com/time/ma 
gazine/article/0,9171,926231,00.html#ixzz1Mb5inDMR, accessed June 2011. 
34  Veit Strassner, Die offenen Wunden Lateinamerikas: Vergangenheitspolitik im 
postautoritären Argentinien, Uruguay und Chile (Wiesbaden: VS, 2007). 
35  http://www.desaparecidos.org/fedefam/, accessed June 2011. 
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punishment versus amnesty.36 The crucial question of the discussions was 
whether punishing the former elite would jeopardize the political stability 
of (re)nascent democracies.37 Transitional justice38 had to balance the de-
mands for procedural justice on the one hand and the hope for the consoli-
dation and reintegration of society on the other one. Especially the Argen-
tine laws, which stopped the prosecution of perpetrators in 1986, caused 
major discussions.39 Yet, besides these debates on legal issues, a new way 
of granting justice to the victims surfaced. Public knowledge and acknowl-
edgement of the committed crimes became recognized as a new form of 
justice that could help to build a moral foundation for the consolidating de-
mocracies. The “right to know” was seen as a necessary precondition for 
restoring social trust in political institutions and for reintegrating the vic-
tims into society.40 Nonetheless, disclosing the truth was not regarded to be 
                                                 
36  For a profound discussion of legal prosecution and its potential benefits and 
consequences see the collection of articles from Aryeh Neier, Jaime Malamud-
Goti, José Zalaquett, Diane F. Orentlicher and Carlos S. Nino (among others) in 
Transitional justice: How emerging democracies reckon with former regimes, 3 
vols., ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington, DC: United States Inst. of Peace Press, 
1995). 
37  Diane F. Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts’ Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms 
with Local Agency, International Journal of Transitional Justice 1, 1 (2007), 
12-13. 
38  The term “transitional justice” itself became prominent in the late 1990s after 
the publication of the compendium “Transitional justice” in 1995 by Neil Kritz. 
See Arthur, How transitions shapes Human Rights.  
39  See the discussion between the lawyer Diane Orentlicher and Carlos Nino who 
advised Argentine president Alfonsín in his transitional justice policies in Diane 
F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Viola-
tions of a Prior Regime, The Yale Law Journal 100 (1991), 2537-2615; Carlos 
S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: 
The Case of Argentina, The Yale Law Journal 100 (1991), 2619-2640; Diane F. 
Orentlicher, A Reply to Professor Nino, The Yale Law Journal 100 (1991), 
2641-2643; Orentlicher, Settling Accounts Revisited. 
40  Park, Truth as Justice. 
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a trade-off for procedural justice.41 It rather became recognized as an addi-
tional component of transitional justice.42  
These academic discussions about accountability, amnesty, and the 
“right to know” took place in a number of conferences that were held from 
the end of the 1980s onwards. One of the most prominent conferences was 
hosted by the Aspen Institute in 1988 under the title “State Crimes: Pun-
ishment or Pardon?“ against the backdrop of the resurrection of Latin 
American democracies.43 After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the 
breakdown of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the Latin American 
discussions on transitional justice were transferred to these countries in 
transition and their legacies of a repressive past. These conferences were 
sought to facilitate a transfer of Latin American experiences of dealing with 
the past to post-socialist countries.44 One important conference in this re-
gard was “Justice in Times of Transition” which was organized by the New 
York based Charta 77 Foundation in Austria in March 1992 and conceptu-
alized as the inaugural meeting of a new transitional justice organization 
with the same name as the conference title. In the foreword of his “Transi-
tional Justice” compendium, Neil Kritz summarizes his impressions from 
this conference that inspired him to compile this book:  
 
“In word spoken and unspoken, in skeptical glances and general body language, the 
Latin Americans and Europeans seemed to be expressing the same thing to one an-
other: the suffering of our people during the old regime and the difficulties resulting 
from our legacy is far worse than any hardship you endured. Ours is the greater pain; 
                                                 
41  But there was a debate on “truth vs. justice”. See Rotberg and Thompson, Truth 
v. justice; The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Socie-
ties, ed. Carmen González Enríquez et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001); Ellen Lutz, Transitional justice: Lessons learned and the road ahead, in: 
Transitional justice in the twenty-first century: Beyond truth versus justice, ed. 
Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2006), 325-41. 
42  Arthur, How Transitions reshaped Human Rights, 353. 
43  Arthur, How Transitions reshaped Human Rights. 
44  Timothy Phillips, The Project on Justice in Times of Transition, in: The New 
Humanitarians, ed. Chris E. Stout (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Press, 2008), 
2-22. 
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there is little we can learn from your experience. […] And yet. By day two of the 
proceedings, there was a gradual but palpable recognition that many of the details 
and dilemmas were not so different.”45  
 
After the breakdown of the apartheid regime in 1994, another important 
conference was held by the title “Dealing with the Past” in South Africa. It 
was organized by the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Afri-
ca and supported by the Project Justice in Times of Transition. At this con-
ference, experts from Argentina and Chile introduced their experiences of a 
truth commission to South African politicians and human rights activists. 
Until today, as the Tunisian conference shows, organizations such as the 
ICTJ or the Project Justice in Times of Transitions hold conferences in or-
der to transfer transitional justice knowledge and experiences to countries 
in political transition. 
Altogether, these conferences facilitated an exchange of experiences as 
well as the discussion on a broad range of possible ways how to deal with 
the past after political transitions. This had a strong impact on the world-
wide diffusion of transitional justice and in particular of truth commissions. 
Based on a collectively shared reservoir of knowledge about different orga-
nizational forms, procedures, and practices of transitional justice, an epis-
temic community,46 i.e. a network of professionals consisting of practition-
                                                 
45  Neil J. Kritz, The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice, in: Transitional justice, 
xix–xxx, here: xix. 
46  Haas defines an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with rec-
ognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”. Peter M. 
Haas, Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordina-
tion, International Organization 46, 1 (1992), 3. In the realm of human rights, 
Keck and Sikkink suggest to talk about transnational advocacy networks instead 
of an epistemic community. They define transnational advocacy networks as a 
network of “actors working internationally on an issue, which are bound togeth-
er by shared values, a common discourse, and a dense exchange of information 
and services.” Kathryn Sikkink and Margaret E. Keck, Transnational Advocacy 
Networks in International and Regional Politics, in: International organization 
and global governance: A reader, ed. Friedrich V. Kratochwil and Edward D. 
Mansfield, 2nd ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2006), 162-176, here: 162. 
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ers from the field, academics, politicians, and policy consultants who ad-
vised governments or intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) all over the 
world, started to form. This epistemic community contributed to institu-
tionalizing transitional justice as a widely shared expectation in the context 
of regime transitions and introduced this paradigm to the United Nations.47 
Furthermore, this epistemic community also provided members to follow-
ing truth commissions. Human rights activists like the Chilean José Zala-
quett or the South African Alex Boraine became members of truth commis-
sions in their home countries.  
Oettler interprets this process as the development of a “global transi-
tional justice design”, which these experts promote as a “hegemonic 
truth”.48 Through workshops, conferences, and direct support of NGOs and 
governments, this epistemic community not only spreads its transitional 
justice expertise. It also promotes its normative assumptions about the right 
way of dealing with the past. The members of this epistemic community are 
also members of research institutes, consulting agencies, NGOs or IGOs. 
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) soon became one of 
the most prominent non-governmental organizations of this kind.49 The 
                                                                                                  
While they stress the identification with values as the important factor for coop-
eration, which are nonetheless also included in the definition of an epistemic 
community, in this article, I want to stress the formation of expert knowledge 
and the development of transitional justice standards and their promotion. Thus, 
I will refer to the term epistemic community.  
47  The term “transitional justice” appears in an UN document for the first time in 
1997 in the context of the question how to stabilize new governments. While, on 
the one hand, transitional justice is recognized to be an important factor, the do-
cument demands, on the other hand, that “[f]or reconciliation, the actors in a 
post-conflict society must reach consensus on the issue of transitional justice 
and a balance must be struck between the needs for justice and for tolerance”. 
United Nations, Economic and Social Council, E/1997/86, 27 June 1997. From 
the beginning of the 2000s onwards, the mentioning of “transitional justice” in 
UN documents increases continuously.  
48  Anika Oettler, Der Stachel der Wahrheit. Zur Geschichte und Zukunft der Wahr-
heitskommission in Lateinamerika, Lateinamerika Analysen 9 (2004), 93-126, 
here: 120. 
49  http://www.ictj.org, accessed June 2011. 
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ICTJ was founded in 2001 after the experience of the South African TRC. 
Its foundation members were two transitional justice practitioners, former 
TRC’s deputy chairperson Alex Boraine and TRC’s executive secretary 
Paul van Zyl. Additionally, Priscilla Hayner, a pioneer in the research on 
truth commissions, became a third founding member. This constellation al-
ready demonstrates the twofold mission of the ICTJ. It does not only re-
search on truth commissions. It also advises NGOs and governments all 
over the world in how to establish a truth commission.  
The before mentioned Tunisian conference on “Justice in Times of 
Transition”, which was co-organized by the ICTJ, is thus another example 
which demonstrates once again the promotion of transitional justice and, in 
particular, truth commissions as appropriate action after political transiti-
ons. Truth commissions are now a commonly shared standard in the transi-
tional justice repertoire. They have become the common enterprise of an 
epistemic community because they are expected to be an adequate solution 
for transitional justice. But why could, in particular, truth commissions de-
velop as such a popular transitional justice practice?  
 
 
FROM TRUTH TO RECONCILIATION 
 
The political, cultural, and social background against which truth commis-
sions have been established has varied across countries. While the Argen-
tine Comisión sobre la Desaparición de Personas was set up against the 
backdrop of the “dirty war” against civilians by the military dictatorship, 
the Comisión de la Verdad para El Salvador tried to account for the gross 
human rights violations committed during the twelve years of civil war. 
The Chilean Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación was intro-
duced while former dictator Augusto Pinochet still remained the supreme 
commander of the military forces. The German Enquête-Kommission was 
established after a long-lasting socialist dictatorship that had confined its 
people not only in economic, political, and social but also in geographical 
terms within the borders of the German Democratic Republic. In contrast to 
the GDR, the apartheid regime had drawn borders within the country sepa-
rating and repressing South African people due to their ethnical origins. 
And the Moroccan Instance Equité e Réconciliacion was the first truth 
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commission that was installed in an Islamic country and inaugurated by the 
former oppressor’s son, King Mohammed VI. 
Also in terms of their establishment, personnel composition, and com-
petences, truth commissions have differed distinctively from each other. 
They have been installed by a presidential or royal decree, a parliamentary 
decision, or a peace agreement. They have been executed by national or fo-
reign human rights activists, churchmen, politicians, or academics. Some 
have been equipped with the right to name potential perpetrators or to grant 
amnesties, while others were limited to collecting information about indivi-
dual suffering and were not allowed to investigate individual accountabil-
ity. Nevertheless, no matter how much these truth commissions differed in 
practice, a closer look on their mandates and end reports reveals a striking 
similarity. The Argentine truth commission claimed: “[W]e are neither mo-
tivated by any resentments nor by the spirit of vengeance; we only ask for 
truth and justice, […], because we think that there won’t be reconciliation 
without contrition of the culprits and justice based on the truth.”50 The re-
port of the Chilean Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación stated 
that their “task revolved around two fundamental objectives: truth and rec-
onciliation. As defined for us, our work was to come to a comprehensive 
grasp of the truth of what had happened, for it was utterly necessary to do 
so in order to bring about reconciliation among Chileans.”51 Moreover, the 
UN brokered truth commission in El Salvador hoped “that knowledge of 
the truth […] will be a reasonable starting-point for national reconciliation 
and for the desired reunification of Salvadorian society”.52 The German En-
quête-Kommission found that “the experiences of the Enquête-Kommission 
have emphasized the dictum ‘No reconciliation without truth’. Particularly 
the victims of the former regime have a right to truth. Only when the truth 
has been disclosed and individual guilt has been admitted, reconciliation 
                                                 
50  Nunca Más: Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Perso-
nas (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1987), 10. 
51  Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 1118. 
52  UN Security Council, From Madness to Hope, Annex, 176.  
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can be addressed.”53 And the until now most famous truth commission, the 
South African TRC, emphasized that “[o]ne of the main tasks of the Com-
mission was to uncover as much as possible of the truth about past gross 
violations of human rights […]. The Commission was founded […] in the 
belief that this task was necessary for the promotion of reconciliation and 
national unity.”54  
Although these quotes result from very different contexts, they all show 
a similar account of legitimacy. In order to justify their establishment, these 
truth commissions refer to the same argument. They describe their aim as 
discovering, documenting, and reporting the truth about gross human rights 
violations in order to reconcile a fractured society.  
In the early 2000s, influenced by the prominent South African truth 
commission, the establishment of truth commissions increased. In 2003, 
several truth commissions were at work in countries as different as Sierra 
Leone, Timor Leste, Peru, and Serbia and Montenegro. These truth com-
missions show that “truth” and “reconciliation” are key concepts that are 
not only used to describe and to justify their work across cultural and polit-
ical differences, but which are even represented in the names of many truth 
commissions.55  
The Moroccan Instance Equité e Réconciliacion presents a further ex-
ample. Although, reconciliation is often believed to be a Christian concept, 
this truth commission, inaugurated in 2004 in an Islamic country, referred 
to the establishment of the truth about gross human rights violations as im-
portant “[t]o develop and promote a culture of dialogue and set up the basis 
of a reconciliation process oriented toward the consolidation of the demo-
                                                 
53  Bericht der Enquête-Kommission Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der 
SED-Diktatur in Deutschland, ed. Der Deutsche Bundestag, Drucksache 12/ 
7820, 31 May 1994, 281. 
54  Truth & Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Report, Vol. 1 (Basing-
stoke: Macmillan, 1999), 49. 
55  Translated into the national idiom the commissions were called Comissão de 
Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação (Timor Leste), Comisión de la Verdad y 
Reconciliación (Peru), Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Sierra Leone), 
Komisija za istinu i pomirenje (Serbia and Montenegro). 
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cratic transition in our country, the strengthening of the rule of law and the 
propagation of citizenship and human rights values and culture.”56 
These examples show that starting with the “right to know” about the 
fate and the whereabouts of victims of human rights violations, a new idea 
of transitional justice has surfaced. With the establishment of first truth 
commissions in the early 1980s, a new rationale has become part of the 
transitional justice practice and discourse. Besides ideas of justice through 
punishment, establishing the “truth” is related to “reconciling” societies. To 
publicly acknowledge the individual suffering of victims in the context of 
its structural and historical background has become recognized as an indis-
pensable contribution to political transitions. This counts for the countries 
that have yet established a truth commission. But also beyond national 
boundaries, this practice has gained recognition. International NGOs as 
well as IGOs as the United Nations are now promoting truth commissions 
as a reasonable solution for dealing with past human rights violations, 
thereby contributing to its further diffusion. The rationale that truth leads to 
reconciliation has been institutionalized. 
 
 
THE MEANING OF RECONCILIATION  
 
However, truth commissions have also always been contested. Their global 
diffusion across different countries around the globe as well as their inter-
national promotion by a number of national, transnational, and international 
NGOs or IGOs proves that truth commissions are recognized as one possi-
ble way to exercise transitional justice, although, their results are often crit-
icized. Critical evaluations show a lack of actual efficacy in various ways.57 
                                                 
56  Approving Statutes of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission, Dahir No 
1.04.42 of the 19th of Safar 1425 (10 April 2004), The Kingdom of Morocco, 
http://www.ier.ma/article.php3?id_article=1395, accessed June 2011. 
57  Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission, ed. Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson (Johannesburg: Wit-
watersrand University Press, 2002); Rosalind Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Leone, Special Report 130 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005); James L. Gibson, 
Overcoming apartheid: Can truth reconcile a divided nation? (New York: Rus-
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In Argentina human rights activists also first refused the CONADEP, be-
cause they had opted for a parliamentary commission of inquiry with more 
judicial powers. Some members of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo even nev-
er accepted it.58 They wanted to discover the truth about the gross human 
rights violations in order to punish the guilty. Hence, they were not inter-
ested in reconciliation at all. 
However, despite of contestation and critical evaluation, truth commis-
sions have become more and more popular for dealing with past crimes, al-
beit the urge for accountability never ceased. Initially, truth commissions 
had not been thought of as a substitute for trials.59 However, due to (self-) 
amnesties, still powerful former elites or an insufficiently working judici-
ary, in many countries the truth-seeking process was not followed by trials 
and sentences against perpetrators. As a consequence, the establishment of 
truth commissions became accompanied by the fear of impunity. In coun-
tries where no trials were held before or in the aftermath of a truth commis-
sion, they were thus often considered to have facilitated impunity.  
In particular, the term “reconciliation” was criticized. Already in the de-
bates about “punishment or pardon”, amnesties had been justified as an im-
portant factor for reconciliation. In this context, “reconciliation” became 
soon to be seen as a “watchword for impunity”.60 With the emergence of 
truth commissions and, at the same time, with the lack of trials, the goal of 
truth commissions to achieve reconciliation also got a bad aftertaste. Hu-
man rights activists as well as victims expressed their concern that the aim 
of reconciliation could end the search for the guilty and draw a line under 
the human rights violations of the past, which then would lead to impunity. 
                                                                                                  
sell Sage Foundation, 2006); Audrey R. Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, 
Truth and reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC deliver? (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
58  Strassner, Die offenen Wunden Lateinamerikas, 87. 
59  The Argentine mandate insisted on transmitting information to the courts, 
Decreto 187 “Comisión sobre la Desaparición de Personas, Constitución, 
Integración y funciones”, 15 November 1983. This also happened until the “full 
stop law” in December 1986. See Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie Booth Walling, 
Argentina’s Contribution to Global Trends in Transitional Justice, in: Transi-
tional justice in the twenty-first century, 301-324. 
60  Orentlicher, Settling Accounts Revisited, 13, 
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It is important to notice though, that the consequence has not been a com-
plete abandonment of this transitional justice practice. Instead, the Ecua-
dorean truth commission from 2007 explicitly decided not to apply the term 
“reconciliation”, because it was regarded as opposite to justice. Justice in 
this case was defined as accountability for committed crimes. Therefore, 
the truth commission – called Comisión de la Verdad para Impedir la Im-
punidad (Truth Commission to Impede Impunity) – was set up to gather in-
formation in order to prosecute the perpetrators of severe human rights vio-
lations.61 Reconciliation was not mentioned at all. But what does “reconcil-
iation” actually mean?  
In addition to the debates “in the field” about reconciliation, this term 
was also discussed in the epistemic transitional justice community. These 
debates show firstly that reconciliation is not limited to truth commissions. 
In discussions about retributive versus restorative justice, both sides have 
claimed to reach for reconciliation.62 Furthermore, other transitional justice 
approaches such as social justice63 are also seen as a means for reconcilia-
tion. Nevertheless, no matter whether punishment, reparations or truth were 
assumed to be the prerequisites for reconciliation, there was a growing 
awareness that it was necessary to get a clearer picture of what the term 
reconciliation actually addressed. After all, in post-conflict societies, where 
the former conflict still latently persists, transitional justice and its justifica-
tions are always based on morally loaded concepts. Different interpretations 
and applications of reconciliation are therefore bound to arise due to politi-
cal interests and personal needs.  
                                                 
61  Gobierno Nacional de la República de Ecuador, Madato “Se creó la Comisión 
de la Verdad ‘para impedir la impunidad’”, 3 May 2007, http://www.usip.org/fil 
es/ROL/Mandato%20de%20Ecuador.pdf. 
62  Franklin Oduro, What do we understand by ‘Reconciliation’? A Review of the 
Literature on Reconciliation. Emerging Definitions of Reconciliation in the 
Context of Transitional Justice (Ottawa: The International Development Re-
search Centre, 2007). 
63  Bloomfield adds a third form of transitional justice. Social justice implies that 
all the “goods” of a society (economic, political and social) are shared in a fair 
way. David Bloomfield, On Good Terms: Clarifying Reconciliation, Berghof 
Report 14 (Berlin: Berghof Research Center For Constructive Conflict Man-
agement, 2006), 21. 
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Several organizations have actively engaged in clarifying what reconcil-
iation could be. The International Institute for Democray and Electoral As-
sistence (IDEA),64 the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict 
Management,65 the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR),66 the 
South African Centre for the Study of Violence (CSVR),67 and the Canadi-
an International Development Research Centre68 have tried to evaluate the 
meaning and concept of reconciliation.  
Focusing on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
Hamber and Van der Merwe from the CSVR define five different “ideolo-
gies” of reconciliation which do not only apply in this specific context.69 
These interpretations range from restoring individual relationships to re-
building social bonds and political trust on the national level. Furthermore, 
they identify religious interpretations of forgiveness with references to hu-
man rights and the rule of law as well as the overcoming of racial discrimi-
nation for a peaceful co-existence as the content of reconciliation.  
Additionally to the distinction between an individual and a collective 
level of reconciliation, Minow stresses different degrees of reconciliation. 
On the basis of truth, reconciliation can reach from a “minimal agreement 
to coexist and cooperate” to “a stronger commitment to forgive and uni-
                                                 
64  David Bloomfield, Terri Barnes and Lucien Huyse, Reconciliation after violent 
conflict: A handbook, ed. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003); Mark Freeman, Making rec-
onciliation work: The role of parliaments, Handbook for parliamentarians 10 
(Geneva: International IDEA, 2005); Luc Huyse, Traditional justice and recon-
ciliation after violent conflict: Learning from African experience (Stockholm: 
International IDEA, 2008). 
65  Bloomfield, On Good Terms. 
66  Charles Villa-Vicencio, Erik Doxtader and Richard Goldstone, Pieces of the 
puzzle: Keywords on reconciliation and transitional justice, ed. Institute for Jus-
tice and Reconciliation (Cape Town South Africa: Institute for Justice and Rec-
onciliation, 2004). 
67  Brandon Hamber and Hugo van der Merwe, What is this thing called Reconcili-
ation?, Reconciliation in Review 1, 1 (1998), http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/article 
s/artrcbh.htm. 
68  Oduro, What do we understand by ‘Reconciliation’. 
69  Hamber and van der Merwe, What is this thing called Reconciliation. 
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fy”.70 Villa-Vicencio et al. find that “different kinds of conflict require dif-
ferent forms of reconciliation”.71 But to talk and to listen are from their 
point of view the essential capacities on which reconciliation is built.  
In order to evaluate the effects of the TRC on the South African society, 
Gibson operationalizes reconciliation in terms of four dependent varia-
bles.72 Defined as social (interracial) trust, political tolerance, the accep-
tance of human rights, and the support of political institutions, these varia-
bles focus on the effects of reconciliation on the macro-level and present 
reconciliation as a goal of transitional justice practices. The outcome of the 
TRC is measured according to these norms and attitudes in order to draw 
conclusions about its efficacy.  
Bloomfield regards it as important to predefine reconciliation as a har-
monious end-state of working social relationships. From his point of view, 
this future vision could then become a “motivating ideal” for all actors in-
volved.73 However, he also stresses that reconciliation is a process and 
points to Huyse who describes the process of reconciliation as a three-stage 
model from “non-violent coexistence” to “building confidence and trust” 
towards “empathy”. Starting from “looking for alternatives to revenge”, in 
a second step he sees the “acknowledgement of the humanity of others“ as 
“the basis of mutual trust [which] opens the door for the gradual arrival of a 
sustainable culture of non-violence”. As a last step towards reconciliation, 
Huyse defines empathy as the “victims’ willingness to listen to the reasons 
for the hatred of those who caused their pain and with the offenders’ under-
standing of the anger and bitterness of those who suffered”.74  
This brief overview of the term “reconciliation” shows that it comprises 
many different interpretations. Altogether, these concepts, definitions, and 
interpretations demonstrate that reconciliation is an umbrella term, which 
                                                 
70  Martha Minow, The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?, in: 
Truth v. justice, 235-260, here: 250. 
71  Villa-Vicencio et al., Pieces of the puzzle, 3. 
72  James L. Gibson, Does Truth Lead to Reconciliation? Testing the Causal As-
sumptions of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Process, American 
Journal of Political Science 48, 2 (2004), 201-217. 
73  Bloomfield, On Good Terms, 6. 
74  Luc Huyse, The Process of Reconciliation, in: Reconciliation after violent con-
flict, 19-33, here: 19-21. 
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contains a wide range of different dimensions. There are individual acts of 
building relationships as well as societal efforts to reduce conflicts and ten-
sions by constructing a tolerant, peaceful, and inclusive environment. On 
the political level, reconciliation can stand for (re-)building political trust as 
well as political tolerance, but it can also encompass even broader ideas of 
peace-building and democratic reconstruction. 
However, while this discussion about the content of reconciliation con-
tinues, it reveals some interesting insights that go beyond definitions and 
typologies. On the one hand, the term “reconciliation” has become part of a 
symbolic language of transitional justice. To aim for reconciliation is a legi-
timate goal used to justify transitional justice practices. As there is no ex-
plicit definition of what reconciliation implies, many ideas, procedures, and 
actions have been integrated into various concepts of what reconciliation 
actually implies. But regarding the efforts to define what reconciliation is 
about, there is a commonly shared understanding that reconciliation can be 
understood as restoring social relationships. Nonetheless, the particular de-
mand for reconciliation in terms of who has to be reconciled with whom 
under which circumstances and by what kinds of efforts is always influ-
enced by political and social pressures. As a consequence, not only the fear 
of its abuse has increased; sometimes – as e.g. in Ecuador – it has led to the 
complete rejection of reconciliation.  
On the other hand, the goal to restore social relationships and to (re-) 
integrate victims as well as perpetrators into society can be found even in 
countries where the term “reconciliation” was opposed. Although the Ecua-
dorian Comisión de la Verdad para Impedir la Impunidad did not refer to 
reconciliation, the Ecuadorian end report stated that human rights viola-
tions, which were discovered by the truth commission, had to become part 
of a public memory in order to help to restore social relationships.75 They 
did not talk about “reconciliation”, but they nonetheless applied the same 
                                                 
75  Comisión de la Verdad Para Impedir la Impunidad, Sin Verdad No Hay Justicia. 
Informe de la Comisión de la Verdad, Vol. 5, Conclusiones, 2010, http://www.c 
overdad.org.ec/informe-final, 433; “The consequences of the human rights vio-
lations, like the pain, the fear, and the suffering of the victims and their families, 
must be regarded as part of the country’s history; they must be known by the en-
tire society and must be considered in the policies for reparations and for the re-
construction of social relationships which had been fractured by the violence”.  
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characteristic idea in the truth commissions that truth leads to the recon-
struction of society and thus to their reconciliation.  
Reconciliation as a symbolic term as well as a concept of restoring so-
cial bonds is therefore an integral part of truth commissions. However, it 
remains quite vague. It does not specify how this rationale of truth and rec-
onciliation is interpreted in a specific context by human rights activists, vic-
tims, perpetrators, politicians, or policy consultants.  
At the same time, the findings suggest that it is exactly the ambivalence 
of reconciliation that enables the diffusion of truth commissions and their 
promotion across the world. Truth and reconciliation are an integral part of 
truth commissions’ legitimacy account that is applied across various con-
texts. Because the content of the symbolic terms “truth” and “reconcilia-
tion” remain vague, the rationale that truth leads to reconciliation facilitates 
a fictional consensus,76 within which various interpretations about what 
should be done and what should be reached can co-exist. This fictional con-
sensus enables and ensures the formation of truth commissions. Against the 
backdrop of political and societal pressures to somehow “manage” past 
human rights abuses, the argument about truth and reconciliation provides 
the least common denominator for a consensus that allows for the establish-
ment of a truth commission. Every participant can apply his or her own 
subjective interpretation to these commonly shared and legitimized goals. 
The ambiguity inherent in this argument, which links fact-finding and the 
public acknowledgement of its results to the aim of restoring a fractured so-
ciety, is a necessary precondition for the establishment of truth commis-
sions worldwide. Consequently, it can be applied to various contexts de-
spite political divides and cultural diversity. And as the involvement of the 
multitude of international NGOs and IGOs shows, this argument is not only 
applicable in various national contexts, but also at the international level. 
The United Nations as well as a variety of (I)NGOs are now promoting 
truth commissions as a legitimate answer for dealing with the problems of 
                                                 
76  The term “fictional consensus” and its underlying concept, that collective action 
can be based on an unquestioned illusion of mutual understanding, were devel-
oped and defined by Roland Eckert, Alois Hahn and Marianne Wolf, Die ersten 
Jahre junger Ehen. Verständigung durch Illusionen? (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 
1989). 
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In this article, I have shed light on the phenomenon that truth commissions 
have been installed across the world in spite of different cultural contexts 
and political situations. From a global perspective, attention is drawn to the 
fundamental question why truth commissions have been accepted as a legit-
imate solution to the problem of massive human rights violations after po-
litical transitions worldwide. Truth commissions have been established in 
very different contexts. The political conflict, the level of violence, or the 
cultural environment always differed distinctively from the context of other 
truth commissions. Thus, every truth commission has been adapted to the 
respective conditions regarding its composition or competences. Nonethe-
less, although there is variation in the political and cultural context as well 
as in the formal conditions of their establishment, many countries across the 
world have decided to install this particular practice in an effort to come to 
terms with the past.  
In order to answer this question of the global diffusion of truth commis-
sions, I have taken a look behind their particular context and formal struc-
ture. Focusing on the mandates and end reports of truth commissions, I 
have highlighted the normative expectations on which their establishment is 
based. While the national context always affects the conditions under which 
a truth commission is established, the rationale behind their establishment 
is the same across cultural and political differences. Truth commissions are 
expected to disclose the truth in order to facilitate reconciliation. The “right 
to know”, i.e. the public disclosure of human rights violations has become a 
transitional justice standard. States in political transition are expected to 
comply with it and thus to establish and publicly acknowledge the severe 
human rights violations committed by the former regime. Reconciliation as 
the restoration of society has become prominently linked to this process of 
fact-finding and acknowledgement. Thus, the “right to know” has prevailed 
over the fear of “re-opening old wounds”. Instead, it has become positively 
related to societal restoration. The rationale that truth leads to reconciliation 
has become a standard assumption in the realm of transitional justice.  
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This article shows that the global spread of truth commissions comes 
along with the institutionalization of this rationale. The establishment of 
truth commissions by national parliaments, presidential or royal decrees or 
via peace agreements reflects not only a growing awareness that past re-
gime crimes have to be addressed after political transitions even if they 
have been committed already years ago. Furthermore, their establishment 
responds to the widely shared assumption that the public disclosure of truth 
will help to reconcile societies as a precondition for democratic consolida-
tion. A multitude of national and international NGOs, among many others 
the ICTJ, and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations 
promote and support this rationale based on the expectation that truth leads 
to reconciliation. Accordingly, they contribute to the global diffusion of 
truth commissions.  
At the same time, I have suggested that the worldwide spread of truth 
commissions and their promotion are related to the ambiguity of this ra-
tionale about truth and reconciliation. The focus of the investigation and 
hence what part of the “truth” is addressed is always point of debate. But 
the term “reconciliation” is even more contingent. It comprises a wide array 
of different interpretations. In the case of Ecuador, where the claim for rec-
onciliation was regarded as providing impunity to the perpetrators, it has 
even been rejected and replaced by the aim of restoring society. This aspect 
of restoration is also the least common denominator of the scope of inter-
pretations of the term “reconciliation”. At the same time, it does not define 
the persons that are sought to engage in this process and the conditions un-
der which reconciliation should be reached. The ambivalence of reconcilia-
tion thus allows for the co-existence of multiple meanings and interpreta-
tions without the need for addressing the differences among them. It pro-
vides a fictional consensus about what should be reached by establishing 
the truth via a truth commission. This fictional consensus based on the ra-
tionale of truth and reconciliation enables the establishment of truth com-
missions because it provides legitimacy across political and cultural differ-
ences. As a result, this rationale bridges not only national divides but also 
allows for their global diffusion. 
The rationale of truth and reconciliation is now a collectively shared 
normative standard about coming to terms with the past within the episte-
mic transitional justice community. Based on this assumption, they advise 
countries in political transition all over the world in how to deal with their 
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pasts and promote truth commissions as an adequate answer to this prob-
lem. The Tunisian conference on “Justice in Times of Transition” is a fur-
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